Petr Bouianov v. Travelers Insurance, 2020 CanLII 34496

Citation: Petr Bouianov vs. Travelers Insurance, 2020 ONLAT 19-005097/AABS

Released Date: 05/07/2020

In the matter of an Application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8., in relation to statutory accident benefits.

Between:

Petr Bouianov

Applicant

and

Travelers Insurance

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Avvy Go

Appearances:

For the Applicant:

Kateryna Vlada, Paralegal

For the Respondent:

Julianne Brimfield, Counsel

HEARD:

By way of written submissions

OVERVIEW

1The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident on September 6, 2016. The applicant reports driving over oil spill caused by another vehicle. Police and a tow truck attended the scene of the collision. The applicant’s car was towed and later repaired. No ambulance was required, and the applicant did not receive any immediate medical treatment.

2The applicant sought certain benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective after September 1, 2010¹ (the “Schedule”) which were denied by the respondent. The applicant submitted an application for dispute resolution services to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”).

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

3As per a Direction dated October 1, 2019 from the Tribunal, I have been asked to decide the following issues:

a) Are the applicant’s injuries predominantly minor injuries as defined in s.3 of the Schedule, subject to treatment within the $3,500.00 limit in the Minor Injury Guideline?

b) Is the applicant entitled to the cost of an examinations in the amount of $1,999.28 for a psychological assessment recommended by Imperial Medical Assessments in a treatment plan submitted January 23, 2017, and denied by the respondent on May 10, 2017?

c) Is the applicant entitled to receive a medical benefit in the amount of $3,511.97 for physiotherapy services, recommended by Newmarket Health and Wellness in a treatment plan submitted February 8, 2017, and denied by the respondent on May 10, 2017?

d) Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of amounts?

4While not included in the Direction, the Case Conference Report of the same date listed the following as a preliminary issue in dispute:

a) Is the applicant barred from proceeding with his claim for medical benefits as he failed to commence his application within two years after the respondent’s refusal to pay the amount claimed?

RESULT

5For the reasons set out below, I find that the applicant’s claim is statute barred. As such the applicant is not entitled to the benefits claimed and no interest will be payable.

DEFINING THE ISSUES IN DISPUTE

6Before addressing the issues as outlined in the Direction and Case Conference Report, I must first address another preliminary issue raised by the applicant.

7In his written submission, the applicant submitted there are two additional issues in dispute that were added on consent at the Case Conference as a result of a verbal agreement between the legal representatives for the parties. These two issues are: a) whether the applicant is entitled to the cost of examination in the amount of $2,486.00 for a chronic pain assessment; and, b) whether the applicant is entitled to cost of medical benefit for psychotherapy in amount of $3,192.25, both of which were recommended by Imperial Medical Assessments in a treatment plan submitted October 24, 2019, and denied by the respondent on November 4, 2019.

8The respondent denied that such an agreement was reached. The respondent pointed out that the treatment plans for both of these benefits were submitted on October 24, 2019, after the Case Conference was held, and were denied by the respondent on November 4, 2019. As such, it was impossible for these plans to have been added at the Case Conference.

9Neither the Case Conference Report nor the Direction refer to any additional issues, other than the ones listed above in paragraphs 5 and 6. Further, as the decision to deny these treatment plans was dated after the Case Conference, I therefore find that these two additional issues could not have been added at the Case Conference. I therefore will not deal with these two additional issues.

ANALYSIS

Preliminary Issue: Is the applicant barred from proceeding with his claim for medical benefits because he failed to commence his application within two years after the respondent’s refusal to pay the amount claimed?

10To make a finding on this preliminary issue, and based on the submissions I received from the parties, I believe there are three sub-issues that I need to address:

a) Did the applicant fail to commence the application within the two-year limitation period?

b) Does the Tribunal have the discretion to extend the two-year limitation period set out under s.56 of the Schedule?

c) If the answer to a) and b) is yes, should I exercise my discretion to extend the two-year limitation period in this case?

Sub-issue 1: Did the applicant fail to commence the application within the two-year limitation period?

11For the reasons set out below, I find the applicant did fail to commence the application within the two-year limitation period.

12There are two treatment plans under dispute; the psychological assessment was initially denied on January 23, 2017, and the treatment plan for physiotherapy was initially denied on February 8, 2017. However, the respondent subsequently requested the applicant attend two Insurer’s Examinations (“IEs”) to address the treatment plans. Following these assessments, the respondent confirmed in a letter dated May 9, 2017 to the applicant that the treatment plans remained denied and copies of the IEs were included with the fax. The records submitted by the applicant confirmed that the denial letter and the IEs reports were received by the applicant’s representative on May 10, 2017 at 2:30 p.m.

13The applicant then served the current application to the Tribunal on the respondent by fax on Friday, May 10, 2019 between 6:18 p.m. and 6:20 p.m. Citing Rule 6.2 of the Tribunal Common Rules², the respondent submitted that when a document is served via fax after 5:00 p.m., receipt is deemed to have occurred the next day that is not a holiday, which includes Saturdays and Sundays. As such, the respondent submitted receipt should be deemed to have occurred on Monday May 13, 2019³, which was outside of the two-year limitation period.

14I note in this case, the applicant never made a formal motion or request to the Tribunal asking for an extension of time to file the appeal. Indeed, the applicant did not even address the issue of filing deadline in his written submission dated January 21, 2020, even though the Case Conference Report noted it as a preliminary issue.

15The applicant did, however, address this issue in his reply submission. The applicant did not dispute the date and time that he submitted the application as being May 10, 2019 between 6:18 p.m. and 6:20 p.m. Instead, the applicant submitted that he made “all reasonable efforts” to “preserve his rights with regards to the denied benefits against the limitation period”. He submitted that he was only outside of the limitation by a matter of hours, and to allow the applicant to adjudicate the application would not present unfairness or uncertainty to the respondent. Finally, the applicant submitted that the respondent has not offered any reason or evidence of how it is prejudiced by the delay.

16As the respondent has rightly pointed out, Rule 6.1 of the Common Rules of the Tribunal states:

6.2 DEEMED RECEIPT

Where a document is served by a party, filed with the Tribunal, or sent by the Tribunal, receipt is deemed to have occurred when served or sent by:

(a) Personal delivery, when given to the party; (b) Regular mail, on the fifth day after the postmark date, not including holidays; (c) Fax, when the person sending the document receives a fax confirmation receipt, but if the fax confirmation receipt indicates a delivery time after 5:00 PM, service will be deemed to have occurred the next day that is not a holiday;

17As the applicant did not file the application until Friday, May 10, 2019 after 5:00 p.m. the application should be deemed to have occurred on the following Monday, May 13, 2019. The applicant has thus filed the application outside of the two-year limitation period.

Sub-issue 2: Does the Tribunal have the discretion to extend the two-year limitation period set out under s.56 of the Schedule?

18In principle, I find that the Tribunal does have the discretion to extend the two-year limitation period.

19Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act (“LAT Act”) states:

Extension of time

Despite any limitation of time fixed by or under any Act for the giving of any notice requiring a hearing by the Tribunal or an appeal from a decision or order of the Tribunal under section 11 or any other Act, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief, it may,

(a) extend the time for giving the notice either before or after the expiration of the limitation of time so limited; and

(b) give the directions that it considers proper as a result of extending the time.

20The issue is whether s. 7 allows the Tribunal to extend the limitation period in s. 56 of the Schedule.

21Relying on M.N. v Aviva General Insurance Company⁴(M.N.), a 2019 decision from this Tribunal, the respondent submitted that the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to extend the limitation to dispute statutory accident benefit claims. In that case, adjudicator Neilson found that while s.7 of the LAT Act gives the Tribunal power to extend limitation periods, that section does not apply to the limitation period set out in s.56 of the Schedule.

22The applicant did not address this argument raised by the respondent nor did the applicant cite any case law in his reply submission in this regard.

23Although not cited by the applicant, a case that has guided this Tribunal in deciding whether to extend the statutory limitation period was a reconsideration decision of the Executive Chair of the Tribunal in AF v. North Blenheim Mutual Ins. Co.⁵. In that decision, the Chair outlined four factors to consider in granting an extension of time for appeal:

a. The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

b. The length of the delay; Prejudice to the other party; and

c. The merits of the appeal

24Further, these four factors “are not strict elements that must each be met in order to grant an extension of time. Rather, they are a guide to assist in determining the justice of the case. Whether to grant an extension of time depends on the specific facts of each case.”⁶

25In M.N., adjudicator Neilson decided not to follow the decision in AF. Adjudicator Neilson relied on her reconsideration decision of S. v. Certas Home and Auto Insurance Company⁷ in which she determined that s.7 does not apply because the limitation period for accident benefit claims is fixed under a regulation and not “by or under any Act” as the language of s.7 of the LAT Act dictates. Adjudicator Neilson also specifically noted that she preferred her determination in S. v. Certas over A.F. v. North Blenheim and found that she does not have jurisdiction to extend the limitation period for statutory accident benefit claims.

26I have had the opportunity to review the decision in M.N. in which Adjudicator Neilson began by examining the definition for “Act” vs. “regulation” under the Legislation Act, 2006, and the changes that were made to the Insurance Act when the dispute resolution process was transferred to the Tribunal. Adjudicator Neilson found that:

If the Legislature had intended to give the Tribunal the discretion to extend the limitation period for appealing a denial of accident benefits, the limitation period in s.281.1(1) of the Insurance Act would not have been repealed, but would have been amended to state that it was subject to the discretion of the Tribunal in accordance with the LAT Act. Instead, only s.56 of the Schedule imposing a limitation period was amended. Further s.55 of the Schedule was amended to allow the Tribunal to permit an applicant to apply to the Tribunal, despite the applicant’s failure to submit an insurer’s examination under s.55(1)2 of the Schedule or when the dispute relates to an invoice that is under investigation under s.55(1)3 of the Schedule. This new power was not extended to the amended s. 56 of the Schedule. However, the amendment to s.121(1)26 of the Insurance Act effective April 1, 2016 gives the Lieutenant Governor in Council the power to make regulations governing the proceedings before the Tribunal, including imposing time limits or limitation periods.⁸

27Adjudicator Neilson went on to state:

Section 7 of the LAT Act could have been amended to include “regulations” but was not….If the applicant’s reasoning is accepted, the amendments and repeals would have to be considered oversights or errors by the Legislature, which I do not accept. I find that on a plain reading, the Legislative intent was to remove the limitation period from the jurisdiction of s.7 of the LAT Act, as it is no longer a limitation of time fixed by or under any Act, but rather it is fixed under a regulation.

28For whatever reasons, the applicant has chosen not to address the jurisdictional argument raised by the respondent. This is most unfortunate as I only have the submission from the respondent to determine whether the applicant could even have the benefit of the dispute resolution process before the Tribunal.

29While I appreciate the reasoning of Adjudicator Neilson to rid the Tribunal of the discretion in these types of applications, I am not bound by her decision. More importantly, I find her decision to be inconsistent with the principles of interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd.,⁹ a case also cited by Adjudicator Neilson in M.N. The SCC made it clear in Rizzo that

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.¹⁰

30The SCC in Rizzo was dealing with the interpretation of a provision for termination pay under the Employment Standard Act, which the SCC found to be “a mechanism for providing minimum benefits and standards to protect the interests of employees, it can be characterized as benefits-conferring legislation. As such, according to several decisions of this Court, it ought to be interpreted in a broad and generous manner. Any doubt arising from difficulties of language should be resolved in favour of the claimant.”¹¹

31I find a similar conclusion must be drawn when interpreting the Insurance Act and the Schedule, as they provide a mechanism for determining eligibility to benefits for motor vehicle accident victims. An overly mechanical interpretation of the Insurance Act and the Schedule, as well as the power of the Tribunal under the LAT Act would not, in my view, be consistent with the purpose of this legislative mechanism. I find the distinction drawn in M.N. between the Act and the regulation too narrow an interpretation of the power granted to the Tribunal under the LAT Act, and fails to take into consideration the overall purpose and scheme of the Insurance Act, the Schedule and the LAT Act.

32As such, I find that I do have the jurisdiction to extend the statutory limitation period in this case as granted to me under s. 7 of the LAT Act.

Sub-issue 3: Should I exercise my discretion to extend the two-year limitation period in this case?

33Having found that I have the discretion to extend the statutory limitation period, I will have to decide whether I should so exercise my discretion. To make that decision, I apply the four factors outlined in AF v. North Blenheim Mutual Ins. Co.:

a. The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period

34As noted above, the applicant did not address the preliminary issue in his initial written submission for this hearing, and only partially addressed the respondent’s argument in his reply submission. Other than a general statement claiming that he has made “all reasonable efforts to preserve his rights with regards to the denied benefits against the limitation period”, the applicant did not provide any explanation as to why he waited until the very last day of the two year limitation period to file his application, and only after 5:00 p.m. on that day. From the record, I also cannot find any correspondence between the parties that would point to any effort on the part of the applicant to pursue the claim, and/or reasons for the late filing. I therefore find insufficient evidence to confirm there is a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period. This factor does weigh against the granting of the extension.

b. The length of the delay

35The length of the delay in this case was two days, and as such is a factor that weighs in favour of granting the extension.

c. Prejudice to the Other Party

36The respondent did not cite any prejudice that they would suffer should I grant the appeal, and as such I consider it a non-issue.

d. Merits of the appeal

37The merits of the appeal in this case are tied to the first of the substantive issues, namely, whether the applicant’s injuries fall within the Minor Injury Guideline (“MIG”).

38The term “minor injury” is defined in s. 3 of the Schedule as “one or more of a strain, sprain, whiplash associated disorder, contusion, abrasion, laceration or subluxation and includes any clinically associated sequelae to such an injury.” The terms “strain”, “sprain,” “subluxation,” and “whiplash associated disorder” are all defined in s. 3, and collectively are referred to as “soft tissue injuries” in this decision. S. 18(1) limits recovery for medical and rehabilitation benefits for such injuries to $3,500. The definition of MIG does not include any psychological or psycho-emotional impairment.

39Section 18(2) of the Schedule allows an applicant to receive treatment outside of the MIG if he has a pre-existing medical condition that was documented by a health practitioner before the accident and that will prevent the insured person from achieving maximum recovery from the minor injury. As noted in A.B.-H. v. Travelers¹², to rely on this provision, the applicant must demonstrate that the pre-existing condition prevents the achievement of maximal recovery if subject to the MIG.

40The applicant has the burden of proving that his injuries fall outside of the MIG and are not subject to the $3,500 treatment limit in s. 18 of the Schedule.

41The parties did not specifically clarify, but for the purpose of this decision, I am assuming that the benefits claimed have exceeded the $3,500 limit pursuant to the MIG.

42For the reasons set out below, I find the applicant’s injuries fall under the MIG.

Applicant’s Physical Injuries

43I will begin by reviewing the medical reports with respect to the diagnosis concerning the applicant’s physical injuries.

44The information before me confirms that the applicant did not seek any immediate medical treatment after the accident. He took a day off from work and returned to work full time. The applicant went to see his family doctor, Dr. Sadri, on December 16, 2016 and complained about left shoulder pain. An ultrasound of his left shoulder on January 20, 2017 showed the result as normal, and four days later, Dr. Sadri diagnosed the applicant with a left arm strain. The applicant also had an MRI on May 5, 2017 of his left shoulder from which Dr. Sadri diagnosed him with mild left shoulder tendonitis. The applicant last saw Dr. Sadri on July 21, 2017.

45The applicant received some treatment approved under the MIG at Newmarket Health & Wellness between September 6, 2016 and February 2, 2017 where he was diagnosed as having a sprain/strain to his lower back and left knee. The applicant himself advised Newmarket Health & Wellness on February 7, 2017 that his headaches, left knee and neck pain had resolved, but that he still had mild pain in his lower back and left shoulder.

46The applicant attended an IE assessment on April 24, 2017 conducted by a physiatrist, Dr. Seyed Hossen Hosseini. There, the applicant reported his headaches, right hip and left knee pain had resolved, and that he experienced a 50% improvement in his left shoulder and lower back as of December 2016. The applicant acknowledged that he was prescribed pain medication but did not take it. Dr. Hosseini diagnosed the applicant with a sprain/strain of his left shoulder ligament or joint and lumbar spine sprain/strain. On that basis, Dr. Hosseini opined the applicant had sustained predominantly minor soft tissues injuries.

47On the basis of these reports, which were completed within a timeframe shortly after the accident, the applicant appears to have sustained only soft-tissue “sprain/strain” type injuries, which fall under the MIG.

48In support of his claim that his injuries fall outside of MIG, the applicant relied on two very recent reports. The first was the report of Dr. Wilderman, a pain specialist. Dr. Wilderman saw the applicant on November 14, 2019 – about three years after the accident - and diagnosed the applicant with:

• Chronic pain syndrome

• Mechanical lower back pain pattern 2: aggravation of pre-existing condition

• Lumbago: aggravation of pre-existing condition

• Bilateral Sacroiliac Joint Dysfunction: aggravation of pre-existing condition

• Rotator cuff syndrome on the left

• Depression

• Anxiety and Mild PTSD

49The applicant also submitted a psychological assessment report from Dr. Hewchuk dated October 23, 2019, more than 3 years post-accident, to support his position that his depressive symptoms had worsened since the accident.

50I have reviewed these various reports submitted by the applicant. With respect to Dr. Wilderman’s report, I note while he diagnosed the applicant with chronic pain, yet his own findings appear to be contradictory to a finding of chronic pain. In his report he noted the following findings based on his own examination of the applicant: no swelling, deformity, wasting muscle, scars, or tenderness of the applicant’s left shoulder. He confirmed as normal, the applicant’s sitting position and standing position. Most of other physical examination tests performed by Dr. Wilderman also came back negative in terms of pain, with the exception of some pain associated with range of motion (“ROM”) with extension, and lateral flexion, as well as palpatory tenderness at L3, L4, L5, and SI joint. Dr. Wilderman also found no neurological abnormality. He also found the applicant does not suffer from fibromyalgia, which is defined by Dr. Wilderman as “a chronic disorder characterized by a constellation of symptoms, including widespread tenderness and pain, as well as non-restorative sleep, fatigue, cognitive disfunction, mood changes, and other somatic symptoms”. The only medication that the applicant was taking at the time of the examination was an asthma inhaler.

51In short, Dr. Wanderman’s diagnosis of chronic pain does not seem to be supported by the objective medical evidence included in his own report. While the applicant submitted that this diagnosis was supported by Dr. Sadri’s medical notes, as noted above, he was last seen by Dr. Sadri in July 2017. Thus, there appears to be a gap of about two years during which it was unclear to me whether the applicant underwent any treatment for chronic pain. As well, many of the symptoms described by the applicant to Dr. Wilderman were not reported to Dr. Sadri, nor to the IE assessors in 2017.

52I also note that the applicant underwent a second s.44 assessment with Dr. Hosseini on November 27, 2019. Dr. Hosseini found the applicant’s left shoulder as having full active ranges of motion (ROM), albeit with tenderness, and normal ROM in his lumber spine with reports of back pain on forward flexion and extension. However, there was no pain or tenderness reported with palpation of the spine and surrounding musculature. Dr. Hosseini reviewed Dr. Wilderman’s report and noted that it did not change his opinion. Also, I note that while in the written submission, the applicant claimed he was not able to perform all essential tasks in his pre-accident employment, he advised Dr. Hosseini that he returned to work approximately three days after the accident and is currently working full hours and normal duties. The applicant did advise Dr. Hosseini of a pre-existing “dull and achy” sensation across his lower lumbar region and reported that the accident aggravated this complaint. Dr. Hosseini could not find any objective clinical findings to support the applicant’s complaints of left shoulder and exacerbation of pre-existing thoracolumbar pain.

53Based on these reports and Dr. Hosseini’s clinical finding, I find insufficient evidence for Dr. Wilderman’s chronic pain diagnosis, and I do not find that the applicant’s pre-existing condition with respect to his thoracolumbar pain has prevented his maximal recovery.

54My finding is supported also by the decision of this Tribunal in Y.X.Y.v. The Personal¹³, cited by the respondent, which noted:

For chronic pain to be more sequelae from the soft issue injuries… it must be chronic pain syndrome or continuous…and it must be of severity that it causes suffering and distress accompanied by functional impairment or disability. A diagnosis of chronic pain without any discussion of the level of pain, its effect on the person’s function, or whether the pain is bearable without treatment will not meet the applicant’s burden to show that chronic pain is more than mere sequelae.

55Similarly, in 17-007825 v. Aviva¹⁴, this Tribunal confirmed chronic pain is a severe, debilitating condition distinct from ongoing or recurring pain.

56Applying the caselaw, while the applicant may be suffering from ongoing pain in his left shoulder and lower back, there is insufficient evidence to support that he suffers from chronic pain. In addition, I note the applicant has no reported use of or dependence on prescription drugs or other substances (which is another common indicator of chronic pain syndrome). The applicant also reported to Dr. Hosseini that he has resumed many household chores since the accident. In terms of his social/recreational activities, the applicant continues to walk his dog daily and participates in a daily self-directed exercise program, although he had not returned to running due to low back pain. And finally, as noted above, the applicant returned to work on a full-time basis following the accident. Taken all these factors into consideration, I find the applicant has not proven that he suffers from chronic pain.

Applicant’s Psychological Injuries

57I then consider the evidence with respect to the applicant’s psychological condition and its impact on applying the MIG. Dr. Sadri’s notes mention a psychiatric referral after the accident. His subsequent records also note a history of depression and anxiety dating back 10 years. However, I was not provided with any actual medical report from any psychiatrist/psychologist who may have treated the applicant since the accident.

58The applicant was diagnosed by Dr. Wilderman in 2019 as having severe depression, anxiety, and PTSD. I note that Dr. Wilderman is neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist. Dr. Hewchuk, the psychologist who assessed the applicant administered the Beck Anxiety Inventory and Beck Depression Inventory-II for the applicant and noted his scores as mild for depression and moderate for anxiety.

59Finally, I reviewed the report by Dr. Talebizadeh, a psychologist who examined the applicant on November 21, 2019. Dr. Talebizadeh opined that while the applicant has reported insomnia and symptoms of depression and anxiety for a number of years, he has not been formally diagnosed with depression and anxiety. These symptoms have not changed much since the accident but continue to persist as before. Based on the tests conducted, Dr. Talebizadeh found the applicant to be a person with distress and dysphoria but does not meet diagnostic criteria for any psychological disorders.

60The applicant’s assertion in his written submissions that he suffered from post-traumatic headaches, dizziness, nausea, nervousness, anxiety, depressed mood, sleep deprivation and emotional distress was not supported by affidavit, nor was it supported by the medical reports.

61The applicant also did not provide any evidence to confirm if he had received any treatment – both in terms of counselling and medication - from any health professionals for his psychological conditions for the last two years.

62In the final analysis, I find there is insufficient evidence before me to demonstrate that the applicant’s pre-existing anxiety and depression had in any way prevented his achievement of maximal recovery if he were to subject to the MIG.

63Based on the medical reports before me, I therefore find that the applicant’s injuries were predominantly minor and are subject to the MIG.

Conclusion on the Extension of Statutory Limitation

64As I find the applicant’s injuries fall within MIG, there is no merit to his appeal. Based on this factor, and in light of the lack of evidence demonstrating the existence of bona fide intent to file the appeal, I decide not to exercise my jurisdiction to extend the timeline for the filing of the application.

Issue 2: Is the applicant entitled to interest for any overdue payment of benefits

65In view of my findings above, I find the applicant is not entitled to any interest.

FINDING & ORDER

66The applicant’s claim is statute barred. The applicant is not entitled to the benefits claimed and as such there is no interest owing.

Released: May 7, 2020

___________________________

Avvy Go

Adjudicator

Footnotes

1. 1O. Reg. 34/10.
2. 2Common Rules of the Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board and Fire Safety Commission (Effective October 2, 2017).
3. 3Ibid, Rule. 2.7.
4. 4M.N. v Aviva General Insurance Company, 2019 CanLII 119731 (ON LAT), para. 18.
5. 52017 CanLII 87546 (ON LAT).
6. 6Ibid, at para. 30.
7. 7S. v. Certas Home and Auto Insurance Company (Tribunal File 18-001196/AABS, September 5, 2019).
8. 8M.N. v Aviva General Insurance Company, supra, at para 21.
9. 9Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 27 (“Rizzo”).
10. 10Rizzo, Ibid, at para.21
11. 11Rizzo, supra at para.36
12. 1217-001856 v. Travelers, 2018 CanLII 13173 (ON LAT) at paras 34-35
13. 1316-000438 v The Personal Insurance Company, 2017 CanLII 595151 (ON LAT), para 27-28.
14. 1417-007825 v. Aviva Insurance Canada, 2018 CanLII 98282 (ON LAT), para 6.