Suzy Basdeo v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2022 CanLII 106448

Licence Appeal Tribunal

Date: 2022-11-02

Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Suzy Basdeo Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Colin Osterberg, Member

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Suzy Basdeo, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Steve Grootenboer, Agent

Heard by Teleconference: October 25, 2022

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

OVERVIEW

1Suzy Basdeo (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on September 30, 2022. At the time of the impoundment, the driver was driving with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

3For the reasons set out below, the appeal is dismissed, and the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED

4The issue to be determined is whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

5The respondent presented evidence which establishes that:

(1) the appellant is the registered owner of the impounded vehicle, a 2019 Tesla;

(2) on September 30, 2022, the police discovered the impounded vehicle being driven by the appellant’s husband, Kevin Basdeo; and

(3) Kevin Basdeo’s licence was under suspension for a criminal conviction at the time it was impounded.

Exceptional Hardship

6Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

7Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will fail.

9If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then s. 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to s. 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses. The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

10The appellant argues that the impoundment makes it difficult for her to get to and from work and that this amounts to exceptional hardship under the Act. She made no other allegations of hardship. The appellant lives alone in Dundalk, Ontario and is a full-time office worker at a company located in Brampton, which she says is about 1.5 hours away from her home. She has recently separated from her husband.

11The evidence presented at the hearing shows that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle. She says her employer has been patient and has allowed her to work from home more often than she did before the impoundment. Also, the appellant has been able to get to the office some days by borrowing her mother’s vehicle.

12In addition, the appellant is the registered owner of two other vehicles, both of which are currently at her home in Dundalk. She says her 1997 Honda is mechanically unfit to drive. However, her 2016 Mercedes can be made roadworthy with $2,500 in repairs.

13The appellant gave several reasons that she has elected not to complete those repairs. First, after her vehicle was impounded, the appellant entered into a separation agreement with her husband pursuant to which she is to keep the Tesla and the Mercedes is to be transferred to him. She says her husband does not want her to drive the Mercedes in the meantime. Further, the appellant says she does not want to make the needed repairs because that expense would be to her husband’s benefit once the Mercedes is transferred to him.

14I find that the Mercedes is currently available to the appellant and that it is a reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle. The appellant is currently the owner of the Mercedes and there is nothing in the separation agreement which prevents her from using it before it is transferred to her husband. Moreover, the fact that the appellant’s husband might benefit from repairs she makes to the Mercedes is not relevant to the determination of whether that vehicle is available to the appellant as an alternative to the impounded vehicle.

15The evidence at the hearing was that the impact of the impoundment would be mitigated if the appellant were able to live with her parents in Brampton. If she did so, then she would be able to get to work using public transportation. However, the appellant says she would be uncomfortable doing this because her husband has been living with her parents since the separation. In my view, this is the appellant’s choice and staying with her parents temporarily while her vehicle is impounded is a reasonable alternative in the circumstances.

16Based on the above, I am not satisfied that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available. The appellant is able to work from home; she is able to borrow her mother’s vehicle to get to work; she owns another vehicle which she could use if she chooses to repair it; and she could choose to live with her parents during the impound period. Therefore, her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail and I need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.

ORDER

17For the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.