Monika Selvarajah v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2023 CanLII 2708

1The appellant’s vehicle was impounded under the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8 (the “Act”) because it was driven by someone with a suspended licence. The appellant appeals this impoundment on the basis that it causes “exceptional hardship”. It is the respondent’s position that, pursuant to the Act, the appellant can not appeal on the basis of “exceptional hardship” because her vehicle was previously impounded.

2I find that the Act precludes the appellant from relying on the ground “exceptional hardship” because her vehicle was previously impounded under this same provision of the Act. The appeal is dismissed, and the impoundment confirmed.

Evidence and Analysis

3On November 25, 2022, the appellant’s partner was driving the appellant’s 2019 Mercedes. The vehicle was detained and impounded under s. 55.1 of the Act because the licence of the driver who was operating the vehicle at the time, was suspended for a Criminal Code-related reason. The impoundment was for 90 days because this was the second impoundment of a vehicle owned by the appellant within two years (Act, s. 55.1(3) and O. Reg 631/98, s.1). The respondent established that on June 20, 2021, the appellant’s vehicle was impounded for 45 days because this same driver drove the appellant’s vehicle while his licence was suspended for a Criminal Code-related reason. I am satisfied that the respondent has established that the appellant’s vehicle was validly impounded on November 25, 2022.

4The appellant acknowledged the prior impoundment. She testified that neither she nor her partner can afford the impoundment fees. She indicated that she is currently working from home. The appellant lives with her mother and father who both have vehicles. She does not regularly drive their cars but is allowed to when necessary.

5Section 50.2 of the Act sets out the grounds on which the owner of a motor vehicle may appeal its impoundment. Included in those grounds is s. 50.2(3)(d): “that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship”. However, s. 50.2(4) provides that clause 3(d) “does not apply if there was a previous impoundment under section 55.1 with respect to any motor vehicle owned by the same owner”.

6Because on June 20, 2021, the appellant’s vehicle was impounded under section 55.1, exceptional hardship is not a ground for appeal that is available to the appellant and her claim of exceptional hardship must fail. As the appellant did not argue any other ground for appeal, her appeal must be dismissed.

7Even if s. 50.2(3)(d) did not apply and I continued to consider the appellant’s exceptional hardship ground, s. 10(4) of O. Reg. 631/98 requires the appellant to first demonstrate that there is no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle. The appellant has access to other vehicles during this period of impoundment. As a result, her evidence would not have been sufficient to support a claim of exceptional hardship as defined in the regulation and her appeal would still be dismissed.

Order

8The Tribunal confirms the impoundment of the appellant’s motor vehicle.