Licence Appeal Tribunal

Safety, Licensing Appeals and Standards Tribunals Ontario

Tribunal d’appel en matière de permis Tribunaux de la sécurité, des appels en matière de permis et des normes Ontario

Date: 2022-05-03

Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8 from an impoundment pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act.

Between:

Kurstin Santokhi Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Evelyn Spence

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Self-represented

For the Respondent: Steve Grootenboer, Agent

Heard by Teleconference:

April 25, 2022

DECISION AND ORDER

A. Overview

1The appellant, Kurstin Santokhi, appeals the 45-day impoundment of her motor vehicle. On March 30, 2022 the vehicle was impounded because it was being driven by her sister’s boyfriend, whose driver’s licence was under suspension as a result of a Criminal Code conviction.

2The appellant requests that the Tribunal make a finding that the impoundment be set aside and the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) be ordered to release the vehicle.

B. ISSUE AND DECISION

3The issue to be decided is whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H8 (the “Act”).

4For the reasons that follow, the impoundment is confirmed. I find that the impoundment does not result in exceptional hardship.

C. LAW AND ANALYSIS

5The intent of the Act is to promote public safety by preventing persons whose driver’s licenses are suspended for certain reasons from operating motor vehicles. Pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act, a vehicle shall be detained and impounded where the licence of the person driving the vehicle is under suspension for various Criminal Code-related offences.

6The owner of a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act may, pursuant to s. 50.2 of the Act, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle. As a practical matter, if the Tribunal finds that one or more of the grounds of appeal have been met, the respondent Registrar would be required to reimburse the appellant for the impound fees for the period of impoundment.

7There are limited grounds on which an owner may appeal an impoundment. The appellant bears the burden of proving that they fall within one of the grounds of appeal set out in s. 50.2(3) of the Act.

8In this case, the single ground listed in the appellant’s Notice of Appeal and identified in the case conference report and order was that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

a) Exceptional Hardship

9Section 10 of Ontario Regulation 631/98 (the “Regulation”), made under the Act, sets out the criteria that the Tribunal may consider, and others that it may not, in determining whether an impoundment will result in exceptional hardship. The test for exceptional hardship in the impoundment context is very difficult to meet.

10Pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Regulation, the Tribunal’s first step, in assessing exceptional hardship, is to consider whether an alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available. If the Tribunal finds that there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle, then the Tribunal need not consider any other requirements – the ground of exceptional hardship will have failed. Pursuant to s. 10(2)(a), under no circumstances can the Tribunal consider “inconvenience to any person” in determining exceptional hardship.

The appellant’s circumstances

11The appellant lives in a home with her mother, father, and her aunt, who is disabled. Her parents are separated, with her mother living on the upper level of the home and her father living on the lower level. She has four vehicles registered under her name, however she testified that the impounded vehicle is her primary vehicle and the only one that she can drive. The other vehicles include a Dodge Caravan, which her father uses exclusively for his work, and two vehicles that she identified were her father’s ‘project’ or ‘leisure’ cars, both of which are equipped with manual transmission. Only one of the leisure vehicles has valid plates and is in good working order, and Ms. Santokhi stated that her father purchased and is the primary driver on each of the additional vehicles.

12Ms. Santokhi is employed full-time, and works from 10am to 6pm, Monday to Friday. The appellant also holds a secondary, part-time, job as a driver for Amazon. Prior to her vehicle having been impounded, Ms. Santokhi’s mother, who owns her own vehicle and is employed at the same place as the appellant, would drive the appellant to work each day. The appellant’s sister would then pick the appellant up from work with the appellant’s vehicle, after which Ms. Santokhi would begin her second shift making deliveries for Amazon with her own vehicle.

13The appellant explained the arrangement she had made with her sister, where her sister was permitted to use the appellant’s vehicle during the days, when the appellant was at work, so that she could perform the duties of her work as a private courier for medical specimens. Ms. Santokhi explained that the arrangement was in place because she does not use her vehicle during the day and because her sister requires a vehicle for her work.

14As a result of the impoundment, the appellant has not been able to perform her secondary job with Amazon, and she now travels to and from work with her mother. She testified that her primary, full-time, work has not been impacted and that getting to and from work has been “fine,” but that she does not have options available to her to perform her second job with Amazon.

15The appellant states that she has not been financially able to rent a second vehicle during the impoundment period, given that she continues to pay $500/month to cover the leasing fees and insurance costs for her vehicle. She also testified that her mother and father do not permit Ms. Santokhi to use their vehicles to make her deliveries with Amazon or to conduct general errands, including to take her aunt on outings or to visit her grandmother. Moreover, she stated that she does not know how to drive a manual vehicle and is not comfortable learning to drive on an expensive vehicle that was purchased by her father.

16The appellant did not suggest that her immediate or essential needs have been wanting during the impound period. She has continued to acquire groceries, purchased by her mother and father in their vehicles, and has not had to miss any medical or other appointments. When asked whether she has considered taking public transportation to facilitate her errands or her visits with her grandmother, Ms. Santokhi answered that she has tried not to, in order to keep her costs down. She further stated that she has cut activities from her life, which has been inconvenient and is not sustainable over the long-term.

17The appellant’s aunt is typically transported by the appellant’s vehicle on weekends, so that she can enjoy activities outside of the house. While the appellant currently cannot take her aunt on outings in her vehicle, she testified that she has been able to accompany and assist her aunt on walks during the impound period.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

18The legal threshold for confirming whether there is an “alternative to the impounded vehicle” is not simply whether the appellant owns or has access to a second vehicle. Instead, s. 10 (4) of the Regulation sets out what an appellant must show in order to meet this initial prong of the test, as follows:

In order to show that no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available… the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

19Sections 10(2) and 10(3) of the Regulation prohibit the Tribunal from considering financial or economic loss or loss of education in determining whether exceptional hardship exists, unless the appellant is able to demonstrate that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

20In this case, the appellant’s evidence is that there are alternatives to the impounded vehicle, in that Ms. Santokhi:

• has access to at least one other vehicle, which has valid licence plates and is in working condition;

• has been able to avail herself of rides from her mother to travel to and from work;

• has had her immediate needs met through assistance from others;

• has made arrangements to spend time with her aunt, doing activities that do not require use of a vehicle; and,

• has chosen to forego certain activities.

21While some of the above-noted alternatives may not be ideal, and do not provide her with the freedom to travel independently or perform her secondary work delivering parcels for Amazon, they are available options which have helped to mitigate the threat or loss of her full-time employment and have assisted her in meeting her immediate and pressing needs.

22Given that I have found there are alternatives to the impounded vehicle available, I do not need to consider the other provisions of s.10(1) of the Regulation.

D. ORDER:

23Pursuant to s. 50.2(5) of the Act, I deny the appeal and confirm the impoundment of Ms. Santokhi’s motor vehicle. The vehicle shall remain at the impound facility for the remainder of the impound period.