Tribunals Ontario Licence Appeal Tribunal
Tribunaux décisionnels Ontario Tribunal d'appel en matière de permis
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 15069/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act
Between:
Ronald Wiebe Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent
DECISION
VICE-CHAIR: Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Ronald Wiebe, Self-represented For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative
HEARD: August 4, 2023
OVERVIEW
1Ronald Wiebe, (“the appellant”), appeals the impoundment of his 2014 Chevrolet Silverado, (“the vehicle”), on July 4, 2023 for 45 days.
2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship to him because he needs the vehicle to service the customers of his business and earn income to support his family, and because the impoundment is causing financial loss because of reduced income and impoundment fees.
ISSUE
3The issue in dispute is:
Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship?
RESULT
4I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship.
ANALYSIS
5The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA”) may, pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.
6An owner may appeal only on the grounds set out in s. 50.2(3), (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the HTA. The appellant appeals on ground (d), that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship?
7I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship because the appellant has alternatives available to the impounded vehicle.
8Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. In order to establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement, as set out in s. 10(1) of the Regulation, is that there must be no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
…the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
9If the appellant is able to establish that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle then under s. 10(1), I must consider whether the impoundment will result in:
(a) a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; or
(b) a threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used.
10I can only consider financial, employment and education or training losses listed in s. 10(2) of the Regulation if the appellant first establishes that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
11Pursuant to s. 10(2)(a) of the Regulation, the Tribunal may never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to any person.
12The appellant testified that that he is self-employed doing construction work and depends on the vehicle to transport his tools, supplies and dump trailer to job sites. The appellant testified that the vehicle is his only work vehicle. The appellant also testified that he needs to continue working to financially support his wife who does not work outside the home and their two children who have special needs. The appellant testified that he was supposed to do a large renovation job in another municipality approximately a one hour drive from his home, and although the work can be delayed, he is not sure he will be able to get to it this year.
13In cross-examination the appellant conceded that he and his wife own a second vehicle, a 2013 Toyota SUV (the SUV) that they have used to take the children to their medical appointments, obtain groceries, pharmaceuticals and meet their personal needs during the impoundment period.
14The appellant also conceded that, during the impoundment period, although he has had to turn some work away, he has been able to continue working in his business by doing small jobs, the tools for which fit in the SUV. The appellant testified that another contractor has also let the appellant use his truck sometimes to pick up material. The appellant also said that the local supplier of construction materials can deliver materials but typically this takes one to one and one half weeks. The appellant testified that except for the large job in the municipality a one hour drive away, there are no other jobs that he could not do during the impoundment period.
15It is clear from the appellant’s evidence that, although inconvenient, he has access to alternate transportation for his business and to meet the family’s transportation needs during the impoundment period. Inconvenience is not a factor which the Tribunal can take into consideration.
16I may only consider whether the impoundment will result in financial loss to the appellant if there is no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle.
17I find that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to him during the impoundment period including the SUV, using the truck of another contractor sometimes and the option of having the local supplier deliver materials, albeit with some delay.
Conclusion
18As a result, I find the appellant has not established the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation.
ORDER
19Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the HTA, I confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.
Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair
Released: August 30, 2023