Tribunals Ontario Licence Appeal Tribunal
Tribunaux décisionnels Ontario Tribunal d'appel en matière de permis
Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8 from an impoundment pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act.
Between:
Linda Benedict Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent
MOTION DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Evelyn Spence, Member
Appearances:
For the Applicant: Linda Benedict
For the Respondent: Sanjay Kapur, Agent
Heard by Teleconference:
April 27, 2022
MOTION DECISION AND ORDER
A. Overview
1This is a decision on a motion brought by the appellant, Linda Benedict, to extend the time to appeal a motor vehicle impoundment.
2The appellant’s vehicle was ordered to be impounded on February 16, 2022, on the grounds that it was being operated by a driver whose licence was suspended. Pursuant to section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8 (the “Act”), the impoundment period is 45 days.
3Notwithstanding the legislated timeline for appealing under the Act, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, together with her Notice of Motion, on April 5, 2022, forty-eight (48) days after the impoundment of her vehicle, thirty-three (33) days after the 15-day statutory appeal period had expired, and three days after her vehicle was available to be released to her. The appellant submits that the exceptional hardship occurred on or shortly before the day when she went to pick up her vehicle, resulting from the significant cost of the impoundment fees.
4The Tribunal scheduled a case conference, held by teleconference on April 27, 2022, to have the motion heard. Both parties attended and provided evidence and arguments on the motion.
B. ISSUE AND RESULT
5The issue to be decided in the present motion is whether the appellant has established reasonable grounds to support an extension of time to appeal the impoundment.
6For the reasons that follow, and in considering the parties’ evidence and arguments, I find that the appellant has not established reasonable grounds to support the extension of time to appeal the impoundment. The motion is therefore denied, and the appeal is dismissed.
C. LAW
7The intent of the Act is to promote public safety by preventing persons whose driver’s licenses are suspended for certain reasons from operating motor vehicles. Pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act, a vehicle shall be detained and impounded where the licence of the person driving the vehicle is under suspension for various Criminal Code-related offences.
8The owner of a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act may, pursuant to s. 50.2 of the Act, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.
9The Tribunal’s powers on an appeal are limited. It may either:
confirm the impoundment, or
order the vehicle to be released (Act, s. 50.2(5)).
10As a practical matter, if, after an appeal, the Tribunal finds that one or more of the grounds of appeal have been met, the respondent Registrar would be required to reimburse the appellant for the impound fees for the period of impoundment (Act, s.50.2(7)).
11The deadline for commencing an appeal is set out in Ontario Regulation 631/98, s. 9 which states:
An appeal to the Tribunal…with respect to the impoundment of a motor vehicle…shall be commenced by filing with the Tribunal a notice of appeal…within 15 days after the vehicle was detained…”
12Finally, this Tribunal has been given the statutory discretion to extend the time for filing an appeal pursuant to section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sched. G, which reads:
Despite any limitation of time fixed by or under any Act for the giving of any notice requiring a hearing by the Tribunal, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief, it may,
a) extend the time for giving the notice either before or after the expiration of the limitation of time so limited; and
b) give the directions that it considers proper as a result of extending the time.
D. ANALYSIS
13The Tribunal has consistently been guided by the following factors when deciding whether there are grounds to grant an extension of time:
a) The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;
b) The length of the delay;
c) Prejudice to the other party1; and
d) The merits of the appeal.
14The onus is on the appellant to address these issues when asking for relief from the timelines for appeal.
Bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period
15Ms. Benedict confirmed that she had been informed by the police officer, on the day of the impoundment, that she had the option to file an appeal in respect of the impoundment, such that she was aware of her right to appeal. She only decided to appeal, however, when she discovered that the impoundment of her vehicle would cost almost $1,000 more than the impound fees her friend, Harry, had paid only weeks prior (at a different towing yard).
16In her testimony, the appellant stated very clearly that she only formed an intention to appeal the impoundment near the end of the impoundment period, when she learned about how much the impoundment would cost. Put another way; the appellant formed the intention to appeal approximately 30 days after the expiry of the appeal period.
17Based on the appellant’s admission, it is clear she did not have a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period.
Length of the delay
18The length of the delay in this matter is considerable. The appellant filed her Notice of Appeal thirty-three (33) days after the 15-day statutory appeal period had expired, and forty-eight (48) days after the impoundment of her vehicle.
Prejudice to the other Party
19The 45-day impoundment period expired on April 2, 2022. In this particular case, I find that the appellant’s delay in filing her appeal would certainly result in significant prejudice to the respondent.
20Specifically, if the appellant were allowed to proceed and should the Tribunal find in her favour, the Registrar would be responsible for paying impound fees for the full 45-day period of impoundment. These fees far exceed what the Registrar would otherwise have been required to pay had the appeal been filed and the matter heard within the timelines set out in the statute.
Merits of the Appeal
21On a motion to extend time, the appellant need not establish her case on a balance of probabilities but only that her version of events, if believed, could reasonably result in a favourable outcome.
22The appellant alleges that she suffered exceptional hardship as a result of the impoundment. Pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Regulation, the Tribunal’s first step, in assessing exceptional hardship, is to consider whether an alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available. If the Tribunal finds that there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle, then the Tribunal need not consider any other requirements – the ground of exceptional hardship will have failed.
23Moreover, the legal threshold for confirming whether there is an “alternative to the impounded vehicle” is not whether the appellant owns or has access to a second vehicle. Instead, s. 10 (4) of the Regulation sets out what an appellant must show in order to meet this initial prong of the test, as follows:
In order to show that no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available… the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
24In the present case, there were alternatives to the impounded motor vehicle. Specifically, the appellant testified that Harry, who resides with her and with his grandmother, owned his own vehicle. Notwithstanding that his own vehicle had been recently impounded because he does not have a valid driver’s licence, Harry had been driving the appellant’s vehicle at the time the vehicle was impounded. His vehicle was released from the impound facility on February 21, 2022, which was five (5) days after the appellant’s vehicle was impounded. The appellant stated that after Harry’s vehicle was released from the impound facility, he parked it at his grandmother’s home, which the appellant estimated was 5 kilometers away. She confirmed that Harry’s vehicle was driveable and in working condition, however she stated that she did not avail herself of the vehicle because she “never thought” to do so.
25The appellant also stated that she was able to get rides from others during the impound period, including from Harry’s grandmother, to get groceries and run errands. Harry’s grandmother drove her to the impound facility on the date her vehicle was available for release.
26Sections 10(2) and 10(3) of the Regulation prohibit the Tribunal from considering financial or economic loss or loss of education in determining whether exceptional hardship exists, unless the appellant is able to demonstrate that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. In the present case, there were alternatives to the impounded vehicle, such that the appellant’s appeal would likely fail on this ground.
DECISION
27In considering each of the four factors listed above, I find that the appellant has failed to establish reasonable grounds to support an extension of time for the filing of her appeal, and I decline to grant the motion.
28An impoundment appeal is intended to be a pathway by which an owner can have their vehicle released from impoundment if the owner can establish one of the specified grounds for appeal. It is not meant to be a means by which an owner can obtain compensation for any financial hardship they may experience resulting from the impoundment fees, as in the present case.
E. ORDER:
29The appellant’s motion is dismissed. Pursuant to Rule 3.4 of the Tribunal’s Common Rules of Practice and Procedure (October 17, 2017), I dismiss this appeal without a hearing because the statutory requirements for bringing the appeal have not been met.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
____________________________ Evelyn Spence, Member
Released: May 9, 2022
Footnotes
- 11913 v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2019 CanLII 32250; 7816 v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2013 CanLII 334.