S.R. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2018 CanLII 128755

Date: 2018-09-14

File Number: 11581/MVIA

Appeal under subsection 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act

Between:

S.R.

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Panel: Dawn Kershaw

Appearances:

For the Appellant: S.R., Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenboer, Agent

Place and Date of Hearing: By Teleconference

September 12, 2018

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

OVERVIEW:

1A teleconference hearing was held on September 12, 2018 to consider the appellant’s appeal of the 45 day impoundment of her 2014 Chevrolet Cruze (the “vehicle”). The vehicle was impounded on August 20, 2018 and is due to be released on October 4, 2018.

ISSUES:

2The issue to be determined is whether the impoundment resulted in exceptional hardship to the appellant.

CONCLUSION:

3On the evidence before me at the hearing, I find that the impoundment did not result in exceptional hardship as defined in section 50.2(3)(d) of the Highway Traffic Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“Act”).

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

4The owner of a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O.1990, c H.8 (the “HTA”), may pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.

5There are limited grounds on which an owner may appeal an impoundment as set out in section 50.2(3) of the HTA. The appellant in this case appealed only on the ground that the impoundment will cause her exceptional hardship.

6The other reasons for appeal did not apply because she admitted she let her boyfriend drive while knowing his licence was suspended.

7Section 10 of O. Reg.631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. In order to establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement set out in 10(1) of the Regulation is that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. If I find that there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle, then I need not consider any other requirements. I find that the appellant has not met this first requirement.

8The facts of the impoundment are not in dispute. The appellant, who is now 8 months pregnant and has a high risk pregnancy and gestational diabetes, and her boyfriend were returning from a doctor’s appointment when the appellant began to feel ill. Because she just wanted to get home and they were only about an 8 minute drive from there, she permitted her boyfriend to drive her vehicle, knowing that his licence was suspended.

9The police stopped the vehicle because of an invalid sticker, and the police officer asked for the appellant’s boyfriend’s licence, which he could not produce. The police officer advised that the vehicle would be impounded for 45 days.

Exceptional Hardship

10The appellant lives alone in a small town that is about 20 minutes from the town in which she works at and owns a hair salon.

11The appellant used to drive herself to work as required. Prior to her vehicle being impounded, she sometimes worked 10 hour days. However, she has not worked as much since her vehicle was impounded, and now sometimes only works about four hours a day. The reduction in her hours is due both to sometimes not being able to get a ride at a time convenient to her work, and also because of her health. The appellant admitted that part of her reduction in working hours has been at the suggestion of her doctor because of her high risk pregnancy.

12The appellant advised that she has had friends and family drive her to work since the impoundment. She testified that she has missed about two days a week of work since the impoundment because she could not get a ride. She considered taking a cab from her town to the town where she works, but stated it costs approximately $30 one way. She stated she determined it was not financially worth it to spend $60 for cab fare because even though some days she can make between $150 and $200, some days she relies on walk in business. If the walk in business does not materialize, she will not make that amount of money and she would then be financially worse off than if she simply did not go to work.

13The appellant also testified that she has about three doctor’s appointments per week now. She has had friends and family drive her to those.

14The evidence does not support exceptional hardship. There is no doubt that the appellant and her friends and family have been greatly inconvenienced because of the impoundment. However, the appellant must prove first of all that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, and she has not done so.

15The appellant testified that she has friends and family who drive her to both work and her doctors’ appointments as they are able. She has missed some work, but she also testified there is cab service available to her. Though she has chosen not to use it for financial reasons, which are legitimate, I cannot consider financial reasons because she has not met the onus to prove that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

16In reaching my decision, I also considered the appellant’s health situation. Again, because she testified that friends and family have driven her to her doctors’ appointments, she did not persuade me that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. I also accept the respondent’s submission that the appellant lives in an area served by 911 and therefore has alternate transportation available to her in the event of an emergency.

17I am sympathetic to the appellant’s situation and the inconvenience and financial difficulties in which she finds herself because of the impoundment. However, the appellant’s testimony does not support a finding of exceptional hardship. For that reason, I do not need to consider the other provisions of s. 10 of the regulation.

ORDER:

18Pursuant to subsection 50(2)(5) of the HTA, I deny the appeal and confirm the impoundment order.