Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended
Between:
Sonya Azimi
Appellant
-and-
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR:
Laura Hodgson
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant
Self-represented Neptune Azimi (appellant’s daughter)
For the Respondent Held by Teleconference:
Stella Velocci, Agent April 22, 2022
1The appellant’s vehicle was impounded for 45 days pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the Act). This section requires a police officer to impound a motor vehicle if it is not equipped with an ignition interlock device and the driver is required to have such a device.
2On March 9, 2022, the appellant’s son, who holds a G1 licence with conditions, was driving the appellant’s vehicle and was stopped by police. It was discovered that he had a condition on his licence prohibiting him from driving a vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device. The appellant’s vehicle was not so equipped. This condition stems from the appellant’s son’s 2016 conviction for impaired driving. The impoundment period for the appellant’s vehicle ends April 22, 2022, the day after this hearing.
3The appellant testified (through interpretation by her daughter) that her son had only driven her vehicle a short distance in a mall parking lot. She stated that she was unaware that her son required an ignition interlock device to drive.
4There are limited grounds on which an owner may appeal an impoundment. In this case, the appellant is appealing on the ground that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship (s. 50.2(3)(d)). The appellant testified that her daughter, who very recently had a baby, has had to take her to her appointments and to get groceries. Because of the impoundment she had to reschedule a dentist appointment. On one occasion, the appellant had to take a taxi to a store. The appellant’s daughter testified that it has been difficult for her to assist her mother while also caring for her newborn. The appellant does not work and is in receipt of disability benefits. She testified that it will be difficult to pay the impoundment fees.
Law and Analysis
5The test for exceptional hardship is set out in Ontario Regulation 631/98 (the Regulation), a regulation made under the Highway Traffic Act. In determining exceptional hardship, the Tribunal must first determine whether the appellant has established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
6In order to show that no alternative vehicle is available, s. 10(4) of the Regulation requires the owner to demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could mitigate or eliminate a threat or loss. This includes using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without a vehicle.
7Sections 10 (2) and 10 (3) of the Regulation set out factors that may or may not be considered by the Tribunal in certain circumstances. The Tribunal cannot consider “inconvenience to any person” (ss. 10 (2) (a) and (3)).
8With respect to the other factors in s. 10(2), namely financial or economic loss, loss of employment or employment opportunities and loss of education or training opportunities, the Tribunal may only consider those factors, if there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, and that, among other things, the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting.
9The vehicle impoundment has clearly been difficult for both the appellant and her daughter, who provided her mother transportation even after having a baby. The legislation, however, creates a high threshold for establishing “exceptional hardship”. The appellant has not met this threshold. She has not established that she does not have an alternative to her impounded vehicle as set out in [s. 10 (4)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-631-98/