Licence Tribunal

Appeal d'appel en

Tribunal matière de permis

DATE:

2015-03-20

FILE:

8927/MVDA

CASE NAME:

8927 v. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002

Appeal from a Notice of Proposal by the Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 30, Sch. B to Revoke Registrations

Scott Edwards, Derek Booth,

1716114 Ontario Limited o/a Your Car Auto Finance

Appellants

-and-

Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002

Respondent

MOTION DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR:

Laurie Sanford,

Vice-Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant Scott Edwards:

Annsley Kesten, Student-at-Law

For the Appellants Derek Booth, 1716114 Ontario Limited o/a Your Auto Finance:

Claudio Aiello, Counsel

For the Respondent:

Elizabeth Maishlish, Counsel

Rebecca Durcan, Counsel

For the Director, MVDA, Intervener on the motion:

Paul Stunt, Counsel

Heard in Toronto:

February 10, 2015

MOTION DECISION AND ORDER

This motion is brought by the Appellants Derek Booth and 1716114 Ontario Limited o/a Your Car Auto Finance (the “Dealership”) for disclosure. The Appellant Scott Edwards supports the motion. The motion arises in the course of an appeal by the Appellants, to this Tribunal from a Notice of Proposal by the Registrar (the “Registrar”) under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002 (the “Act”) to revoke the registrations of the Appellants.

The motion was originally brought for further particulars and for disclosure. The motion included an affidavit by Ms. Laura Halbert, Director of Compliance for the Ontario Motor Vehicle Industry Council (“OMVIC”) and cross-examination on her affidavit by the Appellants. Following a hearing on the original motion on December 9, 2014, the Tribunal ordered the Registrar to disclose further particulars to the Appellants. This has been done. At the continuation of the motion, there were three issues raised which require a decision by the Tribunal.

The first issue is whether the Director, MVDA, Mr. Jack Grey, should be added as a party to the motion or otherwise be permitted to make submissions. Representing Mr. Grey at the motion was his counsel, Mr. Stunt. The second issue is the extent to which the Registrar should be obliged to disclose details of a completed investigation that are relevant to the Appeal. Ms. Durcan, Counsel for the Registrar, conceded that the Registrar does have a disclosure obligation but asserts that the only information about completed investigations available to the Registrar is that contained on an intraweb, an OMVIC internal intranet based recording system. Mr. Aiello seeks information beyond that which is recorded on the OMVIC intraweb. The third issue is whether the Registrar should be obliged to disclose details of ongoing investigations.

Motion by Director, MVDA

To understand the motion by the Director, MVDA to be added as a party to this motion, it is necessary to understand the background of this motion for disclosure and the testimony of Ms. Halbert. In the fall of 2014, Mr. Aiello brought the original motion to, among other things, obtain details of any completed investigations undertaken by OMVIC related to his clients and to obtain any “facts” obtained by OMVIC in its ongoing investigations of his clients. The written submissions of the Registrar make a distinction between the “Registrar MVDA 2002” and the “Director, MVDA 2002”. The Registrar argues that the two functions are divisible at law, with the Registrar having the function of “inspector” and the Director, MVDA having the function of “investigator and Crown”. In the Registrar’s submission, he does not participate in investigations, charges and prosecutions. It was therefore the Registrar’s position that while he might be obliged to disclose information regarding inspections, he should not have to disclose information regarding investigations.

Ms. Halbert swore an affidavit in support of the Registrar’s positon. She identified herself as the Director of Compliance and explained that she managed the OMVIC Inspectors who are charged with inspecting existing registrants, dealing with complaints and otherwise ensuring compliance with the Act. Inspections may reveal violations of the Act and may result in regulatory or administrative sanctions being proposed by the Registrar. In this appeal, the Registrar is proposing to revoke the Appellants’ registrations as a result of inspections made.

In her affidavit, Ms. Halbert testified that investigations are distinct from inspections in purpose and in the potential outcomes. She noted that investigators are appointed under the Act by the Director of the MVDA. They investigate persons suspected of committing an offence under the Act or other Provincial legislation and may bring charges as a result of their investigation, according to Ms. Halbert.

At the outset of her cross-examination, Ms. Halbert identified Mr. Carey Smith as a person she spoke to in preparing her affidavit. She identified Mr. Smith as the Director of Investigations. She further testified that both she, as Director of Compliance, and Mr. Smith, as Director of Investigations, reported to the Registrar. Both she and Mr. Smith sit, with other senior managers, in a meeting to review the results of inspections. The purpose of the meeting is to determine whether a Notice of Proposal or some other administrative action should be taken, whether an investigation should be launched or whether both administrative and investigatory options should be pursued. An investigation might lead to a prosecution for offences under the Act or other legislation. A prosecution would proceed independently of an administrative sanction sought by the Registrar. Mr. Smith, according to Ms. Halbert’s testimony, supervises the investigators under the Act. .

At the commencement of the continuation of this motion, Mr. Stunt brought a motion on behalf of the “director appointed pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act” to be added as a party. It was not until his reply submissions that Mr. Stunt clarified that he was not representing Mr. Carey Smith, the Director of Investigations, but Mr. Jack Grey, the Director, MVDA. Mr. Stunt submitted that counsel for the Appellants had not asked the right questions of Ms. Halbert during her cross-examination. They ought, in Mr. Stunt’s submission, to have asked Ms. Halbert whether she, and by extension, Mr. Smith reported to the Registrar for all purposes. The implication was that had the question been phrased in that way, Ms. Halbert would have testified that Mr. Smith reported to Mr. Grey for some purposes. The Tribunal does not accept this submission. Ms. Halbert was asked directly to whom Mr. Smith reported. She testified that he reported to the Registrar. It was the responsibility of Ms. Halbert, as a senior manager at OMVIC, to disclose dual reporting structures for Mr. Smith if they existed.

Mr. Stunt referred to the Act to delineate Mr. Grey’s functions. Under Section 18 of the Act, the director may appoint investigators. However, nowhere in the Act does it specify that the director, that is Mr. Grey, is to carry out investigations or determine what action to take with the fruits of those investigations. What is before the Tribunal in this motion is Ms. Halbert’s testimony that the investigations conducted by OMVIC are supervised by Mr. Smith and that it is Mr. Smith, or his investigators, who decides whether or not to pursue charges. At no time during her cross-examination did Ms. Halbert identify Mr. Grey as having any role in investigations or the laying of charges. She did not refer to him at all by name.

During submissions made in the course of the cross-examination, Ms. Maishlish, counsel for the Registrar, did refer to a “director of the MVDA” who was separately appointed under the Act and who had a role in investigations. It was open to the Registrar to submit a further affidavit to clarify that there were two separate directors with a role in investigations. He did not do so. It was also open to the Director, MVDA to submit an affidavit in support of his motion to be added as a party. That affidavit could have provided evidence as to his interest in this matter. Mr. Grey did not submit such an affidavit. Based on the evidence before the Tribunal it is impossible to conclude that the Director, MVDA, Mr. Grey, has any role in investigations beyond the appointment of investigators under the Act.

There is evidence before the Tribunal that Mr. Smith is responsible for the actions of OMVIC investigators and supervises the conduct of the investigations. Mr. Smith reports to the Registrar, who is a party to this matter. Mr. Aiello, counsel for the Appellants Derek Booth and the Dealership, confirmed that he is not seeking any disclosure from Mr. Grey. He is seeking disclosure concerning investigations from Mr. Smith via the Registrar.

In view of the above, the Director, MVDA has not established that he has an interest in these proceedings that would justify his being added as a party. However, the Tribunal believes it would benefit from considering the submissions of the Director, MVDA on this matter. Accordingly, the Tribunal gave the Director, MVDA status as an intervener on the motion and accepted his written submissions and authorities for consideration.

Motion for Disclosure of Completed Investigations

The Registrar concedes that he has an obligation to disclose details of completed investigations that are relevant to the Appellants. Ms. Durcan submits that this has been done. Her submission is that the only information the Registrar has access to about these completed investigations is contained on an OMVIC intraweb and this information has been disclosed. However, during her cross examination, Ms. Halbert, at pages 202, 206 and 207 of the transcript, testified that investigators tended to be more paper oriented than inspectors and tended to keep paper notes of their investigations. Ms. Halbert testified that investigators did not upload most of their communications, notes and investigation files to the OMVIC intraweb when the investigation was complete. These investigators report to the Director of Investigations who in turn reports to the Registrar. It follows that the Registrar may be expected to have access to details of completed investigations regardless of format. Given that the Registrar acknowledges his obligation to disclose, that disclosure should include all information within his possession or control regardless of whether it exists electronically or on paper.

Motion for Disclosure of Ongoing Investigations

Mr. Aiello seeks disclosure of “facts” that have been determined in the course of any ongoing investigation undertaken by OMVIC and relating to Mr. Booth and the Dealership. He seeks this disclosure in two contexts. First, he seeks the disclosure broadly, to encompass all facts determined in any investigation relating to his clients. Secondly, he seeks disclosure of facts relating to a very specific investigation in which one of the customers of the Dealership was contacted by OMVIC.

Any motion for disclosure involves balancing competing interests. Sometimes, the matter is as straightforward as balancing the rights of the requesting party against the time and expense to be incurred by the producing party in preparing the disclosure. Other cases may involve weighing complex matters of public interest or privilege against a party’s right to a fair hearing where issues of liberty, livelihood or reputation are at stake. In each case, it is ultimately a question of fact and the exercise of judicial discretion in light of those facts. The courts have provided guidance for the exercise of this discretion.

The case of R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, the Supreme Court of Canada established some principles to be used in dealing with disclosure matters in a criminal case. The Court held that the Crown in a criminal prosecution has a legal duty to disclose all relevant information, regardless of whether it is inculpatory or exculpatory and regardless of whether the Crown intended to introduce the evidence at the trial. Justice Sopinka wrote, “I would add that the fruits of the investigation which are in the possession of counsel for the Crown are not the property of the Crown for use in securing a conviction but the property of the public to be used to ensure that justice is done.” Justice Sopkina stated that the obligation to disclose was not absolute. The Court noted by way of examples that Crown counsel have duties to respect the rules of privilege and to protect the identity of informers. The Court further held that initially, the discretion to determine what was relevant should lie with the Crown counsel subject to review by the trial judge. To determine relevance during this review, the Court held, the trial judge:

. . . should be guided by the general principle that information ought not to be withheld if there is a reasonable possibility that the withholding of information will impair the right of the accused to make full answer and defence, unless the non-disclosure is justified by the law of privilege. The trial judge might also, in certain circumstances, conclude that the recognition of an existing privilege does not constitute a reasonable limit on the constitutional right to make full answer and defence and thus require disclosure in spite of the law of privilege.

There have been several decisions of this Tribunal which import the principles of Stinchcombe to Tribunal proceedings. The most recent of these is the case of Axcel Auto Group Inc. (c.o.b. Mountain Mazda) (Re) [2014] O.L.A.T.D. No. 59. In that case, the Tribunal found parallels between the role of the Registrar after a Notice of Proposal has been appealed and the role of the Crown during a prosecution. Despite these similarities, the Tribunal was faced with the case of May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82 in which the Supreme Court of Canada held categorically that “The Stinchcombe principles do not apply in an administrative context.” The grounds for this conclusion were that in the cases under consideration, the decisions were purely administrative and should be distinguished from criminal proceedings where the innocence of the accused is at issue. The Tribunal preferred the reasoning in the case of Sheriff v Canada (Attorney General), 2006 FCA 139. In this case, the Federal Court of Appeal made a distinction between types of administrative proceedings. Referring to the May decision, Malone J.A. wrote:

While the Court is unequivocal in stating that “[t]he Stinchcombe principles do not apply in an administrative context,” it is clearly not referring to a licensing review hearing, where the loss of livelihood and damage to professional reputation are at stake. In contrast, in the present appeal, the innocence, i.e. the reputation of the Trustees, is under review. Accordingly, I would classify a review of a trustee in bankruptcy’s licence by the OSB as an exception to the rule established in May . . . .

Mr. Stunt, counsel for the Director, MVDA, submitted that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to import the principles of the Stinchcombe decision into its proceedings on two grounds. First, he submits, the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice do not provide for it. In support of this submission, Mr. Stunt cited Rule 6.8(a) which gives the Tribunal the discretion to order disclosure of “. . . . all documents and things that the party will refer to or present as evidence at the hearing.” In Mr. Stunt’s submission, this is a limited disclosure obligation that cannot be expanded by the importation of the Stinchcombe principle. The problem with Mr. Stunt’s argument is that he neglected to consider the entirety of Rule 6.8, particularly Rule 6.8 (d) which provides that the “Tribunal may at any stage in the proceedings order a party to: disclose any document or thing the Tribunal considers relevant to the issues in dispute.” This Rule of Practice was instituted following the Axcel case. Among other things, it permits a consideration of principles of disclosure without the distinction of whether or not a party intends to put forward the document or thing at a hearing.

The second ground on which Mr. Stunt opposes the use of the Stinchcombe principles is that he supports the view that Stinchcombe principles cannot be used in the administrative context of a Tribunal hearing. Like the panel in the Axcel case, this panel prefers the reasoning in the Sheriff decision. Disclosure obligations should be concomitant with what is at stake in the proceeding. Here, given that OMVIC is alleging improprieties in the Appellants’ past conduct, the panel which hears the matter will be dealing with issues of the reputation and the livelihood of the Appellants. Disclosure obligations should reflect this reality. It does not follow that the Tribunal must import the principles of Stinchcombe and the subsequent cases which expand on those principles as though hearings before this body were comparable to criminal trials in all respects. When applying the principles set out in Stinchcombe, the Tribunal must be mindful of the differences in law, process and consequence between a criminal trial and a licencing hearing before this Tribunal.

The balance of Mr. Stunt’s submissions appear to relate to objections to disclosure on the part of the Director, MVDA. Since Mr. Aiello is not seeking disclosure from the Director, MVDA, it is not necessary to consider these submissions.

In this motion, Mr. Aiello is seeking information about ongoing investigations being conducted by the Director, Investigations. He seeks all documentation and information pertaining to his clients within the possession or control of the Registrar. Mr. Aiello has submitted that what he seeks are all the “facts” of all ongoing investigations which may involve his clients. Mr. Aiello does not detail what he means by “facts” but he does advise that he is not seeking information about the theories of the investigation or possible prosecution. Ms. Halbert has confirmed that there was an investigation started relating to Mr. Booth and the Dealership and that no charges have yet been laid. Ms. Halbert has also testified that there is an ongoing investigation related to Mr. Edwards. Counsel for Mr. Edwards submits that he is entitled to any disclosure ordered as a result of this motion.

In support of his motion, Mr. Aiello cites the case of R. v. Goulbourne [2007] O.J. No. 3704, a ruling on a disclosure motion by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. Mr. Goulbourne was charged, among other things, with aggravated assault as a result of a shooting in a Toronto nightclub in which a patron was wounded. The wounded patron was standing very close to another patron, a Mr. Brown, when he was shot. The next day Mr. Brown was shot and killed. The wounded patron testified at the preliminary inquiry that he had “no issues” with Mr. Goulbourne. Nor was there any evidence of problems between Mr. Goulbourne and Mr. Brown. At the time of the disclosure motion, the investigation into the murder of Mr. Brown was ongoing. Mr. Goulbourne sought disclosure of the results of the autopsy of Mr. Brown and the names of suspects, witnesses and witness statements in the murder investigation. The Crown opposed the disclosure on the grounds of lack of relevance and on the grounds of a public interest privilege. Mr. Goulbourne wished to develop a defence based on the theory that it was Mr. Brown who was the target of the nightclub shooting. According to this theory, when that murder attempt failed, another attempt was made the next day, which succeeded. In order to advance this theory, Mr. Goulbourne wanted to know whether the autopsy results would show that Mr. Brown had been wounded during the nightclub shooting. Mr. Goulbourne also wanted to show that the murder witnesses could not place him at the scene of the killing.

Justice B.L. Croll addressed the issue of relevancy by first finding a temporal and factual connection between the two shootings, based largely on evidence elicited during the preliminary inquiry. She then considered whether the information sought could be reasonably used by the accused, Mr. Goulbourne, either in meeting the case for the Crown, advancing the defence or otherwise making a decision which might affect the conduct of the case. Based on these considerations, Justice Croll found that the information sought was relevant to Mr. Goulbourne.

Justice Croll then considered the issue of whether the material sought was protected by a public interest privilege and concluded:

The ongoing investigation into the Brown homicide is a recognized category of public interest immunity. This question involves a delicate and difficult balance as to whether the public interest in this ongoing investigation outweighs the right of the accused to make full answer and defence. While I recognise the very high public interest in a homicide investigation, and . . . the risk that disclosure of witnesses and suspects could jeopardize the investigation, in the end, I am satisfied that the disclosure I have specified is necessary to allow Mr. Goulbourne to properly prepare his defence. This is not, in my view, a case where the information sought is of little probative value or only marginally relevant. Given that this is an identification case and the defence submission that the one Crown witness is not reliable, I am satisfied that the disclosure about suspects, witnesses, and possibly the autopsy report goes to the root of the defence theory that there is an alternate suspect . . .

Justice Croll notes that the disclosure requested is quite specific and concludes with the caution, “In giving this direction to counsel, I reiterate that although there is a relatively low threshold for Crown disclosure, relevancy must still be established, and the defence is not entitled to the entire homicide file. . . . .”

Ms. Durcan, Counsel for the Registrar, opposes the disclosure of ongoing investigations, in part on the grounds of a public interest privilege. The Tribunal agrees that there is a legitimate public interest to be protected. The public has an overriding interest in knowing that a consumer may purchase a motor vehicle from a seller who is acting honestly. The purchase of a car or truck is, for most people, one of the largest and most significant purchases they make. The Act provides a regulatory scheme but also sets out certain violations of the Act as offenses, subject to prosecution as provincial offences. When OMVIC decides to investigate, as opposed to inspect, a registrant it is with the goal of determining whether an offence has occurred and whether a charge should be laid. It is the investigations leading up to a possible charge that are of interest to the Appellants in this motion. It is in the public interest to preserve the privacy of these investigations. Witnesses might be less forthcoming if their privacy were not preserved. Premature disclosure of details of the investigation may injure the reputations of innocent people in situations where an investigation is ultimately completed without charges being laid. An opportunity for witness intimidation or the tailoring of evidence is created where details of the investigation are released before it is complete.

Ms. Durcan also opposes the disclosure of ongoing investigations in part because she submits that Mr. Aiello is seeking the sort of holus-bolus disclosure of the entire investigation file that Justice Croll cautions against. Ms. Durcan notes that Mr. Aiello has not established that the information he seeks “goes to the root of the defence theory”. The Tribunal agrees that Mr. Aiello has not met the criteria cited by Justice Croll in the Goulbourne case. He is not able to say specifically what information he wants disclosed. Nor is he able to establish that the information is of any probative value. Mr. Aiello cannot establish that the information he seeks goes to the root of a defence theory.

Mr. Aiello submits that because Section 6 of the Act contemplates the examination of all past conduct of a registrant to determine whether the registrant is entitled to remain registered, then the registrant is entitled to know all information about his conduct that is uncovered during ongoing investigations.

There are two problems with this submission. First, to follow this logic to its conclusion, any Appellant whose past conduct is at issue would be entitled to know the details of any ongoing investigation of him, regardless of harm to the public interest that might arise. That result is not consistent with the ruling in the Goulbourne case. It would render the concept of a public interest immunity null in cases where OMVIC pursues both a Notice of Proposal and an investigation. It also raises the prospect of OMVIC delaying the commencement of an investigation until a Notice of Proposal has been completed or of a delay in the issuance of a Notice of Proposal until the provincial offenses investigation is complete. It is certainly not in the public interest, nor is it consistent with the intention of the Act, for either of these delays to occur.

The second problem with this submission is that the disclosure that Mr. Aiello’s clients have already received has narrowed the scope of the “past conduct” on which the Registrar will rely in putting forward his case. It is of course open to the Appellants to raise any other past conduct which they think may assist them. This ability of the Appellants to widen the scope of a hearing by putting a wide range of past conduct into consideration by the Tribunal is a key distinction between these hearings and a criminal trial. This expansive definition of “past conduct” goes well beyond the comparatively narrow concept of “making a full answer and defence” to which Stinchcombe refers in the criminal context. The question is whether the Registrar is obliged to disclose details of an ongoing investigation to assist the Appellants to go beyond a full answer and defence and to raise issues which would not be germane in a criminal prosecution. There may be situations where the Registrar has that obligation. But, at a minimum, that obligation would arise because the information has great probative value and goes to the root of the case the Appellants seek to establish. That is not the case here.

The second context in which Mr. Aiello seeks disclosure of an investigation is quite specific. In an affidavit, a customer (“Ms. SD”) of Mr. Booth and the Dealership testified that Mr. Bob Lucas spoke by telephone with her. Mr. Lucas identified himself as an OMVIC investigator. During the conversation, Ms. SD was asked by Mr. Lucas whether she had been told that the car she was purchasing was a used vehicle. Ms. SD confirmed that she had been told this. Mr. Lucas advised Ms. SD that sales documents for the vehicle she had traded in to the Dealership showed a disparity in odometer readings. She was asked if she could shed any light on that. Ms. SD told the OMVIC investigator that the disparity was due to a mistake she had made in initially registering the vehicle. She heard nothing further from the OMVIC investigator. During the cross-examination of Ms. Halbert, Mr. Aiello asked what Ms. Halbert had done on receipt of this affidavit. Ms. Halbert testified that she had searched the OMVIC database for any reference to this investigation but could not locate it. Ms. Halbert then spoke to the Director of Investigations, Mr. Smith, about it. According to Ms. Halbert, Mr. Smith confirmed that Mr. Lucas, an investigator reporting to him, had contacted Ms. SD but that the inquiries were in relation to another investigation unrelated to the Appellants. Mr. Aiello seeks disclosure of the details of this investigation insofar as it relates to Ms. SD or to his clients.

It is not clear whether this unrelated investigation is complete or not. The Registrar has acknowledged an obligation to disclose information relevant to the Appellants that was gathered in a completed investigation. If this investigation is complete, then two issues arise. First, is the information relevant to the Appellants? Second, if it is, does the fact that the information arises in an unrelated investigation affect the Registrar’s disclosure obligation?

The information sought is relevant to the Appellants. The Registrar’s Notice of Proposal alleges that all three Appellants have been involved in the purchase or sale of cars where the odometer readings have been altered or inaccurately disclosed. In this case, it appears that OMVIC believed that a vehicle taken as a trade-in by the Dealership had inaccuracies in the odometer reading. However, it appears that this belief was contradicted by Ms. SD. This incident is clearly of use to the Appellants in establishing their answer to the allegations.

The fact that the information arises during an unrelated investigation should not affect the Registrar’s obligation to disclose although it may affect the extent of the disclosure. The details of the telephone conversation with Ms. SD and any investigation undertaken as a direct result of the telephone discussion may be disclosed without necessarily disclosing details of the investigation which do not relate to the Appellants. In this case, the Registrar may redact information in the disclosure that concerns the unrelated investigation in which the interview of Ms. SD occurred. This should serve to protect the identities of witnesses and other potentially sensitive information that does not relate to the Appellants.

If the investigation is ongoing, then the Goulbourne case provides criteria to be considered in determining whether disclosure should be ordered despite the public interest privilege. Ms. SD’s affidavit sets out a specific conversation so any order for disclosure could be very specific in scope. The information may be said to be of more than marginal relevance to the Appellants given that they are alleged to have engaged in odometer tampering or in failure to properly disclose odometer readings. However, there is no evidence before the Tribunal that the information sought goes to the root of the Appellants’ case or the theory of their case. Concerning the probative value of the information, it is open to the Appellants to call Ms. SD or to introduce her affidavit at the hearing. It is not clear that learning how Mr. Lucas regarded the conversation or what, if anything, he did as a result would be of great probative value. The Tribunal finds that the Appellants have not met the criteria set out in Goulbourne to justify disclosure of the information relating to Ms. SD’s conversation with the OMVIC investigator in the course of an ongoing investigation.

Accordingly, the Tribunal orders as follows:

1. The disclosure by the Registrar of information about completed investigations where the investigation is related to the Appellants and the information is relevant to this proceeding must include all information within the possession and control of the Registrar regardless of whether the information is stored electronically or on paper.

2. If the investigation during which Mr. Bob Lucas spoke by telephone to Ms. SD on or about August 1, 2013 is complete, then the Registrar will disclose to the Appellants all records, including electronic records and notes, made by Mr. Bob Lucas during the telephone conversation that are in the possession or control of the Registrar. This disclosure will also include any notes or records of actions taken or interviews held as a direct result of the conversation with Ms. SD. In making this disclosure, the Registrar may redact any information which identifies any unrelated investigations, including the names of any witnesses other than Ms. SD.

3. The motion of Mr. Booth and the Dealership for disclosure is otherwise dismissed.

4. By April 16, 2015, the parties will disclose all documents or things on which they intend to rely on the hearing and, apart from timing, the disclosure will comply with Rule 6 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice.

5. The Hearing in this matter will commence on May 6, 2015 at 9:30 am at the Tribunal’s Chambers, 20 Dundas Street West, 5th Floor Toronto, Ontario and will continue, if necessary, on May 12, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 2015.

LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL

Laurie Sanford

Vice-Chair

Released: March 20, 2015