Date: 2022-03-07

An appeal under subsection 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from

the impoundment of a motor vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Patricia Godin

Appellant

-and-

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Laura Hodgson, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Self Represented

For the Respondent: Sanjay Kapur, Agent

Place and date of hearing: By teleconference, February 25, 2022

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

Overview

1The appellant’s motor vehicle was detained and impounded on January 30, 2022, for 45 days under s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8 (the “Act”). This section allows a police officer to detain and impound a motor vehicle driven on a highway if the driver’s licence of the driver is suspended for a Criminal Code related reason. In this case, the appellant’s son was driving the appellant’s motor vehicle. He had a suspended licence at the time.

2The appellant relies on the ground that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

3Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, and for the reasons given below, I find that the appellant failed to establish exceptional hardship pursuant to the legislation and regulations. The appeal is dismissed, and the impoundment confirmed.

Exceptional Hardship

4The appellant testified that she requires her vehicle to assist her adult daughter who is immune compromised because of an organ transplant. She indicated that without her vehicle she is unable to take her daughter, who lives twenty minutes away, for groceries. She is also unable to bring her daughter to the appellant’s home so she can do her laundry. The appellant provided a letter from her daughter’s physician indicating that the daughter is on immune suppression therapy for a prior organ transplant and requires “limited exposure in some circumstances”. While the appellant’s daughter did not testify, she confirmed in a letter to the Tribunal that her mother assists her with groceries and laundry.

5The appellant testified that her husband, who has his own vehicle, is currently at a friend’s home, approximately an hour away, looking after their animals. She agreed that he could possibly return home to assist his daughter. The appellant also acknowledged that she could ask her sister for assistance but said that she would prefer not to. The appellant testified that, due to COVID, she would not take public transportation. She agreed that it was open to her to use an UBER or taxi to deliver groceries or laundry to her daughter but indicated that she also refuses to use those services because of COVID related concerns.

6The appellant testified that because of the stress of the impoundment she has been suffering severe headaches. She testified that she has spoken to a doctor and is taking over the counter medications.

Law and Analysis

7Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

8Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. If the owner fails to establish that there is no reasonable alternative available, then her appeal must fail. In order to show that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person.

9If she does establish that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health or safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for employment or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, the loss will be immediate, significant, and lasting, and that the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle.

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

12The appellant has not established that she does not have an alternative to her impounded vehicle as set out in s. 10(4) of the Regulation. She acknowledged having alternative options of transportation, including using her husband or sister’s vehicle. It is also open to her to take an Uber or taxi to deliver the necessary items to her daughter. While it is understandable that the appellant does not want to inconvenience her husband or sister, as noted inconvenience is not a factor the Tribunal can ever consider. It is also open to the appellant to choose to not use individual transportation services such as Uber to make deliveries to her daughter but, in the circumstances, it constitutes a reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13Given that the appellant has failed to establish that there is no reasonable alternative, the appellant’s appeal must fail.

Conclusion and ORDER

14In all the circumstances, the appellant has not established that exceptional hardship will result or has resulted from the impoundment of the vehicle.

15The Tribunal confirms the impoundment.