C.C. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2018 CanLII 126560

Licence Appeal Tribunal

Date: 2018-11-29

Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

C.C. Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Asad Ali Moten

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Self-represented For the Respondent: Stella Velocci, Agent

Heard via Teleconference: August 27, 2018

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

A. Overview

1C.C. appeals the impoundment of her 2012 Jeep Wrangler (the vehicle). Her spouse C.G.’s licence was suspended in 2004 for three years following an impaired driving conviction. C.G. was also required to have an interlock device for three years after his suspension was lifted. On July 13, 2018, C.G. was driving C.C.’s vehicle, which did not have an ignition interlock device. As a result, the vehicle was impounded for 45 days, pursuant to section 55.1(1)(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the Act).

2The appeal is made not on the basis that the vehicle was wrongfully impounded. C.C. concedes that the vehicle should have been impounded, as C.G. was driving without a licence. She contends, however, that the impoundment should only have been for 7 days, and not 45 days because there was no longer an interlock device condition on C.G.’s licence at the time of the impoundment. As such, C.C. is seeking reimbursement by the Registrar of the difference in cost between a 7 day impoundment and a 45 day impoundment. This difference, by her calculation, is $2,091.00.

3The Registrar argues that although the interlock device condition was not active at the time of the impoundment, the requirement still existed on C.G.’s licence because he had not made an application to have it lifted. Therefore, the impoundment for 45 days should be confirmed, in the Registrar’s submission.

4After considering all of the evidence provided, and based on the reasons below, the Tribunal confirms the impoundment of C.C.’s vehicle for 45 days.

B. ISSUES

5The issue to be determined is whether the statutory grounds for a 45 day impoundment pursuant to section 55.1(1)(2) of the Act existed at the time the vehicle was detained.

6At the heart of this matter is the question of whether C.G. was, at the time of impoundment, subject to a condition requiring any vehicle he drove to be equipped with an ignition interlock device

C. The Law

7Some of the provisions related to this appeal came into effect quite recently. On July 1, 2018, section 50.2(1)(b.1) of the Act came into effect. This provision provides a ground for appeal from an impoundment where it can be shown

[…] that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1 (1).

8Similarly, section 55.1(1) was repealed and on July 1, 2018 substituted with a new provision that itemized the grounds for detention and impoundment of a motor vehicle. Specifically, paragraph 2 of the new 55.1(1) of the Act states that a vehicle can be impounded if the driver is driving the vehicle without an ignition interlock device when the driver is required to have one.

2. In contravention of a condition, imposed for a prescribed reason on his or her driver’s licence under a conduct review program under section 57, that prohibits him or her from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device.

9Section 50.2(5) of the Act allows the Tribunal to confirm the impoundment or order the Registrar to release the vehicle.

10The onus in this appeal lies with the appellant, and the standard of proof that the appellant must meet is a balance of probabilities. In other words, C.C. must show that it is more likely than not that C.G. was not subject to the ignition interlock condition at the time of impoundment.

D. Evidence AND ANALYSIS

11On July 13, 2018, C.G. was driving the vehicle without a licence. He was pulled over by police for speeding. He was issued tickets for speeding, for driving without a licence, and for not having the ignition interlock device installed on the vehicle. The vehicle was impounded because C.G. did not have an interlock device installed.

12C.G. was the only witness to present evidence for C.C. In July 2004 C.G. was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol content of more than 0.08 mg and was suspended from driving until July 2007. The Driver Record submitted by the Registrar confirms this.

13In addition, according to C.G., he was subject to a condition to have an ignition interlock device in place on any vehicle he drove for a period of time after his licence suspension was lifted. An ignition interlock device requires a person to blow into a Breathalyzer machine attached to the ignition of a car in order to turn the car on.

14There is some discrepancy as to whether C.G. was subject to this condition for three years or four years. In any case the result is the same in that the condition has been expired for a number of years. This discrepancy does not affect the reliability of C.G.’s evidence.

15Between 2007, when his driver’s licence suspension ended, and 2018, C.G. did not apply to have his licence reinstated. He testified that he had no need to drive during that time. As a result, he also never had an ignition interlock device installed on any of his or C.C.’s vehicles. He simply waited it out. C.G. testified he paid all of the fines related to his conviction and suspension, and completed the Back on Track program as required. Besides this he took no further steps between 2004 and 2018 to regain his licence.

16By August 2011 C.G. was eligible to have the ignition interlock device condition removed from his licence. This fact was agreed upon by both parties. C.G. assumed that after 2011, the ignition interlock condition would disappear from his licence automatically.

17In March 2018, C.G. went to his local Ministry of Transportation office to try and have his licence reinstated. He had paid all of his fines and completed the Back on Track program. He was told that he had to start the licensure process over again, beginning with the G1 and G2 class licences. He testified this was because his licence had been cancelled due to inactivity after his suspension expired. Because he did not have the proper identification he needed to initiate this process, he left the MTO office without applying for a new licence.

18C.G. testified that he asked at the MTO office whether there was still an ignition interlock condition on his licence. He was told there was not. He was not informed that he had to apply to the Ministry to have it removed. C.G. stated that the first time he learned that he had to apply to have the ignition interlock condition removed was on July 16, 2018, after the vehicle had been impounded and he made inquiries as to what was required of him. He subsequently made that application and had the condition removed.

19The Registrar contends that C.G. would have received three letters from 2004 onwards that explained the process for removing the interlock condition. The first would have been at the time of conviction, notifying C.G. about the state of his licence suspension. The second would have been at the time the suspension expired, and the third letter would have been at the time when the interlock condition expired. Each of these letters would have explained to C.G. that he was required to apply to have the interlock condition lifted from his licence. C.G. stated that he never received any such letters, and the Registrar did not produce these letters at the hearing.

At the time of the impoundment, was C.G.’s licence subject to a condition requiring him to have an ignition interlock device?

20C.C. makes three arguments in support of her position that C.G.’s licence was not subject to an interlock condition:

a. Because the ignition interlock condition had expired as of August 2011;

b. C.G.’s licence was cancelled, and a condition cannot attach to an expired licence; and,

c. If C.G.’s licence was subject to the condition, he did not know it was, and the vehicle should not have been impounded on that basis.

21With respect to the first argument, the Tribunal accepts the Registrar’s argument that C.G.’s interlock condition was active at the time of the impoundment. The August 2011 date that C.C. argues is the date the condition expired is not when the condition becomes inactive. Rather it represents the minimum period of time that C.G. was to be subject to the condition, as ordered by the court. After that date, provided C.G. had been compliant with the condition, he could have applied to lift the condition. In the absence of such an application, the condition continues to stay on C.G.’s licence, and he is required to only drive vehicles equipped with an interlock device. There was no interlock device in C.C.'s vehicle on the date of the impoundment, and C.G. was therefore in violation of this condition.

22C.C.’s second argument cannot succeed because I agree with the Registrar’s submission that conditions attach to the person, and not to the licence. Therefore, it does not matter whether or not C.G.’s licence was active, expired, or cancelled as of July 13, 2018. C.G. the person was subject to the condition, which was in effect at the time of the impoundment.

23Lastly, the Tribunal must follow the old maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. The Tribunal cannot accept the argument that because C.C. and C.G. were not aware of the condition, the condition should not apply. The condition existed and applied from 2007 until July 13, 2018, regardless of whether C.C. knew it or not. There is no subjective element to section 50.2(1)(b.1) that would allow the Tribunal to account for what C.C. knew at the time of the impoundment.

24Therefore, I find that C.C. has not met her onus to prove that C.G. was not subject to an ignition interlock device condition at the time of the impoundment. The condition remained active, and because the vehicle was not equipped with an ignition interlock device at the time it was detained, C.G. was in violation of the condition. Therefore, I confirm the impoundment and the length of the impoundment.

ORDER:

25After considering the evidence, the Tribunal confirms the impoundment of C.C.’s vehicle for 45 days.