Christopher Lassaline v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2021 CanLII 76759

Date: 2021-08-10

Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Christopher Lassaline

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Colin Osterberg, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Christopher Lassaline, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Steve Grootenboer, Agent

Heard by Teleconference: August 6, 2021

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

OVERVIEW

1Christopher Lassaline (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of his motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “HTA”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on June 19, 2021. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant was driving with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that his driver’s licence was not under suspension. The appellant initially appealed on the basis that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship but withdrew that allegation at the hearing.

3For the reasons set out below, the appeal is dismissed, and the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED

4The issue to be determined in this appeal is whether the appellant exercised due diligence in accordance with section 50.2(3)(c) of the HTA.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

5The respondent presented evidence which establishes that:

(1) the appellant is the registered owner of the impounded vehicle, a 2014 Dodge Caravan.

(2) on May 15, 2021, the police discovered the impounded vehicle being driven by the appellant.

(3) the appellant’s licence was under suspension at the time it was detained for the purpose of impoundment. It was suspended on July 27, 2020 for one year pursuant to s. 41 of the HTA as the result of a conviction under s. 320.13(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (the “Criminal Code”).

6The evidence at the hearing was that, on July 27, 2020, the appellant was convicted of the operation of a conveyance dangerous to the public under s. 320.13(1) of the Criminal Code. The appellant received a sentence of 18 months probation. A condition of the appellant’s probation was that he was prohibited from having care and control of a motor vehicle except for the purposes of driving to and from work, driving to and from his wife’s place of employment, and traveling for necessary reasons such as grocery shopping and medical appointments. The appellant was driving his wife to work when he was stopped by the police and the vehicle impounded.

7Section 41(1)(b) of the HTA provides that the driver’s licence of a person convicted under s. 320.13 of the Criminal Code, as the appellant was, is automatically suspended for one year for a first offence or for longer periods for subsequent offences. By Notice of Suspension dated August 6, 2020, the Ministry of Transportation notified the appellant that his licence was suspended for one-year effective July 27, 2020. The Notice of Suspension instructs the appellant that he is to stop driving and that he must not drive while he is suspended. The Notice of Suspension also instructs the appellant to return his driver’s licence to the Ministry of Transportation.

8The Notice of Suspension contains the telephone number for the Ministry of Transportation in the event that the contents of the Notice of Suspension are not understood.

9It was the appellant’s evidence at the hearing that he thought the probation order permitted him to drive in the circumstances noted above and that it took precedence over the Notice of Suspension. Further, the appellant says that, when he received the Notice of Suspension in the mail, he took it to his probation officer, and she advised him that he was permitted to drive pursuant to the probation order. The probation officer who allegedly advised the appellant of this erroneous information no longer works as a probation officer and did not give evidence at the hearing.

10Based on the above, the appellant argues that he exercised due diligence in attempting to ensure that his licence was not under suspension.

11I do not accept the appellant’s position for the following reasons.

12The Notice of Suspension makes it clear that the appellant is not to drive. It states:

Your driver’s licence is suspended under section 41 of the Highway Traffic Act for a period of 1-year effective July 27, 2020.

Stop driving. You must not drive while you are suspended.

13There is no room for misinterpretation of the Notice of Suspension, and I do not accept the appellant’s evidence that he did not understand its meaning.

14I also do not accept the appellant’s claim that he thought the probation order allowed him to drive in certain circumstances. This makes no sense. The probation order does not mention a suspension of the appellant’s driver’s licence. It only prohibits the appellant from driving with limited exceptions. The Notice of Suspension was issued by the Ministry of Transportation after the probation order and the appellant had no reason to believe that it was somehow modified by the probation order. It would be unreasonable to suggest that a driver’s licence suspension would be moderated by a probation order after a criminal conviction.

15I do not accept that the appellant’s probation officer told him he could drive in the face of the Notice of Suspension. The appellant did not have the probation officer available to give that evidence and did not have the probation officer write a letter to that effect. If the appellant would have the Tribunal accept evidence which is so unlikely, then he would need to present something beyond his own hearsay evidence.

16The appellant could have, and should have, called the Ministry of Transportation if he was confused by the Notice of Suspension. It was the Ministry of Transportation which issued the Notice of Suspension. The number to call the Ministry was on the face of the Notice of Suspension.

17I find that the Notice of Suspension was clear, and the appellant knew, or ought to have known, his licence was suspended when he drove on the day of the impoundment. I find that due diligence required the appellant to, at a minimum, call the number on the Notice of Suspension to make inquiries if he thought he might be permitted to drive.

18I find that the appellant has failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that his driver’s licence was not under suspension when the vehicle was detained. The appeal based on s. 50.2(3)(c) of the HTA must fail.

ORDER

19For the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.