M.P. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act.
Between:
M.P.
Appellant
-and-
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Panel: Luisa Ritacca, Member
Date of Decision: September 7, 2018
Appearances:
For the Appellant: M.P., self-represented
For the Respondent: Sanjay Kapur, Agent
Overview
1This is an appeal, filed by the appellant on August 3, 2018, from the impoundment of her motor vehicle on July 22, 2018. The appellant let her son, L.P., borrow her car to attend to personal errands. At the time, the appellant did not know that her driver’s licence had been suspended for failure to complete a remedial program in connection with a previous conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol levels. While driving the appellant’s vehicle, he was stopped by the police.
2The issue on this appeal is whether the appellant exercised due diligence prior to allowing her son to use her car. While in her Notice of Appeal the appellant originally argued that the impoundment caused “exceptional hardship”, she confirmed at the outset of the hearing that she was withdrawing that ground of appeal. As such, the Tribunal was asked to only address the issue of whether she exercised “due diligence” in attempting to determine whether her son’s licence was under suspension before letting him drive her vehicle.
3For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal finds that the appellant did not exercise due diligence. As a result, the Tribunal confirms the impoundment.
The Law
4Section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act (the “Act”) provides that a motor vehicle may be detained and impounded. Subsection (3) sets out the length of time for the impoundment, given the circumstances. In this case, the appellant’s vehicle was impounded for a period of 45 days.
5Any vehicle owner has the right to appeal an impoundment to the Tribunal. On the appeal, the Tribunal may, under section 50.2(5) of the Act, confirm the impoundment or order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle.
6Pursuant to section 50.2(3), the burden of proof is on the appellant to satisfy the Tribunal that at least one of the following grounds of appeal has been proven on a balance of probabilities:
(3) The only grounds on which an owner may appeal under subsection (1) and the only grounds on which the Tribunal may order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle are,
(a) that the motor vehicle that is impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded;
(b) that the driver’s license of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension;
(c) that the owner of the motor vehicle exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension; or
(d) that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
7Section 50.2(3) (c) is the only ground of appeal advanced by the appellant. There is no suggestion that the vehicle was stolen or that the appellant’s son did in fact have a valid driver’s licence. Further, there is no suggestion that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
8The Act does not define “due diligence”. Black’s Law Dictionary (ninth edition) at page 523 defines “diligence” as “care, caution, the attention and care required from a person in a given situation” and “due diligence” as “the diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an obligation”.
9There is no absolute standard. The required actions will depend upon the particular circumstances and an assessment of what a reasonable and cautious person would do under those circumstances.
10The objective of the impoundment provisions in the Act is to deter owners of vehicles from deliberately or carelessly allowing suspended drivers to drive their vehicles. This is to ensure road safety and minimize risk for other drivers.
Facts and Analysis
11On July 22, 2018, the appellant allowed her son to use her vehicle to attend to personal errands. This was not a unique situation. As of the date of the hearing, the appellant’s adult son has been living with her for approximately three months. At the time of the impoundment, he did not own a vehicle and would regularly use his mother’s vehicle to take her shopping and to her appointments, and for his own personal use.
12The appellant testified that it never occurred to her on the date of the impoundment or at any other point in time to ask her son if he had a valid driver’s licence. She left her car keys on a hook at the front door for his use. There was no suggestion that