Licence Tribunal
Appeal d'appel en
Tribunal matière de permis
2014-04-24
FILE:
8716/MVIA
CASE NAME:
8716 v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from an Impoundment Pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act.
Applicant
Applicant
-and-
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR:
Antoine Aouad, M.D., Member
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant:
Self-represented
For the Respondent:
Sanjay Kapur, Agent
Heard in Toronto:
April 15, 2014
REASONS FOR DECISION
A hearing was held on April 15, 2014, in person to consider the Applicant’s appeal pursuant to section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA” or the “Act”).
Pursuant to section 50.2 (5) the Tribunal CONFIRMS THE IMPOUNDMENT. As a result the Applicant’s motor vehicle will remain detained at the impound facility for 90 days.
BACKGROUND
A motor vehicle was impounded pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act and the impoundment was appealed by the owner. The owner, motor vehicle, and date of appeal in this matter are as follows:
Owner: The Applicant
Motor Vehicle: 2005 MAZD TRI (the “vehicle”)
Date of Appeal: March 28, 2014
As the Applicant did not receive the Registrar’s submission, prior to the commencement of the hearing the Registrar’s Agent read out the list of documents forwarded to the Applicant and explained the content of each.
The Applicant was given the option to adjourn, take a recess to review the documents or proceed. The Applicant opted to proceed.
All documents were entered into evidence as exhibits with the consent of both parties.
ISSUES
As set out in the Applicant’s request for hearing (Exhibit #1), the owner appeals on the basis that the motor vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded, that the vehicle owner exercised due diligence (i.e. all reasonable efforts) to determine that the driver's licence was not suspended and that the loss of the vehicle will result in exceptional hardship, all as provided in sections 50.2(3)(a) (b) (c) and (d) of the Act.
Should the Tribunal order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle on the basis that the motor vehicle was stolen at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded?
Should the Tribunal order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle on the basis that the owner of the motor vehicle exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time in respect of which the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension?
Should the Tribunal order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle on the basis that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship?
FACTS
Evidence for the Applicant
A summary of the Applicant’s evidence follows.
The Applicant’s written submission filed with the Tribunal in support of the appeal was entered as Exhibit # 1. In the Notice of Appeal, the Applicant wrote that the vehicle is his only mode of transportation to go to work and earn a living to support “4 children and a wife”.
During the hearing, the Applicant explained his relationship with the suspended driver. The Applicant was aware of previous suspensions and at the time specifically told the suspended driver she was not to use his cars.
According to the Applicant the suspended driver has spare keys to the vehicle without his knowledge and the vehicle was taken without his consent. He does not want to charge her with theft as he does not wish to cause her any more problems.
In cross-examination, the Applicant testified that he parks the car at a friend’s house in order to save the $40.00 parking fee in his building. He explained that he needs to take the bus to get to his parking spot, or ride his bicycle, or sometimes he is driven home.
The Applicant admitted that the same driver was involved in two previous impoundments, but that he never warned his friend that she was not to drive his vehicle.
The Applicant clarified that he did not literally “allow” the Applicant to drive his car, he simply blames himself for not being careful enough and believing the suspended driver when she told him that she had her licence returned.
As to how she came to have the keys in her possession, the Applicant believes that she may have taken them some time ago when he noticed the keys were missing, but thought he lost them, and she denied having taken them.
Evidence for the Registrar
A summary of the Registrar’s evidence follows.
The documents tendered by the Registrar and admitted into the record on consent of the Applicant were as follows:
Copy of the Ministry of Transportation records indicating that, among other things, the impounded motor vehicle is registered in the name of the Applicant as owner;
A copy of the notice prepared by the officer who detained the impounded motor vehicle indicating, among other things, that the vehicle at the time it was detained was being driven by the person convicted of the offence under the Criminal Code of Canada outlined in point 4 below;
Copy of the Notice forwarded to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles regarding the impoundment;
Copy of the Ministry of Transportation records indicating that the driver at the time of impoundment had been convicted of Driving While Disqualified under the Criminal Code of Canada pursuant to which the driver’s licence of the driver was then under suspension until March 3, 2015.
The Registrar did not call any witnesses.
LAW
Section 55.1 of the Act provides that a motor vehicle may be detained and impounded, and section 50.2 provides the motor vehicle owner’s right of appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal on the appeal may, pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, confirm the impoundment or order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle. Pursuant to subsection 50.2(8), the decision of the Tribunal is, final and binding.
Subsection 55.1(3) of the Act states:
(3) A motor vehicle detained under subsection (1) shall be impounded as follows:
For 45 days, if there has not been any previous impoundment under this section, within a prescribed period, with respect to any motor vehicle then owned by the owner of the vehicle currently being impounded.
For 90 days, if there has been one previous impoundment under this section, within a prescribed period, with respect to any motor vehicle then owned by the owner of the vehicle currently being impounded.
For 180 days, if there have been two or more previous impoundments under this section, within a prescribed period, with respect to any motor vehicle then owned by the owner of the vehicle currently being impounded.
Regulation 631/98 provides that the prescribed period, referred to above, is two years.
The owner may appeal the impoundment on only four specific grounds set out in subsection 50.2(3):
(3) The only grounds on which an owner may appeal under subsection (1) and the only grounds on which the Tribunal may order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle are,
(a) that the motor vehicle that is impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded;
(b) that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension;
(c) that the owner of the motor vehicle exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension; or
(d) that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
The Applicant here appeals on the basis of sections 50.2(3)(a) (b) (c) and (d).
Issue Should the Tribunal order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle on the basis that the motor vehicle was stolen at the time in respect of which the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded?
The meaning of “stolen” is not defined in The Highway Traffic Act.
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed., provides the definition of “stolen” as follows:
Stolen: 1. Obtained by theft. 2. Accomplished or enjoyed by stealth; secret. 3. Of time: obtained by contrivance
Theft: 1. The action of a thief; the felonious taking away of the personal goods of another; larceny 2. That which is or has been stolen; the proceeds of thieving.
The Criminal Code of Canada (the "Code") R.S.C. 1985, Chap. C-46 provides guidance.
Section 1 of the Code states:
“steal” means to commit theft…
Section 322(1) of the Code states:
- (1) Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or the use of another person, anything, whether animate or inanimate, with intent,
(a) to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it, or a person who has a special property or interest in it, of the thing or of his property or interest in it;
(b) to pledge or deposit it as security;
(c) to part with it under a condition with respect to its return that the person who parts with it may be unable to perform; or
(d) to deal with it in such a manner that it cannot be restored in the condition in which it was at the time it was taken or converted.
(2) A person commits theft when, with intent to steal anything, he moves it or causes it to move or to be moved, or begins to cause it to become movable.
(3) A taking or conversion of anything may be fraudulent notwithstanding that it is effected without secrecy or attempt at concealment.
(4) For the purposes of this Act, the question whether anything that is converted is taken for the purpose of conversion, or whether it is, at the time it is converted, in the lawful possession of the person who converts it is not material.
(5) For the purposes of this section, a person who has a wild living creature in captivity shall be deemed to have a special property or interest in it while it is in captivity and after it has escaped from captivity.
The Divisional Court held in Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 that the Tribunal should not limit the meaning of “stolen” only to an intention to take the vehicle permanently. The Court held that the term “stolen” could also apply to an intention to take the vehicle temporarily. The Court reviewed the circumstances of that case and stated:
“In our opinion a vehicle is ‘stolen’ in this context when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily.”
Issue Should the Tribunal order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle on the basis that the owner of the motor vehicle exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time in respect of which the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension?
The Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 3rd ed. provides the definition of “due diligence” as follows:
Due: A. adj. 1. That is owing or payable, as a debt. 2. Belonging or falling to by right. 3. That ought to be given or rendered; merited. 4. Such as ought to be; fitting; proper; rightful. 5. Such as is requisite or necessary; adequate. 6. To be ascribed or attributed; owing to, caused by, in consequence of. 7. Under engagement or contract to be ready or arrive (at a defined time).
Diligence: 1. The quality of being diligent; industry, assiduity. 2. Speed, dispatch. 3. Careful attention, heedfulness, caution. 4. Law. The attention and care due from a person in a given situation....
Also, “due diligence” in Black’s Law Dictionary (sixth edition) at page 457 is defined as follows:
Due diligence: Such a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent man under the particular circumstances; not measured by any absolute standard, but depending on the relative facts of the special case.
Issue Should the Tribunal order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle on the basis that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship?
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed. defines “exceptional hardship” as follows:
Exceptional : Of the nature of or forming an exception; unusual.
Hardship: 1. The quality of being hard to bear; hardness; severity. 2. Hardness of fate or circumstance; severe toil or suffering; extreme privation.
Also, where the owner appeals on the ground of exceptional hardship, subsection 50.2(4) provides:
(4) Clause (3) (d) does not apply if there was a previous impoundment under section 55.1 with respect to any motor vehicle then owned by the same owner.
Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 provides the criteria to be considered and those not to be considered in determining the appeal under this section. First, the Tribunal must consider whether no alternative exists for the impounded vehicle and if there is no alternative, then whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle or a threat to public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.
The section also provides that the Tribunal may not, except in certain circumstances, consider:
- financial or economic loss to any person,
- loss of employment or employment opportunity to any person, or
- loss of education or training.
These factors may be considered only if the owner demonstrates all of the following:
- there is no alternative to the vehicle available,
- the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting,
- the impact will be on a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle and
- the impact of the loss will be on someone other than the suspended driver and will not be the result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type described above.
The regulation states that the Tribunal cannot consider inconvenience to any person as being exceptional hardship.
All elements of the grounds of appeal must be proven on the balance of probabilities by the owner of the vehicle.
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
In closing, the Applicant accepted some of the blame for the incident explaining that he should have investigated things more closely.
In his summary statement the Registrar’s Agent asked that the Tribunal confirm the decision of the Registrar to impound the vehicle for 90 days.
The Registrar’s Agent maintains that there is no doubt the driver was under suspension.
With regards to exceptional hardship, the Registrar’s Agent, notes the law does not allow an appeal on hardship since the Applicant has had two previous impounded vehicles.
As for due diligence, according to the Registrar’s Agent, the appeal must fail on the grounds of due diligence, as by the Applicant’s own admission he did not ask to see the suspended driver’s licence.
The possibility that the vehicle was stolen is not credible, according to the Registrar’s Agent, given the history of the Applicant and the suspended driver. Further, the Registrar’s Agent pointed out that the vehicle was being driven home.
The Registrar’s Agent argued that the Applicant’s friend where the vehicle was parked was never warned that the suspended driver should not drive the car.
The onus is on the Applicant to establish his grounds of appeal as provided in section 50.2(3) of the Act.
The Tribunal concurs with the Registrar’s Agent that evidence shows that the person having care and control of the vehicle at the time of impoundment did not in fact have a valid driver’s licence.
In regards to the possibility that the car could have been stolen, although the Applicant, himself, does not consider that the vehicle to have been stolen the Tribunal, did consider the fact that the vehicle was taken without his consent. The Tribunal finds that given the relationship between the suspended driver and the Applicant, it is plausible that consent would be implied.
Further, being aware of the suspended driver’s previous record, and suspecting that the suspended driver had taken the missing keys some time ago, the Applicant failed to warn his friend that she was not to drive the vehicle.
The Tribunal finds that the vehicle was not stolen at the time of impoundment, and therefore the criteria of section 50.2(3)(a) of the Act has been not met.
With respect to due diligence, the evidence is clear that the Applicant, made no effort to verify the validity of the Applicant’s licence or in fact if she had a licence. The Tribunal finds that the requirements for due diligence under section 50.2(3)(c) of the Act were not met.
As for the Applicant’s appeal on exceptional hardship, under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, the law prescribes that where the owner appeals on the ground of exceptional hardship, subsection 50.2(4) applies:
(4) Clause (3) (d) does not apply if there was a previous impoundment under section 55.1 with respect to any motor vehicle then owned by the same owner.
Thus, the Applicant’s appeal under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail.
DECISION
After considering the evidence, pursuant to the authority vested in the Tribunal under section 50.2(5) of the Act, the Tribunal confirms the impoundment of the Applicant’s motor vehicle, and it will remain at the impound facility for 90 days.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Antoine Aouad, M.D., Presiding Member
RELEASED: April 24, 2014