S. D. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.
Between:
S. D. Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Nidhi Punyarthi
Appearances:
For the Appellant: S.D. self-represented
For the Respondent: Sonia De Santis, Agent
Held by teleconference on: May 29, 2019
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
OVERVIEW
1The appellant, S.D., appeals the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“respondent”) to impound her vehicle dated April 29, 2019.
2The vehicle was stopped on the highway on April 29, 2019 at 2:27 a.m. At the time of the impoundment, the vehicle was driven by the appellant’s then boyfriend. The driver tested for over 80 mg of alcohol in his blood, and his licence was under a Criminal Code suspension. Eventually, it was determined that he did not even have a licence to drive in Ontario.
3The appellant’s vehicle was impounded for a period of 45 days from April 29, 2019, to June 13, 2019.
4The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Licence Appeal Tribunal (“Tribunal”) on May 9, 2019. She appeals the impoundment of the vehicle on two grounds:
a. That the vehicle was stolen;
b. That the impoundment causes her exceptional hardship.
ISSUES
5Section 50.2(3) of the Highway Traffic Act (“Act”) provides the only permissible grounds on which an owner may appeal a motor vehicle impoundment. The grounds relied upon by the appellant (listed previously) are found in Sections 50.2(3)(a) and 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
6Therefore, the issue on this appeal is as follows:
a. Should the Tribunal order the respondent to release the appellant’s motor vehicle on the basis that it was stolen or on the basis that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship?
RESULT
7I find that the appellant’s vehicle was not stolen, and that the impoundment has not caused her exceptional hardship. As a result, the impoundment of her vehicle for the period provided in the Notice of Impoundment is confirmed.
ANALYSIS
The appellant’s vehicle was not stolen
8The Act does not define what “stolen” means. In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles), [2002] O.J. No. 745, the Divisional Court held that the Tribunal should not limit the meaning of “stolen” only to an intention to take the vehicle permanently. The Court stated:
In our opinion a vehicle is ‘stolen’ in this context when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily.
9The test for whether a vehicle is stolen is highly fact-specific. In this case, the appellant testified that she had gone to a bar with her boyfriend. She was too drunk to drive home, and therefore asked her father to come and pick her up. She left with her father, and left her vehicle in the parking lot. Her boyfriend remained at the bar. Her boyfriend later ended up taking the appellant’s vehicle as he was aware of the code on the car which provided him access to the duplicate of the keys which she normally kept inside the vehicle
10When asked how her boyfriend was aware of these details, the appellant testified that they used to see each other frequently and he knew her habits. She did not press charges with respect to the alleged theft of the vehicle.
11It appears from this scenario that the boyfriend accessed and drove the vehicle based on the information that he was privy to over the course of his relationship with the appellant. The appellant, on her end, did not take any steps