Date: 2019-04-02

Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

G.T.

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Panel: Jennifer Friedland, Member

Appearances:

For the Appellant: G.T., Appellant

For the Respondent: Sanjay Kapur, Agent

Heard by Teleconference on: March 25, 2019

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

Overview

1The appellant appeals under s. 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8 (the “Act”) the impoundment of his 2015 Honda Accord (the “vehicle”). He seeks an order releasing his vehicle from impoundment.

2The hearing proceeded by way of a teleconference on March 25, 2019.

3For the reasons stated below, the impoundment is confirmed. The appellant’s vehicle will remain detained at the impound facility until the conclusion of the 45-day impound period.

BACKGROUND

4The appellant’s vehicle was impounded on February 11, 2019 for 45 days pursuant s. 55.1 of the Act, which authorizes a police officer to detain a vehicle for certain reasons, including if it is being driven by a person whose licence is suspended under certain provisions of the Act.

5The vehicle was being driven by the appellant’s brother, whose licence had been suspended earlier that same day following a guilty plea to driving while disqualified. A police officer who had been in the courtroom at the time of his plea, then saw the appellant’s brother driving in the parking lot next to the court. The vehicle was thereafter detained.

ISSUES

6The parties agree that the only issue on this appeal is whether the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle will result, or has resulted, in exceptional hardship pursuant to s. 50.2 (3) (d) of the Act.

EVIDENCE

7The appellant testified that the impoundment of his vehicle will cause him financial strain. In particular, he was concerned that it would cost at least $2500 to have his vehicle released. He felt that the cost of the impoundment was too high. He had hoped that some lesser period of impoundment could have been applied so that his car could be released earlier. He stated that his family was poor and did not have much money. He also testified that he needed his car for work.

8The appellant acknowledged that he had been taking the bus to and from work since his car was impounded. He further acknowledged that he was able to obtain groceries by taking the bus. He stated that his mother had also suffered from the loss of his vehicle but acknowledged that she was now managing to get to and from work by paying a co-worker $8 a day to drive her. The appellant did not identify any further hardship. He admitted that he lives in the City of Toronto where public transportation was readily available.

LAW and ANALYSIS

9Under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, an owner may appeal the impoundment of his or her vehicle on the basis that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship. The onus is on the appellant to prove this ground of appeal.

10Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors to be considered in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

11The first requirement is set out in s. 10(1) of the Regulation and requires the appellant to show that that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Pursuant to s. 10(4), to meet this requirement, the owner must:

…demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

12In the appellant’s case, it is clear that he has had, and will continue to have, a clear alternative to his impounded vehicle in the form of public transportation. He takes the bus to and from work and for groceries. His mother has also secured alternative transportation for work. Moreover, he lives in the City of Toronto where the options for travel without his vehicle are many. The appellant’s appeal therefore fails on the initial consideration under s.10(1) of the Regulation. If he has an alternative to the impounded vehicle, he cannot succeed in a claim for exceptional hardship

13With respect to the appellant’s concern that he would suffer financial hardship due to the cost of the impoundment itself, this is not a factor the Tribunal may consider in determining the issue of exceptional hardship in this case. Pursuant to s. 10(3) of the Regulation, financial or economic loss to a person can only be considered if certain conditions are met, the first of which is, again, that there be no alternative to the impounded vehicle. As the appellant does have an alternative to the impounded vehicle, financial hardship cannot be considered.

14As noted by the respondent during the course of his submissions, the appellant’s recourse with respect to the cost of the impoundment itself is set out in s. 55.1(27) of the Act which establishes that the owner of a motor vehicle may bring an action against the driver of the vehicle at the time it was detained to recover any costs or other losses incurred by the owner in connection with the impoundment. In other words, it is open to the appellant to seek to recoup the costs of the impoundment from his brother, the person who drove the appellant’s car while his licence was under suspension. The extent of those costs does not assist the appellant in proving exceptional hardship.

15For the reasons given above, the Tribunal finds that the appellant has failed to prove exceptional hardship.

ORDER

16Pursuant to s. 50.2(5) of the Act, the impoundment of the appellant’s motor vehicle is confirmed.