N.P. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2018 CanLII 117010

Date: 2018-10-26

File Number: 11645/MVIA

Appeal under subsection 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act

Between:

N.P.

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Panel: Jacqueline Castel

Appearances:

For the Appellant: N.P., Self-represented

For the Respondent: Steve Grootenboer, Agent

Place and Date of Hearing: By Teleconference

October 25, 2018

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

OVERVIEW:

1A teleconference hearing was held on October 25, 2018 to consider the appellant’s appeal of the 45 day impoundment of her 2007 Mazda MAS (the “vehicle”). The vehicle was impounded on September 10, 2018 and was released to the appellant on October 25, 2018.

ISSUE:

2The issue to be determined is whether the impoundment has resulted in exceptional hardship.

CONCLUSION:

3On the evidence before me at the hearing, I find that the impoundment did not result in exceptional hardship within the meaning of s. 50.2(3) (d) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act” or the “HTA”).

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

4The owner of a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the HTA, may pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.

5There are limited grounds on which an owner may appeal an impoundment as set out in section 50.2(3) of the HTA. The appellant in this case appealed on the ground that the impoundment has caused her exceptional hardship.

Exceptional Hardship

6Section 10 of O. Reg.631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. In order to establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement set out in 10(1) of the Regulation is that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. If I find that there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle, then I need not consider any other requirements. I find that the appellant has not met this first requirement.

7The appellant is single and resides by herself approximately 12 kilometers from town. She has been employed, part-time, in town as an activation aide since 2010. There is no public transportation in her community. Taxis are too expensive for her to afford on a regular basis.

8The appellant suffers from bipolar disorder, anxiety and depression. She normally sees a psychiatrist about once a month. She also sees an addictions counselor about once every two weeks. The appellant was off work on a medical leave associated with her mental health for approximately 18 months before the impoundment of her vehicle. She returned to work from this medical leave in June 2018.

9After her vehicle was impounded, the appellant initially missed two days of work because she did not have a way of getting to work. The appellant subsequently returned to work, but her employer instructed her to take a medical leave from work until her psychiatrist confirmed she was fit to return to work. The appellant was able to return to work, with a letter from her psychiatrist, after approximately three weeks. For the remainder of the impoundment period, she had friends drive her to and from work. When her friends were not available, she took taxis and hitchhiked.

10The appellant had friends drive her to purchase groceries on two occasions during the impoundment period.

11The appellant also attended one appointment with her psychiatrist and one appointment with her addictions counselor during the impoundment period. A friend drove her to and from these appointments.

12The appellant borrowed the money from a close friend to have her vehicle released from impoundment on October 25, 2018. She does not have the resources to repay her friend.

13There is no doubt that the appellant has been inconvenienced because of the impoundment. However, the evidence does not support exceptional hardship. To establish exceptional hardship, the appellant must prove, first of all, that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, and she has not done so.

14The appellant managed to rely on friends, taxis and hitchhiking to get to and from work on most days, excluding the three week period in which she was on a medical leave. The appellant’s mental health problems pre-dated the impoundment, and she has taken medical leaves because of her mental health on other occasions. The appellant was also able to rely on friends to drive her to appointments with her psychiatrist and addictions counselor. The evidence did not establish that she missed any scheduled medical appointments during the impoundment period. The appellant also relied on friends to take her grocery shopping while her vehicle was impounded.

15I am sympathetic to the inconvenience and financial difficulties in which the appellant found herself because of the impoundment. However, her testimony does not support a finding of exceptional hardship. For this reason, I do not need to consider the other provisions of s. 10 of the regulation.

ORDER:

16Pursuant to subsection 50(2)(5) of the HTA, I deny the appeal and confirm the impoundment order.