Mohammad v. The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company, 2023 CanLII 137

Citation: Mohammad v. The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company, 2023 ONLAT 21-004231/AABS

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 21-004231/AABS

In the matter of an application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.

Between:

Laura Mohammad

Applicant

v.

The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Brett Todd

APPEARANCES:

For the Applicant:

Laura Mohammad, Applicant

Nidhi Vinayak, Counsel

For the Respondent:

Nadia Rahim, Adjuster

Saly Botelho, Counsel

Natalie Zamick, Counsel

Court Reporter:

Guido Riccioni

Heard by Videoconference: October 3-5, 2022

BACKGROUND

1Laura Mohammad (the “applicant”) was injured in an automobile accident on May 5, 2019 and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (the “Schedule”)¹ from The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company (the “respondent”). The applicant was denied certain benefits by the respondent and applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) for resolution of the dispute.

2As per the case conference report and order (“CCRO”) dated October 6, 2021, this application proceeded to a videoconference hearing before me held on October 3-5, 2022.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

3On September 30, 2022, the respondent submitted to the Tribunal the following list of preliminary issues and an accompanying brief to be addressed at the outset of the hearing. The applicant submitted a response to these preliminary issues to the Tribunal on October 2, 2022.

1. Should the treatment plan/OCF-18 (“OCF-18”) in dispute listed as issue #2 in the CCRO in the amount of $8,294.20 be dismissed as it fails to specify the hours and fees associated with the proposed services, and exceeds the maximum rate for an assessment pursuant to s. 25(5)(a) of the Schedule?

2. Should the OCF-18 in dispute listed as issue #3 in the CCRO in the amount of $2,881.50 be barred from proceeding as this treatment plan was withdrawn by the clinic in question and a subsequent OCF-18 was submitted and approved for this exact same service?

3. Should the applicant be permitted to add a witness—namely the applicant’s husband, Vinay Goyal—fewer than 10 days before the start of the hearing, in contravention of Rule 9.2 of the Tribunal’s Common Rules of Practice and Procedure² (the “Rules”)?

4. Should the respondent be allowed to add the report of its witness, Dr. Samer Hanna, orthopedic surgeon, dated September 26, 2019, to its written submissions and entered into evidence as he is unavailable to testify during the three days allocated for the hearing?

5. Should the respondent be allowed to include its document brief as Exhibit #1 in this hearing, due to the late addition of a report of Dr. Samer Hanna, orthopaedic surgeon, as last-minute surgical scheduling issues meant that he was not able to testify as a witness?

PRELIMINARY ISSUES RESULT

4I heard preliminary issue submissions from the respondent and the applicant at the outset of the hearing. I note the following rulings and results:

1. On the first item regarding the OCF-18 in the amount of $8,294.20, I ruled that the issue would remain in dispute, as the objections raised by the respondent involve the substantive nature of the claim for treatment and shall be heard in the context of the substantive hearing. The three Tribunal precedents cited by the respondent in support of this argument³ all involve decisions made by adjudicators after hearing evidence in their respective hearings, not as preliminary matters that barred the applicant from proceeding to a hearing.

2. The applicant accepted the respondent’s submissions regarding the duplication of treatment and withdrew the OCF-18 in the amount of $2,881.50 from the issues in dispute.

3. I granted the applicant’s request, dated September 26, 2022, to add witness Vinay Goyal to the applicant’s witness list. The respondent objected, given that this witness was added after the 10-day maximum period granted in Rule 9.2 to exchange a witness list in advance of the hearing. I relied on Rule 3.1 to allow the addition of Mr. Goyal, as this permits a liberal interpretation of the Rules to ensure a fair, open, and accessible process, and to allow effective participation by all parties. I was not persuaded by the respondent’s submissions that this witness was added as a last moment “ambush,” or that the respondent had insufficient time to prepare its case. I noted that this witness would be providing personal observations, not medical evidence that would require more extensive preparation for cross-examination. Furthermore, the applicant provided the respondent and the Tribunal with a statement from Mr. Goyal on September 28, 2022 listing the main points of his testimony. Finally, I noted that both parties had opened the hearing by explaining that a number of witnesses listed in the CCRO would not be available to testify, meaning that adding Mr. Goyal would not cause scheduling issues or additional delay.

4. The applicant did not object to this request. I allowed it and entered the statement of Dr. Hanna into evidence.

5. The applicant did not object to this request. I allowed it and entered the full respondent’s document brief into evidence.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

5The following issues were agreed to be in dispute:

1. Is the applicant entitled to a non-earner benefit (“NEB”) of $185.00 per week from October 3, 2019 to September 30, 2021?

2. Is the applicant entitled to $8,346.80 for neuropsychological assessments recommended by Meditecs Independent Medical Examinations in an OCF-18 dated October 8, 2019?

3. Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?

4. Is the respondent liable to pay an award pursuant to section 10 of Regulation 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to the applicant?

RESULT

6I find that the applicant is not entitled to the NEB, as she has not met her burden of proving that she suffers from a complete inability to carry on a normal life.

7I find that the applicant is not entitled to the treatment plan in dispute, as it has not been proven to be reasonable and necessary.

8Given that there is no entitlement to benefits, no interest is payable.

9The claim for an award is denied, due to the above reasons as well as due to the applicant not presenting evidence regarding an award claim during the hearing.

ANALYSIS AND OVERVIEW

Non-Earner Benefits in the Amount of $185.00 per week from October 3, 2019 to September 30, 2021

10The test for entitlement to NEB is set out in section 12(1) of the Schedule, which holds that an insurer shall pay such non-earner benefits to an insured person if the insured person suffers a complete inability to carry on a normal life within 104 weeks of the accident. Section 3(7)(a) of the Schedule defines such “a complete inability to carry on a normal life” as “an impairment that continuously prevents the person from engaging in substantially all of the activities in which the person ordinarily engaged before the accident.”

11The Court of Appeal set out the guiding principles for NEB entitlement in Heath v. Economical.⁴ These principles focus on comparing the applicant’s life before and after the subject accident. Of particular note, these guidelines hold it is “not sufficient to demonstrate that there were changes in post-accident life,” but that it must be established that these changes amount “to being continuously prevented from engaging in substantially all pre-accident activities.”⁵

Applicant Medical Evidence and Testimony

12In support of her claim for NEB, the applicant relied on the Disability Certificate (“OCF-3”) of Dr. Joseph Allen⁶, chiropractor, dated May 16, 2019.⁷ In this OCF-3, Dr. Allen supports the assertion that the applicant suffers a complete inability to carry on a normal life. Dr. Allen lists cervicogenic headache, sprain and strain of cervical spine, sprain and strain of thoracic spine, sprain and strain of lumbar spine along with aggravated chronic/recurrent lower back pain, sprain and strain of the sacroiliac joint (left), and intervertebral disc disorder as the injuries sustained by the applicant in the subject accident.⁸

13In the OCF-3, Dr. Allen refers to an OCF-18, also dated May 16, 2019, which was partially approved by the insurer and is not in dispute here. This OCF-18 lists the same injuries as noted in the OCF-3, along with notations of a workplace lower back injury sustained by the applicant in 2016. This injury prevented the applicant from “maintaining any physical job” and resulted in lower back pain that “was daily and fluctuated in intensity.” As a result of the motor vehicle accident, the pain was said to be “constant and more intense with symptoms of a possible disc irritation and/or nerve root irritation.” Dr. Allen observed that this pre-existing injury would likely result in the applicant needing “a longer recovery time” for her back issues to be resolved.⁹

14This OCF-18 also notes a number of psychological complaints made by the applicant to Dr. Allen. This includes difficulty sleeping, fear when riding in a car as a driver or passenger, depression, persistent thoughts of the accident, flashbacks, and difficulty coping with pain. Psychological testing is also recommended in this OCF-18,¹⁰ and it forms some basis for the applicant’s claim for the treatment plan in dispute here (see below) along with the NEB issue.

15Testimony of the applicant revealed that she was in relatively good health before the accident, although she did acknowledge falling at her place of employment in March 2016 and sustaining a back injury that resulted in her receiving Workplace Safety and Insurance (“WSIB”) benefits for a short time. Following this, the applicant applied for the Ontario Disability Support Program (“ODSP”), but then began full-time work through a temporary employment agency.

16The applicant spent 2017 and 2018 receiving Ontario Works (“OW”) benefits. She reported that the workplace back injury in 2016 caused difficulties on an ongoing basis during the years before the subject accident, in that any sort of strain would be felt as additional pain for one or two days afterward, but that she could cope with this discomfort.

17According to the applicant’s testimony, the vehicular accident made her back issues dramatically worse. Where she characterized her back pain before this accident as “milder,” her back pain following the accident was debilitating to the point where any sort of strain caused one or two weeks of additional pain that was not alleviated with medication. The applicant said that ongoing pain migrated down her legs and into her hips, and that she experienced recurrent neck pain and headaches.

18The applicant also described psychological issues resulting from the accident. She testified that she became afraid of driving or travelling in a car following the accident, and that when she would travel in a car with her boyfriend/later husband, she would grip his hand so tightly that she would dig in with her fingernails.

19The applicant further spoke about psychological issues prior to the accident regarding family issues, but that she had previously received therapy. As a result, she testified that she had “accepted things” to the point that she felt good enough to discontinue this treatment in 2017, and that these issues were not causing any concern at the time of the subject accident.

20The applicant reported that this physical pain caused changes in her day-to-day life. She testified that back pain rendered her unable to work more than two or so days per week, and that she was unable to pick up her infant daughter, born in April 2021, in the mornings because she often woke up with back spasms that required stretching and medication to resolve. She further testified that she was unable to walk any distance without pain, and that she stopped engaging as much in athletic activities she previously enjoyed like swimming and playing basketball.

21According to the applicant’s testimony, pain also affected her ability to do most household chores. She explained that cooking tasks that formerly took 5-10 minutes would take 30-45 minutes after the accident, due to her need to take regular breaks. She described herself as moving in “slow motion” after the accident. She noted that she needed her husband to assist with most of the post-accident household duties. He did much of the cooking, vacuuming, cleaning, and grocery shopping while she had to “pace” herself due to pain and an inability to bend and lift objects as small as a bag of flour.

22The applicant testified that physical pain and psychological issues caused her to curtail many social activities. She testified that, since the subject accident, she was quicker to anger, would cry easier, had become scared of other people, and began avoiding people to the point that she felt her life was “hopeless.” She said that she was “hiding herself” due to feelings that she was “useless.”

23Testimony of the applicant noted that she began working part-time driving for a food delivery company in September 2019, and that she had also started taking courses qualifying her for a career in finance and insurance.

24The applicant testified that she visited Syria in March 2020 to visit family, mainly because her grandmother was seriously ill. She explained that the trip was cut short and that she returned home after just eight days due to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. While in Syria, she testified that she visited what she described as a “traditional healer” and that when she returned to Canada she did not require as much chiropractic and physiotherapy treatment.

25Testimony of the applicant’s husband, Vinay Goyal, supported her claims about the impact of the accident on her life. He described a “drastic change” in the applicant after the accident, that she gained weight, was not going out and was forcing him to cancel plans for social engagements, and was not cleaning her home. He explained that the applicant would get angry more often after the accident, and that she had an overall higher level of anxiety, especially in a motor vehicle. He confirmed that he was doing many household chores and that he was assisting with the applicant’s self care, such as getting dressed and showering.

26Mr. Goyal testified as to the applicant’s work for the food delivery company as a driver, explaining that he assisted her with this job, and worked in a similar position full time. He said that the applicant would stay home with their infant daughter while he worked.

Respondent Medical Evidence and Testimony

27The respondent submitted that the applicant is not entitled to NEB as the evidence shows that she had a prior back injury in 2016 that resulted in a workplace compensation claim. The respondent further argues that the applicant engaged in many of the same activities after the accident as she did before the accident. These activities included continuing to drive and taking on employment as a driver with a food delivery company just six months after the subject accident, getting married to her boyfriend in August 2019, travelling to Syria in March 2020, having a baby in April 2021, and taking part in the activities of daily life on an ongoing basis, such as cooking, housecleaning, food preparation, laundry, and socially interacting with friends and family.

28The respondent relies on three independent examinations (“IEs”) regarding the NEB claim. These were conducted in the summer of 2019, with the corresponding reports filed in September of the same year.¹¹

29The report of Dr. Samer Hanna, orthopaedic surgeon, concluded that the applicant did not suffer a complete inability to carry on a normal life as a result of the subject accident, although he did find evidence of lower back strain and tenderness that required pain control and physiotherapy.¹²

30The report of Dr. Johan Reis, psychologist, concluded that the applicant had major depressive disorder and a vehicular phobia as a result of the accident, and would benefit from psychological therapy, but that she did not suffer a complete inability to carry on a normal life as a result of the accident.¹³

31The report of Joan Saunders, occupational therapist, concluded that the applicant had resumed aspects of her personal care activities and aspects of her pre-accident housekeeping, along with social activities and driving, including driving for a food delivery company. According to Ms. Saunders’ report, the applicant also demonstrated a “functional range of motion, sufficient functional movement, sufficient functional cognitive abilities, and a positive emotional outlook during the assessment.” As a result, the report’s conclusion noted that the applicant did not suffer a complete inability to carry on a normal life.¹⁴

Decision

32For the following reasons, I agree with the respondent.

33The test for entitlement to NEB is one of the most stringent in the Schedule, and an applicant must demonstrate a “complete inability to carry on a normal life.”

34I am not persuaded that the applicant has experienced a level of impairment that meets the complete inability test in the Schedule. While the applicant has presented evidence to indicate that her life has been affected by the subject accident, the applicant is engaged in many of the same pre-accident activities of daily living, including day-to-day chores and employment.

35The applicant’s own testimony indicated that she was not completely unable to carry on a normal life. Where she did speak to significant levels of back pain and neck pain, she also commented on how she continued to carry on despite these symptoms.

36For example, while the applicant testified to not being able to pick up her daughter first thing in the morning, she added the qualifier that she felt better and could interact with her daughter after a regimen of morning stretching and medication. Her husband also explained in his testimony that the applicant was looking after their daughter on her own when he was working full time outside of the home.

37I readily accept that the applicant experienced difficulties following the subject accident due to pain, and needed to adjust some aspects of her lifestyle. But she testified that she was just limited by these impairments, not suffering from a complete inability to carry out her activities.

38The applicant explained that she continued to do household chores, that she continued to visit friends and relatives, that she continued to walk and engage in recreational activities such as swimming, and that she continued to drive and ride in motor vehicles, even to the point of driving a car as her main source of employment. Although the applicant did have to modify how she took part in these activities, she continued to do them nevertheless, showing that she was not completely unable to carry on a normal life.

39The applicant working after the accident is a significant factor in my denial of her entitlement to NEB, as well. Even though the applicant testified that she was working only on a part-time basis, this is still employment. That alone is evidence that the applicant was not suffering from a complete inability to carry on a normal life. It is also telling that driving is the main activity required in this job, along with picking up and hauling parcels of food. This means a reasonable amount of physical activity, along with getting behind the wheel of a car, despite the applicant’s claims of suffering from vehicular phobia as a result of the accident.

40Additionally, the applicant appears to have led a more active life after the accident than she did before the accident. In the two years following the accident, she met her boyfriend, became engaged and got married, began a new occupation, travelled to Syria, began studies for a financial and insurance career, and started a family with the birth of her first child. This level of activity is difficult to reconcile with the applicant’s claim that she suffered a complete inability to carry on a normal life.

41I find the medical evidence presented by the respondent persuasive. All three of the IE reports cited above concluded that the applicant sustained some physical and psychological trauma as a result of the subject accident, but that these impairments did not rise to the level of preventing the applicant from carrying on with her life in a substantially similar way as she did before the accident.

42Little medical evidence was presented by the applicant to contradict these IE reports. The OCF-3 and the OCF-18s that the applicant relies upon do not provide sufficient evidence to outweigh the IEs presented by the respondent. The OCF-3 and the OCF-18s were also completed by a chiropractor (albeit with some assistance from other medical practitioners), not specialized physicians and experts such as the orthopaedic surgeon, psychologist, and occupational therapist who conducted the IEs for the insurer.

43I give greater weight to the three IE reports, especially when compared to the evidence presented by the applicant, because of both the level of expertise and the comprehensive nature of the reports. These IEs were conducted over many hours and the reports contain evidence gathered via direct examination, analysis, and testing. This is in direct comparison to the OCF-3 and OCF-18s, which consist of slight medical assessments and brief notations regarding the applicant’s condition and recommended treatment.

44Dr. Allen testified in support of the above reports on the NEB claim as well as with regard to the OCF-18 at dispute here (see below), but I place little weight on his evidence due to his lack of orthopaedic, neurological, psychological, and occupational therapy experience. He refused to answer a number of questions from the applicant’s counsel, as well, due to the topics being beyond his areas of expertise as a chiropractor.

45I assign a great deal of weight to the submissions of Dr. Reis, as his report was well supported by his oral testimony in the hearing. Dr. Reis confirmed that the applicant had experienced some depression and anxiety as a result of the accident, but that she was able to continue to drive regardless, albeit with “increased stress and anxiety.”

46Dr. Reis further reaffirmed that the applicant had experienced physical and psychological difficulties following the subject accident, but that she was continuing to do many, if not all, of her pre-accident activities, albeit at “reduced quality and quantity.” This meant that the applicant did not suffer a complete inability to carry on a normal life.

47The testimony of Ms. Saunders, occupational therapist, further solidified the evidence provided in her report. She confirmed the conclusions of her report, testifying that the applicant’s one or two limitations did not equate to a complete inability to carry on a normal life. She further testified that the applicant had confirmed during the occupational therapy assessment that she had resumed the majority of her pre-accident activities, including driving.

48As a result of the above, I find that the applicant has not met her burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that she has a complete inability to carry on a normal life as a result of her accident-related impairments. I prefer the respondent’s medical evidence, and I also note inconsistencies between the applicant’s testimony and the evidence regarding her activities before and after the subject accident. Consequently, the applicant’s claim for an NEB is denied.

Meditecs Independent Medical Examinations OCF-18, October 8, 2019 ($8,346.80)

49The second issue in dispute is an OCF-18 submitted by Meditecs valued at $8,346.80 dated October 8, 2019.¹⁵ This plan was denied by the insurer in correspondence dated February 4, 2020 that cited two IE reports of Dr. David Kurzman, psychologist, as grounds for this treatment plan being deemed not reasonable and necessary.¹⁶

Applicant Medical Evidence and Testimony

50In a similar fashion to the NEB claim, the applicant relies upon the OCF-3 signed by Dr. Allen on May 16, 2019 and the OCF-18 in dispute as primary medical evidence for the reasonable and necessary nature of this treatment plan. This plan lists the same injuries and sequelae as noted above. It also describes the applicant’s limitations causing difficulties walking, standing, lifting, doing household chores such as cleaning, cooking, and laundry, and that emotional/cognitive symptoms impacted her life on a daily basis.¹⁷ This plan recommends assessments for environment and mental health and addictions, a test for mental health and addictions, and it includes costs for interpretive services and transportation.¹⁸

51Dr. Allen testified for the applicant in support of this OCF-18. However, he declined to answer a number of questions with regard to the neuropsychological, psychological, and mental health and addictions components of the treatment plan recommendations, noting that they were outside his area of expertise as a chiropractor. Dr. Allen also explained that these parts of the OCF-18 were handled by other experts with Meditecs, and that he signed off on the OCF-18 form as a whole.

52The applicant also relies upon the Counselling Progress Report of Maryam Nali, social worker, dated November 16, 2020.¹⁹ The applicant attended 10 sessions with Ms. Nali from January 8, 2020 to November 16, 2020 to manage various psychological symptoms resulting from the subject accident.²⁰ Ms. Nali conducted the Beck Anxiety and Beck Depression Inventory tests with the applicant and concluded that she was experiencing “mild and moderate levels of emotional distress.”²¹ Ms. Nali also noted that the counselling sessions had been of assistance, but that she would benefit from continued cognitive-behavioural therapy (“CBT”). She recommended 14 more therapy sessions to address the applicant’s remaining psychological symptoms.²²

Respondent Medical Evidence and Testimony

53The respondent relies upon the evidence of Dr. Kurzman, who conducted an Independent Neuropsychology Evaluation Clinical Interview and Cognitive Analysis on January 14 and 15, 2020 that resulted in two IE reports dated January 29, 2020.²³

54Dr. Kurzman concluded (in similar fashion to Dr. Reis, noted above) that the applicant met the criteria for an adjustment disorder with anxious and depressed mood, as a direct result of injuries sustained in the accident.²⁴ Still, he did not find the neuropsychology assessments recommended in the OCF-18 in dispute to be reasonable and necessary, as he concluded that “there is no indication that Ms. Mohammed sustained a traumatic brain injury in the course of the index accident.”²⁵

Decision

55For the following reasons, I agree with the respondent.

56While an OCF-18 may provide some medical evidence with regard to the reasonable and necessary nature of the treatment plan that it recommends, it is not a substitute for a thorough medical examination and report. What has been submitted in the OCF-18 does not provide sufficient medical evidence for a determination that the treatment contained therein is reasonable and necessary.

57I place little weight on the testimony of Dr. Allen, who signed the OCF-18, as he is a chiropractor who lacks the expertise to comment on psychological issues. In his testimony he highlighted the limitations of his expertise and declined to answer any questions on these subjects. Furthermore, he testified that he did not conduct any of the examinations on the applicant that led to the psychological and neuropsychological assessments recommended in this plan. Essentially, Dr. Allen served solely as the signing authority on this OCF-18.

58Ms. Nali’s report has no evidentiary value with regard to determining the reasonable and necessary nature of the OCF-18 in dispute. While the applicant’s counsel submitted that Ms. Nali’s report was the most recent psychological assessment of the applicant, and should take precedence over earlier examinations, there is nothing in this report to support this assertion. The report does not refer to the neuropsychological, psychological, and mental health and addictions assessments and tests recommended in the OCF-18 in dispute.

59Similarly, Ms. Nali does not have the medical expertise to make such recommendations. Finally, Ms. Nali does not recommend any sort of assessments as noted in the OCF-18 in dispute; she recommends 14 sessions of cognitive-behavioural therapy

60I also note the absence of medical imaging reports. While the applicant’s counsel made occasional reference during the hearing to the CNRs of the applicant’s family physician, Dr. Michael Stephenson, and submitted those reports as part of her document brief,²⁶ medical imaging was never ordered by Dr. Stephenson. Without the evidence of such imaging to support a diagnosis of potential head trauma, it makes it difficult to understand how the authors of the OCF-18 determined that neurological assessments were reasonable and necessary.

61I place significant weight upon the IE reports submitted by Dr. Kurzman, as he was the only psychologist with a specialty in neuropsychology to assess the applicant. As noted above, Dr. Kurzman did not find any evidence of any traumatic brain injury, and did not believe the OCF-18 in dispute to be reasonable and necessary. In the absence of any compelling medical evidence to the contrary, his opinion stands essentially unchallenged.

62As a result of the above, I find that the applicant has not met her burden of proving that the OCF-18 in dispute is reasonable and necessary pursuant to the Schedule. Consequently, I find that the applicant is not entitled to this treatment plan.

Award and Interest

63Given that no benefits are payable, the respondent cannot be found to have unreasonably withheld or delayed payment of benefits pursuant to S. 10 of Regulation 664. Thus, no award is payable. The applicant also did not present any specific evidence regarding such a claim during the hearing.

64Given that there is no overdue payment of benefits, the applicant is not entitled to interest pursuant to S. 51 of the Schedule.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

65The applicant is not entitled to NEB, as she has not met her burden of proving that she suffers from a complete inability to carry on a normal life.

66The applicant is not entitled to the treatment plan in dispute, as it has not been proven to be reasonable and necessary.

67Given that there is no entitlement to any benefits, no interest is payable.

68The claim for an award is also denied.

Footnotes

1. 1O. Reg. 34/10 (as amended).
2. 2Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board, and Fire Safety Commission Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, Version I (October 2, 2017).
3. 316-004031/AABS v State Farm Insurance Company, 2018 CanLII 2312 (ON LAT) and 17-007475 v Aviva General Insurance Company, 2018 CanLII 112117 (ON LAT), and 18-001128 v Aviva Insurance Canada, 2019 CanLII 58164 (ON LAT)
4. 4Heath v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2009 ONCA 391 (CanLll) at paragraph 50.
5. 5Ibid.
6. 6Dr. Allen issued this report and all other documents submitted for this hearing using his former last name of Paton, but testified under his current surname of Allen. I refer to him solely by the current surname of Allen in this decision.
7. 7Applicant’s Document Brief, Tab 15.
8. 8Ibid., Tab 15, p. 382. (NOTE: All citations refer to the page numbers of the PDF submissions, not to page numbers of individual reports within those PDF documents.)
9. 9Ibid., Tab 19, p. 480.
10. 10Ibid., Tab 19, p. 484.
11. 11Respondent’s Document Brief, Tabs C1-C3, pp. 114-158.
12. 12Ibid., Tab C1, Independent Orthopaedic Evaluation of Dr. S. Hanna, September 26, 2019, p. 121.
13. 13Ibid., Tab C2, Independent Psychology Evaluation of Dr. J. Reis, September 26, 2019, pp. 133-134.
14. 14Ibid., Tab C3, Independent Examination In-Home Functional Assessment, September 26, 2019, p. 157.
15. 15Applicant’s Document Brief, Tab 17.
16. 16Ibid., Tab 18.
17. 17Ibid., Tab 17, p. 443.
18. 18Ibid., Tab 17, p. 446.
19. 19Ibid., Tab 12.
20. 20Ibid., Tab 12, p. 335.
21. 21Ibid., Tab 12, p. 339.
22. 22Ibid., Tab 12, pp. 339-340.
23. 23Respondent’s Document Brief, Tabs C5 and Tabs C6, respectively.
24. 24Ibid., Tab C6, p. 191.
25. 25Ibid., Tab C6, p. 192.
26. 26Applicant’s Document Brief, Tabs 10 and 13.