Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 14942/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Tina Heffernan

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR: Colin Osterberg

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Tina Heffernan, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenboer, Representative

HEARD: June 29, 2023

OVERVIEW

1Tina Heffernan (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on April 17, 2023. At the time of the impoundment, Jacob Shilling was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below, the appeal is dismissed, and the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

The appellant has not established exceptional hardship according to the Act

5In order to demonstrate exceptional hardship under the Act, the appellant must first show that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to her. The appellant has not satisfied that requirement and her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must be dismissed as a result.

6Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

7Section 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will be dismissed.

9If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then s. 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to s. 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses. The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

10In this case, the impoundment period ended June 1, 2023. The appellant paid the impound costs and the vehicle was released to her on that date.

11The appellant says that she uses the impounded vehicle to drive her grandson to daycare three or four days a week. During the impoundment period, the appellant was able to get her grandson to daycare mainly by using taxis. She did borrow her mother’s vehicle on a couple of occasions but says that her mother is unwilling to lend her the vehicle more than occasionally. She agrees that she could have taken her grandson to daycare using public transit but that would have taken too long and may have caused her to be late for her work placements. The appellant later said that her work placements have not yet started, and I do not accept that this is an impediment to her use of public transportation.

12With respect to her own needs, the appellant is currently attending school which she does mainly online. She will be starting a work placement in the next couple of weeks, and she currently has her own vehicle to use for that. She agreed that attending in-person classes and work placements can be done by public transit or taxis but says that is expensive and difficult and so she usually uses her own vehicle for those activities. In my view, the use of public transit, and possibly taxis, were reasonable alternatives which were available to the appellant during the impoundment period for these activities.

13The appellant says that she would have liked to see a dentist for treatment of abscessed teeth but that her dentist is in a different city than where her residence is located. She did not want to see a dentist in the city where she currently lives because she prefers her own dentist. In my view, this was a choice the appellant made and that she likely had alternatives to the impounded vehicle had she determined to investigate going to a local dentist. She has had her own vehicle since June 1, 2023 and has not seen her own dentist yet, and I am not satisfied that this would have amounted to exceptional hardship in any event.

14Finally, the appellant says that she was scheduled to see a neurologist and a psychiatrist during the impound period for the purpose of obtaining reports in support of her civil action for disability benefits which is scheduled for trial in the fall. The appellant has not satisfied me that those appointments could not be rescheduled or that missing those appointments would result in any significant consequences to her.

15I find that the appellant has not proven that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to her. During the impoundment period the appellant was able to manage her usual activities by using taxis, public transportation, her mother’s vehicle, and by rescheduling some events. This has resulted in inconvenience, however the Regulation precludes me from taking inconvenience into consideration for the purposes of determining whether the impoundment has resulted in exceptional hardship. Her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.

ORDER

16For the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.

Colin Osterberg

Vice-Chair