Singer v. The Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2022 CanLII 68271

Citation: Singer v. The Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2022 ONLAT 19-014099/AABS

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 19-014099/AABS

In the matter of an application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.

Between:

Bryan Singer

Applicant

and

The Co-operators General Insurance Company

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Christopher Evans

APPEARANCES:

For the Applicant:

Ronald J. Preyra, Counsel

For the Respondent:

David Raposo, Counsel

HEARD:

By Way of Written Submissions

BACKGROUND

1Bryan Singer (the “applicant”) was involved in an automobile accident on August 14, 2005, and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Accidents on or After November 1, 1996 (the “Schedule”)¹ from The Co-Operators General Insurance Company (the “respondent”).

2The applicant and a friend were riding a dirt bike on a road in Northumberland County when they struck a parked car. The applicant was severely injured, and the driver was killed. At the Northumberland Hills Hospital, the applicant scored 3 out of 15 on the Glasgow Coma Scale. His score did not return to a full 15 out of 15 until September 6, 2005.

3The applicant’s injuries included a serious brain injury, and fractures of bones in his head, left arm, left leg, and left hand. Because he scored less than 9 on the Glasgow Coma Scale, he was determined to be catastrophically impaired within the meaning of s. 2(1.1)(e)(i) of the Schedule.²

4The applicant initially applied for accident benefits to the parked car’s insurer, RBC General Insurance Company. In a letter dated September 14, 2005, RBC took the position that the applicant ought to apply to the respondent, his parents’ insurer. This led to a priority dispute between RBC and the respondent. The dispute was settled on December 23, 2009. As part of the settlement, RBC took over the applicant’s accident benefits file.

5The applicant applied for and received benefits from the respondent. He submits that the respondent acted in bad faith to prevent him from applying for additional benefits that he ought to have received. He seeks an award under s. 10 of Regulation 664³ with respect to those benefits.

6Case conferences were conducted on July 14, 2020, November 16, 2020, and May 28, 2021. A written hearing was scheduled for September 24, 2021.

ISSUE

7The issue to be decided is:

1. Is the respondent liable to pay an award under s. 10 of Regulation 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to the applicant?

RESULT

8I am not persuaded that the respondent is liable to pay an award pursuant to s. 10 of Regulation 664.

ANALYSIS

9Section 10 of Regulation 664 provides:

10. If the Licence Appeal Tribunal finds that an insurer has unreasonably withheld or delayed payments, the Licence Appeal Tribunal, in addition to awarding the benefits and interest to which an insured person is entitled under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, may award a lump sum of up to 50 per cent of the amount to which the person was entitled at the time of the award together with interest on all amounts then owing to the insured (including unpaid interest) at the rate of 2 per cent per month, compounded monthly, from the time the benefits first became payable under the Schedule.

10“Unreasonable” behaviour can be seen as “excessive, imprudent, stubborn, inflexible, unyielding or immoderate.”⁴

11This case does not concern benefits that the respondent refused to pay or delayed in paying. The respondent paid in full all benefits that were applied for, including attendant care, income replacement, and medical and rehabilitation benefits. The applicant seeks an award with respect to benefits that he “would have been reasonably entitled to had his claim been adjusted in good faith.” He submits that he did not apply for those benefits at the time because the respondent took advantage of his cognitive impairments, his and his parents’ unsophisticated understanding of statutory accident benefits, and his lack of legal representation. He states that when he retained counsel years after RBC took carriage of his file, he discovered that he was entitled to much more in benefits. It was only then that he became aware that he ought to have received those benefits from the respondent.

12The applicant specifically alleges that the respondent unreasonably withheld payment of (1) attendant care benefits additional to those paid by the respondent, and (2) various medical and rehabilitation benefits:

1. The applicant commissioned an expert report opining that he ought to have received attendant care benefits of $6,321 per month from August 14, 2005 to December 1, 2006, and $2,522.33 per month from December 2, 2006 to December 23, 2009. He seeks an award of 50% of the difference between what he ought to have received and the amount paid by the respondent.

2. The applicant alleges that he was entitled to benefits for physiotherapy, occupational therapy, case management services, a dietitian, a social worker, a rehabilitation support worker, and a gym membership on a weekly basis from August 14, 2005, the date of the accident, to December 23, 2009, when his file was transferred to RBC. He seeks an award of 50% of the difference between what he ought to have received for those benefits and the amount paid for medical and rehabilitation benefits by the respondent.

1. Attendant Care Benefits

13The respondent paid attendant care benefits in accordance with assessments conducted by Margarete Sagebiel, an occupational therapist. She provided a series of reports setting out her findings. Her assessments were as follows:

Report Date	Monthly Attendant Care Benefit
November 10, 2005	$1,502.64
December 30, 2005	$3,792.60
March 21, 2006	$1,234.10
June 9, 2006	$0

14The applicant alleges that the respondent acted unreasonably in relying on Ms. Sagebiel’s reports. He concedes that an award is not ordered simply because an insurer made an incorrect decision, and that because insurers are not medical experts, they must rely on the opinions of medical practitioners.⁵ In this case, he must prove not just that Ms. Sagebiel’s assessments were incorrect in hindsight, but that at the time they were written, it would have been apparent to the respondent that they could not reasonably be relied upon.

15The applicant also argues that the respondent deliberately appointed Ms. Sagebiel knowing that she would minimize his attendant care benefits. I address this argument further below with the other allegations that the respondent acted in bad faith.

The Attendant Care Benefits Assessments

16Ms. Sagebiel’s first report is dated November 10, 2005. At the time, the applicant was an in-patient at the Toronto Rehabilitation Institute and was spending weekends at home with his family. Ms. Sagebiel determined that he required attendant care 24 hours per day. She opined that due to his limited mobility, and to a lesser extent his cognitive status, he would be unable to safely leave the house on his own in an emergency. She assessed attendant care benefits of $1,502.64 per month.

17Ms. Sagebiel’s second report is dated December 30, 2005. By this time, the applicant had been discharged from the Toronto Rehabilitation Institute. Ms. Sagebiel noted that he had progressed from using a wheelchair to walking with a cane, which addressed her concern about his mobility in an emergency. She reported that his cognitive capacity had recovered to the point that he would respond to an emergency appropriately. In her opinion, he no longer required full-time supervision. However, she was hesitant to discontinue attendant care entirely because she felt she did not have a good understanding of his functional status, and was concerned that if left alone he might act impulsively and make poor choices. She recommended gradually reducing attendant care while engaging him in a rehabilitation program. She assessed attendant care benefits of $3,792.60 per month for 126 hours of supervision per week, which equates to 18 hours per day.

18Ms. Sagebiel’s third report is dated March 21, 2006. She reported that the applicant’s condition had continued to improve and that he required less supervision. She reassessed attendant care benefits of $1,234.10 per month for supervision by a rehabilitation support worker five hours per day on weekdays, and eight hours per day on weekends.

19Ms. Sagebiel’s fourth report is dated June 9, 2006. She noted that the applicant was spending three hours per day with the rehabilitation support worker, that he was otherwise on his own, and that his mother had returned to work. She concluded that he no longer required attendant care:

I have reviewed the Form 1 and have reduced the attendant care to 0 as it is my impression that Mr. Singer has returned to his pre-accident status in the home environment. He is, in my opinion, safe there and knows how to respond to any situations that typically could arise.⁶

20The respondent discontinued the applicant’s attendant care benefits in July 2006.⁷

Alleged Errors in the Assessments

21The applicant submits that given the severity of his injuries, it is self-evident that Ms. Sagebiel underestimated his attendant care needs and discontinued them prematurely.

22I disagree that it is self-evident Ms. Sagebiel’s assessments were inappropriate. A catastrophically impaired person is not automatically entitled to attendant care benefits. It must be determined separately that attendant care benefits are reasonable and necessary. While the applicant’s injuries were severe, Ms. Sagebiel reported that he made steady progress in recovering from the impairments caused by his injuries. It is not obvious that her findings were false.

23The applicant states that the first assessment of $1,502.64 was clearly inappropriate given the severity of his injuries. However, he omits to say that this assessment was only for weekend visits. In its letter of November 15, 2005 confirming that it would pay attendant care benefits, the respondent made this clear:

This amount reflects the amount of attendant care required by you for your weekend visits home. Another Form 1 will be completed when you are discharged and will require care on a daily basis.⁸

24I also note that Ms. Sagebiel assessed 48 hours per week of attendant care, not 30 hours per week as the applicant states.

25The applicant stresses that in her first report, Ms. Sagebiel noted that no written medical information was available to her. He specifically points to two documents produced by Toronto Rehabilitation Institute that comment on his physical and cognitive limitations: a neuropsychology consultation note of October 28, 2005, and an occupational therapy family conference report of November 4, 2005.

26I am not persuaded that Ms. Sagebiel’s findings are invalid because she did not have medical information in written form. It is clear from the report that she had a thorough understanding of the applicant’s medical condition. She met with the applicant’s treatment team at the Toronto Rehabilitation Institute on November 4, 2005, and conducted her own assessment of his functional abilities. The documents identified by the applicant do not reveal any inaccuracies in the report, and she very likely obtained the key information in those documents at the meeting. In any event, given that she assessed the applicant as requiring 24-hour supervision, I do not see how any error on her part led her to underestimate the applicant’s attendant care needs.

27Overall, I see no red flags in Ms. Sagebiel’s reports that the respondent ought to have noticed. Her conclusions logically flow from her observations and are not implausible on their face. There are no glaring omissions or inconsistencies. The applicant has not identified any contemporaneous information that conflicts with her findings. For example, I see no obvious inconsistencies with Dr. Lorraine McFadden’s neuropsychological assessments of August 30, 2006 and September 26, 2007, or Fergal O’Hagan’s functional capacity evaluation of September 21, 2006. The applicant refers to a Driving Rehabilitation Report dated December 21, 2007 that observed he had difficulty with memory and immediate recall. The report does not appear to be in evidence. In any event, Ms. Sagebiel was aware of those impairments, and took them into account in her assessments. She never denied that the applicant had cognitive impairments. Her assessment was that he had sufficient cognitive capacity to safely spend time on his own, and did not require supervision.

The Applicant’s Medical Expert Reports

28The applicant commissioned two expert reports from medical practitioners:

1. An Occupational Therapy In-Home Functional Assessment of May 1, 2016 by Rena Neufeld, an occupational therapist; and

2. A Physical Medicine Assessment of March 3, 2017 by Dr. Harpreet Sangha.

29The respondent had carriage of the applicant’s accident benefits file from September 14, 2005 to December 23, 2009. These expert reports were commissioned more than six years later. As noted above, the applicant must prove not just that Ms. Sagebiel’s assessments were incorrect in hindsight, but that at the time they were written, it would have been apparent to the respondent that it could not reasonably rely on them. I find that the expert reports do not meet this burden of proof.

The Occupational Therapy In-Home Assessment

30Ms. Neufeld opines that the applicant’s attendant care benefits should have been $6,321.00 per month from August 14, 2005 to December 1, 2006, and $2,522.33 per month from December 2, 2006 to December 1, 2014. The applicant argues that because Ms. Neufeld’s assessments are so much higher, Ms. Sagebiel’s assessments were clearly inappropriate. I disagree because I do not find Ms. Neufeld’s analysis persuasive.

31The applicant was an in-patient at Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre and the Toronto Rehabilitation Institute from August 14, 2005 to December 1, 2005. Ms. Neufeld opined that he required 24-hour supervision during this period because he would be unable to respond appropriately or exit the building on his own in an emergency. That is consistent with Ms. Sagebiel’s November 10, 2005 report. However, Ms. Neufeld argues that the applicant required attendant care seven days per week because hospital staff could not be fully relied upon to supervise him. In support of that claim, she quotes a passage from a 2005 letter by an individual at the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care stating that attendant care services are not insured by OHIP, and hospitals are not funded to provide one-on-one 24/7 care for in-patients. The letter is not attached to the report and no further context is provided. This falls far short of providing adequate support for Ms. Neufeld’s position. I find it implausible that hospital staff could not be relied upon to assist patients in exiting the building or otherwise responding to an emergency.

32For the period of December 2, 2005 to December 1, 2006, Ms. Neufeld relied on information about the applicant’s needs provided by his mother in an interview on April 14, 2016. This information is inconsistent with Ms. Sagebiel’s findings. For example, the applicant’s mother said that for one year following his discharge from the Toronto Rehabilitation Institute on December 1, 2005, he required constant supervision due to his cognitive impairments. As noted above, Ms. Sagebiel reported in her June 9, 2006 report that the applicant spent three hours per day with the rehabilitation support worker, that he was otherwise on his own, and that his mother had returned to work. I find that Ms. Sagebiel’s reports are the more reliable source because they are based on contemporaneous observations rather than the memory of the applicant’s mother 10 years later.

33Ms. Neufeld assessed attendant care benefits of $2,522.33 per month from December 2, 2006 to December 1, 2014 for eight hours per day of custodial care due to cognitive changes, and assistance with meal preparation and medication management. Ms. Neufeld relied on information provided by the applicant’s mother that conflicts with Ms. Sagebiel’s observations. Again, I find that Ms. Sagebiel’s contemporaneous observations are more reliable than the memory of the applicant’s mother about his attendant care needs from 2006-2009. Ms. Neufeld’s assessment for this period—which extends roughly five years after the respondent transferred the applicant’s file to RBC—also appears to be partly based on the fact that the applicant had a seizure in 2010.

The Physical Medicine Assessment

34The purpose of Dr. Sangha’s report was to describe the applicant’s injuries as they presented in 2017. Dr. Sangha was not asked to review Ms. Sagebiel’s assessments, and does not identify any errors in her reports. The closest he comes to disagreeing with her conclusions is to state: “Either there was not enough treatment, or less success than anticipated, in terms of decreasing this individual’s dependence on others with respect to his instrumental activities of daily living.”⁹ This falls far short of proving that it would have been apparent to the respondent in 2005 and 2006 that Ms. Sagebiel’s reports could not be relied upon.

Conclusion on an Award with Respect to Attendant Care Benefits

35The applicant has not proven that it was unreasonable for the respondent to pay attendant care benefits in accordance with Ms. Sagebiel’s assessments. Therefore, the insurer did not unreasonably withhold payment of the attendant care benefits he claims he ought to have received, and he is not entitled to an award with respect to those benefits.

2. Medical and Rehabilitation Benefits

36The applicant alleges that he was entitled to benefits for physiotherapy, occupational therapy, case management services, a dietitian, a social worker, a rehabilitation support worker, and a gym membership on a weekly basis for 277 weeks, from the date of the accident (August 14, 2005) until RBC took carriage of his file (December 23, 2009).

37The applicant states that he became eligible for these benefits after his file was transferred to RBC and he retained counsel. He states that he settled his file with RBC for a much larger amount of money than the respondent offered in 2008. He submits that he was clearly entitled to benefits in excess of what he received from the respondent.

38The applicant did not apply for these additional benefits while the respondent had carriage of his file. He did apply for other benefits, including occupational therapy, physiotherapy, a rehabilitation support worker, and driving rehabilitation therapy. The respondent paid all these benefits in full.

39I find that the applicant has not established what medical and rehabilitation benefits he ought to have received from the respondent. He did not provide evidence that these benefits would have been reasonable and necessary during the period in question. He argues that he was entitled to them from the respondent because he received them from RBC. However, the evidence does not show what benefits he received from RBC.¹⁰ Even if these benefits were in evidence, I cannot infer that because he received a benefit from RBC, he was entitled to the same benefit from the respondent on a weekly basis from August 14, 2005 to December 23, 2009, and that this would have been apparent to the respondent during that period. Because he has not proven that the respondent unreasonably withheld payment for any benefits, he is not entitled to an award with respect to those benefits.

3. Bad Faith

40The applicant alleges that the respondent acted in bad faith by systematically managing his file to minimize the benefits payable while the priority dispute with RBC was in progress. He argues that the respondent took advantage of his cognitive impairments, his and his parents’ unsophisticated understanding of statutory accident benefits, and his lack of legal representation. Specifically, it prevented him from applying for the benefits he ought to have received by:

a. Failing to inform him what benefits he was eligible for and how to claim them;

b. Unilaterally appointing Ms. Sagebiel knowing that she would misrepresent his attendant care needs;

c. Failing to advise him to obtain legal representation; and

d. Inducing him to return to work prematurely.

41Section 10 of Regulation 664 is concerned with whether the respondent acted unreasonably and not whether it acted in bad faith. Bad faith is not required to establish entitlement to an award, but may be relevant to the quantum of an award.¹¹ I take the applicant’s argument to be that the respondent unreasonably withheld payments because it managed his file in bad faith. I do not accept this argument. The evidence shows that the respondent’s conduct was reasonable, and does not reveal an intent to prevent the applicant from obtaining benefits that he ought to have received.

a. Failing to Inform the Applicant What Benefits He Was Eligible For and How to Claim Them

42The applicant argues that the respondent acted in bad faith because it did not explain to him what benefits he was entitled to receive and how to claim them. This deprived him of the information he needed to apply for those benefits.

43The respondent was required to provide this information by s. 32(2) of the Schedule,¹² which stated that when the insured provides notice of his or her intention to apply for a benefit, the insurer must promptly provide the appropriate application forms, a written explanation of the benefits available under the Schedule, information to assist the person in applying for benefits, and information on any possible elections relating to income replacement, non-earner and caregiver benefits. It is unsettled whether an insurer has a comparable obligation as part of its duty of good faith.¹³ I need not decide this question because it does not change the analysis with respect to whether the respondent unreasonably withheld payment of any benefits. The respondent’s conduct is the same regardless of whether it is framed as an alleged breach of s. 32(2) or the duty of good faith.

44Bonnie Luke, the adjuster who handled the applicant’s file, first met with his mother and other family members on October 5, 2005. At that time, the applicant was an in-patient at Sunnybrook, and was scheduled to return home in two days and stay there until a bed became available at the Toronto Rehabilitation Institute. Ms. Luke summarized the meeting in a memo to file dated October 13, 2005. I agree with the applicant that these types of internal documents are potentially self-serving and should not be taken at face value. However, unless Ms. Luke completely fabricated what she said and did—which I am not prepared to find without compelling evidence—it shows that she provided the required information.

45Ms. Luke reported that she provided a package and went through the forms in it with the applicant’s family, talked to them about the benefits available, provided a disability certificate for a doctor at Sunnybrook to complete, and helped the applicant’s mother complete an accident benefits application. I find that she made a reasonable effort to inform them about the benefits the applicant was eligible to claim and the claims process.

b. Unilaterally Appointing Ms. Sagebiel Knowing That She Would Misrepresent His Attendant Care Needs

46The applicant alleges that the respondent appointed Ms. Sagebiel without informing him of his right to choose his own therapist or her qualifications. He argues that the respondent chose her deliberately because she was biased in its favour, and would minimize his attendant care needs.

47In her memo, Ms. Luke wrote that she informed the applicant’s family that she would be assigning an occupational therapist to assess the applicant’s attendant care needs. I agree with the applicant that that an insurer would be acting in bad faith if it unilaterally appointed a medical assessor who was biased in its favour. However, I am not convinced that is what occurred in this matter. It is most likely that Ms. Luke took the lead in finding an occupational therapist because the applicant was returning home from Sunnybrook in a few days, an attendant care assessment needed to be arranged as soon as possible, and the applicant’s family would be busy taking care of him. This was a reasonable approach, and the applicant’s mother agreed to it by waiving the five-day notice requirement for the assessment. Given my finding that there are no conspicuous defects in Ms. Sagebiel’s reports, I have no evidence to establish she was biased.

c. Failing to Advise the Applicant to Obtain Legal Representation

48The applicant submits that the respondent acted in bad faith because it did not advise that he obtain legal representation. That enabled it to take advantage of his and his family’s unsophisticated understanding of the law.

49In her memo, Ms. Luke said that the “first thing” she asked at the meeting was whether the applicant had retained counsel. She explained that she was required to ask because lawyers often do not want their clients to talk with adjusters directly. The applicant’s mother said they had not seen a lawyer, and the meeting went ahead.

50I disagree that the respondent was required to recommend to the applicant that he obtain legal representation. An insured person may choose to retain counsel when claiming no-fault accident benefits, but it is not required. The Schedule did not (and still does not) not require an insurer to recommend that the insured person do so. The furthest it went was to require that an insurer provide notice that the insured person is entitled to be represented at an examination under oath pursuant to s. 33. The Ontario Court of Appeal held in Usanovic v Penncorp Life Insurance Company (La Capitale Financial Security Insurance Company) that the duty of good faith does not require an insurer to disclose information outside the terms of the policy: in that case, the existence of a limitation period.¹⁴ The applicant goes much further in submitting that the respondent was required not just to disclose information, but to offer an opinion on whether the applicant should obtain legal representation. I find that this submission is not supported by the Schedule.

51I find that Ms. Luke acted reasonably in asking whether the applicant had retained counsel before proceeding with the October 5, 2005 meeting, and that the respondent did not act in bad faith because it did not recommend that the applicant obtain legal representation.

d. Inducing the Applicant to Return to Work Prematurely

52The applicant argues that the respondent manipulated him into returning to work prematurely, which it used as a starting point to deny him other benefits. This strikes me as a red herring. The applicant does not seek an award with respect to income replacement benefits that he ought to have received. He began a work trial on August 21, 2006 and returned to work full-time on October 22, 2006. The respondent had already discontinued attendant care benefits in July 2006. In fact, Ms. Sagebiel’s June 9, 2006 report indicates that it was her assessment of the applicant’s attendant care needs that convinced her the applicant was ready for the work trial. Whether returning to work dissuaded the applicant from applying for further medical and rehabilitation benefits is entirely a matter of speculation. I also note parenthetically that it appears the applicant’s return to work was a success.

The Report of John Groe

53The application commissioned a report from John Groe dated April 12, 2021 to provide an expert opinion on whether the respondent acted in good faith. Mr. Groe states that he worked at various Ontario insurance companies as an accident benefit claims adjuster and in related roles.

54The respondent did not challenge the admissibility of the report pursuant to Rule 10.4, but argues that it should be rejected in its entirety because Mr. Groe does not provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective, and non-partisan, opines on matters outside his area of expertise, and engages in legal argument.

55The report largely consists of conclusory statements with little or no explanation. Much of it is very difficult to follow. At most, it repeats the applicant’s arguments about bad faith without providing any additional reasons why they should be accepted.

56I do not accept the opinions stated in the report because they are unsupported. Putting aside the issue of admissibility, the report does not provide any evidence that assists me in deciding the issues in this case. Restating the applicant’s arguments about bad faith under the guise of an expert opinion does not add to their persuasiveness.

Conclusion on Bad Faith

57The applicant has not established that the respondent unreasonably withheld payment of any accident benefits because it managed his file in bad faith.

ORDER

58I conclude that the applicant is not entitled to an award. In summary, I find:

1. The respondent did not act unreasonably in relying on Ms. Sagebiel’s assessments of the applicant’s attendant care needs. It therefore did not unreasonably withhold payment of attendant care benefits in the amount he seeks.

2. The applicant has not established what medical and rehabilitation benefits he ought to have received, and therefore has not established that the respondent withheld payment of those benefits.

3. The applicant has not established that the respondent unreasonably withheld payments by managing his file in bad faith.

59The application is dismissed.

Released: July 29, 2022

__________________________

Christopher Evans

Adjudicator

Footnotes

1. 1O Reg 403/96.
2. 2As amended O Reg 314/05.
3. 3RRO 1990, O Reg 664: Automobile Insurance.
4. 4Malitskiy v Unica Insurance Inc, 2021 ONSC 4603 at para 46; Plowright v Wellington Insurance Company, 1993 CarswellOnt 4786, [1993] OICD No 62 (FSCO) at para 56.
5. 5S.M. v Unica Insurance Inc., 2020 CanLII 61460 (ON LAT Reconsideration Decision) at paras 39, 51, aff’d Malitskiy v Unica Insurance Inc, 2021 ONSC 4603.
6. 6Applicant’s Written Submissions, Tab 20 at 3.
7. 7Memo dated March 19, 2008, Applicant’s Written Submissions, Tab 25 at 2.
8. 8Respondent’s Written Submissions, Tab 5 at 268.
9. 9Applicant Reply Submissions, Tab 1 at 33.
10. 10The applicant cites Tab 37 of his written submissions. This Tab includes Ms. Neufeld’s report and the accompanying Assessments of Attendant Care Needs (Form 1s). It does not include evidence of the medical or rehabilitation benefits provided by RBC.
11. 11Stegenga v Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 615 at paras 50, 66.
12. 12As amended O Reg 314/05.
13. 13Usanovic v Penncorp Life Insurance Company (La Capitale Financial Security Insurance Company), 2017 ONCA 395 at para 30.
14. 142017 ONCA 395 at paras 31, 45.