Appeal from the Proposed Order to Refuse to Renew a Licence issued by the Registrar of Alcohol, Gaming and Racing under the Horse Racing Licence Act, 2015, S.O. 2015, c.38, Sched. 9 (the Act)
Between:
Dominic Khan
Appellant
-and-
Registrar
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Zahra Dhanani
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Dominic Khan, Self-Represented
For the Registrar: Aviva Harari, Counsel
Heard in Toronto: February 13, 2019 March 27, 28, & 29, 2019 April 16, 2019 and May 2, 2019
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
OVERVIEW
1On June 26, 2018 the Registrar issued a Notice of Proposed Order to Refuse to Renew under the Horse Racing Licence Act, 2015, S.O. 2015, c. 38, Sched. 9 (“NOP” and “Act”, respectively).
2The Registrar refused to renew the appellant’s licence because it had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant will not act in accordance with the law, or with integrity or honesty or in the public interest, because a) the appellant withheld information on his licence renewal application and b) of the appellants past conduct.
3On April 3, 2018, the appellant applied for a renewal of his licence to be a horse groomer/owner. On his application, he did not disclose over 60 convictions under the Highway Traffic Act and over 80 driver’s licence suspensions.
4The appellant appeals the NOP asserting primarily that all of the information before the Registrar was the result of a fishing expedition, false or misunderstood.
5For the reasons below, I find that the Registrar has established that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Khan, when acting as a licensee, will not act in accordance with the law, or with integrity, honesty, or in the public interest. Accordingly, the NOP against Mr. Khan’s licence is confirmed.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
6Two motions were raised at the commencement of the hearing and a third motion was brought on March 27, 2019.
7After hearing the parties’ submissions and after deliberation, I made oral decisions on all of the motions on the day that they were raised, indicating written reasons would follow in the final decision. These are the written reasons for those motion dispositions.
Motion 1: Disclosure of Materials
8Despite an order that the appellant was to disclose his hearing documents to the Registrar by February 4, 2019, he did not disclose them until the first day of the hearing. Pursuant to Rule 9.4 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board and Fire Safety Commission Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, October 2017 (Rules) the appellant may not rely on the documents as evidence without the consent of the Tribunal.
9The appellant submitted he had various difficulties as a self-represented party getting his documents together and asked that he be permitted to rely on them. The appellant asserted that he is a self-represented party, therefore it would be in the interests of Natural Justice for his disclosure to be allowed. He stated that he did not have anyone helping him and there was a lot of material in the disclosure that he would be relying on to make his case.
10The Registrar argued it would be at a disadvantage if the appellant were permitted to rely on the documents, given that they had not had an opportunity to review them. She submitted that she would have no time to review the materials and prepare a response.
11The appellant gave several explanations as to why he was providing all his disclosure on the morning of the hearing: that he had troubles with his printer, couldn’t connect to the internet, he had no idea what to address and that he was trying to gather all of the information necessary given that he had to track down information that was over twenty years old.
12I decided to allow the appellant’s disclosure at this late juncture because he stated that his whole case depended on the materials and that most of the materials were related to his financial activities that were central to this matter. In a quick review of the materials, it was clear that they were made up largely of financially related documents.
13To ensure that the interests of the appellant and respondent were served, I permitted the appellant to rely on the documents, but the hearing was adjourned to permit the respondent time to review them. I find that any prejudice to the respondent in permitting the appellant to rely on these documents was cured by the adjournment.
14The appellant had not tabbed all the materials consistently, he was instructed at this point that he would have to take all the materials back, re-organize them and provide them to the Registrar and Tribunal 12 days prior to the next hearing date. At this point the appellant, was instructed that after this he would not be allowed to introduce new disclosure. The appellant said he understood and agreed.
Motion 2: Recusal of Adjudicator
15In this Motion, which I denied, the Registrar asked that I recuse myself as the adjudicator claiming there is a reasonable apprehension of bias because I own a business that is licensed by the Registrar.
16Counsel for the Registrar stated that before the hearing, she searched my name on the internet and found that outside of my role as an adjudicator, I own a corner store that is licensed in Ontario by the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (“AGCO”) to operate a lottery booth.
17Given that a tribunal is presumed to be fair and impartial, the threshold for a finding of real or perceived bias is high and the moving party has the onus of establishing its existence: see Austin v. Ontario Racing Commission, 2007 ONCA 587 and Bailey v. Barbour, 2012 ONCA 325. This has been clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada, where it was held that "a mere suspicion [of bias] is not enough": see R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 CanLII 324 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 (QL), para. 112.
18Simply stated, the test of apprehension of bias as it has been articulated and reiterated in the jurisprudence is “[W]hat would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically - and having thought the matter through- conclude”: see Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369; Zundel v. Citron, 2000 CanLII 17137 (FCA), [2000] F.C.J. No. 679 and Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45.
19I found that it was not necessary to recuse myself because there was no conflict of interest. Had there been a conflict, I would have declared it before the hearing even commenced. I have been an adjudicator since 2008, I am very clear on the role of an impartial decision maker and see it as an extremely high calling. I conduct my hearings with utmost respect for the rules of Natural Justice.
20This case before me is a matter under the Horse Racing and Licensing Act, the issues before me have nothing to do with lottery. There is no interest, association, non-pecuniary or pecuniary benefit I could garner as someone who has a business licensed with the AGCO as a lottery operator. Lottery booths are highly regulated, everything happens electronically and there is no personal interaction between booth operators and the AGCO.
21The Registrar provided no evidence or reasonable explanation beyond a “mere suspicion” that my business could raise a conflict or bias in some way. The Registrar raised this issue “as a possibility for concern”, to “cover the bases” without any evidence or substantial reasoning behind it. It was a “mere suspicion” so to speak and therefore not enough to warrant a positive finding.
22As a result, I find that the threshold for reasonable apprehension of bias or conflict of interest has not been met by the Registrar and this motion is dismissed.
Motion 3: Appellant’s Request for Materials from the Registrar
23The appellant brought a motion seeking an order that would compel the Registrar to produce additional materials. He requested that the Registrar provide all communications that related to him and his file that existed even before he had made his renewal application.
24The Registrar argued that full disclosure had already been provided, that the documents requested are not relevant, have not been requested in a timely manner, could have been requested in advance of the hearing because the appellant was aware of the case he had to make and that this was a fishing expedition on the appellant’s part.
25I denied the motion because I found this request for “additional materials” too broad and open ended, that they are not relevant to this matter and that the request for disclosure is too late.
26The appellant has a theory that because of an unfavourable televised documentary on Global television, the Registrar had something against him in particular and then went on a “fishing expedition” against him.
27The test on the production of documents is set out in the case of West Park Hospital v. Ontario Nurses’ Assn., [1993] O.L.A.A. No. 12 (Knopf). The test has four parts. First, the information being requested must be “arguably relevant”. Second, the information must be particularized so it is clear what is being requested. Third, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the information is not being requested as a “fishing expedition”. And fourth, there must be a clear nexus between the information being requested and the issues in dispute at the hearing.
28The appellant could have requested this information well before the hearing commenced, at the last hearing day he was told that he was given extra time to submit disclosure because he is self-represented but that he cannot delay the proceedings any further with disclosure issues that should have been dealt with long ago. He agreed to this.
29The appellant had more opportunities than most parties to present and request disclosure, if he wanted more information, he could have requested it on the first day of the hearing when he finally submitted his disclosure, in advance of the second day of hearing which had been delayed by six weeks because of his late disclosure.
30The information being requested was not new information to the appellant, he has been expressing this opinion since day one of the hearing. He knew of his own argument at all the points that he should have asked for any extra documentation that he wanted.
31The appellant stated that he didn’t know the process because he is self-represented. On the previous hearing date, the appellant was given a lot of information about disclosure and the need to deal with disclosure issues in a timely fashion. This was not new information anymore. Timely dealings with disclosure were stressed to the appellant repeatedly throughout the previous hearing day.
32The appellant has also been part of other legal proceedings, including another recent legal issue with the AGCO. The appellant is aware that legal proceedings are based on rules and practices. His status as a self-represented party could not continue to be the reason for unreasonable delays and allowance for unreasonable expectations to be met which would result in unfairness to the other party.
33Tanya Cadeau, witness for the AGCO, gave evidence that the investigation into the appellant was triggered by his renewal application. I found the Registrar’s evidence on this credible and accept this.
34The regulator is empowered by the statute to investigate its licensees. The appellant wants to characterize the investigation into his conduct as a “fishing expedition” however this is not the appropriate use of the legal meaning of that terminology. Section 12 of the Act states:
Inquiries
12 (1) The Registrar may make those inquiries and conduct those investigations into the character, financial history and competence of an applicant for a licence or the renewal of a licence that are necessary to determine whether the applicant meets the requirements of this Act, the regulations and the rules of racing.
Collection of information
(4) The Registrar may require information, including personal information, or material from any person who is the subject of the inquiries or investigations and may request information or material from any person who the Registrar has reason to believe can provide information or material relevant to the inquiries or investigations.
Disclosure of information
(5) If the Registrar requires information or material from a person under subsection (4), the person shall disclose to the Registrar the information or material required, unless it is the subject of solicitor-client privilege.
35It was explained to the appellant several times that the function of a regulative body is to ensure that its licensees behave and have behaved according to certain standards, so it is their job to investigate, which means looking into the past conduct of the licensee.
36If the regulator is made aware of information about a licensee because of news coverage they can look into the licensees conduct because they are obligated to make sure that the licensee is conducting themselves with honesty, integrity and in accordance with the law. Therefore, an investigation is necessary and part of the regulator’s function. That is not a “fishing expedition” − it is the regulators job.
37The appellant is upset that the Registrar conducted an investigation into his behaviour instead of just giving him the licence. The regulator does not exist just to stamp documents, it is their primary function to assess who is worthy and who is not of licensure.
38Even if the appellant were to get the materials he is requesting and make a case for his theory that this is a fishing expedition, it would not impact the decision before us, as this hearing is about the appellant’s conduct not the regulators.
39As for the test enumerated in West Park Hospital, supra, the appellant has not satisfied any of the criteria: (a) the information being requested by the appellant is not arguably relevant because it is not information about the case at hand; (b) the appellant cast out a large net requesting all the information related to his file with the AGCO and the investigation conducted by Officer Pailey, this is not a particularized itemized list; (c) indeed, I find this to be a “fishing expedition”; and (d) finally, I find that the information requested by the appellant is of no relevance to the subject of the hearing and there is no nexus between this information and the questions to be answered.
40The appellant’s motion for production of extra materials is dismissed.
ISSUES
41The main issue in this matter is: given the evidence heard, are there reasonable grounds to believe that, when acting as a licensee, the appellant will not act in accordance with the law, or with integrity, honesty or in the public interest, having regard to his past conduct?
42The Registrar states that the appellant failed to disclose all the lawfully required information on his renewal application and the appellant has not met his financial obligations to pay back hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt he owes.
BACKGROUND
43This appeal hearing took place over 6 days. There were 16 exhibits entered into evidence and the Registrar called 3 witnesses: Tanya Cadeau (Administrator for the Registrar), Officer Marnie Pailey (Investigator for the Registrar) and Donald Ross (a Money Lender). The appellant called himself as a witness on his own behalf.
44I found all the Registrar’s witnesses to be credible.
45I found the appellant to be credible as a witness who could speak on behalf of the thinking behind his actions. I accept the appellant’s testimony as his truth but that does not infer acceptance as to his reasoning behind his actions nor as an acceptance of his truth as a general truth. While I believe the appellant believes his own thinking and is not trying to be dishonest, I find that his thinking is not of a reasonable nature and not grounded in common senses of truth..
46There are several facts in this matter that are uncontested and are corroborated by both the appellant’s and Registrar’s evidence. This background is based on the uncontested evidence.
47The appellant has been licensed as a horse groomer/owner with the AGCO since 2017, expiring on March 31, 2018. He is at the very beginning of a career in this industry.
48The appellant lives with his mother, she supports him financially and when he has work, the appellant makes an income. When he has a sustainable income, the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) garnishes 50%, as he is in arrears of family support payments in the amount of $50,480.84.
49The appellant has not filed personal or business income tax returns since 2010.
50The appellant has hundreds of thousands of dollars in debts dating as far back as 1993, owing to individuals and organizations, including: TD Canada Trust Bank, BDC Bank Loans, the Family Responsibility Office and the Ministry of Transportation. The appellant does not deny any of this and in fact he presented evidence to support a finding that he owes money to all of these lenders.
51The appellant was loaned $200,000.00 by F.R. in 2010. Her father Mr. Donald Ross arranged the loan investment on her behalf and did all of the communicating with the appellant. This loan was part of an original agreement that would have totalled $400,000, loaned to the appellant in two stages. The appellant has not paid back the $200,000 and does not believe he is obliged to for varying reasons.
52The appellant failed to disclose over 60 Highway Traffic Act convictions on his licence renewal application.
53The appellant failed to disclose over 80 driver’s licence suspensions.
54At the time of the hearing, the appellant was under a driver’s licence suspension and a Province-wide Prohibited Drive of a Motor Vehicle condition.
55There were a few pieces of information that both the appellant and the Registrar raised that I found to be irrelevant for the purposes of this decision, those items include: the recording of the interview with Officer Pailey, evidence on whether that recording was done lawfully and the Global News documentaries. I name them here because both parties spent quite a bit of time addressing these particular pieces of evidence and the Global News documentaries were mentioned in the NOP.
56I do not rely on any of the details from that evidence as I did not find them to be helpful or necessary with respect to the conclusions that I have drawn. News documentaries can be instructive at times, but rarely can they be relied on as pure fact. I therefore will not address either of the above-mentioned documentation further than these statements.
LAW, EVIDENCE, AND ANALYSIS
57Sections 14 and 19 of the Act together permit the Registrar to revoke a licence if:
Section 14(a): there are reasonable grounds to believe that, when acting as a licensee, the applicant will not act in accordance with the law, or with integrity, honesty, or in the public interest, having regard to the past conduct of the applicant.
58This is the statutory test.
59The licensee is entitled to appeal the NOP and request a hearing before the Tribunal. Sections 20(6) and (7) of the Act state that the Tribunal, after holding a hearing, can confirm or set aside the NOP, direct the Registrar to take the action that the Tribunal considers the Registrar ought to take to give effect to the purposes of the Act, and may substitute its opinion for that of the Registrar.
60In both instances, the onus is on the Registrar to meet the applicable standards and prove the reasons for their actions.
61The interpretation of section 14 of the Act is informed by the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission, Registrar) v. 751809 Ontario Inc., 2013 ONCA 157 (Famous Flesh Gordon’s). While Famous Flesh Gordon’s is distinguishable from this case on its facts, it does supply the determinative test and standard to be applied in this case.
62The Ontario Court of Appeal found that, as a standard of proof, ‘reasonable grounds for belief’ is lower than ‘balance of probabilities’. It requires “something more than mere suspicion” and an “objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information.” It does not require the Registrar to show that a licensee’s conduct will “make it more likely than not that he will not carry on business as required”.
63Although the Tribunal refers to its proceedings as “appeals”, this hearing is akin to holding a first instance hearing. The Tribunals’ function is not to determine whether the Registrar made an error, rather the Tribunal makes its own decision based on the evidence and submissions presented at the hearing. In other words, the Tribunal owes no deference to the decision of the Registrar. Zahariev v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers and Salespersons), 2005 CanLII 44815 (Div. Ct.), at paras. 7-11.
Are there reasonable grounds for the Registrar’s belief?
64The Tribunal’s examination of this issue can be broken down into two related questions:
i. Did the appellant knowingly mislead the Registrar on his 2018 licence renewal application?
ii. Does the totality of the appellant’s past conduct, give rise to reasonable grounds for belief that, when acting as a licensee, the appellant will not act in accordance with the law, or with integrity, honesty, or in the public interest?
65In Famous Flesh Gordon, the Court found that when looking at past conduct, the Registrar is entitled to look at past conduct outside of the four corners of the licence, which includes both criminal and non-criminal conduct. The conclusion can also be drawn from this case that in considering past conduct, the Registrar must take the good and the bad together. This examination of past conduct, in the context of the statutory test in section 14 of the Act, remains directed at the licensee’s future actions “when acting as a licensee.”
CONTEXT: THE GOOD
66As stated in the legal test, the good must be assessed with the bad. Before looking at the specific aspects of the legal test (acting in accordance with the law, with integrity, honesty and in the public interest), I make an introductory comment here about the good aspects of the appellant’s past conduct.
67From 1995 to 2015, the appellant taught rowing as part of his paid and unpaid work. For a lot of this period, he ran a “not-for-profit” organization alongside a for-profit venture. As part of the not-for-profit work, thousands of children were taught how to row at low or no cost to the children. The not-for-profit received some grants, loans and some funds from the for-profit venture.
68The appellant received a Rotary award for this work in 2010.
69The appellant spoke of and brought up his non-profit work at every turn. It was mentioned almost every time he spoke about any subject.
70The for-profit venture was teaching adults who would form corporate teams to row and then competitions would be held. The adults would pay a fee for this and there would be hundreds of teams registered every year, at the height there were over 900 rowers registered in one year. Each rower would pay a $185.00 fee to be a part of the lessons and competitions. This operation was only really functional for six months each calendar year.
71The Registrar alleged that these organizations were not appropriately administered.
72The rowers were told that part of the proceeds would go into the not-for-profit for inner city children. The for-profit venture would then funnel funds to the not-for-profit work.
73From the evidence, I do not doubt that the for-profit supported the not-for-profit at times. It would also seem that at times funds were transferred from the not-for-profit account to the for-profit account. It would seem that there was no real administrative separation between the functioning of the not-for-profit and the for-profit organizations. It was all under the appellant’s leadership and control and he managed it very interchangeably.
74I make no finding in this decision as to whether funds were appropriately accounted for in these two ventures. This was not a hearing into that issue, and while it was raised by the Registrar, I do not need to make a finding on this issue to make a finding overall. There was enough other documentation to make findings about the questions at hand.
75It is clear that the non-profit did valuable work in Toronto. It would take children from inner city schools during the school year and teach them how to row. Rowing has historically been exclusively reserved as a sport for the affluent. The appellant stated in testimony that him and his father had experienced a lot of barriers growing up and he was motivated by wanting to provide children with lesser means the opportunities that would allow them to succeed and access resources otherwise unavailable to them.
76The appellant testified that he was not regularly paid by the non-profit for his work, he would take money when it was available and be patient when it was not. He stated that the non-profit owes him over $800,000.00 in unpaid salary.
77There is no doubt that the appellant has done good work in Toronto with some marginalized children. From the evidence, it appears that the appellant has directly or indirectly had contact with thousands of kids.
78The appellant testified that a few of his rowing students have even become Olympic athletes. There has also been positive news coverage of the appellant’s efforts.
79While I find here that the appellant has done good work, it is not enough to mitigate his other actions that have led to the conclusion in this decision.
Did the appellant knowingly withhold information on his 2018 licence renewal application?
80I find that the appellant did knowingly give incomplete answers on his 2018 licence renewal application.
81On April 3, 2018, the appellant submitted an application for renewal of his licence to the Registrar. A question on the licence renewal form is whether the applicant has had a licence refused, denied, suspended or revoked? The appellant responded to that question with an answer that he had a driver’s licence suspension in January 2018.
82To date of this hearing, the appellant has 130 drivers licence suspensions and 97 convictions pursuant to the Highway Traffic Act. At the time he filled out his renewal application it was less than this, but it is disturbing that even since his application refusal he has been breaking the law.
83The appellant did not disclose any information but for one suspension on his renewal application.
84At the hearing, the appellant did not provide any reasonable evidence as to why he did not disclose information that is legally required.
85When asked, he would often retreat to an explanation that he was doing such good work in the city that he was forced to drive a lot and therefore he got all of these driving tickets. He also stated repeatedly that he did a lot of his “charity” work for free and therefore did not have much money and so it should be understood why he did not pay his fines.
86These responses do not in any way address why he did not disclose the correct information on his application.
87At one point the appellant testified that he didn’t think he had to “disclose his whole driving record” and that he was told he didn’t have to put all the suspensions on the form. I am not satisfied by any of these responses.
88I find that the inaccuracies in the appellant’s application could not have been an honest mistake. There was no evidence put forward to support that conclusion.
89The appellant was not entirely forthcoming in his application. He knew or ought to have known that the information in his application did not tell the full story about his convictions and dozens of driver’s licence suspensions.
90It is a grave concern that the appellant withheld the amount of information that he did and that he took no responsibility for the inaccurate information he provided.
91He gave answers that were completely irrelevant to the question at hand and continuously repeated that he believes because he did “good” “important” work, that his illegal actions should be excused.
92The only conclusion that I can draw from the evidence provided by the appellant is that the appellant believes that rules and the law do not apply to him because he has done important charity work in Toronto. This is not acceptable on any level.
93That being said, a finding of dishonesty on an application does not necessarily disentitle an applicant to licensure under the Act. In many of the statutes over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction, knowingly providing false information is a stand-alone, statutory ground for disentitlement to a licence. This is not the case in this Act. This instance of dishonesty must instead be considered as part of the broader context of the appellant’s past conduct in order to determine whether there are reasonable grounds for the Registrar’s belief.
Does the totality of the appellant’s past conduct, give rise to reasonable grounds for belief that, when acting as a licensee, the appellant would not act in accordance with the law, or with integrity, honesty, or in the public interest?
94I have found that the appellant’s past conduct demonstrates a lack of judicious behaviour which provides reasonable grounds to believe that he will not act in accordance with the law, integrity, honesty or the public interest.
95The Registrar argued that it has reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant would not, when acting as a licensee, act in accordance with the law, or with integrity, honesty, or in the public interest. The Registrar asserted that the nature and seriousness of his past convictions and conduct raises serious questions of integrity and honesty, not to mention acting in accordance with the law.
96I find that the Registrar has met the standard of reasonable grounds of belief and proven that, when acting as a licensee, it is believable and foreseeable that the appellant will not act in accordance with the law, or with integrity, honesty, or in the public interest.
ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW
97The most common and basic understanding of what it means to act in accordance with the law is to comply with the law or to obey the law.
98The appellant’s 97 Highway Traffic Act Convictions and 130 Licence Suspensions demonstrate that he is not willing to obey the law.
99The appellant has demonstrated repeatedly that he will not comply with the law. The Registrar provided the appellant’s Ministry of Transportation record associated with his driver’s licence. This evidence was unrefuted.
100During the whole period that the appellant was a motor vehicle licensee over 2017-2018, he was breaking the law, I list here a small portion of the appellant’s recorded driving convictions:
2017-10-20 Fail to Surrender Permit for Motor Vehicle
2017-10-20 Fail to have Insurance Card
2017-10-30 Driving While Licence is Suspended
2017-12-20 Driving 102 KMH in an 80KMH Zone
2017-12-20 Drive Motor/Veh, Not Currently Validated Permit
2017-12-20 Fail to have Insurance Card – C.A.I.A.
2017-12-20 Fail to Surrender Permit for Motor Vehicle
2018-07-17 Speeding 115KMH in 100 KMH Zone
2018-08-16 Speeding 119 KMH in 80KMH Zone
2018-08-16 Draw/Trailer, No Plate
2018-09-21 No Validation on Plate
2018-09-21 Shall not Drive Holding or Using a Hand-held Com Dev
2018-09-21 Fail to have Insurance Card – C.A.I.A.
2018-09-21 Fail to Surrender Permit for Motor Vehicle
2018-10-25 Disobey Legal Sign
2018-11-01 Permit Use of Plate Not Authorized for Vehicle
101The appellant has had his licence suspended over 40 times since he has been licensed under the AGCO.
102The most troubling aspect of his record, besides the length of it, is that the appellant keeps repeating the same offence.
103When asked why he kept failing to pay the fines, he said that he did not have the money. When asked if he did not have the money why did he keep breaking the law which would inevitably result in paying fines, he would say things such as: because he was doing charitable work. When asked if doing charitable work made him disobey legal signs while driving, in a very round-about way he would answer yes. In a written statement he wrote:
all of these responsibilities had me on the road, whipping all over Toronto delivering corporate “packages”, picking up supplies and materials, travelling to regattas, visiting police stations, community centres, local politicians and the innumerable other duties. During all those years, I got traffic tickets and a whole lot of fines. Along with those fines came suspensions as a result of never having the funds to deal with them until it was absolutely necessary. While, I concede that these were unwise actions, I don’t believe that the Tribunal should look at those indiscretions with the law absent of the surrounding circumstances: community and public benefit in an environment of a lack of funds…(they) do not demonstrate reckless breaking of any laws that they should be used against me…Further, many of the violations were minor in nature and could be considered administrative violations…. (emphasis added)
104It is very disturbing that when asked why he kept breaking the law, the appellant went on to talk about the good work he had done, that he did the law breaking while in the business of his not-for-profit work. Not only irrelevant responses but demonstrative of very dangerous thinking.
105At the time that the appellant was a licensee he was no longer engaged in the rowing work with marginalized children. All of his rowing work ended by 2016. Yet he continued to break the law.
106Nowhere in the law does it say that if you are engaged in the process of doing charitable work you are exempt from following the rules. Indeed, it is the opposite, if you are going to promote to the public that you are engaged in good work, then you must uphold the law as a display of ethical and responsible behaviour that people can trust.
107The appellant asserted that his offences were not serious: such as not having the right licence plates, his insurance information and ownership records. Part of the offences that made up his record also included: disobey legal sign, speeding, improper turn, driving with a suspended licence, improper class of licence, unsafe move, fail to come to stop at intersection, disobey traffic signal, disobey legal sign, failure improper use of seat belt, driving while using a hand-held device.
108There is an excessive repetition of many of the same offences, for example driving without his driver’s licence. To get 20 infractions for not having your licence while you are driving and not learning from this mistake (which leads to fines) is quite frankly incomprehensible.
109Characterizing all the offences as “minor” is also beyond reasonable comprehension. It is staggering that the appellant could look at a record of 97 convictions and characterize this as “minor” and not “serious”. As part of his record he has speeding convictions and fail to obey legal signs and communicating on a hand-held device. These are incredibly serious offences that could result in fatalities.
110The appellant fails to acknowledge the potential harm he could do and he is doing a serious disservice to other drivers and the general public.
111When faced with his 30-year history of repeated offences and irresponsible behaviour, his response at the hearing was to dismiss it or suggest he was entitled to behave that way because of his work with inner city children.
112The conclusion I draw from this is that the appellant has not learnt from his mistakes and is not going to. He continues to break the law and push the limits of the law at will.
113Finally, with respect to the suspensions based on fines, the appellant testified that he would not pay his fines so that he could get the extra time once his licence was suspended to finally pay. He wouldn’t pay until he was absolutely forced to.
114The appellant only pays fines when he is forced to. With all of his other unpaid loans, the appellant testified that people should sue him to get their money back. He also stated that if he owes over 50% of his income to paying back family support arrears, he is not required to pay other debts at those times. The appellant only seems to pay back debts when he is backed against wall and forced to do so. He only pays fines when there is a government agency enforcing them, he has not even paid back court ordered fines/restitution.
115In the case of 1958242 Kim’s Auto and Kimar Chambers v. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2018 CanLII 105304 (ON LAT) at para. 50, the Tribunal found that past conduct in relation to HTA offences were serious and indicative of future unlawful conduct:
Mr. Chambers’ past conduct in relation to the HTA offences indicates repeated non-compliance with the provisions of the HTA and a willingness to ignore court ordered sanctions. It suggests that if granted registration, the appellants may similarly disregard the requirements of the Act and the orders of the Registrar. Mr. Chambers’ past conduct in that regard, together with knowingly giving false information to the Registrar in his application, affords reasonable grounds for the belief that the appellants will not carry on business in accordance with the law and with integrity and with honesty.
116The appellant’s injudicious thinking pattern is evidenced here to the point where it would be unnecessary to address the other evidence presented at the hearing. I do go further with the reasons to be clear that this is a pattern and not isolated to the appellant’s driving activity.
ACTING WITH INTEGRITY
117The Merriam-Webster dictionary states that integrity implies trustworthiness.
118The evidence indicates that there are several instances in which the appellant has not been trustworthy. The evidence illustrates a repeated pattern and not an isolated incident.
119The appellant has hundreds of thousands of dollars in debts owing to various lenders dating back to 1995. There was no documentary proof of any of these outstanding debts having been paid or any payment plans put in place for payment as of the dates of the hearing.
120Documentary proof of all of the following outstanding debts were disclosed and entered into evidence. I do not exhaust the full list of outstanding debts the appellant has incurred because that would make this decision untenably long, the following is only a portion of the appellant’s evidenced debt load.
Youth Venture Loan:
121In 1993, the appellant received a government sponsored loan in the amount of $7,500.00. He never paid this money back. As of July 18, 2018, the amount owing on this loan was $12, 878.97.
122He had applied for the loan as a recent graduate for a personal training business he was building.
123When the appellant was asked why he didn’t pay the loan back, he stated that his business didn’t work out, so he moved on and he forgot about the loan. In retrospect he expected the bank would “write it off as a bad debt”.
124Just forgetting to pay back money that was loaned to you on the promise that you would pay it back demonstrates a lack of integrity. It is questionable how one forgets that they were given and used $7500.00 that they did not earn.
125While this debt was over 25 years ago, it is the beginning of a pattern. There a long list of loans starting with this one that the appellant never paid back.
126The appellant expressed no remorse for not paying this debt back he blamed the conditions of his business not working out and minimized the situation by saying it was so long ago “how was he supposed to remember”.
127Given that this loan was government sponsored, the public shoulders the burden of this debt if the appellant does not repay it.
128The appellant had developed a business based on the idea that he would train people in their condo building gyms, so that he would not have to pay any gym fees and the people could train in their own buildings. He thought this was a completely reasonable plan and win for him and his clients. He found out later that the Condo Corporations had rules that people could not run personal training businesses out of their gyms.
129He testified that “I had no idea about these rules.” He also suggested that he was a victim of these rules and that is why his business failed. The appellant was oblivious to the idea that he would have to ask the condo permission to do this on their premises, to check rules before creating such a business plan and not to go ahead with ideas just based on his own authority.
130This is the beginning of a demonstrated pattern of the unethical and victimized thinking of the appellant. He is not the victim of a botched plan; his plan was bad to begin with. The appellant does not see this. This is a theme in the appellant’s life that was demonstrated repeatedly over the hearing.
T.B.:
131T.B. was a friend and supporter of the appellant’s rowing work.
132Between June 2006 and March 2007, she loaned the appellant $13,968.75. There is evidence to show that she asked for the money back several times.
133There is a letter from October 2007 where T.B. had sought legal advice and wrote the appellant a letter as a formal document of their transactions. In it she states. “Please understand, this was meant to be a short-term loan. It was never meant to extend beyond the year 2007 and is now impacting my own personal financial state.” (emphasis added)
134In 2009, T.B. initiated a lawsuit against the appellant wherein she was awarded close to $14,000.00 plus costs and interest.
135The appellant has never paid the money to T.B. and the judgement is outstanding.
136T.B. is no longer friends with the appellant.
Jane Doe:
137“Jane Doe” (a former friend of the appellant who did not want to be identified) lent the appellant $10,000.00 in 2011. There was a promissory note that required the appellant to pay back the debt by March 2012.
138There is evidence that Ms. Doe tried several times to get the money back from the appellant, she even sent him strongly worded correspondence that displayed her anger at the situation. On April 29, 2015, Ms. Doe sent the appellant a short email, it stated “I want my Money Back you piece of S___!!!!”
139The appellant testified that he expected her to speak civilly/more respectfully, as he continued to do so with her. The appellant did not show any understanding of Ms. Doe’s frustration at not having been paid back $10,000.00 in over three years and the circumstances of Ms. Doe.
140She has cancer and was struggling financially, she stated in her correspondence that she desperately needed her money returned to her.
141In testimony, the appellant stated that he was very respectful to her and told Ms. Doe to get a judgement against him. He stated this as if to demonstrate how above board and cooperative he was. He informed her of her legal rights.
142When asked if he believed that when you borrow money, you should pay it back? He answered that “without a judgement, there is no obligation to pay a debt.”
143The appellant has not paid any of this money back to Ms. Doe.
144The appellant stated in testimony that he believes that if someone does not sue you in two years, they lose their funds.
145The appellant demonstrated no empathy for how he was impacting Ms. Doe.
The Appraiser:
146In 2011, the appellant contracted North Country Appraisals to appraise a property he owned so that he could get further loans. North Country Appraisals did the appraisal and submitted their final invoice for $3,164.00.
147For over two years, the appraiser tried to get payment in several amicable ways. Finally, in 2013, they were forced into legal action, which they won. They were awarded a Superior Court judgement in the amount of $4,984.24.
148The appellant has not made any payment on this court ordered judgement.
Writs:
149There was documentation of two writs filed with the City of Toronto Sheriff’s Office, confirming debts that the appellant owes to the Toronto Dominion Bank: a) $39, 375.00 plus 5% interest as of August 13, 2015; and b) $87, 738.56 plus 6 % interest as of April 24, 2014.
150Despite having his name on these writs, the appellant believed that he was not responsible for them because they were loans on behalf of the not-for-profit where he was just the executive director and there were board members that should have been responsible. This regardless of the fact that the appellant dealt with all the money of the organization and made most of the decisions for the direction of the organization.
151Again, here, he takes no responsibility and suggests that he is the victim of board members who should have been the ones paying this debt. This also demonstrates that he does not pay back court ordered fines.
Donald And F. Ross:
152In 2010, the appellant bought a property “Cedarwood Lodge” that he was hoping to turn into a kid’s summer camp.
153Cedarwood Lodge cost $400,000.00. The appellant did not put any of the money down for this property. There was a $125,000.00 vendor take back loan (the property owner lent him the money), a loan from L.L. for $200,000.00 and his ex-wife lent him $75,000.00.
154The appellant had no money of his own at this point, no regular income and just a dream that this camp would one day be able to make a lot of grant and other income.
155The appellant later found out that miners need accommodation near this property and so he decided he would turn it into accommodations for the miners to make an income from them. A renovation like this would take hundreds of thousands of dollars but he still decided to go forward, despite having no money of his own. He started to look for investors and was introduced to a private money lender: Donald Ross.
156The appellant entered into an agreement with Mr. Ross (acting on behalf of his daughter’s investment fund).
157Mr. Ross agreed to lend the appellant $400,000.00 in two phases to get the property renovated and the kids program developed.
158Mr. Ross provided the first $200,000.00 in funds to the appellant. After some months, Mr. Ross spoke with the appellant to get an account of where the funds had been spent to date. In testimony, Mr. Ross stated that from what he could see the appellant had “frittered” away the money on buying equipment and other frivolous things without making any headway on the actual renovation. I found Mr. Ross to be a credible witness and accept his evidence.
159In testimony, the appellant provided a list of items he spent the money on. There was no documentation or receipts, other than a spread sheet that the appellant had made. The appellant accepted his list as fact and expected that everyone else including Mr. Ross should have.
160The appellant seems to believe that everyone should trust his word above everything, therefore no receipts or documentation were required.
161The appellant stated that he had given this list to Mr. Ross and that Mr. Ross was not credible because Mr. Ross stated on the stand that he had not received documentation. The list, while a document, cannot be afforded much weight because there is nothing to support that the list was not something that the appellant just made up (again there were no receipts). It is not actually proof of “documentation”.
162The list that the appellant provided in evidence contained all rounded numbers (nothing was precise to the cent) which has one assume that those were not the correct numbers, there were upwards of 14 different types of vehicles on the list, $25,000.00 was allocated to salaries, there was a payment line for a “book keeper” (there are no “books” from that time), “cook, housekeeper” and to that point the actual renovation of the property was not very far along.
163I did not find this list to be reasonable explanation of where the appellant spent $200, 000.00 that was loaned to him by Ms. Ross.
164That said, the list did offer insight in that the appellant thought it was acceptable to use the money lent to him to renovate the land on: salaries for himself and camp staff, equipment that they would need in the future (5 trucks, skidoos etc.) and other things that were not related to the immediate renovation of the property.
165After Mr. Ross spoke to the appellant and saw this list, he became exceptionally angry and realized that the money Ms. Ross had lent the appellant was not being used for the agreed upon purposes and that the investment was not going to yield the benefit expected. Mr. Ross testified that he decided to no longer work with the appellant, he also did not try too hard at getting his money back because he knew the appellant did not have any.
166When asked why he did not sue the appellant, he stated that “lawyers make all the money when you sue and I did not want to throw good money after bad.”
167Up until the last day of the hearing, the appellant did not believe he owed Ms. Ross her money back.
168This was a loan, not a gift. The appellant has a story that because Mr. Ross did not give him the second $200,000.00, that Mr. Ross broke the agreement and therefore Mr. Ross was at fault and somehow this meant that he did not have to pay Ms. Ross her money back.
169He is adamant about this.
170I respectfully disagree. Ms. Ross never met the appellant, never spoke to the appellant and loaned him the money as an investment with a higher return rate than most banks. She did not give him the money; therefore the money was expected to be paid back.
171The appellant’s thinking that Mr. Ross is at fault is part of his completely unreasonable thinking that he is never at fault.
172The appellant had a responsibility to spend that money wisely and effectively, as an objective observer (based on the appellant’s own explanation) I believe that it was not. Any reasonable person would not put more money into a situation that had already failed expectations, what Mr. Ross reacted in a way that was reasonable.
173The fact that the appellant kept saying that Mr. Ross broke the contract, not seeing that indeed he broke the contract by not doing what was expected with the money, goes to his thinking that he is never at fault. To this day, he does not think he owes that $200,000.00 back to Mr. Ross’s daughter.
174This is the height of untrustworthy thinking and conduct.
The Purchase of a Horse:
175In 2017, the appellant received a lump sum payment of $5,000.00.
176The original amount was for $10,000.00 but half was garnished by the Family Responsibility Office (FRO).
177Instead of paying off other people he owed money to, he bought a $3800.00 horse.
178He stated that he was originally buying the horse “for his son”, so that his son could learn to be with and ride a horse. He sees his son once a week on supervised access.
179Given that he is not the primary caregiver of his son he cannot know how much it costs to raise a child in modern times. Even if he had just paid down another $3800.00 on his family support arears, this would have served his son better than a horse.
180In 2016, he put a $250.00 deposit down on a horse in anticipation of the FRO lump sum to come in. It did not come in when he expected and so he was told by the sellers (after months of holding the horse for him) that he forfeited his down payment and they were left in a very bad position based on his promises.
181A more reasonable approach would have been to buy the horse when he actually had the money.
182He ultimately bought a different horse once the FRO money came in.
183An even more reasonable approach would have been to spend the money on paying down any one of his existing debts. He could have paid any one of T.B., Ms. Doe, the appraiser, the writs etc., but he did not.
184This is another demonstration of the appellant’s untrustworthy behaviour. The appellant seems to have a pattern of thinking “If I spend this money, then I will make money from what is spent.” The money he spends is rarely his own. The money he thinks he will make is all hypothetical. He continues to spend money based on potential not real income.
185Given his level of debt he does not seem to realize that he is not in the position to keep “investing” in potential businesses.
186The appellant stated that buying a horse was important for him to do, so that he could make an income because he decided he could now become a horse groomer/trainer.
187If the appellant conducts his horse grooming/training business in the same manner as he has conducted his other financial affairs, it would be a disservice to give him a license. There was no evidence before me to suggest that his patterns have changed.
188The appellant declared that, one day, he will pay all his debts off. I do not believe him. There is no evidence before me that he would do this. Purchasing this horse demonstrates that when he has had “extra” money, he has not used it to pay off his debt load.
189The appellant demonstrated no ability to act with integrity.
ACTING WITH HONESTY
190Honesty is the quality of being fair and truthful and is defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary as adherence to the facts.
191With regards to honesty, I did not actually find that the appellant displayed signs of “lying” or being duplicitous. He provided documentary evidence that provides proof of all of his unpaid debts and most of his oral evidence was not in his favour.
192He provided several pieces of documentation that were against him.
193He also did not deny any of the allegations that he had not paid back loans. He was forthcoming about all of this.
194The problem is in his thinking about his obligations over the loans and his entitlements to people’s sympathy.
195I am convinced that the appellant does not believe he has to pay the $200,000.00 owed to Ms. Ross. That is a problem with his thinking. His honestly held beliefs are what lead him to dishonest behaviour.
196I am convinced that the appellant does not believe his 97 driving convictions are a serious issue. That is a problem with his thinking.
197I have no doubt that the appellant believes that all the problems in his life are caused by everyone except for him. He is not to blame, and it is everyone else’s fault. At one point in testimony, the appellant unequivocally stated that “the condition of where his life is right now is because Mr. Ross did not give me the additional $200,000.00 that we had discussed. Mr. Ross ruined my life.”
198The appellant does not see the connection between his choices and decisions and his current state of affairs. This is a serious problem. It is a problem with his thinking.
199This demonstrates that the appellant actually believes the stories he tells himself and others no matter how faulty the thinking, how morally incorrect or how harmful.
200This is worse than being dishonest; it demonstrates that the person does not have the capacity to think morally. Which means that he cannot take responsibility for wrong doing.
201While this is in direct opposition to his ideas of helping society, the two can co-exist.
202The appellant thinks working on good causes provides an excuse to break the law.
203This thinking is severely problematic and as we have seen from the appellant’s life has dire consequences, not only on others but on himself.
ACTING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
204Acting in the public interest, simply put is to handle government affairs with fairness, respect and in a way that is worthy of the public trust. It means to protect all aspects of citizenry that affects the rights, health or finances of the public at large with care and responsibility.
205At a distance it might be confusing as to how someone’s financial, business, personal, criminal and other conduct that has nothing to do with horses, come into play when assessing a potential horse grooming/owning licence.
206In some ways those things have nothing to do with each other, so long as you are capable of being kind and competent with the horses.
207On another level, as a licensee your past conduct has everything to do with being licensed, because you are getting the stamp of approval by a public agency that is tasked with protecting the public.
208In this case, the AGCO puts their reputation and all that comes with it in alignment with the licensee, asserting that this person is trustworthy and functioning under a universal moral code. This lends credibility to the actions and pursuits of the licensee.
209Had the appellant disclosed all of his convictions and driving licence suspensions on his application that may have been enough for the Registrar to say that this person does not follow rules.
210The Registrar also argued that the rules for being a horse owner, racer, trainer are all contained in a guide book hundreds of pages long, they do not believe that the appellant will follow all these rules.
211They pointed out that the appellant’s past conduct demonstrates that he will not follow the law.
212I find that the appellant’s behaviour beyond breaking the law is harmful to the public in several other ways.
213The appellant has a dangerous ability to convince himself and others that his visions and expectations (often based in deluded thinking) are reality.
214He bought two pieces of property not using any of his own money, but with his name alone on the title. The vendors of the property even lent him money to buy their property. It is astonishing that he has been able to convince people of extreme investments, despite such an unstable reality. Ultimately, both properties (Cedarwood Lodge and Northwood Lodge) were lost by the appellant because he was not making the monthly payments. Again, the appellant testified that this was not his fault.
215To have the power of convincing people of things is a power that cannot be used irresponsibly.
216The appellant, while he believes his own truth, has a way of thinking and an understanding of truth that is dangerous and harmful to others.
217What he would do as a licensee is not predictable and at this point there is no guarantee that he will stop breaking the law or start to act with integrity. Even in his closing submissions, he was convinced that he was owed a licence because of all the harm he had suffered due to environmental circumstances and other people’s actions. He took no responsibility for his actions and he was firmly entrenched in his own victimized thinking.
218The appellant testified at various times that he would use grants from the government and or other sources to pay off some of his outstanding debts instead of the intended purposes of the loans/grants.
219In July 2015, the appellant was going to get a grant from George Brown College to start a sports program with the College. He testified that he was going to use this money to pay off the debt he owed to the City of Toronto for use of their land for the rowing club. He testified that a Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) agent called George Brown and gave them financial information related to the appellant.
220As a result, George Brown decided to no longer work with the appellant. The appellant was evicted from the land and the City of Toronto sought a judgement against him in Superior Court, which was granted in December of 2015, for the amount of $8938.01 plus a total of 4.7% interest per year. The appellant testified to this point that “see, it’s not my fault that we didn’t pay the City, it’s the fault of a rogue CRA agent.”
221The appellant could not see two major issues with his argument: a) George Brown was not lending him money to pay off old debts and he should not be misusing other people’s money; but also that b) he owed the City of Toronto thousands of dollars for being in arears of rent for years and that is why he is being evicted, not because of the CRA informing George Brown of his financial issues.
222The appellant testified that he was trying to cooperate with the CRA and get all of the documentation together for them. The way he did this was to take summer students (that were government funded) and had been hired to work with the rowing program, to work on organizing his taxes. He testified to this boldly as an example of how cooperative he was and that he put effort into resolving his issues with the CRA. He did not understand that it was unethical to get these government funded student positions to work on his taxes instead of the things they were hired to do.
223At the time, he was working at a Montessori. He decided to use the Montessori school space to deal with his personal CRA issues. The appellant brought all of his boxes of documentation and the rowing club student staff to the Montessori to sort out his tax related documentation. Again, he saw no problem with this. He testified that he was the principal and he made the decision to do this. He had not asked the owners of the Montessori if he could use their space for non-Montessori business. Soon after he was fired from the Montessori and the appellant stated it was because of all of the “lies that were spread about him.” It couldn’t have been because he was misusing the Montessori space.
224The appellant argued that if his licence gets refused then he will not be able to apply for a licence for another two years. He submitted that this would be unfair to him, overly punitive and not justified because he should not be penalized harshly for things that do not relate to working with horses.
225I disagree. The appellant takes the position he takes because he does not see how serious his life-long patterns of financial irresponsibility, illegal actions and harm to others, is. I find his past conduct to be egregious on many counts.
226It would be of benefit to himself and the public interest, if the appellant took the opportunity during the next two years to make amends with a lot of the people/organizations with whom he has outstanding debts. If he could get agreements in writing that outlined his efforts at paying back money owed, it would be a good use of that time.
227Also, the appellant argued that if he does not get his licence, he will not be able to make a living. That is not correct. There are many jobs out there that do not require being licensed. It may serve the appellant well to have a regular job, with an employer where he can demonstrate that for two years he went to a job, showed up regularly, on time and got a regular paycheck from which he started paying off debts.
228The appellant stated that his mother financially supports him so his costs are low. He would be able to not only survive on a minimum wage income but could also pay debts from that income.
CONCLUSION
229The appellant demonstrated throughout the hearing that he was not willing or able to be honest with himself about the impacts of his behaviour on others.
230This is a serious deficit. Without the ability to see how one negatively impacts others, one cannot correct their behaviour and course correct.
231My assessment of the appellant’s future behaviour is not only based in his past conduct but more so in his explanations, thinking and reasoning behind this past conduct.
232In his closing argument, the appellant repeated several times that he “was great”. He began his comments stating “I am Great! I am the number one person in this City for youth. No one in this room has done that.” He repeated that he had done more in this city for “youth” than anyone else. He repeatedly spoke of how “exceptional” he was and how that excused a lot of his actions.
233The appellant taught marginalized children how to row, while this is an important contribution, there are thousands of people in Toronto who work tirelessly with children and youth: in food banks, working with abused kids, working with homeless youth and working with children who are the targets of several different harmful agents. The appellant has an over aggrandized sense of himself.
234He attributed great success to himself. Anything that went wrong or was a failure was the result of someone else’s actions or the environmental circumstances.
235The appellant exhibited an extreme sense of entitlement and a lack of empathy for the people whom he owed money to.
236He seemed to be incapable of integrating the basic concepts of right and wrong and tended to skew everything he experienced in his favour, regardless of the outcome.
237He continued to blame one man, Mr. Ross, for the state of his current life. He could not see how he had made incredibly irresponsible decisions that led to all of the outcomes of his life. The appellant stated at one point “If it wasn’t for Mr. Ross, I would’ve been worth millions right now.”
238There was an insidious message throughout the appellant’s testimony that he ultimately is a good person but a victim of circumstances. The appellant has a 25-year track record of borrowing money from people and institutions and not paying it back. He expresses no remorse about this and he always blames his outcomes on “circumstance” and other people.
239Throughout the six days of hearing, the appellant displayed a pattern of responding to questions. The appellant would respond to questions in one or all of the following seven ways:
a) Taking no responsibility for his actions, the situation or the impacts.
b) Focusing on irrelevant information, deflecting from the questions or issues to be dealt with.
c) Attributing all of the failure and negative impacts of his behaviour to other people and or circumstances.
d) Suggesting that because he has done good work, his behaviour should be understood and excused.
e) Suggesting that the law/rules he broke were not serious and what he did was minor.
f) Suggesting that the law/rules do no apply to him.
g) Expressing a sense of entitlement that the people whom he has harmed, let down, hurt, made agreements with should be more patient with him, even if he has not paid them back thousands of dollars in over ten years.
240I have stated that I accept the appellant as a credible witness in terms of giving insight into his thinking and therefore I accept his evidence as credible. However, I do not find that the appellant has conducted himself in a credible or responsible way throughout the hearing and in his life actions.
241I find that the Registrar has met the standard of reasonable grounds of belief and proven that, when acting as a licensee, it is believable and foreseeable that the appellant will not act in accordance with the law, or with integrity, honesty, or in the public interest.
ORDER
242I find that it is not in the public interest for the Registrar to grant the appellant a licence at this time.
243There are reasonable grounds to believe that, when acting as a licensee, the appellant will not act in accordance with the law, or with integrity, honesty, or in the public interest, having regard to his past conduct.
244I confirm the Registrar’s decision to refuse the renewal of a horse grooming/ownership licence to the appellant.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Zahra Dhanani
Released: August 2, 2019