Licence Appeal Tribunal
An appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act.
Between:
Courtney Lenneville
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR:
Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Courtney Lenneville, Self-represented
For the Respondent:
Sanjay Kapur, Agent
Heard by Teleconference:
July 13, 2021
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
OVERVIEW
1A teleconference hearing was held on July 13, 2021 to consider the appellant’s appeal of the 45-day impoundment of her 2015 Hyundai Elantra (the “vehicle”). The vehicle was impounded on June 18, 2021.
2Subsection 55.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act” or the “HTA”) allows for the impoundment of a vehicle for 45 days where a police officer is satisfied that the driver’s licence of the person who is driving a vehicle is under suspension. The vehicle was impounded pursuant to this subsection of the Act.
ISSUE
3The appellant is appealing the impoundment on two grounds: that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship and that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver had a valid licence.
4In order to determine whether the impound will result in exceptional hardship to the appellant, I have applied the specific test for exceptional hardship that is set out in Ontario Regulation 631/98 (the “Regulation”) under the HTA.
5The first part of the test requires an appellant to show, on a balance of probabilities (meaning more likely than not), that “no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available.”
6Section 10 (4) sets out what an appellant must show in order to meet this first part of the test:
In order to show that no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available…the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
7If the appellant is able to show that she has no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle, s. 10(1) then requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in:
a. A threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; or
b. A threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. O. Reg. 456/10, s. 3.
8The appellant’s second ground of appeal is that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained for impoundment was not then subject to a condition that prohibited him from driving. This ground of appeal focusses on the requirement that the driver only operate vehicles with an ignition interlock device. There was no ignition interlock system installed on the appellant’s vehicle.
CONCLUSION
9On the evidence before me at the hearing, I find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that she meets the specific test to qualify for exceptional hardship as set out in the Regulation. Furthermore, she failed to prove that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine the driver’s licence status of the driver of her vehicle.
ANALYSIS
10The appellant’s vehicle was impounded for 45 days after being driven by her boyfriend on June 18, 2021. There is condition on her boyfriend’s driver’s licence that the vehicle must be equipped with an ignition interlock device. The appellant states she was unaware of this condition and would not have allowed him to drive the vehicle had she known.
11The appellant claims that the impoundment has resulted in exceptional hardship. She works as a personal support worker and needs the vehicle for employment purposes. As a result of the impoundment, she claims that she has not been able to work as many hours as she typically would. She is currently on contract and it is important that she be available for work anytime. The appellant explored renting a vehicle, however, she does not have a valid credit card which permits her to do so.
12Her mother has been assisting her by providing transportation whenever she can. Her mother is also a personal support worker and sometimes their schedules permit them to share one vehicle. On other days, the appellant’s sister has helped out with her transportation needs.
13During the hearing it was revealed that the appellant has another vehicle leased in her name. She states that the vehicle, a 2013 Mercedes, is leased for her boyfriend and is equipped with an ignition interlock device. She acknowledged that she could use this vehicle but finds blowing into the ignition interlock device very inconvenient for her. She also testified that she does not feel comfortable driving the vehicle as it is an expensive, high performance car and she does not feel confident in her ability to manage it. She also states that although she has driven the vehicle in the past, she chooses not to as this would accumulate mileage for which she has only a limited free amount due to it being leased.
14On the subject of due diligence, the appellant testified that she examined her boyfriend’s driver’s licence and observed an “i” to denote a condition for an ignition interlock. She states that her boyfriend advised her that he did not need an ignition interlock device unless it was his own vehicle. She states that she should have verified this claim independently but failed to do so. She did not call the Ministry, nor did she conduct a free online check of her boyfriend’s driver’s licence status. It is also clear that she was aware of the need for the ignition interlock device since the alternate vehicle, that she leased, is equipped with such device to allow her boyfriend to use it.
15I have no doubt that the loss of the appellant’s vehicle has resulted in inconvenience. However, the appellant appears to have managed without the vehicle with the assistance of her mother and sister. In addition to this, she also has another vehicle in her name which could serve as a reasonable substitute until her vehicle is released from impoundment. The Tribunal cannot consider inconvenience to the appellant as a viable basis on which she can demonstrate exceptional hardship. I have also taken into account the fact that both she and her boyfriend are gainfully employed, and the loss of the impounded vehicle and its associated impacts are not permanent in nature.
16I am convinced, based on the respondent’s submissions, that the appellant’s boyfriend has a driver’s licence which would clearly indicate the condition of an ignition interlock device. The appellant testified that she examined the licence and chose to believe her boyfriend that the condition was not required on a borrowed vehicle. I find that the appellant’s decision to believe this proposition was a miscalculation and she should have taken the necessary steps to perform proper due diligence by verifying his ability to drive. Clearly, there were options available to her to confirm this and she chose not to exercise any of them. As a result, this does not meet the threshold of demonstrating due diligence.
17I am satisfied that the appellant has an alternative to the impounded vehicle. I was not presented with evidence of missed medical appointments or employment letters to support her argument of exceptional hardship. The appellant also admits to not performing adequate due diligence in determining whether her boyfriend was under driving conditions prior to allowing him to drive the vehicle.
18In this case I find that the appellant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that she meets the test for exceptional hardship, as set out in the Regulation, based on the alternatives available to her. She has also failed in her due diligence argument.
ORDER
19For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Tribunal’s authority under s.50.2(5) of the Act, I confirm the impoundment order.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member
Released: October 1, 2021