Appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8, from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a driver’s licence under subsection 47(1) of the Act.
Between:
P.C.
Appellant
-and-
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
Panel: Dr. Erica Weinberg, MD, Member Cezary Paluch, Member
Appearances:
For the Appellant: P.C., Self-Represented
For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenboer, Agent
Place and Date of Hearing: By Teleconference October 25, 2018
REASONS FOR DECISION
A. Overview:
1On July 20, 2018, the appellant voluntarily attended at a hospital emergency department (ED) requesting treatment for anxiety attacks. A week prior, a close friend died and the appellant started drinking substantial amounts of alcohol at home after work. During this period of increased alcohol intake, the appellant walked to work and was taken to the ED by a colleague. Based on that ED visit, the emergency physician, Dr. B.N., filed a Medical Condition Report with the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, pursuant to s. 203 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H 8 (the “HTA”), which requires all medical practitioners to report any person older than the age of sixteen who is suffering from a condition which may make it dangerous for that person to drive. The condition reported was: alcohol dependence. As a result of the report, the Registrar suspended the appellant’s driver’s licence pursuant to s. 47(1) of the HTA. The appellant appeals the suspension of his driver’s licence to the Tribunal under s. 50 of the HTA.
2For the reasons that follow, we are satisfied that the appellant is addicted to alcohol (alcohol dependence). However, the Registrar has not established in this case that the appellant’s alcohol addiction is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely. Accordingly, we set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
B. ISSUES:
3The issue for the appeal is whether the appellant has alcohol dependence to an extent that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. In order to answer that question, we will address the following sub-issues:
Does the appellant have alcohol dependence?
If so, is it likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely?
C. THE LAW:
4The Registrar has the burden of establishing the ground for suspending the licence on a balance of probabilities.
5The Registrar has the power under s. 47(1)(g) of the HTA) to suspend a driver’s licence for a sufficient reason. Subsection 14(1)(b) of O. Reg. 340/94 (the Regulation) of the HTA states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not be addicted to the use of alcohol to an extent likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive safely. [emphasis added]
6Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Minister of Transportation to consider the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers (CCMTA Standards) when determining whether the requirements of s.14(1) are met.
7The CCMTA Standards at s. 15.6.3 states that a person who suffers from a substance use disorder (including alcohol dependence) can have their licence reinstated after a period of abstinence of 12 months or sooner if a rehabilitation program is completed and there is support from a treating physician or addiction specialist.
8We may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration, although they are not binding on us.
D. ANALYSIS:
9The test the Tribunal must consider is whether the appellant has an alcohol use disorder (addiction), and if so, whether his condition significantly affects his ability to drive safely.
10We agree that the appellant has an alcohol use disorder, the severity of which we cannot determine from the hearing, but are not satisfied that it currently rises to the level of significantly interfering with his ability to operate a motor vehicle safely.
1. Does the Appellant have alcohol dependence?
11We accept the evidence in the two separate reports of the physician and the nurse practitioner, Dr. N.B. and S.G., that the appellant has been diagnosed with alcohol dependence. There is also a Ministry of Transportation driving record confirming that in 2013 the appellant was convicted under the Criminal Code of driving with more than 80 mgs of alcohol in blood and his licence was suspended.
12The appellant’s testimony is that between July 23 and 29, 2018, he completed a 5-day residential detox program. Following the program, he was prescribed an anti-craving medication that he continues to take once a day. He testified that he currently does not have urges to consume alcohol. The appellant testified that he no longer keeps alcohol in his home and does not drink at home. He testified that he remained abstinent for 27 days following the detox program, but has started drinking socially since then. He described this social drinking as going out with a buddy to watch a game and consuming ‘a pint’. The appellant acknowledged repetitive and inappropriate use of alcohol in the past, especially during stressful situations in his life, plus a family history of alcohol dependence in his biological father. He maintains that since 2013 he does not drink and drive. The appellant explained that he has learned from his mistakes in the past and knows that if he was to drink and drive again he faces certain jail time. In addition, although the appellant appears to truly believe that he does not have alcohol dependence, and we believe he has learned from previous mistakes, we prefer the evidence of the medical professionals, who are better qualified to identify and diagnose alcohol dependence.
13Therefore, we find that the appellant suffers from alcohol dependence.
2. Is the Appellant’s alcohol dependence likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely?
14Having found that the appellant suffers from alcohol dependence, we now must consider whether this condition is likely to significantly affect his ability to drive safely.
15We note that the legislature chose to use the words “significantly interfere with his or her ability to drive” as opposed to the less onerous “interfere with his or her ability to drive”, in the regulatory provision. The use of the word 'significantly' modifies or qualifies the requisite standard to determine whether a person has an alcohol dependence that will interfere with their ability to drive a vehicle safely.
16The word “significant” or “significantly” is not defined in the HTA or the Regulation. The Black’s Law Dictionary, defines the word “significant” as “of special importance, momentous.”1 The online Canadian Oxford Dictionary defines “significantly” as “in a sufficiently great or important way as to be worthy of attention.”2
17The modern approach to statutory interpretation requires that the words of a statute be read “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.” The Court of Appeal held in R. v. Plummer, that the scheme of the Highway Traffic Act has many purposes, and first and foremost is a collection of duties and obligations imposed on drivers in relation to the operation of vehicles to ensure the safety of motorists and others.3
18With this approach in mind, in our view, “significantly interfering” must be something more than minor or insignificant. It must be great, momentous or in an important way, and must be read in the context of the primary goal of the statute, which is to protect the safety of motorists and others.
19The medical documentation submitted by the nurse practitioner at Pinewood on August 2, 2018 is very basic and only indicates, through a check-mark, that the appellant suffers from alcohol dependency. It does not with any specificity detail any pattern of repetitive inappropriate use of alcohol. Although the nurse practitioner does indicate that the appellant has been prescribed anti-craving medication, it does not, as the form requires, specify whether the current medication regime results in any side effects. Only 2 of the 4 biochemical markers are checked off, both which are within the normal laboratory range and are not elevated.
20In his testimony, the appellant stated that currently he only consumes one pint of beer socially with friends once or twice a week. He does not drink at home, nor does he keep any alcohol in the house. He stated that he never drinks and drives and has learned his lesson from his criminal conviction. The CCMTA at section 15.2 defines heavy drinking as five or more drinks a day for men. The self-reported amount of alcohol consumed by the appellant is well below this amount.
21The appellant’s testimony was credible and convincing that he would never drive while intoxicated, and is corroborated by the absence of any DUI on his driving record since 2013. He seemed to have a good grasp of his past condition and was very concerned about taking care of himself and not putting anyone else at risk. He displayed insight into his problem when he voluntarily sought help for his anxiety and alcohol. This was supported by the appellant’s friend, Ms. Holmes, who also testified at the hearing. He has followed the advice of professionals and has taken steps to become involved with an outpatient clinic and community support groups. We also note that he is working as a lab technician, has managed to keep his employment without the use of a car, and was recently promoted.
22The appellant lost a good friend and this appears to have been the main trigger for his anxiety attacks and why the resumption of his drinking. With this event now clearly behind him, completion of a detox program since the event, compliance with his medication and ongoing counselling in place, the Tribunal finds the appellant’s condition is not likely to significantly affect his ability to drive safely. His condition appears controlled and the effect of that condition is unlikely to interfere sufficiently or momentously with his ability to drive safely.
23After considering the evidence and submissions of the parties, we find on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s alcohol dependence is not likely to interfere significantly with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
E. CONCLUSION:
24We find that, under the circumstances, based on the totality of the evidence, the Registrar has not proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from alcohol dependence to a degree likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.
F. ORDER:
25For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the HTA, we set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s licence.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Erica Weinberg, M.D., Member
Cezary Paluch, Member
Released: December 7, 2018
Also cited in M.F.Z. v Aviva Insurance Canada, 2017 CanLII 63632 (ON LAT)
Footnotes
- Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed., West Publishing Co., at page 1594.
- Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC) citing Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994) at page 87.
- R. v. Plummer, 2006 CanLII 38165 (ON CA) para. 38.