H.Y.Z. v. Allstate Canada, 2022 CanLII 65546

Citation: H.Y.Z. v. Allstate Canada, 2022 ONLAT 18-003942/AABS

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18-003942/AABS

In the matter of an Application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8., in relation to statutory accident benefits.

Between:

[H. Y. Z.] Applicant

and

Allstate Canada Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

VICE-CHAIR: Chloe Lester

APPEARANCES:

For the Applicant: Pavlos Achlioptas, Counsel

For the Respondent: Jonathan Schrieder, Counsel

HEARD: By Way of Written Submissions

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

BACKGROUND

1The applicant, [H. Y. Z], was involved in an automobile accident on March 29, 2016, and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (the Schedule). [Ms. Z.] has pre-existing injuries and was on ODSP.

2Based on her accident-related injuries, she applied for and received various benefits.

3[Ms. Z] applied to Allstate, the respondent, for a determination of whether she is catastrophically impaired.

4Based on a series of s. 44 assessments, [Ms. Z.] was advised on May 2, 2019, that she was deemed catastrophically impaired.¹ The assessments opined that she had a class 4 marked impairment in adaptation and social functioning.²

5After Allstate received [Ms. Z’s] ODSP file, the documents were sent to Dr. Eisen, psychiatrist, the original s. 44 assessor who opined [Ms. Z] has a marked impairment in 2 areas of function. After a review of the documents, Dr. Eisen changed his opinion and determined that [Ms. Z’s] current level of functioning is consistent with her pre-accident level of function. Dr. Eisen opined that [Ms. Z] has a class 1-2 impairment in all areas of function as a result of the accident.³

6After a review of the addendum report authored by Dr. Eisen, Allstate reversed its decision on March 30, 2020, and advised [Ms. Z] that she is no longer considered catastrophically impaired.⁴

7Just prior to and during the time [Ms. Z] was determined to be catastrophically impaired, she submitted 14 treatment plans to Allstate. Allstate denied those treatment plans. [Ms. Z] wishes to dispute the denied benefits and filed an application to the Licence Appeal Tribunal - Automobile Accident Benefits Service (“Tribunal”).

8[Ms. Z] is not disputing Allstate’s decision on the catastrophic determination. She is disputing that during the period she was determined to be catastrophically impaired, she should be entitled to the catastrophic enhanced policy limits. Allstate disagrees.

9Currently, she has $12,530.44 left in her non-catastrophic medical and rehabilitation policy limit.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

10The issues in dispute for this hearing are:

a. Is [Ms. Z] entitled to catastrophic medical and rehabilitation policy limits while she was deemed catastrophically impaired by Allstate?

b. Is [Ms. Z] entitled to 3 treatment plans for occupational therapy services?

c. Is [Ms. Z] entitled to 8 treatment plans for physical therapy services?

d. Is [Ms. Z] entitled to 2 treatment plans for psychological therapy?

e. Is [Ms. Z] entitled to 1 treatment plan for an attendant care benefit assessment?

f. Is Allstate liable to pay an award under Regulation 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments of benefits to Ms. Zheng?

g. Is [Ms. Z] entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?

RESULTS

11[Ms. Z] is entitled to apply for enhanced catastrophic policy coverage during the period she was considered catastrophically impaired by Allstate. All benefits would be subject to their respective legal tests for entitlement.

12[Ms. Z] is partially entitled to the psychological treatment plans. She is entitled to two physiotherapy treatment plans (one is a complete approval, the other is only partially approved). The remaining treatment plans are not reasonable and necessary.

13[Ms. Z] is not entitled to an award.

14[Ms. Z] is entitled to interest as per the Schedule.

IS [MS. Z] ENTITLED TO CATASTROPHIC POLICY LIMITS DURING THE PERIOD SHE WAS DETERMINED TO BE CATASTROPHICALLY IMPAIRED?

15[Ms. Z] argues that all the treatment plans in dispute were either submitted just before or during the time period when she was deemed catastrophically impaired. As a result, [Ms. Z] argues that Allstate should be precluded from relying on the non-catastrophic policy limits in the Schedule. [Ms. Z] argues that once Allstate made a decision that she was catastrophically impaired, that decision should be final. She argues that Allstate denied those treatment plans on the basis that they were not reasonable and necessary. So, she argues that Allstate should not be able to argue additional reasons for the denial other than the ones provided in the original denial letters. Lastly, [Ms. Z] argues that since the Schedule is consumer protection legislation, it should be liberally construed in favour of the insured.⁵

16Allstate argues that since [Ms. Z] is not disputing the catastrophic determination, she is not entitled to its corresponding enhanced benefit limits. It argues that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to make any order above the non-catastrophic policy limits. Allstate relies on the decision by Adjudicator Farlam in P.K. v. Coseco⁶ that the statutory policy limits act as an absolute defence to any claims made above them. It argues that there is no case law or precedent establishing that an insurer is required to fund amounts greater than the statutory cap.

17Neither party has presented any precedent or binding decisions on this issue, nor does the Schedule contain any provision on this issue.

18It is commonly held in decisions by the Tribunal that an insurer is entitled to re-evaluate or continuously adjust the file, that an insurer is not held to a standard of perfection and is entitled to correct mistakes. Binding decisions have also held that the Schedule is a consumer protection legislation and should be interpreted in such a way.

19The question in this hearing is whether an insurer is allowed to retroactively apply a decision.

20In light of the SABS being consumer protection legislation, I find that an insurer is not allowed to apply a decision retroactively.

21[Ms. Z] applied to Allstate for a determination of catastrophic impairment. In accordance with the Schedule, Allstate was entitled to seek an unbiased opinion, a s. 44 assessment. Once it received the report, it is the responsibility of Allstate to review the report, other medical information in the file, and any other information it sees fit to determine whether [Ms. Z] was catastrophically impaired. Allstate is by no means bound by the decision in the s. 44 report. That is why s. 44(1) of the Schedule states “For the purposes of assisting an insurer to determine if an insured is or continues to be entitled to a benefit…” or in this case a determination if [Ms. Z] was catastrophically impaired. The s. 44 report can only assist the insurer in making its decision.

22In this case, after receipt of the initial s. 44 catastrophic determination report, Allstate did not automatically decide [Ms. Z] was catastrophically impaired. Before rendering its decision, it requested further pre-accident medical records.⁷ Once they were received, Allstate requested an addendum. The review of the records did not change any of the assessor’s opinions. It was then that Allstate decided that [Ms. Z] was catastrophically impaired.⁸ The notice on May 2, 2019 states “...please take this as formal notification that you have been deemed to be catastrophically impaired.” At that point, [Ms. Z] would be entitled to apply for benefits within the catastrophic impairment limits.

23Just prior to and after the determination that [Ms. Z] was catastrophically impaired, she submitted to Allstate 14 treatments for various therapies. They were all denied on the basis that they were not reasonable and necessary.

24At some point after its decision that [Ms. Z] was catastrophically impaired, Allstate received the ODSP/CPP file and asked Dr. Eisen for an addendum. This second addendum report indicated that [Ms. Z’s] current level of function is likely similar to her pre-accident level of function and that it was Dr. Eisen’s opinion that [Ms. Z] did not have a marked impairment. Consequently, on March 30, 2020, Allstate reversed its decision.

25Allstate relies on P.K. v. Coseco that found an insurer is not obligated to pay more than the statutory policy limits. In that case, the applicant applied for several treatment plans that were all approved. Once several invoices were submitted, the parties realized the approved amounts were greater than the funding limits. The insured denied paying the remaining approved treatment plans that were over the statutory limits. Adjudicator Farlam decided that exhausting the statutory limits is an absolute defence for any claims above them.

26In my opinion, the decision of P.K. v. Coseco is not persuasive and can be differentiated. An influential factor in the adjudicator’s decision was the approval letters cautioned the applicant that despite the approval it would not pay for any treatment above the non-catastrophic policy limits. In this case, [Ms. Z] was told she was rendered catastrophically impaired. Therefore, she would be eligible to apply for enhanced policy limits and she did. Even though Allstate denied the treatment plans, the Schedule allows [Ms. Z] to dispute those denials. The denials were because Allstate believed the treatment would not provide any benefit to Ms. Zheng. The letters did not indicate that she was subject to lower statutory policy coverages.

27Allstate is asking me to allow them to retroactively apply its decision that [Ms. Z] is not catastrophically impaired. Based on the Schedule being a consumer protection legislation, and should be liberally construed, I find that the enhanced catastrophic policy limits apply to [Ms. Z] during the period she was determined catastrophically impaired. Allstate is entitled to make mistakes and rectify them. But to allow an insured to retroactively apply those decisions would be wholly unfair to an insured who makes choices based on communication with its insurance company. The Schedule allows for [Ms. Z] to dispute denials of benefits subject to its respective test and statutory policy limits. In this case, most of the treatment plans were submitted during the period [Ms. Z] was determined to be catastrophically impaired and should be disputed in the context of the enhanced policy limits. Therefore, this is the same background in which this Tribunal should adjudicate the disputed treatment plans.

THE APPLICANT’S IMPAIRMENTS AND HISTORY

28[Ms. Z] argues that three years prior to the accident she had psychological and physical conditions, which included insomnia, fatigue, depressed mood, chest pain and palpitation, dizziness, mood swing, lack of concentration, and low back pain. She claims that she had not suffered from low back pain since 2014. She also claims that in 2013, she was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and in the year prior to the accident, her mood would vary.

29Allstate argues that based on the medical records, [Ms. Z] has returned to her pre-accident level of function and her impairments are unrelated to the car accident. It relies on the report of Dr. Eisen who opined that even though the car accident may have exacerbated [Ms. Z’s] pre-accident psychological condition, she has likely returned to her pre-accident baseline level of function. Allstate argues that any need for treatment would result from impairments not related to the car accident. Allstate also argues that the applicant has not provided sufficient evidence that the disputed physiotherapy and chiropractic treatment plans would provide a benefit or achieve its goals.

30I find that the accident both exacerbated [Ms. Z’s] pre-accident physical and psychological impairments and created new impairments.

31[Ms. Z’s] pre-accident and post-accident medical records are some of the most detailed records I have ever seen. Her family doctor, Dr. Choy, had yearly physicals that outlined the medical concerns [Ms. Z] was suffering from.

32[Ms. Z] was unfortunately not a healthy person. She suffered a significant number of physical and psychological ailments in the three years prior to the accident.⁹

33In 2013, she suffered from chest pain and palpitation, dizziness, forgetfulness, and upper joint pain.¹⁰

34In 2015, she suffered from abdominal pain, diarrhea, dizziness, forgetfulness, upper back pain, fatigue, insomnia, lower back pain, and depression.¹¹

35In 2016, just prior to the accident, she suffered from, though not limited to, chest pain, lower abdominal pain, incontinence with stress, dizziness, forgetfulness, lower back pain, joint pain, fatigue, insomnia, and depression.

36Although she suffered from these numerous ailments, in the three years preceding the car accident, [Ms. Z] rarely complained about her back pain. Most of her complaints surrounded a serious disease she had, her depression concerning a trauma she experienced, dizziness and gastrointestinal issues. In 2013, [Ms. Z] was diagnosed with chronic pain syndrome because she had been suffering from low back pain for over 3 years.¹²

37[Ms. Z] has ongoing psychological treatment and monitoring because she was diagnosed with major depressive disorder.¹³ Her psychological symptoms began shortly after her husband had committed suicide in 2012. Since that time, many of her psychological impairments continued because she remarried someone who began abusing her. [Ms. Z] has continuously suffered from depression and anxiety.¹⁴ In the year prior to the accident, her psychological symptoms changed frequently. She would have some good days and some bad days. She was in the process of divorcing her current husband.¹⁵

38Immediately after the car accident, [Ms. Z] complained of headaches, dizziness, neck pain and low back pain to her family doctor.¹⁶ [Ms. Z] continuously complained of these same car accident impairments frequently in the months and years after the accident.¹⁷ She reported to her family doctor that her mood fluctuates and results in poor effort to do daily activities of living. She reported that she has no interest in doing anything and that the recent accident has affected her mental state. The family doctor’s records indicate that her neck and lumbar spine are tender, which was something she did not have prior to the car accident.¹⁸ Her next physical exam on September 26, 2016, indicated similar complaints as the previous ones, except now confirmed her spine was tender.

39The psychiatric records of Dr. Fung indicate that the year prior to the car accident, [Ms. Z’s] mood fluctuated. On some visits she reports she is feeling good, and, on others, she reports she is feeling down. A lot of her pre-accident mood fluctuated because of her current marital situation and going through a divorce. She experienced dizziness, difficulty concentrating, forgetfulness, isolation, anxiety, hallucinations and feeling tired.¹⁹

40At her next visit after the car accident, [Ms. Z] reports to Dr. Fung that she has pain all over, tiredness, low self-confidence, nausea and dizziness. Some of these complaints were new. Her sleep was poor, and she had a decrease in her appetite. [Ms. Z] was still experiencing distress from her divorce. In the following visits beginning in July 2016, [Ms. Z] complained that the car accident was the main cause of her psychological distress, and the divorce was no longer a stressor.²⁰ In September of 2017, Dr. Fung wanted [Ms. Z] to attend psychotherapy sessions but she indicated that she was sick with lower back pain.²¹

41In 2018, the psychiatrist’s records indicate that the main stressor was the car accident. [Ms. Z] appetite was still not good, she had an increase in social isolation and her mood continued to fluctuate.²² [Ms. Z’s] medication also fluctuated throughout 2017 and 2018.²³

42I also note in the s. 44 catastrophic report of Dr. Eisen that [Ms. Z] suffered from a new psychiatric condition of driver/passenger phobia.

43From 2017 to 2019, [Ms. Z] attended numerous psychotherapy counselling sessions. She attended anywhere from once a week to once per month.²⁴

TREATMENT PLANS

44All treatment plans submitted to Allstate by [Ms. Z] are subject to the test of being reasonable and necessary. This is outlined under s. 15 of the Schedule. Allstate is only required to pay for treatment relating to [Ms. Z’s] car-accident impairments.

45[Ms. Z] argues that the psychological treatment plans are reasonable and necessary because Allstate’s s. 44 assessor diagnosed [Ms. Z] with an exacerbation of her pre-accident diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder as well as a specific phobia (driver passenger anxiety) as a direct result of this accident.²⁵ In that same report, Dr. Eisen opined that [Ms. Z] will likely require ongoing psychological monitoring on a regular basis from weekly to monthly sessions and it will likely be lifelong.

46[Ms. Z] argues that she attended psychological counselling and her limited progress was outlined in the psychological progress report dated July 17, 2019.²⁶ [Ms. Z] argues that Dr. McDowall, psychologist, recommended additional counselling sessions as outlined in the two treatment plans that are in dispute. [Ms. Z] also argues that the report Dr. Cook, a s. 25 psychiatrist, noted that her psychological symptoms have a significant impact on her life and that the accident significantly exacerbated her depressive condition.

47Allstate argues that [Ms. Z’s] need for required treatment is no longer due to the car accident. It relies on its s. 44 report by Dr. Eisen who opined that the accident may have caused a temporary exacerbation of her pre-accident problems, but she is likely back to her pre-accident baseline level. Allstate argues that [Ms. Z] does not require any treatment and has resumed her pre-accident level of function.

48I find that on the balance of probabilities the accident is currently the only stressor of [Ms. Z’s] psychological impairments, and the treatment plans are partially reasonable and necessary. The records are clear that [Ms. Z] had ongoing major depressive disorder for many years prior to the accident and it impaired her ability to function. Despite her reports to the assessors, the medical records just prior to and after the accident are very clear that she had a low level of functioning.²⁷ However, it is also clear in her psychological records that after 2016, the only psychological stressor [Ms. Z] experienced was the car accident. I find the catastrophic report of Dr. Eisen where he recommended continuous treatment supportive of the opinion of Dr. McDowell and her treatment plans. I find that the last report of Dr. Eisen failed to consider that despite [Ms. Z’s] level of functioning is the same as it was before the accident, the root cause of her psychological impairments had changed to solely being the accident.

49I find the transportation costs of the treatment plans not reasonable and necessary because I have no submissions of whether [Ms. Z] meets the criteria necessary to have transportation costs approved as per the Schedule.

50[Ms. Z] argues that the treatment plans for physical therapy (chiropractic, massage, and physiotherapy) recommended by Total Recovery are reasonable and necessary to improve upon her accident-related physical impairments including low back pain, dizziness, neck pain, lower leg soreness and right knee pain. [Ms. Z] argues that her family doctor recommended active exercise, and physical therapy on May 7, 2018, and again on October 15, 2019, for her neck and low back pain, headaches, and leg pain.²⁸

51Allstate argues that [Ms. Z] has not discharged her onus to prove that the physiotherapy treatment plans will provide any benefit. It argues the only evidence submitted regarding the treatment plans is the treatment plans themselves and that is not sufficient proof that more physical therapy will provide any benefit to her.

52The records indicate that the low back pain was exacerbated as a result of the car accident. Although [Ms. Z] suffered from low back pain pre-accident, she hardly complained of it to her family doctor. After the accident, there are numerous appointments where [Ms. Z] complained of back pain. She also experienced neck pain and headaches which seem to be new impairments since the accident.²⁹ On the other hand, none of the records suggest that [Ms. Z’s] knee and ankle were injured in the car accident. They only began being a concern in May of 2016. Also, the hospital records from the accident do not indicate that the knee or ankle was injured in the car accident.³⁰

53[Ms. Z] has received physical treatment for these injuries for approximately 2 years. The respondent denied the treatment plans because of a s. 44 assessment by Dr. Saplys, an orthopedic surgeon, who opined that [Ms. Z] suffered from soft tissue injuries as a result of the car accident and after 2 years of treatment she has reached maximum medical recovery.³¹

54I find most of the treatment plans for physical therapy not reasonable and necessary. As per the report of Dr. Saplys, [Ms. Z] has received approximately 2 years’ worth of physical therapy and has likely reached maximum medical recovery. Without any additional proof that [Ms. Z] was receiving any benefit from it, i.e.: pain relief, improvement in her condition, or increase in functionality, then additional treatment would serve no benefit. I have no evidence to suggest [Ms. Z] is receiving any benefit from the treatment.

55On the other hand, there are two appointments where [Ms. Z’s] family doctor recommended more physiotherapy because of her chronic neck pain, headaches and lower back pain radiating to the right leg.³² These are areas that were injured in the car accident. The appointments took place on May 7, 2018, and again on October 15, 2019.

56I find that the treatment plan submitted to Allstate on May 8, 2018 and January 8, 2020, is reasonable and necessary considering [Ms. Z’s] family doctor’s recommendation for physiotherapy because of her accident-related impairments. On May 7, 2018, [Ms. Z] reported to her family doctor that in the past physiotherapy, massage and acupuncture helped the pain subside for a while. It then resurfaced. Despite Dr. Saplys’ opinion, it appears that the physical therapy did provide some temporary relief to Ms. Zheng. Based on [Ms. Z’s] family doctor’s recommendations and her long history with Ms. Zheng, I find the two treatment plans proposed around those visits reasonable and necessary.

57I find the entire treatment in the amount of $1,823.52 dated May 8, 2018 reasonable and necessary. I find the treatment plan in the amount of $6,103.44 partially reasonable and necessary. That treatment plan proposed a re-assessment, physiotherapy, active therapy, massage therapy, transportation and a progress report. I find that only the re-assessment, physiotherapy and progress report are reasonable and necessary considering the recommendations from the family doctor in the amount of $2,822.84 (subject to Professional Service Guidelines’ hourly rates). I have no evidence to suggest why active therapy or massage therapy would provide any additional benefit to [Ms. Z] or whether she is entitled to transportation costs as per the Schedule.

58[Ms. Z] argues that she submitted three treatment plans for occupational therapy services to reduce pain, increase strength, increase range of motion and regain function. It was also to help implement rehabilitation services, training skills, social skills, education and promoting health.

59Allstate has not provided submissions on these treatment plans.

60[Ms. Z] states that Allstate never arranged for a s. 44 assessment for those treatment plans but based its denials on previous s. 44 assessments addressing other benefits.

61After these three treatment plans for occupational therapy services were submitted, a fourth treatment plan was submitted to Allstate and it was approved. [Ms. Z] argues that the three previous treatment plans were similar, if not identical to the approved treatment plan.

62I have no submissions from [Ms. Z] on why these treatment plans are reasonable and necessary other than what is stated in the treatment plans. The treatment plans are not specific as to why these services are being recommended for [Ms. Z’s] accident-related impairments. The treatment plans do not have any information in the additional comments section to understand why the treatment is being recommended. The provider simply checked off several boxes regarding the treatment goals. Since [Ms. Z] admitted that Allstate has already approved an occupational therapy treatment plan that is similar, if not identical to the ones being recommended, I do not understand why further treatment would be needed or whether [Ms. Z] benefited from the treatment already provided. Since I have no clinical notes regarding the occupational therapy treatment sessions from Total Recovery Rehabilitation Centre, I cannot determine whether [Ms. Z] received any benefit from the sessions. I find the occupational therapy treatment plans not reasonable and necessary.

63[Ms. Z] argues that she submitted a treatment plan for an in-home assessment for attendant care in the amount of $2,200.00 and it was denied by Allstate. [Ms. Z] argues that once she was designated catastrophically impaired, Allstate failed to reconsider its position.

64Allstate has not provided submissions on this treatment plan.

65Allstate had conducted its own s. 44 assessment on whether [Ms. Z] required attendant care. The report of Dr. Eisen and Tracy Shaw, OT, opined that the in-home assessment was not reasonable and necessary because [Ms. Z’s] functionality had not changed since before the car accident The report indicates that [Ms. Z] could not complete a lot of her pre-accident activities of daily living and not much has changed since the car accident.

66[Ms. Z] has not provided any submissions on why the treatment plan is reasonable and necessary. The s. 25 assessment report indicates a level of pre-accident functionality different than what is recorded in the clinical records, CPP and ODSP files. The s. 25 report does not reflect an accurate level of [Ms. Z’s] pre-accident function, and therefore very little weight can be given towards it. Since I have no submissions on why this assessment should be considered reasonable and necessary and how the evidence relates to it, I find the assessment not payable.

AWARD

67[Ms. Z] argues that she is entitled to an award as per S. 10 of Regulation 664 because the insurer has denied the issues in dispute. [Ms. Z] argues that once Allstate had deemed [Ms. Z] catastrophically impaired there was no reason to deny her attendant care assessment.

68Allstate has not provided submissions on the request for an award.

69The mere fact that a disputed treatment is denied does not entitle an insured to an award. Also, rendering an insured catastrophically impaired also does not automatically ensure entitlement to benefits. Benefits are still subject to their respective tests.

70In order to be entitled to an award, [Ms. Z] must prove that Allstate unreasonably withheld or delayed payments of benefits. She must show that Allstate’s behaviour was excessive, imprudent, stubborn, inflexible, unyielding, or immoderate. [Ms. Z] has not provided any submissions on why she meets this high bar.

71The request for an award is denied.

Order

72I order that:

a. [Ms. Z’s] disputed treatment plans submitted during the period in which Allstate determined her to be catastrophically impaired are adjudicated in the context of the enhanced policy limits.

b. The treatment plan in the amount of $1,823.52 dated May 8, 2018 for physiotherapy is reasonable and necessary.

c. The treatment plan dated January 9, 2020, for psychological counselling in the amount of $6,608.43, partially approved by Allstate, is partially reasonable and necessary in the amount of $3,713.43. The transportation costs outlined in the treatment plan are not reasonable and necessary.

d. The treatment plan for $6,608.43 dated March 25, 2020, for psychological counselling is partially reasonable and necessary in the amount of $5,008.43. I do not find the transportation costs to be reasonable and necessary.

e. The treatment plan dated January 8, 2020 for physiotherapy is partially reasonable and necessary (re-assessment, physiotherapy and progress report) in the amount of $2,822.84.

f. All treatment plans or parts thereof that I have found reasonable and necessary are subject to Professional Service Guidelines and hourly rates.

g. [Ms. Z] is entitled to interest on any benefits incurred and are considered overdue, pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule.

h. The remainder of the treatment plans that were not identified above are not reasonable and necessary.

i. There is no award under s. 10 of Reg. 664.

Footnotes

1. 1Respondent’s Brief Tab 53
2. 2Applicant’s Brief Tab 12
3. 3Respondent’s Brief Tab 78
4. 4Respondent’s Brief Tab 78
5. 5Smith v. Co-operators General Insurance Company (2002 SCC 30, 2 S.C.R.)
6. 6P.K. v Coseco Insurance Company, 2020 CanLII 94817 (ON LAT)
7. 7Respondent’s Document Brief Tab 41
8. 8Respondent’s Document Brief Tab 53
9. 9Applicant’s Brief page 22
10. 10Applicant’s Brief page 24
11. 11Applicant’s Brief page 26
12. 12Applicant’s Brief page 19
13. 13Applicant’s Brief page 44
14. 14Applicant’s Brief page 25
15. 15Applicant’s Brief page 27
16. 16Applicant’s Brief page 29
17. 17Applicant’s Brief page 29-30, 82, 83, 85, 86
18. 18Applicant’s Brief page 30, 32 and 22
19. 19Applicant’s Brief page 120-125
20. 20Applicant’s Brief page 146
21. 21Applicant’s Brief page147
22. 22Applicant’s Brief page 149, 165
23. 23Applicant’s Brief page 130, 150, 151
24. 24Applicant’s Brief Tab 9
25. 25Catastrophic Determination Report of Dr. Eisen page 345
26. 26Applicant’s Brief Tab 17
27. 27Medical records from Ms. Zheng;s family doctor, pre-accident psychiatric records, CPP and ODSP File
28. 28Applicant’s Brief page 726 and 848 and 849
29. 29Applicant’s Brief page 29
30. 30Respondent’s Medical brief page 27
31. 31Applicant’s Brief Page 1134 and 1144
32. 32Applicant’s Brief page 848