Date: 2022-07-05

Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle pursuant to section 55.1 of that Act

Between:

Tina Young

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

MOTION ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Tina Young, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard by Teleconference: June 27, 2022

ORDER ON MOTION

BACKGROUND

1Tina Young (the “appellant”) filed a motion for an order granting an extension of time for the appellant to file an appeal pursuant to section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“Act”) from the impoundment of her 2018 Chevrolet (the “vehicle”) on May 27, 2022 by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “respondent”). The impoundment is for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant submits in her Notice of Appeal that the time for her appeal should be extended because she did not realize she could appeal the impoundment and it took time to figure out that she could appeal.

3The respondent opposed the motion for extension of time. The respondent submitted that there is enough information on the Tribunal website and the website of the Ministry of Transportation that the appellant should have known she could appeal and known the statutory deadline for doing so. The respondent also submitted that the police are under no obligation to give legal advice about the appeal to the appellant. The respondent also submitted that the appellant should have been able to file her appeal by the deadline of June 13, 2022.

issue

4The issue to be addressed in this hearing is whether the Tribunal should extend the time for the appellant to file her appeal.

RESULT

5The appellant’s motion to extend the time to file her appeal is denied. The appeal shall not proceed.

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

Should the Tribunal extend the time for the appellant to file her appeal?

6Section 9 of O. Reg. 631/98, entitled “Long-Term Vehicle Impoundment Under Section 55.1 of the Act”, states that an appeal of an impoundment under s. 55.1 of the Act must be filed within 15 days of the impoundment.

7The appellant’s motion is to extend the time for filing her appeal. Pursuant to section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sched. G the Tribunal may extend the time to file an appeal if the Tribunal is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief.

8To be successful on this motion the appellant must show that there are reasonable grounds for the extension and for the granting an extension of time. The Tribunal must consider the following factors as set out in Manuel v. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492 (Div. Ct.) when deciding whether to grant an extension of time to file an appeal:

1. The existence of a bona fide (good faith) intention to appeal [within the appeal period];

2. The length of the delay;

3. Prejudice to the other party; and

4. The merits of the appeal.

9The Divisional Court determined that the factors to be considered are simply a guide to assist in determining the justice of the case and should not be slavishly followed.

10I will consider these factors below in light of the evidence of the appellant and her submissions at the hearing.

(i) Bona fide (good faith) intention to appeal within the appeal period

11Both the appellant and her witness Jacques Periard, who helped her complete the Notice of Appeal and her Notice of Motion, testified that the appellant did not know she had the option of filing an appeal with the Tribunal. Mr. Periard testified that the appellant’s appeal was filed late because she did not know she could appeal the impoundment and that it “was impossible for her to know”.

12The appellant testified that the police officer involved in the impoundment did not tell her about an appeal to the Tribunal and that she did not find out that appealing was an option until Mr. Periard told her about it, despite having been informed about the impoundment the day it occurred and despite having received notice of the impoundment in writing by mail approximately one and one half weeks after the impoundment. By the time Mr. Periard told the appellant she could appeal, and he was able to help her complete the appeal documents, the statutory deadline had expired.

13While this is somewhat understandable, I am left with insufficient evidence that the appellant had a good faith intention to appeal within the appeal period. The appellant acknowledged at the hearing that she knows ignorance of the law is no excuse.

(ii) Length of the delay

14The appellant’s Notice of Appeal is undated but was received at the Tribunal together with her Notice of Motion to extend the time for filing on June 15, 2022, some two days late. I find there has not been substantial delay. However, this is only one of the factors to be considered on the motion.

(iii) Prejudice to the other party

15Given that the appeal was filed outside the time limit for doing so, I find that the respondent would be prejudiced if the motion was granted because if the appeal goes forward and is successful, the respondent would likely be required to pay greater impoundment fees than if the appeal had been filed within the legislative time.

(iv) Merits of the appeal

16The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act may, pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment. An owner may appeal only on the grounds set out in s. 50.2 (3), (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Act. Here the appellant’s sole ground of appeal as indicated in her Notice of Appeal and confirmed by the appellant in her testimony is under s. 50.2(3)(a), specifically that her motor vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded. The appellant’s Notice of Appeal states only that “the person did not have permission to have my car-it was stolen”. No dates, details or specifics of this allegation are given.

17The appeal is unlikely to succeed on the merits, even if the time to appeal is extended, because the appellant appears to have no evidence to support her position that her vehicle was stolen. Although the appellant testified that she tried to report her vehicle as stolen, there was insufficient evidence given and little detail put forward about her efforts to do so and the circumstances in which the driver of the vehicle had access to her keys and to the vehicle.

18As a result, the appeal is unlikely to succeed on the merits even if I extended the time for filing of the appeal.

19To succeed on a motion for an extension of the time to file an appeal, the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate reasonable grounds on which an extension of time should be granted. I find that the appellant has not demonstrated that she had a bona fide (or good faith) intention to appeal within the time for appeal. There would be prejudice to the respondent and the appeal is unlikely to succeed on the merits. As a result, I find that the appellant has failed to establish that the justice of the case requires an extension of the time for the filing of the appellant’s appeal. The appellant’s motion is denied.

ORDER:

20The appellant’s motion to extend the time to file her appeal is denied. The appeal shall not proceed.