A. O. v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2022 CanLII 49946

DECISIONS AND ORDERS

Citation: A. O. v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2022 ONLAT 20-005078/AABS and V. O. (Minor) v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2022 ONLAT 20-005097/AABS

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 20-005078/AABS and 20-005097/AABS

In the matter of an Application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8., in relation to statutory accident benefits.

Between:

[A. O.] and [V. O.] (Minor)

Applicants

and

Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company

Respondent

ADJUDICATOR: Stephanie Kepman

APPEARANCES:

For the Applicant: Anna Szczurko, Counsel

For the Respondent: Symone Marlowe, Counsel

HEARD: By way of written hearing

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

BACKGROUND

1The applicants were involved in an automobile accident on September 2, 2017 and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016)¹. The applicants were denied certain benefits by the respondent and submitted an application to the Licence Appeal Tribunal - Automobile Accident Benefits Service (“Tribunal”).

ISSUES

2The parties consented to the Tribunal deciding the following two application substantive issues together:

For file 20-005078/AABS:

i. Are the applicant’s injuries predominantly minor as defined in s. 3 of the Schedule and therefore subject to treatment within the $3,500.00 limit and in the Minor Injury Guideline?

ii. Is the applicant entitled to $1,700.00 for occupational therapy services, recommended by Novus Rehab Limited in a treatment plan (OCF-18) dated November 1, 2018 and denied on November 15, 2018?

iii. Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?

iv. Is the applicant entitled to an award under s. 10 of Regulation 664 for unreasonably withheld or delayed payment of benefits?

3For file 20-005097/AABS:

i. Are the applicant’s injuries predominantly minor as defined in s. 3 of the Schedule and therefore subject to treatment within the $3,500.00 limit and in the Minor Injury Guideline?

ii. Is the applicant entitled to $1,700.00 for occupational therapy services, recommended by Novus Rehab Limited in a treatment plan (OCF-18) dated November 1, 2018 and denied on November 15, 2018?

iii. Is the applicant entitled to $993.50 for occupational therapy services, recommended by Cheryl Richardson in a treatment plan (OCF-18) dated November 13, 2019 and denied on December 2, 2019?

iv. Is the applicant entitled to $3,431.88 for physiotherapy services, recommended by Cheryl Richardson in a treatment plan (OCF-18) dated March 8, 2019 and denied on March 25, 2019?

v. Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?

vi. Is the applicant entitled to an award under s. 10 of Regulation 664 for unreasonably withheld or delayed payment of benefits?

LAW

4Sections 14 and 15 of the Schedule state that an insurer shall pay medical benefits to, or on behalf of an applicant so long as said person sustains an impairment as a result of an accident and that the medical benefit in dispute is a reasonable and necessary expense incurred by the applicant as a result of the accident.

5Section 18(1) of the Schedule states that when an insured person sustains an impairment that is predominantly a minor injury, the total cost of his/her/their medical and rehabilitation benefits payable shall not exceed $3,500.00.

6Section 18(2) of the Schedule provides that the $3,500.00 funding limit does not apply if an applicant provides compelling medical evidence that she has a pre-existing medical condition that will prevent her from achieving maximal recovery from the minor injury if she is subject to the MIG funding limit.

7Section 51(2) of the Schedule states that interest is due on a benefit that is overdue if the insurer does not pay the benefit within the time stated by the Schedule.

8In Scarlett v. Belair Insurance² (“Scarlett”), the Divisional Court reviewed the minor injury provisions in the Schedule, finding that they were a limit on an insurer’s liability, not an exclusion from coverage, and that the onus of establishing entitlement beyond the cap rests with the claimant. Applying Scarlett, the applicant must establish her entitlement to coverage beyond the $3,500 cap for minor injuries

EVIDENCE & SUBMISSIONS - 20-005078/AABS – APPLICABILITY OF THE MINOR INJURY GUIDELINE (‘MIG’)

9The parties do not deny that the applicant in matter 20-005078/AABS, was involved in a prior accident on June 12, 2017 (‘the previous accident’).

10The applicant submitted she ought to be excluded from the MIG on the basis of having a pre-existing condition that would prevent her maximum medical recovery if confined to its limits, a psychological impairment and chronic pain syndrome.

11The respondent submitted that all of the applicant’s injuries were minor in nature, and that she did not have grounds to be excluded from the MIG.

Does the applicant have any pre-existing conditions?

12The standard for excluding an impairment on the basis of pre-existing condition(s) is well-defined and strict. A pre-existing condition will not automatically exclude a person’s impairment from the MIG: it must be shown to prevent maximal recovery within the cap imposed by the MIG.

13In this matter, the applicant submitted that as a result of her previous car accident³, 3 months before the subject accident, she suffered from whiplash-associated disorder (‘WAD II’), and neck and back pain which never fully resolved when she was subject to the current accident.

14The applicant relied on Dr. Steven Macaluso, physiatrist’s report⁴, where the doctor opined that the applicant was in the previous accident and sustained injuries to her neck. Dr. Macaluso diagnosed the applicant with chronic pain syndrome, neck and shoulder pain, sleep disturbance, mood and anxiety symptoms.

15Dr. Macaluso opined that the applicant’s WAD II injury and neck pain were caused by her previous accident and never fully resolved by the time the subject accident occurred.

16The applicant also relied on the treatment plan⁵ (‘OCF-18’) of Jane Hendriksen, physiotherapist. Ms. Hendriksen noted under “prior and concurrent conditions” that the applicant reported being in the subject accident, the previous accident, and an antecedent accident in 2006.

17The respondent disagreed with the applicant’s position. It argued that based on the decision of 16-000642 v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company⁶, having a pre-existing injury is not sufficient on its own to remove an applicant from the MIG, the applicant must prove, based on a balance of probabilities, that his/her/their pre-existing condition prevents them from achieving maximal medical recovery within the MIG. Based on this decision, the respondent submitted that the applicant has not met her evidentiary burden.

18The respondent also directed the Tribunal’s attention to 16-000045 v Aviva Canada⁷, where the Tribunal found that the applicant’s injuries were minor in nature, as the medical evidence provided failed to comment on the impact of the applicant’s pre-existing injuries and their ability to recover within the MIG.

19The respondent submitted that since the applicant’s Family Doctor, Dr Uththara Perera, did not comment on the applicant’s capacity to recover if confined to the MIG, she failed to meet her burden of proof.

20The respondent also relied on an email sent by the applicant to her treating physiotherapist clinic, Physiohause⁸, where the applicant qualified her previous accident as “minor” and stated that “I can not recall pain” from the accident.

21The respondent also denied that as a result of the applicant’s previous accident, she suffered any injuries and therefore, has no pre-existing condition.

Analysis

22After considering the submissions of the parties, based on a balance of probabilities, I find that the applicant has not provided compelling evidence that her injuries are pre-existing and require treatment beyond the limits of the MIG.

23The applicant has not provided persuasive evidence that her WAD II injury was caused by the previous accident. Though I did consider Dr. Macaluso’s report, I found it less persuasive in terms of causation, as Dr. Macaluso did not provide the medical basis on how he determined that the applicant’s previous accident was the cause of her WAD II injury.

24As the applicant did not seek medical attention after her first accident, and was not assessed by Dr. Macaluso after it, I put less weight on this aspect of Dr. Macaluso’s report.

25I was also more persuaded by the email submitted by the respondent, where the applicant does not recall experiencing any pain from her previous accident.

26Furthermore, neither Dr. Macaluso nor Ms. Hendriksen commented on the impact of the applicant’s pre-existing injuries should she be confined to the MIG.

Does the applicant have (a) psychological impairment(s)?

27The applicant also claims that she sustained a psychological injury as a result of the accident that places her outside of the MIG.

28Psychological injuries, if established, may fall outside the MIG, because the MIG only governs “minor injuries”, and the prescribed definition does not include psychological impairments.

29The parties agree that the applicant has a previous history of anxiety. However, the applicant submitted that she suffered a psychological impairment as a result of the accident.

30The applicant submitted that she reported a rapid heart rate, anxiety and headaches on October 29, 2017, to Dr. Perera. Upon review of the clinical notes and records of Dr. Perera, it appears this appointment occurred on October 29, 2018, or one year later. During this appointment, the applicant reported a history of anxiety, and that she had feelings “similar to an anxiety attack”. Dr. Perera opined that the applicant was dealing with anxiety, panic attacks and features of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (‘PTSD’). Based on this, Dr. Perera prescribed the applicant an anti-anxiety medication and recommended she attend counselling.

31The applicant also relied on evidence provided by Rachel Korol, occupational therapist, where she noted that the applicant had tearfulness, low mood and isolation⁹.

32Finally, the applicant relied on evidence from Dr. Macaluso, who diagnosed the applicant with mood and anxiety issues¹⁰ in his report, which he attributed directly to the accident.

33The respondent disagrees that the applicant suffered a psychological impairment as a result of the accident. It submitted that the applicant had not provided any clinical notes or records to prove that her psychological issue was as a result or magnified by the accident.

34The respondent directed the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that the applicant’s reporting of her anxiety after the accident failed to mention the accident. Instead, the clinical notes and records of Dr. Perera¹¹ noted her history of anxiety but that this was related to marital issues.

35Further clinical notes and records of Dr. Perera¹² note that the applicant continued to have anxiety due to deaths in her family and was assessed with reactive anxiety.

Analysis

36After considering the submission and evidence of the parties, based on a balance of probabilities, I find that the applicant’s psychological issue was not caused by the accident and therefore, do not warrant removal from the MIG.

37The applicant failed to present any direct evidence that her anxiety was caused by the accident or that her mood issues were caused by such. Without this, I have no basis to determine that her mood issues are more than sequalae and therefore, not exempt from the MIG.

38I put less weight on the evidence of Ms. Korol and Dr. Macaluso in relation to the psychological diagnosis. The evidence submitted by the applicant related to psychological issues did not come from a medical professional who specialises in these diagnoses, such as a psychologist or psychiatrist, but rather an occupational therapist and physiatrist, neither of whom specialize in mental health.

39Though a physiatrist is a specialist medical doctor, given the low psychometrics found by Dr. Macaluso, and that he found that the applicant is “in a very good spot in regard to mood and anxiety”, I did not accept that the applicant had a psychological injury as a result of the accident.

Does the applicant suffer from chronic pain?

40The applicant submitted that she clearly suffers from chronic pain syndrome as a result of the accident.

41The applicant relied on Dr. Macaluso’s report¹³. The applicant submitted that as Dr. Macaluso is a physiatrist, it is within his scope of practice to diagnose chronic pain syndrome.

42Dr. Macaluso diagnosed the applicant with chronic pain syndrome and provided the basis of this diagnosis, namely the applicant’s lack of pain resolution after nearly 3 years, her self-reporting and mood metrics.

43In terms of causation, Dr. Macaluso opined that the applicant’s previous accident in June of 2017 caused her to have a WAD II and secondary impacts on her anxiety, mood and stress. He continued by stating that he believed the subject accident amplified her previous injuries and caused her to develop chronic pain syndrome as a result.

44The applicant also relied on her totality of her clinical notes and records from the last four years, where she reported the chronic nature of her pain. She relied on the clinical notes and records of Dr. Paul Collins¹⁴, general surgeon, Telehealth Ontario¹⁵, and the Occupational Assessment of Ms. Korol¹⁶.

45The applicant submitted that her chronic pain has limited her functional abilities and mood. She also submitted that her pain has disrupted her sleep and compromised her activities of daily living such as driving, housekeeping participation in leisure activities and caused her low moods, anxiety and avoidance of social events.

46The applicant also relied on the argument that a diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome, or a diagnosis of chronic pain that is associated with secondary impairments and limitations in functional abilities takes a person out of the MIG as seen in 16-000438 v The Personal Insurance Company¹⁷.

47The respondent disagreed with the applicant’s position and submitted that the applicant’s injuries did not meet the definition of chronic pain requiring removal from the MIG, as seen in Scarlett v. Belair Insurance¹⁸.

48In terms of the evidence raised by the applicant, the respondent submitted that the report of Dr. Macaluso is the only medical evidence to support the applicant’s position. The respondent argued that Dr. Macaluso’s report could not be relied on upon as his “theory” regarding the applicant’s previous and subject accidents was not accurate, as the applicant did not suffer from the pain and injuries as described after the previous accident.

49Instead, it argued that the applicant suffered soft tissue injuries after the subject accident, which did not require removal from the MIG. The respondent also noted that the applicant suffered other injuries after the subject accident that contributed to her pain and were not addressed by Dr. Macaluso.

50The clinical notes of Dr. Perera¹⁹ show that the applicant suffered a fall on January 4, 2018, where she was found to have supraspinatus tendinitis and a partial tear of her left shoulder, which is typically an injury that would fall within the MIG. The respondent submitted that the applicant has failed to show that her shoulder injury was not caused by this fall.

51The applicant reported a second fall to Dr. Perera²⁰, where she landed on her bent knee. The applicant also reported to Dr. Perera that she attended her local Emergency Room on April 4, 2019, with new lower back pain.

52Based on the issues with Dr. Macaluso’s findings and the applicant’s injuries following the subject accident, the respondent submitted that the applicant had not shown that the cause of her chronic pain was the subject accident.

53The respondent also disagreed with the applicant’s submissions that a diagnosis of chronic pain automatically warrants her removal from the MIG and, instead, submitted that the applicant bears the onus of showing her chronic pain exists and is not a clinically related sequalae²¹.

54The respondent also submitted that the applicant has not provided sufficient evidence to support Dr. Macaluso’s findings. It submitted that had the applicant’s pain been as severe and chronic as she described, the respondent would expect limitations in her daily life. However, as the applicant has continued working and attending school after the accidents, the applicant has not shown any limitations.

55The respondent also submitted that the Dr. Macaluso’s findings are incorrect. It relied on an email from the applicant to one of her physiotherapists²², where the applicant stated the following regarding her previous accident: “However, it was a minor accident the truck behind me just rolled slowest [sic] and hit the bumper. I did not really experience any pain.”

56The respondent also submitted that the applicant’s prescription history from Costco²³ and Shoppers Drug Mart²⁴ would reflect the applicant taking prescriptions or pain killers to manage this pain. However, the prescription histories do not reflect this. Therefore, the respondent submitted that the applicant’s pain should not remove her from the MIG.

Analysis

57After considering the submissions of the parties, based on a balance of probabilities, I find that the applicant’s chronic pain does not require removal from the MIG.

58As stated above, Dr. Macaluso’s report did not provide the medical basis on how he determined that the applicant’s previous accident was the cause of her WAD II injury. Moreover, the applicant failed to make any submissions related to causation.

59As the applicant failed to provide evidence beyond the report of Dr. Macaluso, she has not shown that her chronic WAD II and back pain were caused by the subject accident.

60Furthermore, the applicant has provided limited information that her impairments are outside the definition of a minor injury as found in section 3(1) of the Schedule.

61Though it is not denied that the applicant has been suffering from neck and back pain for an extended period of time, which can be characterized as chronic, she has not demonstrated how this chronic pain had led to a functional impairment.

When considering removing an injured person from the MIG on the basis of chronic pain, a diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome can remove the applicant from the MIG, as seen in 16-000438 v The Personal Insurance Company²⁵.

62However, in this case, I find that the applicant has not provided persuasive evidence that her impairments are beyond soft-tissue injuries, as noted by the respondent.

COSTS

63The applicant also made submissions related to costs, in accordance with the Tribunal’s Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, specifically Rule 19. This Rule allows a party to requests costs in writing or orally at a case conference or hearing, or at any time before the decision or order is released.

64The applicant submitted that the respondent’s conduct warrant costs in the amount of $1,000.00. The applicant did not provide the basis for this calculation but made general submissions that the respondent knowingly and unfairly denied the applicant’s benefits.

65The respondent did not address costs in its submissions.

66When considering the applicant’s request, I turned to Rule 19.4, which states that submissions on costs shall set out the reasons for the request and the particulars of the other party’s conduct that they alleged to be unreasonable, frivolous, vexatious or in bad faith.

67In this matter, the applicant has not done so. Though she provided general statements regarding her characterization of the respondent’s conduct, she failed to provide particulars regarding the above-mentioned conduct. Therefore, the request for costs is denied.

Interest and award

68In accordance with section 51 of the Schedule, interest is only payable on overdue payments.

69Section 10 of Regulation 664 provides that, if the Tribunal finds that an insurer has unreasonably withheld or delayed payment of benefits, the Tribunal may award a lump sum of up to 50 per cent of the amount in which the person was entitled together with interest on all amounts owing to the insured (including unpaid interest).

70Since I have determined that no benefits are owing, no interest or award is payable.

EVIDENCE & SUBMISSIONS - 20-005097/AABS – APPLICABILITY OF THE MIG

Does the applicant have any pre-existing conditions?

71The parties do not deny that the applicant in matter 20-005097/AABS, was also involved in a prior accident in June 2017 (‘the previous accident’). In this case, the applicant in matter 20-005078/AABS is the mother of the minor applicant.

72The applicant submitted that as a result of the accident, her pre-existing condition, scoliosis, that will prevent her from reaching maximum medical recovery if subjected to the $3,500.00 limit of the MIG. As described above, the applicant must demonstrate that she has a documented, pre-existing condition and provide compelling medical evidence that she requires removal from the MIG to receive maximal medial recovery.

73The applicant took the position that as a result of her pre-existing conditions, back pain and scoliosis, she cannot achieve maximal medical recovery within the MIG.

74After the accident, the applicant complained of back pain, and she attended the Emergency Department²⁶. She then attended an assessment with Dr. Douglas Pooley, Chiropractor²⁷, who noted the applicant’s main issue was left mid/low back pain.

75In a Treatment Confirmation Form²⁸ (‘OCF-23’) Dr. Pooley noted the following injuries the applicant suffered as a result of the accident: “WAD II with complaints of neck pain with musculoskeletal signs, dislocation, sprain and strain of joints and ligaments thorax, and dislocation, sprain and strain of joints and ligaments of lumbar spine and pelvis”.

76The applicant then saw her Family Doctor, Dr. Perera²⁹, who noted that the applicant had lower back pain when she stretched and that she had been in a previous car accident. Based on this, Dr. Perera opined the applicant’s pain was likely muscular in nature³⁰.

77The applicant’s first documented notation of scoliosis was from Registered Physical Therapist Cheryl Richardson³¹, nearly eleven and a half months after the subject accident. Ms. Richardson noted during her assessment of the applicant that she suffered from “possible scoliosis”. The applicant attended treatment with Ms. Richardson to address her lower back pain³².

78The applicant then attended an Occupational Therapy assessment³³ with Rachel Korol, Occupational Therapist where the applicant noted her issues were related to her neck pain, mid back pain and decreased focus. Ms. Korol noted the applicant’s pain when sitting and recommended she attend occupational therapy to address her pain management and properly return her functionality to that pre-accident as well as physiotherapy for her pain strategies, strengthening and stretching of her back.

79When the applicant returned to Dr. Perera³⁴, the doctor noted that the applicant has had back pain since her accident in 2017 and has no improvement with physiotherapy. Dr. Perera ordered an x-ray of the applicant’s back to rule out a back abnormality. Based on this, Dr. Perera opined that the applicant’s pain was mechanical in nature and that she would be referred to a pediatric orthopedic physician if her x-ray was abnormal.

80Upon analysis of this x-ray³⁵, the applicant was diagnosed with “mild scoliosis measured at approximately 7 degrees”.

81The applicant was also diagnosed with myofascial thoracolumbar pain and confirmed thoracic scoliosis by Ms. Richardson³⁶. Ms. Richardson recommended on-going physiotherapy and massage therapy.

82The applicant was assessed by Dr. Macaluso, Physiatrist³⁷, where the doctor noted³⁸ that the applicant was in a previous vehicular accident 3 months before the subject accident, where she suffered neck injuries. Dr. Macaluso opined that as a result of the subject accident, the applicant suffered chronic low back pain with a history of mild scoliosis. Dr. Macaluso recommended chiropractic care, massage and physiotherapy.

83The respondent disagreed with the applicant’s position. It argued that the applicant’s scoliosis was not caused by the accident and that the applicant has not provided medical evidence to demonstrate that this is a pre-existing condition.

84Instead, it argued that the applicant has only been diagnosed with soft tissue injuries as a result of the accident. The respondent relied on its section 44 assessment conducted by Dr. Allen Greenspoon, General Practitioner³⁹. Despite having the information about the applicant’s earlier accident, Dr. Greenspoon found that the applicant’s injuries were soft tissue in nature and that the applicant did not have any pre-existing conditions or medical issues that were aggravated by the accident. Based on this, he opined that the applicant’s injuries could be treated in the MIG.

85The respondent also argued that the applicant had not provided persuasive evidence that she had a documented, pre-existing injury. It submitted that her scoliosis was only formally diagnosed 1 year and 4 months after the accident⁴⁰ and that the applicant had not provided medical records demonstrating that her back-pain preceded the accident.

86The respondent submitted that the applicant has not proven, based on a balance of probabilities that her scoliosis and back pain were caused or worsened as a result of the accident.

87The respondent also argued that the presence of a pre-existing condition alone does not require removal from the MIG, as seen in 16-000045 v Aviva Canada⁴¹. The respondent submitted that as the applicant has not demonstrated why her alleged back pain and scoliosis requires removal from the MIG to reach maximum medical recovery, she has failed to meet her evidence burden.

Analysis

88After considering the submissions, based on a balance of probabilities, I find that the applicant’s back pain and scoliosis are not pre-existing conditions requiring removal from the MIG.

89Though I was persuaded that the applicant suffered back pain as a result of the accident, she has failed to demonstrate based on a balance of probabilities that said back pain and her scoliosis are pre-existing medical conditions that were documented by a health practitioner before the accident.

90Instead, I was more persuaded by the respondent’s position, and that the applicant had suffered soft tissue injuries as a result of the accident. This was because the applicant provided no pre-accident records that documented her medical conditions before the accident.

91Though the applicant argued that given the applicant’s previous accident, her similar injuries and the temporal connection and that it was reasonable to conclude that the subject accident have prevented her from reaching maximum medical recovery, I disagreed.

92The applicant provided no medical records from her first accident, nor any medical professional’s opinion from between her first and second accident that supported this position.

93I put less weight on the findings of Dr. Macaluso, as he assessed the applicant approximately 3 years and twenty-two days after the accident. This evidence did demonstrate that the applicant had chronic pain from soft tissue injuries but did not provide information regarding the methodology he used to make determinations regarding causation, nor provide persuasive medical evidence to show this.

94Though Ms. Korol suspected the applicant had scoliosis after the accident, this too does not demonstrate a pre-existing condition.

95Furthermore, I would have expected the clinical notes and records of the applicant’s family doctor, Dr. Perera, to contain notations regarding the applicant’s pre-existing condition or at least its symptomology, which was not the case here.

96As the applicant has not met her evidence burden, her injuries are found to be within the MIG.

COSTS

97The applicant also made submissions related to costs, in accordance with the Tribunal’s Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, specifically Rule 19. This Rule allows a party to requests costs in writing or orally at a case conference or hearing, or at any time before the decision or order is released.

98The applicant submitted that the respondent’s conduct warrant costs in the amount of $1,000.00. The applicant did not provide the basis for this calculation but made general submissions that the respondent knowingly and unfairly denied the applicant’s benefits.

99The respondent did not address costs in its submissions.

100When considering the applicant’s request, I turned to Rule 19.4, which states that submissions on costs shall set out the reasons for the request and the particulars of the other party’s conduct that they alleged to be unreasonable, frivolous, vexatious or in bad faith.

101In this matter, the applicant has not done so. Though she provided general statements regarding her characterization of the respondent’s conduct, she failed to provide particulars regarding the above-mentioned conduct. Therefore, the request for costs is denied.

Interest and award

102In accordance with section 51 of the Schedule, interest is only payable on overdue payments.

103Section 10 of Regulation 664 provides that, if the Tribunal finds that an insurer has unreasonably withheld or delayed payment of benefits, the Tribunal may award a lump sum of up to 50 per cent of the amount in which the person was entitled together with interest on all amounts owing to the insured (including unpaid interest).

104Since I have determined that no benefits are owing, no interest or award is payable.

CONCLUSIONS & ORDERS

105For matter 20-005078/AABS:

a. I find that the applicant’s injuries are found to be within the Minor Injury Guidelines and no benefits are payable.

b. No interest or award is payable.

c. No costs are payable.

106For matter 20-005097/AABS:

a. I find that the applicant’s injuries are found to be within the Minor Injury Guidelines and no benefits are payable.

b. No interest or award is payable.

c. No costs are payable.

Footnotes

1. 1O. Reg. 34/10 as amended.
2. 2Scarlett v. Belair Insurance, 2015 ONSC 3635.
3. 3On June 12, 2017.
4. 4Dated October 5, 2020.
5. 5Dated January 12, 2021.
6. 616-000642 v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2016 CanLII 93132 (ON LAT).
7. 716-000045 v Aviva Canada, 2016 CanLII 60728 (ON LAT).
8. 8Dated June 2, 2020.
9. 9As seen in the Occupational Therapy Assessment of Ms. Korol.
10. 10In the Report of Dr. Macaluso dated October 5, 2020.
11. 11Dated October 29, 2018.
12. 12Dated January 21, 2019.
13. 13Dated October 5, 2020.
14. 14Dated August 20, 2018.
15. 15Dated February 12, 2018.
16. 16Dated December 11, 2018.
17. 1716-000438 v The Personal Insurance Company, 2017 CanLII 59515 (ON LAT).
18. 18Scarlett v. Belair Insurance, 2015 ONSC 3635.
19. 19Dated January 23, 2018.
20. 20Which occurred on February 18, 2019.
21. 2116-000438 v The Personal Insurance Company, 2017 CanLII 59515 (ON LAT).
22. 22Dated June 2, 2020.
23. 23Costco prescription summary of the applicant.
24. 24Shoppers Drug Mart prescription summary of the applicant
25. 2516-000438 v The Personal Insurance Company, 2017 CanLII 59515 (ON LAT).
26. 26Emergency records of the London Health Sciences Centre dated September 2, 2017.
27. 27On September 11, 2017.
28. 28Dated September 13, 2017.
29. 29On May 8, 2018.
30. 30Based on the clinical notes and records of Dr. Perera of May 8, 2018.
31. 31On August 23, 2018.
32. 32From September to November 2018.
33. 33On November 22, 2018.
34. 34On January 21, 2019.
35. 35Completed in the Radiology Consultation Report dated January 21, 2019.
36. 36In the Physiotherapy Progress Report of Cheryl Richardson dated October 22, 2019.
37. 37On September 24, 2020.
38. 38In the Physiatry Report of Dr. Steven Macaluso dated October 5, 2020.
39. 39Dated February 19, 2019.
40. 40Based on the clinical notes and records of Dr. Perera of January 23, 2019.
41. 4116-000045 v Aviva Canada, 2016 CanLII 60728 (ON LAT).