Tribunals Ontario Licence Appeal Tribunal

Tribunaux décisionnels Ontario Tribunal d'appel en matière de permis

Date: 2022-07-11

Appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a driver’s license under subsection 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

Justin Robson

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicators: Dr. Dimitri Louvish, Member Jeffery Campbell, Vice-Chair

Appearances

For the Appellant: Justin Robson, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Steve Grootenboer, Agent

Heard by Teleconference: June 27, 2022

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

A. Overview

1By letter dated March 24, 2022, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the Registrar) suspended the appellant’s driver’s licence (“licence”) under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“Act”). On May 26, 2022, the Registrar confirmed the suspension, effective April 3, 2022. The appellant appeals the suspension and asks the Tribunal to reinstate his licence.

2Having considered all the evidence and for the reasons that follow, we set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence for medical reasons.

B. Issue

3The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

4To resolve that issue, we will address the following questions:

1. Does the appellant suffer from alcohol use disorder?

2. If the appellant does suffer from alcohol use disorder, is this likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

C. The Law

5The Registrar has the authority under s.47(1) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any grounds listed in paragraphs (d), (e), (f) or (g) of that section. Paragraph (g) states that a licence may be suspended for “any other sufficient reason not referred to in clause (d), (e), or (f).”

6One sufficient reason to suspend a driver’s licence under s.47(1)(g) of the Act is that the driver suffers from a medical condition or addiction likely to significantly interfere with his or her ability to drive safely.

7Subsection 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 enacted under the Act requires that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from “any…physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with his or her ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.” Section 14(2)(a) allows the Registrar to consider the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators (“CCMTA”) Medical Standards for Drivers when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The CCMTA Standards are not binding on the Minister of Transportation or on this Tribunal.

8Section 203(1) of the Act requires medical professionals to report prescribed medical conditions to the Registrar, while s. 203(2) gives medical professionals the discretion to report medical conditions that they believe might make it dangerous for a person to drive.

9Section 14(2)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 allows the Registrar to consider the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators (“CCMTA”) Medical Standards for Drivers when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The CCMTA Standards are not binding on the Registrar or on this Tribunal.

10The Registrar has the burden of establishing on a balance of probabilities that one or more grounds for suspending a driver’s licence has been made out. Pursuant to section 50(2) of the HTA, after a hearing, the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

D. Evidence and Analysis

a. Does the appellant suffer from alcohol use disorder?

11In support of its allegation that the appellant suffers from alcohol use disorder, the Registrar relies on a Medical Condition Report (“MCR”) dated March 21, 2022 and a Substance Use Assessment Form (“SUA form”) from Nurse Practitioner, Megan Yates (“NP Yates”) dated May 25, 2022. The Registrar also submitted the appellant’s Extended Driver Record Search for Criminal Code Convictions, noting the only entry was that the appellant’s license suspended for medical reasons on April 3, 2022.

12On May 24, 2022, the Registrar advised that, should the SUA form state that the appellant suffers from severe alcohol disorder, the Ministry of Transportation would require confirmation that the appellant had abstained from alcohol for a period of 12 months which could be reduced to 6 months upon completion of an alcohol treatment program.

13In the SUA form, NP Yates advised that the appellant suffers from severe substance use disorder with respect to alcohol. The SUA form states that, to NP Yate’s knowledge, the appellant had abstained from alcohol for less than 6 months and that he had “recently completed a supervised treatment program as a result of [his] reported condition” and that the patient had “completed [an] inpatient rehab program.”

14In his testimony, the appellant advised that in February 2021 he became ill and was diagnosed with alpha 1 antitrypsin deficiency, a genetic disorder which affects the lungs and the liver. The appellant was placed on a list for a liver transplant, which he received on September 20, 2021.

15Due to the diagnosis and the subsequent medical treatment, the appellant understood that drinking alcohol was contraindicated to his health and could result in further medical issues. The appellant testified that from the diagnosis in February 2021 until January 2022, he did not consume any alcohol.

16At the end of January 2022, due to stressors in his life, the appellant began to consume alcohol. He testified that, from the beginning of February 2022 to mid-March 2022, he drank a couple of wine coolers at night at home. For 2 or 3 days in that period he consumed 8 or 9 coolers. The appellant testified that, as his consumption of alcohol concerned him, he notified his transplant team, including his transplant psychiatrist, of his drinking and to discuss alcohol treatment. The appellant further testified that he also contacted his employer regarding his concerns about his alcohol consumption. As a result, his employer agreed to assist with the cost of an in-patient alcohol treatment program at the Homewood Centre for Recovery in Guelph, Ontario (“Homewood”). The appellant testified that he completed the 42-day in-patient treatment program at Homewood.

17From the above evidence, we find that the appellant suffers from alcohol use disorder.

b. Is the appellant’s alcohol use disorder likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a vehicle safely?

18The Registrar has the burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

19The Registrar is relying on 15.6.3 of the CCMTA Standards, “Substance Use Disorder – All Drivers”. This CCMTA Standard states that drivers suffering from a Substance Use Disorder may be eligible for a licence if they meet the criteria for remission and/or have abstained from the substance for twelve months. This CCMTA Standard also states that earlier re-licensing may be considered upon favourable recommendation from an addiction specialist and/or treating physician recognized by the licensing authority, and the successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program.

20The Tribunal is entitled to take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but is not bound by them. The overriding consideration in this appeal is whether the Registrar has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant’s substance use disorder is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

21In a letter dated June 16, 2022, NP Yates wrote the following:

Justin has completed a 42-day inpatient program. He has remained sober since that time. He is also in counselling weekly with an addictions counsellor, is seen by a psychiatrist through the transplant team, and is accountable for biweekly ethanol screens through the transplant team, as well as random monthly screens through his employer...As his health care provider I feel he is able to resume driving safely.

22The appellant also submitted eight blood and urine lab results dating from December 9, 2021 to June 7, 2022, indicating objective data such as his liver function tests that he has not been consuming alcohol since March, 2022.

23The appellant further submitted a Letter of Agreement Regarding Inpatient Treatment and Subsequent Substance Testing from his employer. It reflected his employer’s agreement to assist in funding the appellant’s treatment at Homewood and contains conditions on the appellant’s return to work. The agreement was signed by the appellant and a representative from the employer on March 9, 2022. The agreement stipulates:

As contemplated by paragraph 4 above, you will be screened for alcohol and impairing substances (including cannabis) for 24 months after your return to work, on a frequency determined at [the employer’s] and/or Homewood’s discretion.”

24The appellant testified that if he failed one of these tests he could lose his job.

25The appellant is currently accountable to, and is in regular contact with, NP Yates, his transplant team including the team’s psychiatrist, Homewood, and his employer. He is subject to and is submitting himself to regular medical testing.

26The appellant’s testimony is that he voluntarily reported his consumption of alcohol to his transplant team and to his employer. The appellant understands that a failure to abstain from alcohol may cost him his employment and will compromise his health. We find his testimony to be honest, forthright and credible.

27In view of the letter of June 16, 2022 from NP Yates attesting to the appellant’s ability to “resume driving safely”, the appellant’s self-reporting of his condition, clean driving record, consistent submission to medical testing, completion of the 42-day inpatient recovery program at Homewood with it’s ongoing monitoring, and the strict and continuous monitoring of the appellant’s alcohol intake from both medical practitioners and his employer, we find that the likelihood of the appellant’s alcohol use disorder affecting his driving of a vehicle is minimal, if at all. Therefore, we find that the Registrar has failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s alcohol use disorder is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a vehicle safely.

F. Order

28For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, we set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.