Ashley Hughes v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2021 CanLII 11874

Licence Appeal Tribunal

Date: 2021-01-26

File Number: 13801/MVIA

Appeal under subsection 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act

Between:

Ashley Hughes

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Jacqueline Castel

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Ashley Hughes, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Sonia De Santis, Agent

Heard by Teleconference: January 25, 2021

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

OVERVIEW:

1A teleconference hearing was held on January 25, 2021 to consider the appellant’s appeal of the 45-day impoundment of her 2010 Ford Escape (the “vehicle”). The vehicle was impounded on December 28, 2020 because it was being driven by her partner, whose licence was under suspension. The appellant is requesting that the Tribunal make a finding that the impoundment should be set aside and order the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) to release the vehicle.

2The appellant is appealing the impoundment on the ground of exceptional hardship.

ISSUE:

3The issue to be determined is whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

CONCLUSION:

4On the evidence before me at the hearing, I find that the impoundment did not result in exceptional hardship within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA.

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

5The owner of a vehicle that has been impounded. pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the HTA, may appeal the impoundment under s. 50.2 and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.

6There are limited grounds on which an owner may appeal an impoundment as set out in section 50.2(3) of the HTA. The appellant in this case appealed on the ground of exceptional hardship.

Exceptional Hardship

7Section 10 of O. Reg.631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. In order to establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement set out in 10(1) of the Regulation is that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. If I find that there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle, then I need not consider any other requirements. I find that the appellant has not met this first requirement.

8The appellant testified that she is a bartender and has been out of work and receiving Employment Insurance throughout the pandemic. She stated that her partner, who was the suspended driver at the time of the impoundment, obtained employment in mid-December for a company that is considered an essential service. She stated that public transportation is not available between their residence and her partner’s place of employment. As a result, she testified that he has been taking taxis to and from work, and the appellant’s mother has also been driving him to and from work. The appellant indicated that this has been very inconvenient for her mother as her mother resides one hour away from them. The appellant stated that if the vehicle was not impounded, she would be responsible for driving her partner to and from work.

9The appellant stated that she has been doing errands, such as groceries, on foot while her vehicle has been impounded. In response to a question, she stated that she has not missed any medical appointments during the impoundment period.

10There is no doubt that the appellant, as well as her mother, have been inconvenienced because of the impoundment. However, the evidence does not support exceptional hardship because she has alternatives to the vehicle.

11Since the appellant did not satisfy the test that there was no alternative to the impounded vehicle, I do not need to consider the other provisions of s. 10 of the regulation.

ORDER:

12Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the HTA, I deny the appeal and confirm the impoundment order.