Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.
Between:
S.B.
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair
Appearances:
For the Appellant: S.B., Self-represented
For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenboer, Agent
Heard by teleconference: February 13, 2019
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
Overview
1A teleconference hearing was held on February 13, 2019 to consider the appellant’s appeal of the impoundment of her 2009 Chevrolet (“vehicle”) on December 26, 2019 for 45 days. The appellant obtained the release of her vehicle on February 9, 2019
2The appellant submits that the impoundment resulted in exceptional hardship to her because the impoundment caused her financial hardship and worries.
ISSUE
3The issue to be determined is whether the impoundment resulted in exceptional hardship.
CONCLUSION
4I find that the appellant’s evidence fails to support a finding that the impoundment resulted in exceptional hardship.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
5The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA”) may, pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.
6An owner may appeal only on the grounds set out in s. 50.2 (3), (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the HTA. The appellant appeals on ground (d), that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship?
7I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship because the appellant has alternatives available to the impounded vehicle.
8Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. In order to establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement, as set out in s. 10 (1) of the Regulation, is that there must be no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
…the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
9If the appellant is able to establish that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle then under s. 10(1), I must consider whether the impoundment will result in:
(a) a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; or
(b) a threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used.
10I can only consider financial, employment and education or training losses listed in s. 10(2) of the Regulation if the appellant first establishes that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
11Pursuant to s. 10(2)(a) of the Regulation, the Tribunal may never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to any person.
12The appellant testified that the vehicle belonged to her deceased husband and it is intended that the appellant’s son will drive the vehicle when his driving licence is reinstated. The vehicle is registered in her name and she pays the bills for the vehicle because of sentimental attachment to the vehicle. It is stored at her son’s home but he is not to drive the vehicle until his driving licence is reinstated. The appellant did not know her son was driving the vehicle until the police came to her home and informed her. She testified that her son had to use the vehicle to flee from his common law wife during a domestic incident.
13The appellant said the fees she had to pay to obtain the release of the vehicle from impoundment on February 9, 2019 caused her financial hardship and worries because she is a senior citizen and has limited funds. The appellant testified that she owns another vehicle which she drives, and during the impoundment period she did not require the impounded vehicle for her own driving needs.
14I find that the appellant had an alternative to the impounded vehicle available to her during the impoundment period based on her own testimony.
15As the appellant had an alternative to the impounded vehicle, I am unable to consider the appellant’s submissions related to financial or economic loss.
16I therefore find the appellant has not established the impoundment has resulted in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation.
ORDER
Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the HTA, I confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair
Released: March 21, 2019