Licence Appeal Tribunal / Tribunal d'appel en matière de permis
FILE: 10510/MVIA
CASE NAME: 10510 v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from an Impoundment Pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act.
1846910 Ontario Inc. Appellant
-and-
Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR: Bryant Greenbaum, Member
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Christina Singh, Agent
For the Respondent: Sanjay Kapur, Agent
Heard by teleconference: November 16, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
A hearing was held on November 16, 2016, by teleconference, to consider the Appellant’s appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).
Pursuant to section 50.2(5) of the Act, the Tribunal confirms the impoundment. As a result, the Appellant’s motor vehicle will continue to be detained at the impound facility for the remainder of the 45-day impoundment period.
BACKGROUND
The Appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on October 6, 2016, pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act. The Appellant Corporation was represented by its sole shareholder, Christina Singh, and the matter was appealed to the Tribunal on the ground of exceptional hardship only.
The Appellant is a wholesale company that imports and sells perishable food items. The impounded vehicle is used for the business and is also used by the sole shareholder of the company, Christina Singh, for personal use. Christina Singh allowed her father-in-law, whose licence was under suspension, to drive the impounded vehicle. Furthermore, Christina Singh stated that she knew her father-in-law’s licence was under suspension when he drove the vehicle; and therefore, there is no issue of two of the other possible grounds for appeal, “due diligence” or “stolen”.
The Tribunal must decide if it should order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle on the basis that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
ISSUE
Does the impoundment cause “exceptional hardship” within the meaning of s.50.2(3)(d) of the Highway Traffic Act?
The legislative test for this ground of appeal is very clear and detailed.
Section 10 of the Regulation, Long-Term Vehicle Impoundment under Section 55.1 of the Act, requires that there be no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Section 10(4) states that in order to show that no alternative is available, “… the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.”
Even if the Appellant passes this hurdle of showing no available alternative to the impounded vehicle, the Appellant must also show that the impoundment will result in a threat to health or safety, or that it will cause a financial, employment or education loss to a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle other than the suspended driver that will be “immediate, significant and lasting”. The Regulation also states that the Tribunal cannot consider inconvenience as meeting the test for exceptional hardship.
The Tribunal finds that there are reasonable alternatives to the Appellant’s impounded vehicle.
First, although Christina Singh stated that the impounded vehicle was used to go to the airport to clear import shipments, and to attend to company banking matters, the Appellant Corporation has eight other vehicles registered in its name, two of which, a BMW and a Ford Explorer, are assigned to company sales employees. The Tribunal finds that some of these vehicles could have been used to clear shipment and to attend to banking matters even if this may have caused some inconvenience and scheduling changes. Also, the Tribunal notes that the company did not inquire about the use of rental vehicles and this was also an option to assist during the impoundment period.
Second, Christina Singh mentioned that she uses the impounded vehicle for some limited personal matters and the loss of vehicle has inconvenienced her when taking her children to their after-school programs and when getting groceries. She also mentioned that she has the use of her mother’s vehicle and that her mother resides with her, and is retired. Furthermore, she noted that her children’s schooling has not been affected as they are picked up by a school bus. With the above in mind, the Tribunal finds that there was a reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle, for Christina Singh’s personal use, namely Christina Singh’s mother’s vehicle, while also noting that no health or educational concerns were mentioned.
Finally, even if the Appellant could pass the hurdle of showing that it has no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle, which it has not done, the evidence still does not support a finding that there has been an immediate, significant or lasting financial loss. Although Christina Singh stated that there was a decrease in revenues, she was not able to provide an approximate loss in a numerical value. Also, the business is still functioning without disruption and her company will continue into the future. Christina Singh also testified that the company clients are still satisfied with the services of the company and the company’s five employees are still working without disruption.
Therefore, the Tribunal finds that the evidence does not establish exceptional hardship as defined in section 10 of the Regulation.
DECISION
After considering the evidence, pursuant to the authority vested in the Tribunal under section 50.2(5) of the Act, the Tribunal confirms the impoundment of the Appellant’s motor vehicle, and it will remain at the impound facility for 45 days.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
_______________________ Bryant Greenbaum, Member
Released: November 21, 2016