Licence Tribunal
Appeal d'appel en Tribunal matière de permis
FILE: 9705/MVIA
CASE NAME: 9705 v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from an Impoundment Pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act.
Appellant Appellant
-and-
Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR: D. Gregory Flude, Vice-Chair
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Shalini Puri, Paralegal
For the Respondent: Sanjay Kapur, Agent
Heard in Toronto: August 16, 2015
REASONS FOR DECISION
A hearing was held on August 18, 2015 to consider the Appellant’s appeal pursuant to section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA” or the “Act”).
The Tribunal finds that the relief requested by the Appellant falls outside of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal declines to hear the case on its merits.
BACKGROUND
A motor vehicle was impounded pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act and the impoundment was appealed by the Appellant. The owner, motor vehicle, and date of appeal in this matter are as follows:
Owner: In dispute
Motor Vehicle: 1998 Mazd PDS (the “vehicle”)
Date of Appeal: July 27, 2015
ISSUE
Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to provide declaratory relief stating that the Appellant is not the owner of the vehicle and therefore is not liable for the towing and impound charges associated with the vehicle impoundment?
FACTS
The facts in issue are admitted by each party. The Appellant was the owner of the vehicle until about one month ago. Around mid-summer 2015 he decided to sell it and to purchase a new car. He advertised it on Kijiji and received an offer from a buyer (“X”). The Appellant and X agreed on a price, and on July 6, 2015, X, accompanied by a tow truck, met with the Appellant at his home. She paid the agreed price; the Appellant removed the plates and delivered the signed the transfer section of the ownership to X. The Appellant removed the plates and has transferred them to his new vehicle.
On July 13, 2015, X was stopped by police while driving the vehicle. The Tribunal has no knowledge of what number plates or permits may have been displayed but they cannot have been the Appellant’s plates since they were transferred to his new car. A record check established that X’s licence was then under suspension pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Code. The police officer impounded the vehicle and served X with a Notice to Registrar.
In the week between purchasing the vehicle and being stopped, X had not transferred the vehicle into her name. According to the regulations she must complete the transfer within six days. The Registrar’s records still showed the Appellant as the owner, and so the Registrar sent the Notice of Impoundment to the Appellant.
The cash nature of the sales transaction was such that the Appellant had no information on the full identity of X. When the Registrar served the documentation for this hearing, disclosing the full name and address of X, the Appellant attended at a Service Ontario office and recorded that the vehicle had been sold.
LAW
Section 55.1 of the Act provides that a motor vehicle may be detained and impounded, and section 50.2 provides the motor vehicle owner’s right of appeal to the Tribunal. Section 50.2(2) specifies that “the owner and the Registrar are the parties.” The Tribunal’s authority to release the vehicle is limited to four specific grounds set out in subsection 50.2(3):
(3) The only grounds on which an owner may appeal under subsection (1) and the only grounds on which the Tribunal may order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle are,
(a) that the motor vehicle that is impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded;
(b) that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension;
(c) that the owner of the motor vehicle exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension; or
(d) that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
Section 50.2(11) defines “owner” as follows:
(11) In this section,
“owner” means each person whose name appears on the certificate of registration for the vehicle but in subsection (4) “owner” means the person whose name appears on the plate portion of a permit in cases where the certificate of registration consists of a vehicle portion and a plate portion and different persons are named on each portion.
O/Reg 631/98 addresses factors that the Tribunal may take into account when determining whether the vehicle may be released based on exceptional hardship:
- (1) In determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment under section 55.1 of the Act, the Tribunal shall consider whether no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available and, if no alternative is available, whether the impoundment will result in,
(a) a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; or
(b) a threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. O. Reg. 456/10, s. 3.
(2) In determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment under section 55.1 of the Act, the Tribunal shall not, subject to subsection (3), consider whether the impoundment will result in,
(a) inconvenience to any person;
(b) financial or economic loss to any person;
(c) loss of employment or employment opportunity to any person; or
(d) loss of education or training or of an educational or training opportunity to any person. O. Reg. 456/10, s. 3.
(3) The Tribunal may consider the criteria set out in clauses (2) (b), (c) and (d) if the owner demonstrates that,
(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;
(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;
(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and
(d) the impact of the loss,
(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and
(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
It is not in dispute in this hearing that the person (X) who purchased the vehicle had her licence suspended at the time she was stopped. It is also agreed that she had paid the full consideration for the vehicle and was the beneficial owner, so it cannot be said that she had stolen her own vehicle. The Appellant did not try to determine if X had a driver’s licence, presumably because he only needed to be concerned about getting the money for selling his vehicle. The only possible ground for release alleged was a suggestion that the Appellant may suffer exceptional hardship. That hardship was characterized in submissions as the Appellant being held liable for the impoundment costs. As set out above, s. 10 of Ont. Reg. 631/98 sets out very detailed criteria that the Tribunal must apply when deciding whether there is exceptional hardship. For example, an Appellant must first establish that no alternative exists for the impounded vehicle, and the Appellant in these circumstances would not be able to cross that first hurdle, since he had sold this vehicle and he doesn’t need to use it anymore. Furthermore, there is a specific exemption for financial loss unless there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
The facts in this case highlight a problem area in impoundment cases. There is no doubt that the Appellant had transferred all of his legal interest in the vehicle to the buyer, X. He had done everything required of him, including signing the “Application for Transfer” section of the certificate of ownership, and she had paid the price asked. The problem is that there will always be a period of time between the legal sales transaction taking place and the completion of the regulatory process to transfer title in the Registrar’s records. The Tribunal notes that the statutory scheme places the onus for registering a transfer on the purchaser.
The Registrar takes the position that the seller, in this case the Appellant, remains liable for the actions of the purchaser until the purchaser completes the transfer or the seller takes steps to notify the Registrar of the transfer. The Appellant takes the position that he is no longer the owner of the car and should not be held liable for the impoundment charges. In essence, he is looking for a declaration to that effect. But the Tribunal’s role in these impoundment appeals is not to directly decide who is liable for the impoundment charges; it is to decide whether the motor vehicle should be released. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction in impoundment cases is constrained by the statutory scheme. It cannot give relief except as provided for in the four grounds of appeal set out above. Declaratory relief is outside of its jurisdiction. Indeed, with respect to the Appellant, no direct relief is available. If the Tribunal had found grounds to order the release of the vehicle, it could not properly order that it be released to the Appellant. He has already sold the vehicle and received money for it, and he is not the beneficial owner, notwithstanding that he may fall within the definition of owner set out in the legislation as argued by the Registrar.
DECISION
For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal finds that it is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
D. Gregory Flude, Vice-Chair.
RELEASED: August 17, 2015