Licence Appeal Tribunal
Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act
Between:
Deborah Foley Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Colin Osterberg, Member
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Deborah Foley, Self-represented For the Respondent: Sanjay Kapur, Agent
Heard by Teleconference: January 6, 2022
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
OVERVIEW
1Deborah Foley (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle, under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on November 17, 2021. At the time of the impoundment, the driver, the appellant’s roommate Amber Cutler, was driving with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days. On January 1, 2022, the impoundment period ended, and the vehicle was released to the appellant.
2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.
3For the reasons set out below, the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.
ISSUE TO BE DETERMINED
4The issue to be determined in this appeal is whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
LAW
5Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.
6Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that to show there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
7If the owner fails to establish that there is no alternative available, then her appeal will fail. If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health or safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.
8The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for employment or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle and additional criteria are met.
9The Tribunal is not able to consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.
EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS
10The evidence presented at the hearing demonstrates that the appellant had alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to her and her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result.
11The appellant’s evidence is that, during the impoundment period she was working nights as a cleaner at two restaurants in Orillia. In addition, three weeks ago she obtained contract employment at the Honda manufacturing facility in Alliston working full-time days. The appellant borrowed her daughter’s car so that she could continue working and this created significant inconvenience for her daughter. There was no evidence presented to show that the appellant’s daughter suffered more than inconvenience as the result of allowing the appellant to use her vehicle. The appellant missed no time from working as the result of the impoundment.
12In addition, the appellant was required to walk to get her groceries while her vehicle was impounded. The store where she shops is close enough that walking is possible, but this was inconvenient for her.
13The appellant raises no other impacts which resulted from the impoundment.
14Based on the above evidence, I conclude that the appellant has failed to show that there was no alternative to the impounded vehicle available to her. The appellant was able to attend work and to conduct her personal affairs during the impoundment period, albeit with inconvenience.
15In addition to the above, the appellant alleges that the payment of the costs of towing and impounding the vehicle has caused her to experience significant hardship. I am sympathetic to the appellant’s situation, but this is not a factor the Tribunal may consider in determining whether the impoundment has caused exceptional hardship. Under s. 10(3) of the Regulation, financial or economic loss to a person can only be considered if certain conditions are met, the first of which is that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Since the appellant had alternatives to the impounded vehicle, financial hardship cannot be considered.
16Given that the appellant has failed to show that there was no alternative to the impounded vehicle available to her, I need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test. Although the impoundment resulted in inconvenience, the appellant has failed to prove exceptional hardship under the Act and her appeal must fail.
ORDER
17For the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
_______________________
Colin Osterberg, Member
RELEASED: January 12, 2022