Licence Appeal Tribunal
Released Date: 06/22/2020
In the matter of an Application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8., in relation to statutory accident benefits.
Between:
M.M.R.
Applicant
and
Travelers Insurance Company of Canada
Respondent
DECISION [AND ORDER]
ADJUDICATOR:
Monica Chakravarti
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant:
Gus Triantafillopoulos, Counsel
Shannon Kelly, Counsel
For the Respondent:
Kadey BJ Schultz, Counsel
Megan Cui, Counsel
HEARD: In-Person:
August 27, and 28, 2019.
OVERVIEW
1On December 16, 2017 the applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident (the “Accident”). As a result of the accident the applicant sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Effective June 1, 2016 (the ''Schedule'').1
2Specifically, the applicant sought income replacement benefits (“IRBs”) as a result of not being able to work due to injuries and impairments sustained in the Accident. Prior to the case conference that set up this hearing the respondent paid the IRBs with interest. However, the applicant submitted that the respondent unreasonably withheld or delayed the payments of IRBs and therefore the respondent is liable to pay an award under Regulation 664. The respondent disagreed and a hearing took place.
3During the hearing both parties as well submitted that costs should be awarded to each party.
ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
4The issues to be decided in this hearing are as follows:
a. Is the respondent liable to pay an award under section 10 of Regulation 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed IRB payments to the applicant?
b. Is the respondent liable to pay costs to the applicant?
c. Is the applicant liable to pay costs to the respondent?
RESULT
5Based on the evidence presented at the hearing I find:
a) The respondent is not liable to pay an award under Regulation 664.
b) Costs are not payable by either party.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
6Following the close of the hearing the respondent brought a motion to have a Tribunal decision in matter 18-000467/AABS (the Case) put before me for my consideration. The applicant objected to this and stated it was tantamount to having evidence before an arbitrator after the close of the hearing.
7Based on the submissions and based on the principles of fairness I will allow the Case to be put before me.
8The respondent indicates that the Case in question was released on August 7, 2019 and its conclusion is based on findings made by this Tribunal. The respondent submits, and I have no reason to doubt, that this Case was not published at the time of this hearing.
9I should also note that a motion relating to this case was brought on August 26, 2019 that confirmed the decision in the Case was released on August 7, 2019. (A decision on the motion was rendered in the fall of 2019 and did not change the original decision of the Case). 2
10While I appreciate that neither party made fulsome submissions3 on the importance or relevance of the holding in the Case tendered by the respondent, the reality is that I am not bound by previous decisions of the Tribunal and caselaw is one of the factors used in coming to my decision. Therefore, I do not see any prejudice to the parties in allowing the Case to be entered, as it may have no effect or only act as a guide to this fact specific matter before me.
11There were also submissions raised about the evidence filed and how they were to be weighed by me. Specifically, the applicant raised an issue concerning the adjuster log notes, asserting that they should be assigned little weight.
12The applicant submitted that the log notes which form part of the evidentiary record are unreliable because they do not log the thought process of decisions made by the adjusters, they do not log full conversations between the handling adjuster and anyone else the handling adjuster may have spoken to (such as managers or other adjusters) about the adjusting of the applicant’s accident benefits file and that the adjusters do not log the contents of letters sent out.
13I find the applicant’s position to be untenable. The evidence provided by the adjusters, specifically Ms. Savage, the handling adjuster, was straightforward and did not stray from the log notes. In other words, Ms. Savage did not embellish or provide information that could not be substantiated by the log notes, emails, correspondence or other documentary evidence. Further, the evidence provided by the managing adjuster was also corroborated by the log notes and correspondence filed.
14The applicant did not provide evidence to show how the log notes differed from the oral or documentary evidence/information provided at the hearing and therefore I find the log notes should be taken at face value.
AWARD
15Section 10 of Ontario Regulation 664, states the following:
If the Licence Appeal Tribunal finds that an insurer has unreasonably withheld or delayed payments, the Licence Appeal Tribunal, in addition to awarding the benefits and interest to which an insured person is entitled under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, may award a lump sum of up to 50 per cent of the amount to which the person was entitled at the time of the award together with interest on all amounts then owing to the insured (including unpaid interest) at the rate of 2 per cent per month, compounded monthly, from the time the benefits first became payable under the Schedule. [The “Award”]
16The respondent provided the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (“FSCO”) case of Plowright and Wellington4 which held that the definition of unreasonable was behaviour by an insurer in withholding or delaying payments which can be seen as excessive, imprudent, stubborn, inflexible, unyielding or immoderate.5
17I agree with the approach from Plowright and Wellington and adopt it for the purposes of this hearing.
18The applicant submits that the applicant is entitled to an Award based on three arguments:
a. The respondent unreasonably delayed the initial entitlement and therefore payment of the applicant’s IRBs;
b. The respondent agreed to provide a lump sum payment of IRBs and then reneged on this agreement; and,
c. When the respondent did pay the IRBs there was an error in the calculation resulting in a lower weekly benefit of IRBs, which was not rectified until just before the case conference, thereby attracting an Award.
19A finding of whether the insurer’s actions were unreasonable is a finding of fact based on a review of the evidence which I will turn to now.6
a) Did the Respondent Unreasonably Delay the Initial Entitlement of the IRBs?
20First, the applicant submits that, pursuant to section 36 of the Schedule, the respondent was to initiate the IRB payment within ten days of receipt of the OCF-1 (Application for Accident Benefits) and OCF-3 (Disability Certificate). By not doing so, the respondent unreasonably withheld the benefits and therefore an Award is payable.
21The respondent submits that the applicant’s interpretation and application of section 36 of the Schedule is inaccurate and unsupported by any caselaw or the section itself. Secondly, even if the applicant is correct in her interpretation and application of the Schedule the respondent could not initiate the IRBs until the applicant provided the respondent with the requested information, specifically financial documents, to allow the respondent to quantify the quantum of the benefits.
22Section 36(2) of the Schedule states that an applicant for a specified benefit shall submit a completed disability certificate with his or her application under Section 32.
23Section 36(4) states that within 10 business days after the insurer receives the application and completed disability certificate, the insurer shall:
d. Pay the specified benefit; or
e. Give the application a notice explaining the medical and any other reasons why the insured does not believe the applicant is entitled to the specified benefit…
24Based on the evidence provided during the testimony of the adjuster and the documentary evidence filed, I find that the respondent did not unreasonably withhold the IRB benefits at the outset of this claim for IRBs.
25The basis for my decision above begins with Section 32 of the Schedule. Section 32(1) requires a person who intends to apply for a benefit, which includes IRBs, to notify the insurer of his/her intention to do so “no later than the seventh day after the circumstances arose that give rise to the entitlement to the benefit, or as soon as practicable after that day.” The insurer must then provide that person with amongst other things, the appropriate application forms.
26Section 32(6) provides that if the application forms are incomplete, the insurer is required to notify the applicant and request the missing information. Pursuant to section 32(7), the insurer is not permitted to give a notice unless, “The insurer, after a reasonable review of the incomplete application is unable to determine without the missing information whether a benefit is payable.”
27Subsections 32(8) - (9) lay out that a benefit is not payable until the applicant provides the missing information and that the information must be submitted to the insurer within 30 days after receiving additional application forms.
28In the matter at hand the applicant provided an application for benefits (OCF-1) to the respondent that was incomplete.
29On January 15, 2018 the applicant provided the respondent with her OCF-1 and acknowledged in the accompanying cover letter that the respondent is to review and process the applicant’s application for Accident Benefits. This I find is the applicant acknowledging that January 15, 2018 is the date upon which she first applied for accident benefits as a whole.
30On January 24, 2018, by way of a letter to the applicant, the respondent acknowledged receipt of the OCF-1 and indicated that it requires the OCF-2 and financial documents to assess the IRBs.
31I find the respondent’s January 24, 2020 letter to be notice under section 32(2) that the respondent requires an additional form, that being the employer’s confirmation form and the disability certificate, in order to determine eligibility for IRBs.
32The applicant did not respond to the letter of January 24, 2020 nor did she provide the OCF-2 or the financial documentation requested. On February 1, 2018 the respondent emailed the applicant’s counsel and provided the letter acknowledging receipt of the OCF-1. During this email the respondent stated that the OCF-1 is incomplete and specifically notes that Part 8, the Income Replacement Determination portion of the application was incomplete.
33In this email the respondent again requests completed forms:
“I have enclosed another blank form for your convenience, along with a blank OCF-2 & 3 form.”
34While this email to the applicant’s counsel that the OCF-1 was incomplete cannot be considered “notice” under section 32(6), it nonetheless provides a rationale to the applicant as to why the respondent required the OCF-2 and the income information.
35As of February 1, 2018, the applicant had not provided any information regarding her employment or her income and had not provided a new OCF-1. Her application was incomplete, and I find that there was no obligation on the respondent at that stage to provide her with her IRBs. Therefore, the respondent did not unreasonably withhold the IRBs.
36Somewhere between February 1, 2018 and February 16, 2018, the respondent received the OCF-3 indicating that the applicant is unable to work due to her injuries.
37On February 16, 2018, the respondent provided an explanation of benefits (“EOB”) to the applicant. The EOB stated that, in order for the respondent to determine eligibility for IRBs, it required an OCF-2 providing her employer’s confirmation of income, pay stubs and information regarding any short-term disability payments or availability of disability.
38I find that this EOB constitutes notice as contemplated in section 36. Eligibility for IRBs includes determining the quantum of the benefit7. The respondent notified the applicant that they cannot ascertain the applicant’s eligibility to IRBs as they do not have the information to ascertain the applicant’s pre-accident income and advised that there is no medical reason to deny the benefit. This I find constitutes the insurer’s rationale as to why the applicant was not entitled to IRBs at that moment in time.
39On March 27, 2018, by way of an email, the applicant’s representative acknowledged that the OCF-2 had not been sent to the respondent. The representative stated that once they receive the executed OCF-2 from the applicant it will be forwarded to the respondent. The necessity or the reasonableness of the OCF-2 was not disputed in the email.
40On April 9, 2018 the applicant forwarded the OCF-2 to the respondent along with a cover letter of April 4, 2018. This is the first time the applicant provided any information to the respondent regarding her employment or her income. On April 11, 2018, the respondent acknowledged receipt of the OCF-2.
41The applicant submitted that the log notes show that the OCF-2 was produced on February 11, 2018. When asked about this, the adjuster testified that it was a typo and that it should have read April 11, 2018 i.e. the same date the respondent acknowledged receipt of the OCF-2. Based on the evidence as a whole, including that on March 27, 2018 the applicant’s representative confirmed that she had not sent the OCF-2 to the respondent and given that the OCF-2 is dated March 3, 2018, I find on a balance of probabilities that the OCF-2 was produced on April 9, 2018 and not February 11, 2018.
42As of April 11, 2018, I find that there was no unreasonable withholding or delay of the initial entitlement to the IRBs that would attract an Award.
Potential Absurd Result
43I also find that over and above the interpretation of the Schedule, to find the respondent unreasonably withheld benefits when the applicant withheld information would be an absurd result.
44Specifically, I find that the applicant withheld pertinent information in her application for Accident Benefits when she did not fill in Part 8 of the OCF-1.
45Part 8 of the OCF-1 consists of a chart with 5 columns and 4 rows. It contains instructions about providing information about a person’s employment in the last 52 weeks prior to the accident. The purpose of Part 8 is indicated in the heading of that section which is entitled “Income Replacement Determination”.
46The OCF-1 signed by the applicant provided no information regarding employer or income earned before the accident. Further, in part 8 underneath the chart with five columns and 4 rows there are questions asking if the applicant was working and has returned to work. These two questions were answered by the applicant.
47The applicant was never called as a witness at the hearing nor has the applicant provided any explanation as to why the chart in Part 8 of the OCF-1 was left blank. Without the witness attending to provide an explanation, I am left to the evidence and to make a finding on a balance of probabilities and I find on a balance of probabilities the applicant made a choice to leave this portion (the chart in Part 8) of the OCF-1 blank.
48When looking at the log notes and correspondence a whole it is quite clear that the respondent was seeking the applicant’s pre-accident income for the four weeks pre-accident in order to quantify the IRB payment. The respondent was not overreaching nor did the applicant object to the reasonableness of this request.
49To find that the respondent unreasonably withheld benefits because the applicant withheld information would cause an absurd result.
b) Did the respondent unreasonably withhold a “good faith” lump sum payment?
50Second, the applicant submits that the respondent unreasonably withheld or delayed the payment of benefits when the respondent’s adjuster told the applicant that they would provide a “good faith” lump sum payment of the IRB benefit and then failed to do so.
51I should note that the period of time between the offering of lump sum and the rejection of same was 4 business days.
52Following the receipt of the OCF-2, the adjuster stated in a telephone call to the applicant’s representative on April 20, 2018 at 2:06 p.m. that she would be issuing a “good faith” lump sum payment of the IRBs based on the OCF-2. This is confirmed in the log notes as well by the testimony of the handling adjuster.
53On April 26, 2018 at 4:26 p.m., the applicant’s representative was advised by the handling adjuster that the good faith lump sum IRB payment was rejected by management as there was insufficient documentation to verify pre-accident income. Prior to this the adjuster never mentioned that the lump sum payment was subject to management approval.
54The adjuster further testified that her authority for payments could not exceed $5000.00 and she needed management approval.
55The managing adjuster testified and corroborated that the reason for the rejection was the respondent wanted further information. Specifically, the respondent wanted an accountant to look at the information because the applicant was self-employed and, in the respondent’s view, self-employment income is more difficult to calculate.
56The managing adjuster admitted during her testimony that having an accountant quantify IRBs was not mandatory under the Schedule and neither was the request for financial documents a requirement under the Schedule.
57I find that the applicant has not shown how the respondent’s rejection of the lump sum payment was unreasonable withholding of the IRBs. The rejection of the gratuitous lump sum payment was due to a lack of financial documents from the applicant. Specifically, the respondent was requesting information to verify the four weeks of income pre-accident.
58I find that this was a reasonable request because the applicant submitted an OCF-2 only on April 9, 2018. Further the applicant never advised the respondent that she was self-employed. It was only when the adjuster spoke with the applicant’s “employer” on or about April 20, 2018 that the respondent became aware that the applicant was paid via a direct deposit to her bank account and that the applicant was responsible for her own taxes and reporting of income for income tax purposes.
59A calculation of a person who is self employed can be done by an accountant pursuant to section 7(4) of the Schedule and, pursuant to section 4(3), a self-employed person can designate the last four weeks or the last 52 weeks as the basis for the calculation of the IRBs. In other words, self-employment income is treated differently than employment income from an employer and therefore it was reasonable for the respondent to request the financial documents before issuing payment of IRBs.
60I find that the respondent did not unreasonably withhold the IRBs as of April 26, 2018. There was no obligation on the respondent to provide a gratuitous lump sum payment and the information that the respondent required prior to being able to issue an IRB payment (which was requested from the applicant) was reasonable.
c) Error in the IRB Calculation
61Eventually the applicant began receiving IRBs.
62The applicant’s IRB payments started sometime in May of 2018. The evidence led by the adjuster and the managing adjuster is that it started in or around May 15 or May 29, 2018, however there was no evidence to indicate this to be the case. Neither the applicant nor the respondent took exception to this fact so I will not either8. In addition, both the applicant and respondent agree that as of May 2018 the respondent had paid the IRBs from December 24, 2017 until May 2018, and thereafter the respondent paid the IRBs on a biweekly basis.
63The applicant and respondent agree there was an error in the calculation of the weekly IRBs payable to the applicant resulting in a lower IRB payment per week. Both parties agree that prior to the case conference the respondent paid the difference with interest.
64The issue that remained was whether the respondent unreasonably withheld the benefit - that being the difference between the lower IRB amount paid out weekly versus the actual weekly IRB amount of $399.00
65The following are the events that took place leading to the recalculation of the IRBs:
a. On August 24, 2018 the applicant’s counsel sent a letter to the respondent and stated the following:
i. The applicant is receiving IRBs of $582.28 biweekly
ii. On April 20, 2018 the respondent advised that the applicant’s entitlement of IRBs was $787.50 biweekly.
iii. As per the OCF-2 the amount of the IRB should be $400 per week or $800 biweekly.
b. In the same letter, the applicant’s counsel also advised that the failure to pay her the IRB amount based on the respondent’s calculation represented bad faith and advised that if the respondent did not issue payment of the outstanding amounts (i.e. the difference between the $787.50 biweekly and $582.28 biweekly) with interest that a special award (Award) would be sought.
c. In response, the respondent sent a letter on September 11, 2018 stating that the IRB calculation was based on the income information provided. It also stated that the income information in the OCF-2 is incorrect. The rationale provided as to why the respondent thought the income information was incorrect was because the applicant was paid her salary directly and made her own source deductions.
d. On September 17, 2018, the applicant’s counsel told the respondent by way of letter that regardless of how the calculation was done the amount of the IRB paid to the applicant is incorrect. The applicant asserted that the respondent did not hire an accountant to calculate IRBs, nor did they provide their IRB calculations to the applicant.
e. On September 18, 2018, the current appeal was filed with the Tribunal.
f. On October 3, 2018, the respondent provided the in-house accounting income calculation report of May 15, 2018 and the income calculation report states that the applicant reports self-employment income in 2016 and 2017.
g. An EOB dated February 15, 2019 notes that there is a revised IRB. It shows the IRB payable is $399.00 per week and it provides payment of the difference between the IRB that had been paid versus what should have been paid along with interest.
h. The case conference took place on February 19, 2010.
66All parties agree that the error in the calculation was contained in the respondent’s in-house accounting report of May 15, 2018 which incorrectly based the weekly IRB amount on the applicant’s net income. The weekly IRB should have been calculated using the applicant’s gross income.
67There is no evidence as to how and when the error came to be noted. The respondent’s counsel made submissions at the hearing that the error was discovered by her when she was retained prior to the case conference however there was no evidence to substantiate this submission.
68The applicant did not provide submissions or evidence as to when she or her counsel discovered that the IRBs were calculated on a net basis as opposed to a gross basis. The case conference summary of the applicant states that the IRB is improperly calculated because it is based on the net income of the applicant, however there is no information as to when this was noticed by the applicant and if she informed the respondent prior to the respondent themselves noting the error in the IRB calculation.
69It should also be noted in and around February 15-19, 2019 the that the applicant was paid the proper amount of her weekly IRB with interest.
70In order to find the respondent is liable to pay an Award I must decide if the respondent’s conduct when adjusting the file with respect to the IRBs was excessive, imprudent, stubborn, inflexible, unyielding or immoderate.
71I find, based on the evidence, that although an error did exist and the respondent should have known how to properly calculate IRB, the respondent did not act in a manner that was excessive, imprudent, stubborn, inflexible or unyielding.
72The applicant, in the letters of August 24, 2018 and September 17, 2018 (described above) told the respondent that the IRB amount was incorrect because it was not based on the OCF-2 information and/or it differed from a calculation done by the respondent in April of 2018.
73After receiving the letters from the applicant, the respondent did not go back and look at the accounting report, but instead responded to the information in the applicant’s letter of August 24 and September 17, 2018.
74By responding to the details in the applicant’s letter I find that the respondent acted in a responsive manner and not in a manner that was imprudent or unreasonable.
75While it would have been ideal for the respondent to go back and look at the IRB calculation this did not happen and there is no evidence to show that the respondent acted stubbornly or unreasonably by not doing the ideal.
76By the time of the case conference the IRBs were recalculated. However, there is no evidence led as to the driving reason for the recalculation of the IRB prior to the case conference. Without this evidence I cannot make a direct finding of either parties’ actions leading up to the recalculation and I specifically cannot make a finding of the respondent’s conduct leading up to recalculation.
77Therefore, based on the totality of the evidence and the reasons above I find the respondent is not liable to pay an Award.
COSTS
78Both the applicant and respondent are requesting costs.
79At the hearing the respondent objected to providing oral submissions on costs, arguing that submissions on costs prior to me rendering a decision on the issue of an Award would be potentially prejudicial.
80I find this to be an untenable position. Costs are not based on the outcome of the hearing but rather on the conduct of the parties during the full proceeding.
81As per Rule 2.17 of the Tribunal’s Rules9 , a proceeding commences when the appeal is filed with the Tribunal. In this case the proceeding began on September 18, 2018 and I will focus on the conduct of the parties after September 18, 2018 and not prior to that time.
82Section 17.1(2) of the Statutory Power and Procedures Act10 allows the Tribunal to award costs and provides the basis for same.
83Rule 19 of the Tribunal’s Rules states the following:
Where a party believes that another party in a proceeding has acted unreasonably, frivolously, vexatiously, or in bad faith, that party may make a request to the Tribunal for costs.
84The applicant submits that costs should be awarded because, following the case conference of February 19, 2019, counsel for the respondent made continual requests for documents and threatened sanctions pursuant to section 33 for non-compliance of the productions of the documents.
85The applicant further contends that despite attending at the case conference, discussing and agreeing to productions, the respondent was trying to circumvent the Tribunal process by requesting documents not agreed to at the case conference and advising the applicant that her IRBs would be terminated if she did not comply. Further, the applicant submits the request for section 33 documents were not based on letters from the respondent but from the respondent’s counsel.
86The respondent submits that as counsel she is an agent for the respondent and can send letters making requests pursuant to section 33. Further, the respondent submits that it would have been improper during the course of the proceeding for the respondent to write directly to the applicant.
87The evidence shows that between March and July of 2019, the respondent’s counsel sent approximately 5 letters requesting documents pursuant to section 33 of the Schedule. In all those letters, however, there is no mention of the documents being requested for the hearing or the proceeding.
88In responding to the letters, the applicant’s counsel comes to the conclusion that the documents are for the hearing. The applicant’s counsel responded that the respondent’s counsel should be invoking the motion procedures available at the Tribunal if they require the documents for the hearing.
89The respondent’s counsel does not respond to whether the documents are for the hearing but does, however, continue to request documents.
90Despite having the adjusters available to testify there was no evidence led as to why those documents were requested, the timing of the request for the documents and whether they were being requested by the respondent for the hearing. This evidence would have been helpful to determine if the submissions by the applicant for costs were meritorious.
91There was no direct evidence led as to the timing of the request for the documents, I am left to only look at the letters that clearly state that the purpose of the documents was for the entitlement to IRB benefits and makes no mention of the hearing or proceedings.
92I therefore cannot award costs payable from the respondent to the applicant based on the respondent’s counsel request for documents that do not appear to have a nexus to the proceeding.
93Further the respondent is seeking costs based on the “bullish” nature of the applicant’s counsel which the respondent submits was done on the instructions of the applicant. The “bullish” behaviour is that the applicant’s counsel would threaten bad faith allegations in their correspondence and would place the words “bad faith” in capital letters.
94There are four issues with this argument. Firstly, the letters that I am tasked to look at when deciding costs would be those from September 18, 2018 onwards. In that regard, there is only one letter that makes note of an accusation of bad faith. This does not rise to the level of unreasonable, frivolous, vexatious, or in bad faith.
95Secondly, there were no evidence or submissions led as to how raising bad faith, when an application has already been made to the Tribunal seeking an Award amounts to unreasonable, frivolous, vexatious, or in bad faith.
96Thirdly, the instructions to seek an Award come properly from the applicant to her counsel. The way those instructions are conveyed is done by her counsel. The applicant’s counsel chose to put the words bad faith in all capital letters. In my view putting words in capital letters in one letter I find does not amount to conduct that is unreasonable, frivolous, vexatious or bad faith that should attract costs.
97Lastly, to ask an applicant to pay costs for her counsel’s putting words in capital letters, especially when the respondent admittedly underpaid her IRBs when the respondent knew and agreed that she was not able to work, would be unfair.
98The respondent also seeks costs because the respondent was not told until the hearing that the applicant would not be testifying. However, this submission is false. In the email to counsel dated July 31, 2019 the applicant’s counsel advised that he has not made a decision regarding whether the applicant would testify at hearing.
99I find that again there is nothing to lead me to decide that there should be costs attached to the fact that the applicant did not testify, especially when the respondent was notified that there was a chance this would happen.
100As such, neither party is awarded costs.
CONCLUSION
101For the reasons above I find that there will be no Award payable to the applicant and there will no costs payable by either party.
Released: June 22, 2020
__________________________
Monica Chakravarti
Adjudicator
Footnotes
- Reg 34/10.
- The Case is now cited as: M.M. v Aviva Insurance Canada, 2019 CanLII 94050 (ON LAT). The motion: M.M. v Aviva Insurance Canada, 2019 CanLII 130384 (ON LAT).
- The applicant provided a cursory response objecting to the relief sought to the Notice of Motion.
- Plowright and Wellington Insurance Company (FSCO A-003985, October 29, 1993).
- Ibid. at page 17.
- 17-006757 v Aviva Insurance Canada, 2018 CanLII 819499 (ON LAT) at para. 31
- 17-004906 v Coachman Insurance Company, 2018 CanLII 81883 (ON LAT).
- The applicant did however note that there was nothing in the log notes or any documentary evidence to support how or why the respondent came to the decision to pay IRBs.
- Safety, Licensing Appeals and Standards Tribunals Ontario Common Rules of Practice and Procedure.
- RSO 1990, c S.22.