Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act
Between:
Sasha Jacobs
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicators: Colin Osterberg, Member
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Sasha Jacobs, Self-represented
For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent
Heard by teleconference: June 17, 2022
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
background
1Sasha Jacobs (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her 2016 Hyundai motor vehicle under s. 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on April 12, 2022 for 45 days. At the time of impoundment, the vehicle was being driven by Kaci Laidlow whose licence was then under suspension.
2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
3For the reasons set out below, the appeal is dismissed, and the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.
ISSUES
4The issue to be determined is whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
ANALYSIS
Exceptional Hardship
5In determining whether the appellant has shown that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, s. 10(1) of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) requires the Tribunal to consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
6If the owner fails to establish that there is no alternative available, then her appeal will fail. If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health or safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.
The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for employment or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle and additional criteria are met
7The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.
Alternative to impounded vehicle
8The evidence presented at the hearing demonstrates that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to her and her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) must fail as a result.
9According to the appellant, she has two jobs which she uses her vehicle to attend. She works full time at a Coca Cola factory, on the night shift, and she works part time days at Rogers. The appellant has been given alternate shifts by Rogers to accommodate her current use of public transportation and has missed no time from that employment during the impoundment period.
10The appellant has been able to get to her employment at Coca Cola by taking a bus to get to work and using a ride-sharing service to get home. She says that this is expensive, and that she has missed five shifts during the impoundment period. She intends to continue to attend work in this manner until her vehicle is released from impoundment. She does not expect to miss any further shifts.
11The appellant normally uses the impounded vehicle to drive her daughter to school. Her daughter is 11 years old and the school she attends is too far for her to walk there. Since the impoundment, the appellant’s daughter has attended school by taking public transit and has not missed any classes.
12The appellant also uses the impounded vehicle to get to her grandmother’s home to help her take her medication and to provide care for her. She normally attends at her grandmother’s home several times a week. Since the impoundment, the appellant has been unable to go to her grandmother’s home since she has no reasonable way of getting there. Instead, the appellant has hired a nurse to take care of her grandmother and she intends to continue that until the vehicle is released from impoundment.
13The impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle has clearly resulted in inconvenience to the appellant. However, inconvenience is not a basis upon which the impoundment may be appealed. The evidence demonstrates that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to her and I find that the appellant has failed to show that she will suffer exceptional hardship under the Act. Her appeal on this ground must fail.
ORDER
14For the reasons set out above, and pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, I confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
___________________________
Colin Osterberg, Member
Released: June 20, 2022