Tammy Jones v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2023 CanLII 19925

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 14607/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Tammy Jones Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Tammy Jones, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative

Heard by Teleconference: March 8, 2023

OVERVIEW

1Tammy Jones, the appellant, appeals from the impoundment of her 2019 Nissan, the vehicle, on February 8, 2023 for 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship to her because she needs her vehicle to get to her employment.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

Issue 1: Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship.

ANALYSIS

5The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA”) may, pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.

6An owner may appeal only on the grounds set out in s. 50.2(3), (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the HTA. The appellant appeals on ground (d), that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

Issue 1: Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship?

7I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship because the appellant has alternatives available to the impounded vehicle.

8Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. In order to establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement, as set out in s. 10 (1) of the Regulation, is that there must be no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

…the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

9If the appellant is able to establish that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle then under s. 10(1), I must consider whether the impoundment will result in:

(a) a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; or

(b) a threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used.

10I can only consider financial, employment and education or training losses listed in s. 10(2) of the Regulation if the appellant first establishes that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

11Pursuant to s. 10(2)(a) of the Regulation, the Tribunal may never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to any person.

12The appellant testified that at the time of the impoundment she had a full-time job at a school approximately a one hour drive away from her home and a part-time job at a retail store in the municipality in which she lives. At her school employment, the appellant typically works several hours a day after the end of classes in the school’s daycare program which gives her additional income. The appellant fears she may lose both jobs because of the impoundment.

13The appellant filed a letter from Allison Boone, the principal at the school where she works, confirming her employment and that she needs transportation to work from Monday to Fridays. The appellant also filed a second letter from Ms. Boone confirming that the appellant missed work on February 22 due to inability to access a ride, has been replaced since February 9 for additional hours in the daycare, and noting that the appellant’s reduced hours are putting a strain on the school.

14The appellant testified that although she has missed several days at her school employment, she has been able to obtain a ride to the school with a co-worker. The appellant filed a letter from her co-worker confirming that she has been helping her get to work but that this has been challenging. Because the co-worker leaves when classes end, the appellant has not been able to work her usual extended hours at the school day care because she gets a ride home with her co-worker and that the inability to work in the daycare has resulted in some loss of income.

15The appellant testified that she has not been given any written or verbal warning from her school employer that her full-time employment is in jeopardy because of missing several days so far or being unable to work the extended hours in the school’s daycare. The appellant testified that the co-worker who gives her a ride to the school has not received any written or verbal warnings from her school employer either.

16The appellant also testified that although she typically works several evenings a week at her retail store employment and weekends, her employer has allowed her to adjust her working schedule so that she mostly works weekends during the impoundment period. Although this adjustment to her working schedule has resulted in some loss of income, the retail store employer has accommodated her need to work weekends so that she can take public transportation.

17The appellant testified that she has been able to walk to stores in the municipality where she lives and obtain groceries and other supplies.

18The appellant also testified that if she has to pay the impoundment fees to obtain release of her vehicle, this will be a financial hardship for her.

19Based on the appellant’s evidence, it is clear that arranging alternate transportation to her full-time employment during the impoundment period is inconvenient for her and possibly others. However, inconvenience is not a factor which the Tribunal can take into consideration.

20I may only consider whether the impoundment will result in financial loss to the appellant if there is no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle.

21I find that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to her during the impoundment period. Albeit difficult, and resulting in some loss of income, the appellant has been able to arrange alternate transportation through a co-worker to her full-time employment, and to adjust her working hours at both her school daycare employment and her retail store employment so that she can maintain her employment during the impoundment period. The appellant confirmed that she has not received any warnings during the impoundment that she may lose her employment and both of her employers have demonstrated a willingness to adjust the appellant’s work hours during the impoundment. The appellant has received accommodation from both of her employers during the impoundment period in that she has been allowed to work somewhat reduced hours.

Conclusion

22As a result, I find the appellant has not established the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation.

ORDER

23Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the HTA, I confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.