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Licence Appeal Tribunal
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**Date:** 2018-12-07
**File Number:** 11683/MVIA
Appeal under subsection 50.2 of the [Highway Traffic Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h8/latest/rso-1990-c-h8.html), R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment pursuant to [Section 55.1](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h8/latest/rso-1990-c-h8.html#sec55.1_smooth) of the Act
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**Between:**
L.B.
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
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## DECISION AND ORDER
**Panel:** Harriet Lewis, Member
**Appearances:**
For the Appellant: D.B., Agent
For the Respondent: Sanjay Kapur, Agent
**Place and Date of Hearing:** By Teleconference
November 15, 2018
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## REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
### OVERVIEW:
[1] A teleconference hearing was held on November 15 to consider an appeal of the 45-day impoundment of the appellant L.B.’s 1979 G.M. van. The vehicle was impounded on October 6, 2018 and was to be available for return to the appellant upon payment of the towing and impoundment charges on November 20, 2018.
[2] The appellant submits that the impoundment of her vehicle resulted in exceptional hardship.
### ISSUES:
[3] The issue to be determined is whether the impoundment resulted in exceptional hardship to the appellant.
### CONCLUSION:
[4] On the evidence before me at the hearing, I find that the impoundment did not result in exceptional hardship as defined in [section 50](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h8/latest/rso-1990-c-h8.html#sec50_smooth) of the [Highway Traffic Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h8/latest/rso-1990-c-h8.html), R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“Act”).
### PRELIMINARY ISSUES:
[5] At the outset of the hearing, the agent for the respondent objected to D.B. acting as both agent for the appellant, L.B., and a witness on her behalf.
[6] D.B. is not only the designated agent of L.B. but also her husband and the driver of the vehicle at the time of impoundment. L.B. was not present at the teleconference hearing. D.B. advised that L.B. was uncomfortable about testifying and representing herself and wanted him to act on her behalf. There were no other witnesses.
[7] Although D.B. was L.B.’s authorized representative, as L.B.’s spouse he also had personal knowledge of L.B.’s circumstances following the impoundment; those circumstances being the ground of this appeal. I therefore decided, on the basis of fairness to the appellant, to allow D.B. to provide testimony.
### LAW AND ANALYSIS:
[8] The owner of a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to [s. 55.1](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h8/latest/rso-1990-c-h8.html#sec55.1_smooth) of the [Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h8/latest/rso-1990-c-h8.html), may pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.
[9] An owner may appeal only on the grounds set out in [s.50.2(3)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h8/latest/rso-1990-c-h8.html#sec50.2subsec3_smooth) of the [Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h8/latest/rso-1990-c-h8.html). in this case, the appeal is only on the basis of s.50.2(3)(d): that the impoundment caused exceptional hardship.
[10] The appellant’s vehicle was being driven by her spouse D.B. at the time it was detained and impounded. At that time, D.B.’s drivers licence was suspended and cancelled. This was confirmed by the tendering in evidence of a certified copy of a search of D.B.’s drivers record.
[11] [Section 10](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-631-98/latest/o-reg-631-98.html#sec10_smooth) of [O. Reg.631/98](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-631-98/latest/o-reg-631-98.html) (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. In order to establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement set out in 10(1) of the Regulation is that there be no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, the owner:
“…must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.”
[12] Pursuant to [s. 10(2)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-631-98/latest/o-reg-631-98.html#sec10subsec2_smooth)(a) of the [Regulation](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-631-98/latest/o-reg-631-98.html), the Tribunal may never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to any person.
[13] The appellant resides with D.B. and their three young children on a somewhat isolated country property.
minicounsel