Licence Appeal Tribunal

Safety, Licensing Appeals and Standards Tribunals Ontario

Tribunal d’appel en matière de permis

Tribunaux de la sécurité, des appels en matière de permis et des normes Ontario

Date: 2019-12-09

Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Stephanie Walters

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Stephanie Walters, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Steve Grootenboer, Agent

Heard by teleconference: November 21, 2019

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

A. Overview

1A teleconference hearing was held on November 21, 2019 to consider the appellant’s appeal of the impoundment of her 2009 Pontiac (the “vehicle”) on October 6, 2019 for 45 days. The impoundment period ended the day before the hearing and the appellant had not at the time of the hearing obtained the release of her vehicle.

2The appellant submits that the impoundment has resulted in exceptional hardship to her because as the single mother of an eight year old son, she needed her vehicle to get to work, to get herself and her son to doctor appointments and the payment of the impoundment fees to get the vehicle out of impoundment is a financial hardship to her.

B. ISSUE:

3The issue to be determined is whether the impoundment has resulted in exceptional hardship to the appellant.

C. CONCLUSION:

4I find that the appellant’s evidence fails to support a finding that the impoundment has resulted in exceptional hardship.

D. LAW AND ANALYSIS:

5The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA”) may, pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.

6An owner may appeal only on the grounds set out in s. 50.2(3), (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the HTA. The appellant appeals on ground (d), that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship?

7At the time the appellant filed her appeal her vehicle was impounded. Although the vehicle was available for release before the hearing, I still need to determine if the impoundment resulted in exceptional hardship.

8I find that the impoundment did not result in exceptional hardship because the appellant had alternative modes of transportation available to the impounded vehicle.

9Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. In order to establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement, as set out in s. 10 (1) of the Regulation, is that there must be no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

…the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

10If the appellant is able to establish that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle then under s. 10(1), I must consider whether the impoundment will result in:

(a) a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; or

(b) a threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used.

11I can only consider financial, employment and education or training losses listed in s. 10(2) of the Regulation if the appellant first establishes that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

12Pursuant to s. 10(2)(a) of the Regulation, the Tribunal may never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to any person.

13The appellant is employed full time at a coffee shop in a different municipality than where she lives and needed her vehicle to get to work. There is no public transit where she lives and works. She has been able to keep her job during the impoundment period by cutting down her working hours so that she can get rides to work around other people’s commitments. The first week after the impoundment she could only work eight hours but after that the routine stabilized to four hours a day instead of her seven to eight hours a day. The reduction in hours has resulted in some lost wages which the appellant said she may have an opportunity to make up once she can resume her full-time hours. She has received rides to work from her mother, her work supervisor, a friend and by hiring a taxi although she cannot afford to pay $35.00 to a taxi for a one-way ride to work and taxis are not always available. The appellant testified that she has known her employer for a number of years, her employer has accommodated her change in work schedule during the impoundment period, has kept her full-time job open for her and is eager for her to work full-time again.

14The appellant testified that she needed emergency surgery on November 6, 2019 and her mother was able to drive her to the surgery. She had a follow up appointment on the Friday but because she did not have a ride there, she was able to change the appointment to the following day and attend. The appellant said she and her son had a joint medical appointment which they were not able to attend during the impoundment but this will be rescheduled to a future date.

15The appellant said that her son has been able to walk the two blocks from her home to the school and has not missed any school during the impoundment period.

16The appellant said the reduction in her hours of work and payment for taxis to get to work has caused her financial hardship and she may not be able to pay her rent and buy groceries. She said that she cannot afford to pay the impoundment fees to obtain release of her vehicle now that the impoundment period has ended.

17It is apparent from the appellant’s evidence that the impoundment period was inconvenient for her. However, she was able to keep her job and her employer has accommodated her reduced hours of work and kept her full-time job open for her. There may be an opportunity for the appellant to make up her lost hours in the future. She was able to attend her surgery appointments and her son has not missed any school. Inconvenience is not a factor which the Tribunal can take into consideration.

18I may only consider whether the impoundment will result in financial loss to the appellant if there is no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle.

19I find that the appellant had alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to her during the impoundment period because she was able to get rides from her mother, her work supervisor, a friend and taxi, albeit at a financial cost.

20Therefore I find the appellant has not established the impoundment has resulted in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation.

ORDER:

21Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the HTA, I confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.