Christina Geddes v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2021 CanLII 97399

Date: 2021-09-24

File Number: 13555/MVIA

Appeal under subsection 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act

Between:

Christina Geddes

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Panel: Jacqueline Castel

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Self-represented

For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenboer, Agent

Place and Date of Hearing: By Teleconference

September 22, 2021

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

OVERVIEW:

1A teleconference hearing was held on September 22, 2021 to consider the appellant’s appeal of the 45-day impoundment of her 2002 Audi 41Q (the “vehicle”). The vehicle was impounded because the driver’s licence was under a Criminal Code suspension at the time of the impoundment.

2The appellant is requesting that the Tribunal make a finding that the impoundment be set aside and order the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) to release the vehicle on the ground that she will suffer exceptional hardship.

ISSUE:

3The issue to be determined is whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

CONCLUSION:

4On the evidence before me at the hearing, I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA.

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

7The owner of a vehicle that has been impounded. pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the HTA, may appeal the impoundment under s. 50.2 and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.

8There are limited grounds on which an owner may appeal an impoundment as set out in section 50.2(3) of the HTA. The appellant in this case appealed on the ground of exceptional hardship.

Exceptional Hardship

9Section 10 of Ontario Regulation 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from the impoundment. In order to establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement set out in 10(1) of the Regulation is that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. If there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle, I need not consider any other requirements.

10The appellant testified that she owns two other vehicles, a 2004 Jeep Cherokee and a 2000 Audi 41Q. She indicated that both vehicles are in need of costly repairs which she cannot afford at this time. In response to a question, she stated that she did not explore selling the vehicles as she eventually plans to repair them. She also explained that she looked into renting a vehicle during the period of impoundment but concluded it would be too expensive on her income in addition to the impound fees and her other expenses.

11The appellant testified that she is employed full time as an Educational Assistant. She stated that during the period of impoundment, she has been using her bicycle to get to and from her place of employment. She explained that it takes her approximately one hour to bike to the school where she works. She indicated that she missed one day of work when her bicycle had a flat tire. She acknowledged that colleagues at her school drove her to and from work on the professional development days at the beginning of the school year. She explained that when school is in progress, her colleagues, who are teachers, finish work later than she does, and she prefers to bike home at the end of her workday rather than waiting around for a ride. She stated that she has also been using her bike to do errands and groceries during the period of impoundment.

12The appellant stated that she has a part-time job after school babysitting two boys, one of whom has special needs. She gave evidence that she has not been able to pick the boys up from school without a vehicle, and their parents have had to make alternative childcare arrangements during the period of impoundment. She stated that she will resume her part-time employment, looking after the boys, when her vehicle is released from impoundment.

13The appellant indicated that she resides in the country and has felt very isolated from family and friends without a functioning vehicle during the period of impoundment. She stressed that it has been very difficult on her mental health, and she has been undergoing virtual counselling sessions with a mental health professional to help her cope with the anxiety.

14While the impoundment of her vehicle has undoubtedly caused stress and inconvenience, the appellant has not demonstrated that there is no alternative to the vehicle. She has two other vehicles which she has chosen not to repair at this time, given the costs, and she has successfully used her bicycle to get to and from her primary place of employment and to do errands. She has also occasionally obtained a ride to and from work with colleagues.

15Under the Regulation, I can only consider financial or economic loss and the loss of employment if the owner can demonstrate that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting, and the impact of the loss will be on a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle. While the appellant did have to discontinue her part-time babysitting job during the period of impoundment, she admitted that there will be no lasting impact as she will be able to resume this employment as soon as her vehicle is released from impoundment. She also indicated that the parents of the two children she babysits have been able to make other childcare arrangements during the period of impoundment.

16Accordingly, for the above reasons, I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment of her vehicle has resulted in exceptional hardship, as defined in the Regulation.

ORDER:

17Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the HTA, I deny the appeal and confirm the impoundment.