An appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of that Act
Between:
Mason Devon Andrus-Lake
Appellant
-and-
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
REASONS FOR MOTION DECISION
Adjudicator: Katherine Livingstone, Member
Appearances:
For the Appellant: self-represented
For the Respondent: S. Kapur, agent
Heard by teleconference: March 10, 2022
Background
1On February 5, 2022, the appellant’s vehicle was detained and impounded for 45 days pursuant to section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8 (“the Act”), after being driven by the appellant’s father whose licence was suspended at the time for a Criminal Code-related reason. The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on February 24, 2022, four days after the time allowed for filing an appeal.
2The appellant then brought a motion to extend the time for filing his appeal and a date for hearing the motion was set for March 10, 2022.
The Hearing
3The appellant appeared by teleconference, just before the 9:30 am start time. Initially his father was in the background, seemingly providing him with assistance with respect to the circumstances surrounding the filing of the motion. When I determined that the appellant was not alone, I requested his father leave the room, which appeared agreeable to the appellant.
4After the appellant made his submissions, I asked the Registrar’s agent to make submissions. As he was proceeding through his submissions, the appellant said something that was inaudible and then his line was disconnected.
5I waited several minutes on the line for the appellant to call back in before emailing the Tribunal’s case management officer (CMO) at 10:07 am, asking her to contact the appellant to try and ascertain what the problem was. I received an answer back from the CMO at 10:16 indicating she had left a voice message and sent an email to the appellant. At 10:18, the CMO advised that she would try to call again and at 10:21 she indicated she had left another voice message. In the meantime, I asked the Registrar’s agent to hang up and dial back in to make sure there was not a problem with the conference call system. I hung up and called back in as well. Neither of us had a problem signing back into the call.
6At 10:28 am, the CMO advised she had left another message asking the appellant to call. I waited until 10:45 am to see if the appellant reconnected and when I did not hear further from him, I terminated the hearing.
7As a result of the failure of the appellant to attend the entirety of the motion hearing, I am making my findings based on the submissions of the appellant that I did hear, bearing in mind the appellant bears the onus to demonstrate there are reasonable grounds for granting the extension.
Result
8The appellant’s motion to extend the time to file his appeal is denied.
Law and Analysis
9Pursuant to s. 9 of Ontario Regulation 631/98 under the Act, an appeal of a long-term impoundment is required to be filed within 15 days after the day the vehicle was detained.
10The Tribunal has jurisdiction to extend the time for filing of an appeal pursuant to s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Schedule G, which reads:
Despite any limitation of time fixed by or under any Act for the giving of any notice requiring a hearing by the Tribunal under section 11 or any other Act, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief, it may,
a) extend the time for giving the notice either before or after the expiration of the limitation of time so limited; and
b) give the directions that it considers proper as a result of extending the time.
11Determining whether there are reasonable grounds for an extension is not an exact formula. Referring to Manuel v. Registrar, Motor Vehicles Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492 (Div. Ct.), the Tribunal must consider the following factors in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to grant an extension of time:
a. The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;
b. The length of the delay;
c. Prejudice to the other party; and
d. The merits of the appeal.
12The analysis requires a balancing of these factors applied to the facts. No one factor takes precedence over the others. The overriding consideration is whether the “justice of the case” requires that an extension be granted.
13The onus is on the appellant to establish that there are reasonable grounds for granting the extension.
a) Bona Fide Intention to Appeal within the Appeal Period
14The appellant, who is eighteen years old, stated that he did not fully understand the process for appealing and that he “just lost track of time”. He said he did not know there was a time limit although he did acknowledge having read the papers provided at the time of the impoundment. In his application he also said his internet was “horrible”. He said he started looking at appealing about 2 days after the impoundment.
15I found his answers about the steps he took towards appealing the impoundment to be somewhat vague and conclude that although he may have started to think about appealing within the appeal period, he took a rather relaxed approach to completing the appeal papers with no real concern about the timeliness of his application. I find the appellant has not demonstrated he had a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period
b) The length of the delay
16The appellant’s notice of appeal was received four days after the 15 day period specified in s. 9 of the Regulation. This is not a significant delay
c) Prejudice to the other party
17If an extension of the time to file was granted, it would result in prejudice to the respondent. This is because if the appellant was successful on the appeal, the respondent would be responsible for the cost of the impoundment. If the appeal had been heard earlier, the financial burden on the respondent would in all likelihood be lessened. This factor weighs against granting an extension of time.
d) The merits of the appeal
18While acknowledging the low threshold for satisfying this ground of appeal, I find the merits of the appeal to be very weak. The appellant appeals based on exceptional hardship. Specifically, he alleges the impoundment has impacted him getting to work as he sometimes has to walk as other family members’ vehicles “are not always available” or he has to get rides “from various members of the community”. He is also finding it difficult to take his father and little brother where they want to go.
19Although I am not deciding whether the vehicle should be released due to exceptional hardship, a few words can be said. For this ground to succeed, s 10(2) of the Regulation requires the appellant to demonstrate that there is not alternative to the impounded vehicle. There was no evidence before me on this question and without such evidence, I could not consider this ground of appeal.
20While it is likely that the impoundment has caused inconvenience for the appellant, this is not a factor I can consider. There was nothing before me to demonstrate his situation approached exceptional hardship.
21In the circumstances, I find the appellant has not demonstrated he had a bona fide intention to appeal within the legislated time period, his delay resulted in prejudice to the respondent and there is little, if any, merit to his appeal. I conclude he has failed to establish reasonable grounds for an extension of time to file his appeal. The justice of case requires that the requested extension be denied.
ORDER
22The appellant’s motion to extend the time to file his appeal is denied and the appeal is dismissed. The Tribunal file will be closed.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Katherine Livingstone, Member
Released: March 14, 2022