Falis Mahhamoud v. Aviva General Insurance, 2022 CanLII 11144

Citation: Mahhamoud v. Aviva General Insurance, 2022 ONLAT 19-010985/AABS

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 19-010985/AABS

In the matter of an Application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.

Between:

Falis Mahhamoud

Applicant

and

Aviva General Insurance

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Lindsay Lake, Vice Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Applicant:

Alex Nikolaev, Counsel

For the Respondent:

Nisaa Khan, Counsel

HEARD:

By Way of Written Submissions

OVERVIEW

1The applicant, Falis Mahhamoud, was injured in an automobile accident on December 11, 2017, and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (Schedule)¹ from Aviva General Insurance, the respondent.

2The respondent denied the applicant’s claims for chiropractic treatment and massage therapy because it had determined that all of the applicant’s injuries fit the definition of “minor injury” as prescribed by s. 3(1) of the Schedule and, therefore, fall within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).² The applicant’s claim for non-earner benefits was also not paid by the respondent. As a result, the applicant submitted an application to the Licence Appeal Tribunal – Automobile Accident Benefits Service (Tribunal).

3A case conference was held on May 27, 2020 and the matter was scheduled for a combination hearing which included an in-person cross-examination on the applicant’s affidavit scheduled for February 19, 2021, followed by written submissions. The cross-examination of the applicant on her affidavit was cancelled, and the matter proceeded by way of written submissions only.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

4The following issues are to be decided:³

(i) Are the applicant’s injuries predominantly minor as defined in s. 3 of the Schedule and, therefore, subject to treatment within the MIG?

(ii) Is the applicant entitled to chiropractic treatment and massage therapy recommended by Mackenzie Medical Rehabilitation Centre Inc. as follows:

(a) $3,696.50 in a treatment plan (OCF-18) dated December 12, 2017?

(b) $1,977.05 in an OCF-18 dated April 24, 2018?

(iii) Is the applicant entitled to a non-earner benefit of $185.00 per week and, if so, for what period?⁴

(iv) Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?

RESULT

5I find that:

(i) The applicant has not met her onus of proving that her accident-related impairments warrant removal from the MIG;

(ii) The applicant is entitled to the December 12, 2017 and the April 24, 2018 OCF-18s, upon submission of an invoice for services rendered, plus interest in accordance with s. 51 of the Schedule as a result of the respondent’s failure to comply with s. 38(8) of the Schedule; and

(iii) The applicant is entitled to NEBs in the weekly amount of $185.00 plus interest in accordance with s. 51 of the Schedule from February 5, 2018 to December 11, 2019.

ANALYSIS

The Minor Injury Guideline (MIG)

6The MIG establishes a framework available to injured persons who sustain a minor injury as a result of an accident. A “minor injury” is defined in s. 3(1) of the Schedule as, “one or more of a strain, sprain, whiplash associated disorder, contusion, abrasion, laceration or subluxation and includes any clinically associated sequelae to such an injury.” The terms, “strain,” “sprain,” “subluxation,” and “whiplash associated disorder” are defined in the Schedule.

7Section 18(1) limits recovery for medical and rehabilitation benefits for predominantly minor injuries to $3,500.00. An applicant may receive payment for treatment beyond the $3,500.00 cap if they can demonstrate that a pre-existing condition, documented by a medical practitioner, prevents maximal medical recovery under the MIG or if they provide evidence that they sustained a psychological impairment or chronic pain with a functional impairment as a result of the accident. In this matter, the applicant submitted that her injuries are outside of the MIG because she sustained a psychological impairment.

8On the evidence, I find that the applicant has not met her burden of proving that her accident-related impairments require treatment beyond the MIG on the basis of a psychological impairment.

9The applicant relied upon two disabilities certificates (OCF-3s) dated December 21, 2017 and September 11, 2018 which list “other anxiety disorders” in the injury and sequela information sections. It is well settled, however, that OCF-3s are not evidence in and of themselves of a diagnosis. Further, both OCF-3s were completed by chiropractors, and psychological conditions fall outside a chiropractor’s scope of practice. Therefore, I give no weight to these two OCF-3s in determining whether the applicant suffered a psychological impairment as a result of the accident.

10The applicant also relied upon the November 6, 2020 Psychological Assessment Report by Dr. Ricardo Harris, psychologist.⁵ In this report, Dr. Harris diagnosed the applicant with a major depressive disorder, single episode, severe with anxious distress, and posttraumatic stress disorder, chronic, as a result of the accident.⁶ I also place little weight on Dr. Harris’ report and his diagnoses because Dr. Harris did not review any clinical notes and records (CNRs) from the applicant’s treating practitioners or any other medical reports as part of his assessment. Dr. Harris’ failure to review the CNRs specifically from the applicant’s family physicians and the Brampton Urgent Care Centre is significant, as these records show that the applicant made no psychological complaints to any of these health care providers since the accident. In fact, in a CNR entry dated August 29, 2018 of Dr. Sofia Elahi, one of the applicant’s family physicians, the applicant was noted as having no symptoms of depressed mood.⁷

11I place greater weight on the insurer’s examination (IE) reports as they are more consistent with the CNRs from the applicant’s family physicians and from Brampton Urgent Care Centre. For example, in the May 17, 2019 Psychiatry IE Assessment Report by Dr. Jay Sethi, psychiatrist,⁸ Dr. Sethi opined that the applicant did not exhibit any evidence of a major mental disorder as a direct result of the accident.⁹ In the October 4, 2018 Psychology IE Assessment Report by Dr. Arnold Rubenstein, psychologist,¹⁰ Dr. Rubenstein found that the applicant did not meet the criteria for any DSM-IV diagnosis.¹¹ Finally, in the December 21, 2020 Psychology IE Assessment Report by Dr. Fabio Salerno, psychologist,¹² Dr. Salerno opined that the applicant did not exhibit an accident-related psychological impairment and made no psychological diagnoses.¹³

12For all these reasons, I find that the applicant has failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that she sustained a psychological impairment as a result of the accident and, therefore, she is not removed from the MIG.

13Despite the maximum of $3,500.00 for medical and rehabilitation benefits available under the MIG being exhausted in this matter, the applicant submitted that the respondent’s denials of the disputed treatment plans failed to comply with s. 38(8) of the Schedule. As a result, the applicant’s position is that she is entitled to the disputed treatment plans as the respondent is precluded from taking the position that the MIG applies to the applicant’s accident-related impairments.

14Sections 38(8) and 38(11) of the Schedule set out strict notice requirements for insurers responding to treatment plans and specific consequences if they fail to comply. Section 38(8) requires an insurer to inform an insured person within ten business days after it receives an OCF-18 which goods, services, assessments, and/or examinations it agrees to pay for, and which it does not, as well the medical and other reasons why it considered any of the goods and services to not be reasonable and necessary.

15The requirement of medical reasons in s. 38(8) of the Schedule was further explained in the Tribunal’s reconsideration decision of T.F. v. Peel Mutual Insurance Company (T.F. v. Peel).¹⁴ In this decision, the Tribunal held:

An insurer’s “medical and any other reasons” should, at the very least, include specific details about the insured’s condition forming the basis for the insurer’s decision or, alternatively, identify information about the insured’s condition that the insurer does not have but requires. Additionally, an insurer should also refer to the specific benefit or determination at issue, along with any section of the Schedule upon which it relies. Ultimately, an insurer’s “medical and any other reasons” should be clear and sufficient enough to allow an unsophisticated person to make an informed decision to either accept or dispute the decision at issue. Only then will the explanation serve the Schedule’s consumer protection goal.¹⁵

16If an insurer fails to comply with its obligations under s. 38(8), the following consequences set out in s. 38(11) of the Schedule are triggered:

1. The insurer is prohibited from taking the position that the insured person has an impairment to which the Minor Injury Guideline applies.

2. The insurer shall pay for all goods, services, assessments, and examinations described in the treatment and assessment plan that relate to the period starting on the 11th business day after the day the insurer received the application and ending on the day the insurer gives a notice described in subsection (8).

17Therefore, s. 38(11)2 provides an insurer a window to “cure” a defective notice. Without such a cure, however, any goods, services, assessment, and/or examinations set out in the treatment plan are payable as an analysis as to the reasonableness and necessity of the proposed treatment under s. 15 of the Schedule is no longer required.¹⁶

18I find that the applicant is entitled to the December 12, 2017 and the April 24, 2018 OCF-18s, upon submission of an invoice for services rendered, as a result of the respondent’s failure to comply with s. 38(8) of the Schedule.

December 12, 2017 OCF-18

19On January 29, 2018, the respondent sent correspondence to the applicant regarding the December 12, 2017 OCF-18.¹⁷ It is unclear from this correspondence, however, what, if any, portion of the December 12, 2017 OCF-18 was denied. The respondent initially stated that $0.00 was payable, but then stated that treatment was payable under the MIG up to $2,200.00, and then requested additional information to consider approval of the recommended treatment plan for the full amount. I find that the January 29, 2018 correspondence is confusing and is not sufficiently clear to allow an unsophisticated person to make an informed decision to either accept or dispute the decision at issue because the respondent failed to set out which of the proposed goods, services, assessments, and/or examinations that it agreed to pay for or not agree to pay for.

20The January 29, 2018 correspondence also stated:

We need more information on your pre-existing condition

We have reviewed all of the documents relating to your claim together with the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) outlined in the Insurance Act, and it appears that your injuries are considered to be predominantly minor. The treatment and assessment plan we received from Mackenzie Medical Rehabilitation, however, states that you have a pre-existing medical condition that will prevent you from being treated within the MIG.

Please ask your health practitioner to send us your medical records and doctor’s notes for us to be able to approve your recommended treatment plan for the full amount. We need compelling medical evidence that describes your pre-existing condition before your accident. In addition, we need compelling medical evidence that describes [sic] [emphasis in original].

21I agree with the applicant that the respondent’s January 29, 2018 correspondence refers to the applicant’s injuries as being “predominantly minor,” but then fails to include specific details about the applicant’s condition or even mention what her “predominantly minor” injuries were. However, the T.F. v. Peel case is clear that it is also open to the respondent to identify information about the insured person’s condition that the insurer does not have but requires to comply with s. 38(8). While the applicant is correct that the January 29, 2018 correspondence is missing details about what additional “compelling medical evidence” the respondent required, the respondent did request the applicant’s medical records and doctor’s notes. Nonetheless, the respondent still failed to provide any specific details about the applicant’s condition as part of its request for further information.

22For these reasons, I find that the January 29, 2018 correspondence falls short of the respondent’s obligations to provide medical and other reasons under s. 38(8) of the Schedule. As a result, the consequences set out in s. 38(11) are triggered.

23The respondent, however, submitted that if I agreed that it breached its obligations under s. 38(8) of the Schedule that no payment is owing under s. 38(11) because the applicant has not proven that any of the proposed treatment was incurred. I disagree with the respondent’s position.

24In M.F.Z. v. Aviva,¹⁸ the Tribunal stated the following regarding interpretation of the Schedule:

The modern approach to statutory interpretation requires that the words of a statute be read “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament [citation omitted]. This approach involves consideration of three factors: the language of the provision, the context in which the language is used, and the purpose of the legislation or statutory scheme in which the language is found.¹⁹

25On a plain reading of s. 38(11)2, there is no requirement for any services to be “incurred” as the section only states “that relate to.” Furthermore, “incurred” is found nowhere in this section, yet it appears in countless other sections of the Schedule. Therefore, when s. 38(11)2 is read harmoniously with the Schedule as a whole, it is readily apparent that the legislature purposefully used the wording “that relate to” in lieu of “incurred” in s. 38(11)2. Moreover, when examining the intention of the Schedule, it would be contrary to its consumer protection purpose to require an injured person to incur an expense prior to a finding by the Tribunal on issues raised over compliance with s.38(8) of the Schedule.

26For all of these reasons, I find that:

(i) The respondent’s January 29, 2018 correspondence was non-complaint with s. 38(8) of the Schedule;

(ii) The respondent’s position that the OCF-18 must be incurred prior to a decision being rendered on the issue in order for the consequences in s. 38(11) to apply is incorrect;

(iii) The December 12, 2017 OCF-18 is payable starting on the 11th business day after the day that the respondent received the OCF-18 and upon submission of an invoice for services rendered despite the maximum benefits payable under the MIG being exhausted as the respondent is prohibited from taking the position that the MIG applies to the applicant’s impairments pursuant to s. 38(11)1 regarding this treatment plan; and

(iv) The respondent is not precluded from taking the position that the MIG applies to the applicant’s accident-related impairments pursuant to s. 38(11)1 for any future treatment plans as argued by the applicant. The Divisional Court has held that the language used in s. 38 of the Schedule refers to the specific treatment plan in question and, as a result, s. 38(11) does not impose a permanent prohibition on an insurer with respect to whether an insured person’s impairments is covered by the MIG or is subject to the $3,500.00 limit in s. 18(1).²⁰

April 24, 2018 OCF-18

27On August 28, 2018, the respondent sent correspondence to the applicant that addressed the April 24, 2018 OCF-18²¹ which stated:

Explanation of benefits

Based on the information we have available, your injuries appear to be treatable within the Minor Injury Guideline, [sic] (MIG) however the OCF18 submitted by your provider is recommending goods and services outside of the MIG.

We're unable to determine whether the recommendations on your OCF 18 are reasonable and necessary for the injuries you sustained and we're not able to pay your benefits at this time.

In the meantime, you are entitled to treatment under the Minor Injury Guideline up to a maximum of $2200. Please have your treating practitioner submit a Pre-Approved Treatment Confirmation Form (OCF-23) to Aviva. You may begin this treatment immediately [emphasis in original].

28The respondent also provided notice to the applicant in the same correspondence of her required attendance at an orthopaedic surgery IE assessment on September 24, 2018.

29Following the IE assessment, the respondent sent a follow-up correspondence to the applicant dated October 10, 2018²² which addressed several treatment plans including the April 24, 2018 OCF-18 and stated:

Reasons for our decision:

Please review the enclosed insurer’s examination completed Viewpoint under section 44 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS). The examination was completed by Louis Weisleder, Orthopaedic Surgeon, and Psychologist, Arnold Rubenstein, and is dated October 4, 2018. Dr. Weisleder reviewed the above noted Treatment and Assessment Plans (OCF-18), and has determined the treatment plans recommended are not reasonable and necessary from the injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident (MVA).

Furthermore, Dr. Weisleder concluded that the Minor Injury guideline (MIG) applies to your impairment as a result of injuries sustained in the above noted motor vehicle accident. Dr. Weisleder further opined that your impairment as related to the subject MVA, is pain-related, and therefore, does not require an Orthopaedic assessment at this stage.

From a Psychological perspective, Dr. Rubenstein concluded that you do not have any psychological accident-related impairment. As such, Dr. Rubenstein opined that the MIG also applies to your impairment, and that the proposed psychology assessment is not considered to be reasonable or necessary.

Therefore, Aviva will not fund any treatment/assessment incurred relating to these treatment plans. We encourage you to review the enclosed reports, for a detailed overview of Dr. Weisleder’s and Dr. Rubenstein’s clinical opinions and findings.

30I agree with the applicant that both the respondent’s August 28, 2018 correspondence as well as the October 10, 2018 correspondence fail to meet the requirements in s. 38(8) of the Schedule. Similar to the respondent’s January 29, 2018 correspondence, the August 28, 2018 is unclear what, if any portions, of the treatment plan were denied given the statement that the applicant was entitled to treatment up to $2,200.00. In any event, the August 28, 2018 correspondence is boilerplate and provides no information about the applicant’s impairments. Further, the October 10, 2018 correspondence simply restated Dr. Louis Weisleder’s general conclusion regarding the treatment plans and failed to provide an explanation as to why the respondent concluded that the April 24, 2018 OCF-18 was not reasonable and necessary. In sum, neither denial provided a medical reason as required by s. 38(8) to the applicant regarding the April 24, 2018 OCF-18 that was clear and sufficient enough to allow an unsophisticated person to make an informed decision to either accept or dispute the decision at issue.

31Because I have found that the respondent’s denials fall short of its obligations under s. 38(8) of the Schedule, the consequences set out in s. 38(11) are again triggered. As a result, the April 24, 2018 treatment plan is payable starting on the 11th business day after the day that the respondent received the OCF-18 and upon submission of an invoice for services rendered despite the maximum benefits payable under the MIG being exhausted as the respondent is prohibited from taking the position that the MIG applies to the applicant’s impairments regarding this treatment plan.

Non-Earner Benefits (NEBs)

32It is the applicant’s position that she is entitled to NEBs based on a breach of the respondent’s obligations under s. 36(4) of the Schedule. Section 36(4) provides the following options that an insurer must take within ten business days after it receives an application and a completed OCF-3 for NEBs:

(a) Pay the specified benefit;

(b) Give the applicant a notice explaining the medical and any other reasons why the insurer does not believe the applicant is entitled to the specified benefit and, if the insurer requires an examination under s. 44 relating to the specified benefit, advising the applicant of the requirement for an examination; or

(c) Send a request to the applicant under s. 33(1) or s. 33(2).

33Section 36(5) further states that if an insurer sends a request to the applicant under s. 33(1) or (2), which is a request that the applicant provide to it certain information set out in the Schedule or to submit to an examination under oath, that the insurer shall, within ten business days after the applicant complies with the request, pay the benefit or give the applicant a notice described in s. 36(4)(b). If the insurer fails to comply with either s. 36(4) or s. 36(5), the insurer must pay the specific benefit for the period starting on the day the insurer received the application and the completed OCF-3 until it provides notice in accordance with s. 36(4)(b).

34In this matter, the applicant submitted that the respondent failed to provide her notice that complied with the Schedule following submission of an OCF-3 on January 12, 2018. Therefore, the applicant submitted that she is entitled to NEBs as a result of the respondent’s non-compliance pursuant to s. 36(6) of the Schedule.

35The respondent disagrees and submitted that it provided a response to the applicant’s application for NEBs on January 26, 2018 in compliance with s. 36(4) and, therefore, no NEBs are payable.

36For the reasons that follow, I find that the applicant is entitled to NEBs in the weekly amount of $185.00 from February 5, 2018 to December 11, 2019.

Timeline

37On February 5, 2018, the applicant submitted an Application for Accident Benefits (OCF-1) to the respondent.²³

38Prior to that time, the applicant submitted an OCF-3 dated December 21, 2017 on January 12, 2018 to the respondent through Mackenzie Medical Rehabilitation Centre Inc. (Mackenzie Medical), one of her treating facilities.²⁴ This OCF-3 was completed by Dr. Masha Gordanpour, chiropractor, who endorsed the applicant’s entitlement to NEBs.

39The respondent sent correspondence to the applicant on January 26, 2018 which acknowledged that the applicant may be eligible for NEBs despite not yet having the completed OCF-1. In this correspondence, the respondent requested that the applicant complete consent forms to allow the respondent to obtain CNRs from the applicant’s family physician, post-accident hospital records, and ambulance reports. The respondent cited section 36(4)(c) and 33(1) of the Schedule in support of its requests.

40I find that the respondent’s January 26, 2018 correspondence met the requirements of s. 36(4)(c) of the Schedule as it requested information from the applicant under s. 33(1). This, however, does not end the analysis on the applicant’s entitlement to NEBs as suggested by the respondent’s submissions given s. 36(5) of the Schedule.

41On behalf of the applicant, Mackenzie Medical submitted a second OCF-3 dated September 11, 2018 to the respondent on September 17, 2018. This OCF-3 was completed by Dr. Prooty Somal, chiropractor,²⁵ and again supported the applicant’s entitlement to NEBs.

42The applicant then provided her family physician’s CNRs to the respondent on December 18, 2018.²⁶

43On December 28, 2018, the respondent wrote to the applicant²⁷ and stated, “I have received your Disability Certificate (OCF-3) and I’m writing to explain what will be happening next with your claim.” This correspondence also stated, “we’re unable to determine whether the recommendations made on your Disability Certificate meet the disability requirement for the specified benefit you are claiming, and we’re not able to pay your benefits at this time.” This correspondence also provided notice to the applicant of her required attendance at several IEs including an occupational therapy in-home assessment, an orthopaedic surgery assessment, and a psychiatry assessment. The medical reason provided for the IE assessments was as follows: “The disability period appears to be inconsistent with the diagnosis or mechanism of injury.”

44The respondent’s December 28, 2018 correspondence is not clear which of the two OCF-3s submitted by the applicant that it is referring to. Nonetheless, I can infer that the respondent’s December 28, 2018 correspondence was provided to the applicant in response to her first OCF-3 dated December 21, 2017 as opposed to the second OCF-3 for the following reasons:

(i) The December 28, 2018 correspondence was dated within ten days of receipt of the applicant’s family physician records that were requested in the respondent’s January 26, 2018 correspondence as opposed to being sent in a timely manner after the applicant submitted her second OCF-3; and

(ii) The respondent directed me to no evidence that upon compliance with its request for information under s. 33(1) in its January 26, 2018 correspondence that it took the second step of providing notice to the applicant as required by s. 36(5) prior to its December 28, 2018 letter.

45Therefore, I find that the respondent’s December 28, 2018 correspondence was provided to the applicant under s. 36(5) of the Schedule. As a result, I also find that the respondent’s December 28, 2018 correspondence falls short of its obligations under s. 36(4)(b) of the Schedule. The correspondence was boilerplate and provided no medical reasons for the insurer’s denial of the applicant’s claim for NEBs. Even the respondent’s request for the three IEs does not comply with the requirement of providing the medical and other reasons for the examinations as required by s. 44(5) because the respondent again used boilerplate language and failed to state any specific details about the applicant’s condition.

46Section 36(6) is clear that if the insurer fails to comply with either s. 36(4) or s. 36(5), the insurer must pay the specific benefit for the period starting on the day the insurer received the application and the completed OCF-3 until it provides notice in accordance with s. 36(4)(b). As there is no evidence before me that any notice was provided to the applicant by the respondent as required by s. 36(4)(b), I find that the applicant is entitled to NEBs in the weekly amount of $185.00 for the period of February 5, 2018 (the date that the applicant had provided both her OCF-1 and OCF-3 with the respondent) until December 11, 2019, which is 104-weeks post-accident.

Interest

47The applicant is entitled to interest in accordance with s. 51 of the Schedule for the December 12, 2017 and the April 24, 2018 OCF-18s as well for payment of NEBs from February 5, 2018 to December 11, 2019.

CONCLUSION

48For the reasons outlined above, I find that:

(i) The applicant has not met her onus of proving that her accident-related impairments warrant removal from the MIG;

(ii) The applicant is entitled to the December 12, 2017 and the April 24, 2018 OCF-18s, plus interest in accordance with s. 51 of the Schedule, as a result of the respondent’s failure to comply with s. 38(8) of the Schedule upon submission of an invoice for services rendered; and

(iii) The applicant is entitled to NEBs in the weekly amount of $185.00 plus interest in accordance with s. 51 of the Schedule from February 5, 2018 to December 11, 2019.

Footnotes

1. 1O. Reg. 34/10 as amended.
2. 2Minor Injury Guideline, Superintendent’s Guideline 01/14, issued pursuant to s. 268.3 (1.1) of the Insurance Act.
3. 3The applicant withdrew the issue of whether the respondent was liable to pay an award under Regulation 664 in an email dated September 30, 2020. The applicant also withdrew her claims for an orthopaedic assessment and a psychological assessment in her written submissions. Further, an OCF-18 in the amount of $1,384.70 for chiropractic treatment and massage therapy was also listed as an issue in dispute in the Tribunal’s May 27, 2020 Case Conference Report and Order. The applicant, however, failed to list it as an issue in dispute in any of her hearing submissions or even address the treatment plan in her reply submissions following the respondent’s submission on the issue. As a result, I accept that while not explicitly withdrawn, this treatment plan is no longer in dispute and I need not render a decision regarding it.
4. 4The Tribunal’s May 27, 2020 Case Conference Report and Order provided the period in dispute for NEBs from May 27, 2019 to date and ongoing. However, s. 12(3)(c) of the Schedule limits eligibility for payment of NEBs to two years post-accident. Further, the applicant made submissions regarding an earlier start date for entitlement. As it appears as though there is discrepancy as to the period in dispute, I find that I am required to make a determination on the applicant’s entitlement to NEBs and, if applicable, the period in dispute.
5. 5Reply Submissions of the Applicant, tab F.
6. 6Ibid. at page 7.
7. 7Written Sur-reply Submissions of the Respondent, tab 5.
8. 8Reply Submissions of the Applicant, tab G.
9. 9Ibid. at page 7.
10. 10Written Submissions of the Respondent, tab 3.
11. 11Ibid. at page 9.
12. 12Written Submissions of the Respondent, tab 4.
13. 13Ibid. at page 9.
14. 142018 CanLII 39373 (ON LAT Reconsideration Decision).
15. 15Ibid. at para. 19.
16. 16See M.F.Z. v Aviva Insurance Canada, 2017 CanLII 63632 (ON LAT Reconsideration Decision) (M.F.Z. v Aviva)at paras. 50-52, 59 and 64.
17. 17Submissions of the Applicant, tab E.
18. 18Supra note 16.
19. 19Ibid. at para. 39.
20. 20Zheng, Cai v. Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, 2018 ONSC 5707 at para. 21.
21. 21Submissions of the Applicant, tab H.
22. 22Submissions of the Applicant, tab I.
23. 23Submissions of the Applicant, tab L.
24. 24Submissions of the Applicant, tab F.
25. 25Reply Submissions of the Applicant, tab E.
26. 26Reply Submissions of the Applicant, tab H.
27. 27Submissions of the Applicant, tab N.