Licence Appeal Tribunal
Safety, Licensing Appeals and Standards Tribunals Ontario
Tribunal d’appel en matière de permis
Tribunaux de la sécurité, des appels en matière de permis et des normes Ontario
Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.
Between:
Julie Tremblay
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Julie Tremblay
For the Respondent: Nora Challis, Agent
Heard by teleconference:
September 17, 2019
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
A. Overview
1A teleconference hearing was held on September 17, 2019 to consider the appellant’s appeal of the impoundment of her 2014 Chevrolet (the “vehicle”) on July 30, 2019 for 45 days.
2The appellant in her Notice of Appeal wrote that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship to her because she is a student and does not have enough money to pay for school and release her car from impound. The impoundment expired September 13, 2019 and as at the date of the hearing the appellant said she had not obtained release of the vehicle from the impound facility.
B. ISSUES:
3The issue to be determined is whether the impoundment has resulted in exceptional hardship.
C. CONCLUSION:
4I find that the appellant’s evidence fails to support a finding that the impoundment resulted in exceptional hardship.
D. LAW AND ANALYSIS:
5The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA”) may, pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.
6An owner may appeal only on the grounds set out in s. 50.2(3), (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the HTA. The appellant appeals on ground (d), that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
7The appellant seeks to have her vehicle released on the basis that the impoundment has resulted in exceptional hardship.
Has the impoundment resulted in exceptional hardship?
8I find that the impoundment has not resulted in exceptional hardship because the appellant has alternatives available to her during the period of impoundment.
9Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that must be considered by the Tribunal in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. In order to establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement, as set out in s. 10 (1) of the Regulation, is that there must be no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
…the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
10If the appellant is able to establish that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle then under s. 10(1), the Tribunal must consider whether the impoundment will result in:
(a) a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; or
(b) a threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used.
11I can only consider financial, employment and education or training losses listed in s. 10 (2) of the Regulation if the appellant first establishes that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. If I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
12Pursuant to s. 10(2)(a) of the Regulation, the Tribunal may never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to any person.
13The impoundment period was from July 30, 2019 to September 13, 2019. The appellant had a summer job working with medical records remotely by computer for a hospital in another municipality and did not miss any time at work because of the impoundment. She testified that she was able to run or walk to the grocery store and a medical clinic when she needed to.
14On September 5, 2019 she went back to school and her insurance company provided her with a rental car at that time.
15Although the appellant spoke of the difficulties and stress the impoundment has caused her, inconvenience of having to run or walk to do personal errands and having to ask the insurance company for a rental vehicle, this amounts to inconvenience, and inconvenience is not a factor which the Tribunal can take into consideration.
16The appellant also said the impoundment has caused exceptional hardship to her insurance company because it had to provide her with a rental vehicle. As the appellant’s insurance company is not a party to this appeal, this submission is not relevant to this appeal.
17I find that the appellant had alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to her during the impoundment period, specifically running, walking and the rental car provided to her by her insurance company on September 5, 2019. Because there were alternatives to the impounded vehicle, I cannot consider the financial loss to the appellant. As I have found there are alternatives to the impounded vehicle, the appellant has failed to make out exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation.
ORDER:
18Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the HTA, I confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair
Released: October 16, 2019