Amanda Mohr v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2020 CanLII 27353

Date: 2020-02-25

File Number: 12571/MVIA

Appeal under subsection 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act

Between:

Amanda Mohr Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

PANEL: Jacqueline Castel

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Amanda Mohr, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Sanjay Kapur, Agent

Place and Date of Hearing: By Teleconference on February 24, 2020

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

OVERVIEW

1A teleconference hearing was held on February 24, 2020 to consider the appellant’s appeal of the 45-day impoundment of her 2015 Dodge, Journey (the “vehicle”). The vehicle was impounded on January 21, 2020 because it was being driven by a person whose licence was under suspension. The appellant is requesting that the Tribunal make a finding that the impoundment should be set aside and order the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) to release the vehicle.

ISSUES

2The issues to be determined are:

(i) Did the appellant exercise due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver of the vehicle, at the time of the impoundment, had a valid driver’s licence?

(ii) Did the impoundment result in exceptional hardship?

CONCLUSION

3On the evidence before me at the hearing, I find that the appellant did not exercise due diligence and that the impoundment did not result in exceptional hardship within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(c) and (d) of the HTA.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

4The owner of a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the HTA, may, pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.

5There are limited grounds on which an owner may appeal an impoundment as set out in section 50.2(3) of the HTA. The appellant in this case appealed on the grounds of due diligence and exceptional hardship.

Due Diligence

6In order to establish that the appellant exercised due diligence, within the meaning of section 50.2(3)(c) of the HTA, the appellant must prove that she made all reasonable efforts to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver was not under suspension at the time the vehicle was impounded.

7The appellant testified that on January 21, 2020 she loaned her vehicle to Joshua Boddison, her boyfriend, at the time, and the driver when the vehicle was impounded. She had been dating Mr. Boddison for approximately 2 months at that time, but has now ended the relationship with him. The appellant stated that she asked Mr. Boddison several times if he had a valid driver’s licence because he did not own a vehicle and she had never observed him driving. On all occasions he told her that he had a valid driver’s licence. She admitted that she did not ask to see his driver’s licence or conduct any verifications with the Ministry of Transportation to confirm that he was telling her the truth.

8According to the Extended Driver Record Search for Criminal Code Convictions, which the respondent introduced into evidence, Mr. Boddison has had his driver’s licence suspended on numerous occasions between 2012 and present for various reasons, including unpaid fines, driving with more than 80 mgs alcohol in his blood, and failure to complete a remedial program. At the time of the impoundment, his licence was under suspension until April 20, 2020 for failure to complete a remedial program. There is also a condition that, upon reinstatement of his licence, he is only permitted to drive vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock device.

9Simply asking one’s boyfriend if he has a valid driver’s licence and relying on him to be honest and forthright about his driving record does not constitute due diligence. The appellant would have had to conduct additional checks to verify the status of his driver’s licence to satisfy the requirements of due diligence.

10Accordingly, I find that the appellant did not exercise due diligence for the purpose of section 50.2(3)(c) of the Act.

Exceptional Hardship

11Section 10 of O. Reg.631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. In order to establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement set out in 10(1) of the Regulation is that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. If I find that there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle, then I need not consider any other requirements. I find that the appellant has not met this first requirement.

12The appellant testified that she is a single mother raising two children, aged 9 and 11. She stated that she works at a correctional facility approximately 10 or 15 minutes from her home. As the facility is out of town, there is no public transportation that goes directly to her place of employment. Her father is retired and resides approximately 5 minutes from the appellant’s home. He has had to drive her to and from work during the period of impoundment. He has also had to transport her children to and from school which is located on the opposite end of town from her place of employment. When her father has not been available, she has had to rely on co-workers to drive her to and from work. She has also taken taxis, on a couple of occasions, to do groceries but normally waited until someone was available to drive her.

13There is no doubt that the appellant, as well as her father, were inconvenienced because of the impoundment. However, the evidence does not support exceptional hardship because she had alternative modes of transportation available.

14Since the appellant did not satisfy the test that there was no alternative to the impounded vehicle, I do not need to consider the other provisions of s. 10 of the regulation.

ORDER

15Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the HTA, I deny the appeal and confirm the impoundment order.