Teagan Feltz v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2023 CanLII 113732

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 15294/MVIA

An appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Teagan Feltz

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

MOTION DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR:

Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Teagan Feltz

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard by Teleconference:

October 17, 2023

REASONS FOR MOTION DECISION AND ORDER

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Teagan Feltz, seeks an extension of time to file an appeal for the 45-day impoundment of her 2018 Ram truck (the “vehicle”). Ms. Feltz owns a property maintenance company and the vehicle is used for work purposes. On September 7, 2023, the vehicle was being operated by one of her employees, N.B., who did not have a valid driver’s licence at the time. Rather, it has been under suspension since February 2, 2018, for failing to complete a remedial program.

2Subsection 55.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act” or the “HTA”) allows for the impoundment of a vehicle for 45 days where a police officer is satisfied that the driver’s licence of the person who is driving a vehicle is under suspension for certain Criminal Code offences. The vehicle was impounded pursuant to this subsection of the Act.

3It should be noted that the appellant was not the owner of the vehicle at the time it was impounded. Instead, her father, Duane Feltz was the owner of the vehicle. The appellant was away at the time the vehicle was originally impounded. Upon her return and having learned about the impoundment, her father transferred the vehicle to her name.

4The Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “respondent”) raised an objection early into the hearing stating that the applicant in the appeal must be the owner at the time of the impoundment. To support this position, the respondent relies on Section 50.2 (1) and (2) of the Act which reads:

Appeal of a long-term vehicle impoundment for driving while suspended

50.2 (1) The owner of a motor vehicle that is impounded under section 55.1 may, upon paying the fee established by the Tribunal, appeal the impoundment to the Tribunal. 2009, c. 5, s. 22.

Parties

(2) The owner and the Registrar are the parties to an appeal under this section. 1997, c. 12, s. 5.

5The respondent also relies on Section 55.1 (27) of the Act which reads:

Owner may recover losses from driver

55.1 (27) The owner of a motor vehicle that is impounded under this section may bring an action against the driver of the motor vehicle at the time the motor vehicle was detained under this section to recover any costs or other losses incurred by the owner in connection with the impoundment. 2009, c. 5, s. 24.

6I understood the respondent’s objection as essentially a motion to dismiss this appeal on the basis that Teagan Feltz did not have standing to appeal the impoundment.

7After reviewing and considering the above-noted sections of the Act, I am not convinced that the appellant, who is the current owner of the vehicle and owner for the majority of the impound period, is precluded from appealing the impoundment of the vehicle she owns under Section 50.2 of the Act. Furthermore, as the owner of the vehicle, the appellant may suffer loss, financial or otherwise, and should be afforded the opportunity to appeal the impoundment on one or more of the grounds available to her.

8More importantly, while the vehicle was not registered in Teagan Feltz’s name at the time of the impoundment, I do not agree that she does not have standing as the appellant. Once she became the registered owner of the impounded vehicle, she had the statutory right to be a party as the “owner”. In my view, the crucial time for Teagan Feltz to be the owner is the time that the appeal is heard. No other person other than her would meet the definition of “owner” in order to have standing. Her father Duane is no longer the owner as he has since transferred the vehicle into her name. Although not the situation here, if Duane Feltz had filed the appeal instead of Teagan Feltz, I consider it possible for the respondent to have argued that he is not the owner (and therefore he does not have standing) since the vehicle has since been transferred to Teagan’s name. In my view, this leads to an absurdity where neither Duane nor Teagan Feltz could appeal the impoundment. I find the Tribunal’s reasoning in 11943 v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2019 CanLII 51310 (ON LAT) to be persuasive here, as it dealt with the transfer of an ownership during the impoundment period.

9Therefore, the respondent’s motion is dismissed and the motion to extend the time to file the appeal was heard in its entirety.

ISSUE

10The issue to be determined is whether the appellant has established reasonable grounds to support an extension of time.

CONCLUSION

11On the evidence before me at the hearing, I find that the appellant has adequately established reasonable grounds to support an extension of time for her to appeal the 45-day impoundment of her vehicle.

LAW

12Pursuant to section 9 of Ontario Regulation 631/98 issued under the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8, (“the Act”) an appeal of an impoundment must be filed within 15 days after the day the vehicle was detained together with the fee established by the Tribunal.

13The Tribunal has jurisdiction to extend the time for filing of an appeal pursuant to section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Schedule G, which reads:

Despite any limitation of time fixed by or under any Act for the giving of any notice requiring a hearing by the Tribunal under section or any other Act, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief, it may,

a) extend the time for giving the notice either before or after the expiration of the limitation of time so limited; and

b) give the directions that it considers proper as a result of extending the time.

14In Manuel v. Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492, the Divisional Court ruled that, on a motion to extend the time to appeal, the overriding consideration is whether the justice of the case requires that the extension be granted. The factors to be considered in making that determination are:

a. The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

b. The length of the delay;

c. Prejudice to the other party; and

d. The merits of the appeal.

15The onus is on the appellant to establish that there are grounds for the granting of the extension. My analysis will include a balancing of the conclusions reached when applying the facts of the case to the factors.

ANALYSIS

The existence of a bona fide intent to appeal

16The appellant did demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal this matter as soon as she learned that the option existed and she was informed about the steps necessary to take. Although this was not completed within 15 days of the impoundment, I find that the appellant took reasonable efforts to obtain information from the police officer who initiated the impoundment. She testified that the officer was not familiar with the impoundment process and did not receive the impoundment number and Notice to Registrar until several weeks after the impoundment. By this time, the vehicle was already transferred to her name and she was fully engaged in obtaining further information on how she could request the release of her vehicle. In addition to this, the appellant also made efforts to contact the Ministry of Transportation (or “MTO”) but was unsuccessful as each attempt resulted in being placed on hold for long periods of time, or reaching MTO representatives who could not assist her.

The length of delay

17The appellant’s notice of appeal was received 33 days after the vehicle was first impounded (18 days after the 15-day period specified in s. 9 of the Regulation). While this is a significant period of delay, I find that this period could have potentially been less, had the appellant been able to obtain the information she was seeking from the police officer and/or the information from MTO. While it is not possible for me to confirm the appellant’s interaction with these parties, I do note that the Notice to Registrar was not filed with the Registrar of Motor Vehicles until several weeks after the impoundment.

Prejudice to the other party

18Given the fact that this appeal is being made well past the impoundment period, I must consider the prejudice this would cause to the Registrar. This is due to the fact that the appellant’s success on appeal would determine the total number of days the vehicle would be impounded. While the respondent does benefit from a hearing without delay, it does not weigh as heavily in favour for the respondent because of the mere economic value of the impoundment.

Merits of the appeal

19In her written reasons for appeal, the appellant states that the loss of the work vehicle has resulted in exceptional hardship for both her and her employees. She states that the vehicle is critical in keeping her company running and leads to delays in service for the properties she maintains. The loss of the vehicle has also not allowed the company to take on the usual amount of work they typically would be able to sustain, resulting in financial loss.

20On a motion to extend time, the appellant need not establish her case on a balance of probabilities but only that her version of events, if believed, could reasonably result in a favourable outcome. I find that the appellant has presented grounds for appeal which disclose a reasonable chance of success should the appeal be allowed to continue to a hearing.

21I am satisfied that the justice of the case requires that an extension of time be granted in the circumstances of this case.

ORDER

22For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Tribunal’s authority under s.50.2(5) of the Act, I grant the appellant’s motion to extend the time for filing of the appeal. The Tribunal shall schedule a hearing of this appeal and notify the parties accordingly.