Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 14574/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Paula Maxwell

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Colin Osterberg

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Paula Maxwell, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Steve Grootenboer, Representative

Heard by Teleconference: February 2, 2023

OVERVIEW

1Paula Maxwell (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on January 20, 2023. At the time of the impoundment, Ted Newberry was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The grounds for the appeal are that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below, the appeal is dismissed, and the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

The appellant has not established exceptional hardship according to the Act

5I find that the appellant has not proven that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available and her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result.

6Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

7Section 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will fail.

9If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then s. 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to s. 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses. The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

10The appellant says that she uses the impounded vehicle to visit her father in the long-term care facility where he lives, to drive to her aunt’s apartment to help her with her housekeeping, to get groceries and to run errands. The appellant says that she cannot take public transit because she has peripheral neuropathy which makes it difficult to walk to the bus stop. She has made no enquiries to see whether she might qualify for paratransit services.

11In addition to the impounded vehicle, the appellant has access to her father’s 2019 Nissan Rogue vehicle. She says that vehicle does not start and that it has been sitting in her driveway for a month and a half. The appellant has made no attempt to have the vehicle looked at to determine what is wrong with it and does not plan to do so until her boyfriend finds a job.

12The appellant has not considered taking a taxi or uber and paying for that with the gas money she has been saving since her vehicle has been impounded.

13The appellant says that her son, who lives with her, has a car and has occasionally helped by doing the grocery shopping but he is busy at school and with his own job and she says he has been unwilling to help her as much as he might. She has not considered asking her son if she can drive him to school or work occasionally so that she can use his vehicle to visit her father and her aunt, or to go grocery shopping.

14In my view, the appellant has not demonstrated that every reasonable option has been inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate her losses resulting from the impoundment. She has not satisfied me that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Reasonable alternatives include taking taxis or Ubers, finding out whether her father’s 2019 Nissan can be repaired, and asking her son to use his vehicle occasionally.

15I find that the appellant has not proven that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available and her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test. Although the impoundment has resulted in inconvenience, the appellant has failed to prove exceptional hardship under the Act and her appeal must fail on this ground.

ORDER

16For the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.