Licence Appeal Tribunal
Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act
Between:
Jason Reynolds
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Colin Osterberg, Member
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Jason Reynolds, Self-represented
For the Respondent: Stella Velocci, Agent
Heard by Teleconference: April 5, 2022
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
OVERVIEW
1Jason Reynolds (the "appellant") appeals the impoundment of his motor vehicle under s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the "Act"). The appellant's motor vehicle was impounded on March 9, 2022. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant was driving the vehicle while his licence was suspended due to a criminal conviction. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.
2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.
3For the reasons set out below, the appeal is dismissed, and the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.
ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED
4The issue to be determined is whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS
5The respondent presented evidence which establishes that:
(1) the appellant is the registered owner of the impounded vehicle, a 2012 Ford Focus;
(2) on March 9, 2022, the police discovered the impounded vehicle being driven by the appellant; and
(3) the appellant's licence was under suspension at the time his vehicle was detained for the purpose of impoundment.
6The appellant alleges that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship and argues that his vehicle should be released pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
7Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the "Regulation") sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. Section 10(3)(d) of the Regulation provides that the Tribunal may only consider financial, economic, employment or educational losses impacting a person other than the suspended driver.
8According to the appellant, he lives alone and is the only person who is regularly transported by the impounded vehicle. He works part-time from home and does not allege that he needs the vehicle for work or that its impoundment would have any impact on anyone other than himself. In fact, he alleges that he intended to sell the vehicle to pay his next two months' rent had it not been impounded.
9Since the only person impacted by the impoundment is the appellant, I find that the Tribunal may not consider financial, economic, employment or educational losses when determining whether the appellant has shown that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
10Section 10(1) of the Regulation provides that, if the appellant can show that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available, the Tribunal must consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle or the community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used. Section 10(4) provides that, to show there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered that could eliminate or mitigate the threat or loss to the person.
11The appellant says that he intended to sell the impounded vehicle in order to pay his rent. He says that he will not have enough money to make his next rent payment because of the impoundment. Although the appellant initially said that he would end up homeless if his vehicle remains impounded, he later acknowledged that his parents will likely provide him with financial assistance so that he will be able to avoid that result.
12The appellant says that he is able to conduct all of his usual affairs by taking public transportation or taxi services. The evidence does not satisfy me that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle.
13Moreover, other than the suggestion that he might become homeless as a result of being unable to sell the vehicle, which he later acknowledged will not occur, the appellant did not present evidence of any other health or safety concerns which might result from the impoundment.
14Given that the appellant appears to be in little danger of becoming homeless, and that he intended to sell the vehicle had the impoundment not occurred, I am not satisfied that the impoundment will result in a threat to health or safety under s. 10(1) of the Regulation.
15In summary: the Tribunal is precluded by s. 10(3)(d) of the Regulation from considering financial, economic, employment or educational losses resulting from the impoundment; the appellant has failed to demonstrate that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle; and the appellant has failed to demonstrate any threat to health or safety which might result from the impoundment. As a result, the appellant has not satisfied me that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as it is defined under the Act.
ORDER
16For the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant's vehicle is confirmed.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Colin Osterberg, Member
RELEASED: April 12, 2022

