Association of Management, Administrative and Professional Crown Employees of Ontario v. The Crown in Right of Ontario, 2026 CanLII 55603

GSB# 2024-01512

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

Under

THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT

Before

THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD

BETWEEN

Association of Management, Administrative and Professional Crown Employees of Ontario (Grievor)

Association

• and -

The Crown in Right of Ontario (The Ministry)

Employer

BEFORE

Ian Anderson, Arbitrator

FOR THE ASSOCIATION

Nadine Blum, Goldblatt Partners LLP, Counsel

FOR THE EMPLOYER

Joohyung Lee, Treasury Board Secretariat, Legal Services Branch, Counsel

HEARING

December 16, 2025 and January 16, 2026

Decision

1The Dispute before me was filed on June 4, 2024. It alleges:

[T]he Complainant was subjected to acts of anti-black racism, harassment, humiliation, degradation, belittlement, and discrimination in the workplace in violation of Articles 3.1 (Management Rights) and Article 2 (Non-Discrimination/Harassment) of the AMAPCEO Collective Agreement, the OPS Respectful Workplace Policy, Anti-Racism Policy, and any other relevant articles of the AMAPCEO Collective Agreement or provisions of the Employer policies, guidelines, or legislation.

2The Union provided the Employer with extensive particulars on May 13, 2025, which span the period 2017 to August, 2024. They are attached in Appendix A to this decision. This decision addresses a motion brought by the Employer to strike certain paragraphs of those particulars. Specifically, the Employer moves to strike:

(i) Paragraphs 1-72 (with the exception of paragraphs 25, 26 and 27) on the basis that they are untimely or not relevant to allegations which were filed in a timely manner.

(ii) In the alternative, paragraphs 1-23, 29-31, 35-43, 44-48, 53 on the basis that they are precluded by the “three year rule”.

3The Union resists the Employer’s motions on the following bases:

(i) This case is not about any particular manager or director. Rather it is about the Employer’s failure to protect the Complainant (to whom I will also refer as the Grievor) from being subjected to racist, harassing, humiliating, degrading, belittling and discriminatory behaviour. This is all one continuous course of conduct. Paragraphs 1-72 are clearly relevant and integral to understanding that course of conduct.

(ii) The relevance of paragraphs 1-72 is best determined within the context of the hearing rather than at the outset.

(iii) Even if paragraphs 1-72 are untimely, the parties agreed to hold timelines in abeyance.

(iv) In any event, the Employer has waived its right to raise a timeliness objection.

(v) In the alternative, an arbitrator has discretion to waive time limits and I should exercise that discretion in this case.

4For the purposes of the Employer’s motion, the parties agreed to certain facts. They are attached in Appendix B to this decision.

Procedural Note

5On January 15, 2026, I provided the parties with a bottom line decision with reasons to follow. Under cover of an email dated February 6, 2026, I provided the parties with a draft decision setting out those reasons. The email stated:

On the basis of the draft decision, it appears that the rights of certain individuals may be affected by the outcome of these proceedings. Prior to finalizing the decision, those individuals are to be afforded an opportunity to make submissions. Accordingly, you are directed to provide a copy of this email and the attached draft decision to the individuals in question. They shall have until February 23, 2026 to provide, in writing, any submissions they may wish to make in relation to the draft decision.

As there is an outstanding question as to whether the decision should anonymize individuals named therein, I would ask that you facilitate the provision of those submissions to me, rather than having them sent through the GSB.

For the same reason, the parties and any person to whom a copy of this email and the attached decision is provided are to keep them and the information contained therein confidential, save and except that they may share it with legal counsel or their union who will then be subject to the same order with respect to confidentiality.

6Based on the Union’s remedial requests, the parties identified one individual (“AA”) whose rights might be affected. Notice and the opportunity to make submissions was given to AA. AA made no submissions on the draft decision. On April 13, 2026, an agreement of the parties and AA was concluded that the decision should be anonymized with respect to the names of any individuals and the Ministry in question¹.

7This decision differs from the draft decision provided to the parties on February 6, 2026 in only two respects: it has been anonymized; and this “Procedural Note” section has been added.

8One final comment. I have adopted the format of referring to individuals as AA, BB, CC etc. (II is skipped). The particulars sometimes referred to individuals by their full names, sometimes by their first names, sometimes by both and sometimes use different spellings for what is probably the same name. These differences were sometimes commented on in the draft reasons. By way of illustration, if the particulars had referred to “Jim Smith”, “Jim” and “Smyth” (they do not), the draft reasons might have included statements like, “assuming “Jim Smith” is the same as “Jim”” or “assuming “Smith” is the same as “Smyth”. For the purposes of anonymization, I have assumed in such instances that it is the same person to which reference is being made, and substituted e.g. XX for “Jim Smith”, “Jim” and “Smyth” where ever they appear. This results in “assuming “Jim Smith” is the same as “Jim”” becoming “assuming “XX” is the same as “XX””. The particulars also refer to two individuals, one of whom’s first name is a contraction of the first name of the other, e.g. “Fred Smith” and “Frederick Jones”. These two individuals are also both referred to by the contracted first name (“Fred Smith” and “Fred Jones”). Subsequently there is a reference to someone by simply the contracted first name, (“Fred”). In that instance, I have substituted [“CC” or “QQ”] for the contracted first name.

Analysis and Decision

9The collective agreement provides that a formal “dispute” (a “grievance”, to use the more typical labour relations parlance) must be filed “within thirty (30) days after the circumstances giving rise to a complaint have occurred, or have come or ought reasonably to have come to the attention of the employee”: Article 15.3.1. Days “includes all days exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and designated holidays”: Article 15.5.6. Article 15.5.4 provides that where a complaint or dispute has not been processed by the employee or the Association within the time period prescribed it shall be deemed withdrawn. Article 15.5.5 provides the time limits may be extended by agreement of the parties in writing.

10The grievance was filed on June 4, 2024. The particulars subsequently provided include reference to an incident on May 10, 2024. This falls within the 30 days prior to the filing of the grievance, and the Employer has taken no issue with its inclusion.

11The Union argues that the grievance is not about the behaviour of any specific manager or director. Rather, it is about the Employer’s continuing failure to protect the Grievor from being subject to racist behaviour. The particulars include at least two recent incidents which are timely. They cannot be understood unless regard is had to the incidents which came before as set out in the particulars. Those incidents are highly relevant to the incidents to which the Employer does not object.

12I agree that in cases of discrimination and harassment particulars of past incidents of a continuing course of conduct may be relevant to establishing that the incidents which are the subject of the grievance constitute discrimination or harassment. I will return to the issue of relevance below. The prior question, however, is which of the particulars can found a timely grievance and which cannot.

13The Employer argues all of the allegations contained in the particulars which predate June 4, 2024 by more than 30 days are untimely. By contrast, the Employer takes no issue with particulars after that date, including the ones which post-date the filing of the grievance: there is no assertion of expansion of grounds.

The Agreement to Extend the Time for the Filing of a Dispute

14In order to understand the parties' arguments, it is necessary to note that on February 17, 2023, the Grievor had filed a Workplace Discrimination and Harassment Prevention (“WDHP”) complaint. The WDHP complaint identified two incidents of harassment and discrimination. “Incident 1” related to a statement made on December 2, 2021 by AA, a co-worker of the Grievor, during a Teams meeting convened by the Grievor’s manager, BB. In her complaint, the Grievor identified as Black and described AA as not a visible minority. She described prior conduct by AA as establishing that the statement made on December 2, 2021 was an anti-Black statement. “Incident 2” related to a direction which the Grievor received on October 14, 2022 from BB, to contact and work together with AA on a project which fell within the Grievor’s portfolio of work. The Grievor referred to an email she sent to BB and to her Director, CC, on that day in which she said: “I have been very clear in the past with management that I will not be working directly with AA one-on-one on projects based on his egregious and racist comments made on more than one occasion of being “scared and afraid” of me - with no evidence to substantiate his claims”. BB left his position and the OPS in or around May of 2023.

15On August 25, 2023, the Grievor was advised that her WDHP complaint had been found not to be a potential breach of the WDHP policy. On September 14, 2023, the Union and the Employer commenced an email thread with respect to the filing of a Dispute (i.e. grievance) in relation to the rejection of the Grievor’s WDHP complaint.

16The Employer concedes that the effect of this email thread was an agreement to extend the time with respect to the filing of a dispute with respect to the disposition of the Grievor’s WDHP complaint, but notes the last firm date agreed upon was to place the matter in abeyance until December 3, 2023. Thereafter, the Employer agreed to the Union’s request to place the matter in abeyance “until we get the report from the mediator”. This was a reference to “conflict resolution” mediation sessions involving the Grievor and AA and the Grievor and CC which had been proposed by the Employer following the disposition of the Grievor’s WDHP complaint. There was, in fact, no report from the mediator, but it is an agreed fact that the mediations concluded on December 20 and 22, 2023 at which time the Grievor entered into agreements with AA and CC. The Employer argues the only reasonable conclusion is that the agreement to hold the time for filing a dispute in abeyance came to an end as of December 22, 2023. Further, and in any event, the Employer argues that agreement only extended to a dispute with respect to the disposition of the WDHP complaint; it did not include an agreement to extend the time limits in relation to the underlying events which were the subject of the WDHP complaint.

17The Union does not really dispute that the agreement to hold the time for filing a dispute in abeyance came to an end as of December 22, 2023. Rather, the Union argues that the Employer waived its right to contest the timeliness of the filing of a dispute by taking fresh steps.

18I find that the agreement to hold the time for filing a dispute in abeyance applied only to the WDHP complaint. In the result, to the extent the particulars which predate the May 10, 2024 incident are meant to found a grievance, there was no agreement to extend the time limits for filing a grievance in relation to them and they are untimely. Given the view I take of this matter, it is not necessary for me to determine whether the agreement to hold the time for filing a dispute in relation to the WDHP complaint applied only to the disposition of that complaint or whether it also applied to the events of December 2, 2021 and October 14, 2022, which were the subject of that complaint. In either event, I find the agreement came to an end as of December 22, 2023.

19The particulars to which the Employer objects all relate to incidents which occurred more than 30 days prior to the filing of the Dispute. There is no suggestion that the Grievor was unaware of the incidents at the time that they occurred. To the extent that these particulars are advanced as grounds for the grievance, all allegations which predate the filing of the grievance by more than 30 days (as defined by Article 15.5.6 in the Collective Agreement) are untimely and the Employer has the right to assert that they are deemed withdrawn by Article 15.5.4 of the Collective Agreement.

20I turn now to the question of waiver.

Waiver

21The Union argues the Employer has waived its right to argue that the grievance is untimely by the taking of fresh steps. It cites OPSEU (Jackson) v Crown (MCCSS), 2020 CanLII 74277 (GSB)(Banks) (“Jackson #1”) at para. 35:

[35] The Board has considered this question on numerous occasions. It has addressed situations quite similar to the one at hand. Taken together, these decisions indicate in my view that a party that fails to object to a clearly untimely grievance or referral to arbitration over a period of months, and during that time takes a fresh step to advance the grievance procedure, for example by agreeing in the Joint Review process to schedule a hearing, will be found to have waived its rights to object on timeliness grounds, in the absence of some compelling explanation of its failure to object earlier.

22For present purposes, the question is whether the grievance was “clearly untimely” when it was received or at the time of any other steps upon which the Union relies. As discussed in OPSEU (Bonacci et al) and Ministry of the Solicitor General, 2021 CanLII 127108 (ON GSB) (Anderson), waiver generally requires both knowledge and the intention to forego the exercise of a right. With respect to the right to object to the timeliness of a grievance, this requires that the Employer had sufficient information as to what the grievance was about. As noted in Bonacci at para. 22, Arbitrator Banks made the same distinction in Jackson at para. 38 where he noted that lack of particulars may be relevant to the determination of whether or not a grievance has been filed in a timely way.

23In the present case, the grievance as filed on June 4, 2024 was devoid of particulars. Further, by the date on which it was filed, BB had left his position in the OPS. Peter Edokpayi, a Dispute Resolution Officer (“DRO”) with the Union, sent the grievance to DD, who had become the Complainant’s manager in or about March, 2024, and was the “Employer’s Designee” for the purposes of this stage of the grievance process. DD acknowledged receipt of the grievance and asked whether it was "related to an ongoing issue that I have been briefed about or is this a new issue”. Edokpayi responded: “The dispute relates to both previous and on-going issues. We would provide detailed information at the FRS meeting.”

24The Union did provide detailed particulars on July 23, 2024 during the Formal Resolution Stage Meeting (“FRSM”), when the DRO read from prepared speaking notes. The Union argues the Employer did not raise a timeliness objection at that time and in fact expressly stated it did not have any preliminary objections. I am not persuaded by this argument.

25It is correct that the Employer’s Designee read the following prepared statement at the FRSM:

The Employer does not have any preliminary objections at this time, however, reserves the right to raise/rely on any preliminary objections should this grievance proceed to a hearing at the Grievance Settlement Board.

However, this statement was read prior to the DRO’s presentation. It cannot be said to constitute an intentional waiver of any timeliness objections which the Employer might have to the particulars contained in that presentation because it was made before the Employer had knowledge of what those particulars were. As it turned out, those particulars were long and detailed, as reflected by the fact that the speaking notes are 12 single spaced pages long. They included reference to the incidents which were part of the WDHP complaint, but also reference to many other incidents, some of which dated back to 2015. The Employer had no advance notice of an intention to file a Dispute with respect to those incidents.

26It is correct that by the end of the meeting the Employer had not raised a timeliness objection. It also had not indicated that it did not intend to do so. Rather the Employer’s notes indicate that the meeting concluded with its Designee making the following statement:

may need FRSM Part Two. Will consult with GG, get additional clarification or meet further before tabling decision. The goal is to provide a written response to dispute.

27By letter dated August 19, 2024, the Employer’s Designee provided the Employer’s response denying the grievance. The letter included the following statement:

In the event of any advance preliminary objections to the Grievance Settlement Board's jurisdiction, "(YY) will be taking the position that the Grievance Settlement Board lacks the jurisdiction to review the merits of this grievance. YY reserves the right to raise and rely on any other preliminary objections."

This statement is not a model of clarity. The objective, however, is not to parse the statement as one would a legal contract but to attempt to discern its meaning within a labour relations context. Just as grievors and unions are not typically represented by counsel at early stages of the grievance procedure, neither are employers. The portion following the prefatory part of the statement is in quotes. This may suggest that it was provided to the Designee by a human resources professional for insertion into his response in the event the Designee wished to advance preliminary objections to the Grievance Settlement Board. In any event, if the prefatory phrase of the statement is ignored and regard had only to the portion in quotes, the Employer has clearly stated its intention to take the position that “the Grievance Settlement Board lacks the jurisdiction to review the merits of this grievance”.

28The Union argues jurisdiction does not necessarily include timeliness. The Union notes that this Board has held that a general reservation of the right to raise preliminary objections is not sufficient, citing OPSEU (MacDonald) v Ontario (Finance), 2024 CanLII 106430 (GSB) (Dissanayake). In MacDonald, the employer purported to reserve the right to raise “any preliminary objections”: para. 11. As discussed in that case, preliminary objections can be addressed to a number of things, some of which may be jurisdictional, some of which may be procedural: see para. 22. In the case before me, the Employer specifically stated it would be taking the position that the Board lacks jurisdiction.

29I find the Employer was not in a position to object to the timeliness of the grievance, or for that matter any other issue, until such time as it was provided with the particulars upon which the Union relied. Once the Employer was provided with those particulars, the Employer did not state it was waiving its right to object to timeliness, rather it stated its intention to take the position that the Board lacked jurisdiction. An objection to timeliness is a jurisdictional objection. It is highly unlikely that any employer would not object to the timeliness of a grievance with respect to alleged violations taking place years in the past, as the particulars provided in support of this grievance purport to do. I find the Employer did not waive its right to object to the timeliness of the grievance.

30I turn to the question of whether I should exercise my discretion to extend the time for filing of a grievance in relation to some or all of those incidents.

Exercise of Discretion

31Section 48(16) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, provides:

(16) Except where a collective agreement states that this subsection does not apply, an arbitrator or arbitration board may extend the time for the taking of any step in the grievance procedure under a collective agreement, despite the expiration of the time, where the arbitrator or arbitration board is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the extension and that the opposite party will not be substantially prejudiced by the extension.

32There is no dispute that this section applies to arbitrations by the Grievance Settlement Board. There is no provision in the collective agreement which states the subsection does not apply. The principles for the application of the discretion are well established. They are those set out by Arbitrator Burkett in Re Becker Milk Co. Ltd. And Teamsters Union, Local 647, [1978] O.L.A.A. No. 71:

(i) the reason for the delay given by the offending party;

(ii) the length of the delay; and

(iii) the nature of the grievance.

I will consider each of these in turn.

33No reason was advanced by the Union for the delay.

34In this case, the length of the delay varies from months to years. The delay relates to the filing of the grievance. This is generally considered more serious than a delay with respect to the processing of a grievance because it is the filing of the grievance which puts an employer on notice that an employee is alleging a breach of the collective agreement.

35The Union argues, however, that the Employer was on notice that a grievance was going to be filed. This argument is based on the filing and subsequent processing of the WDHP complaint. As discussed above, the parties agreed to extend the time for filing a grievance in relation to the WDHP complaint. The Employer maintains that agreement related only to the disposition of the complaint, that is the determination that the complaint did not fall within the WDHP Policy, and not to the substance of the complaint itself. But even if the agreement is understood to have related to the substance of the complaint itself, that would only capture the incidents of December 2, 2021 and October 14, 2022. Further, and in any event, that agreement came to an end as of December 22, 2023. The Dispute was not filed until more than five months later, on June 4, 2024.

36The nature of the grievance is also relevant in considering the length of the delay. There is no doubt that harassment and discrimination are serious matters. Notwithstanding, this Board has found delays measured in months sufficiently long that it declined to exercise its discretion to extend the time limits for filing grievances which allege discrimination or harassment. In Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Lachance) v Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2017 CanLII 30326 (ON GSB) (Briggs), the delay was three months. In Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Kavanaugh) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), GSB Nos. 2007-0136, 2007-2649 (Harris) the delay was two months.

37The Union cites Metropolitan Licensing Commission and C.U.P.E., Loc. 79, Re, [1995] O.L.A.A. No. 35 (Springate). It notes in that case Arbitrator Springate exercised his discretion to extend the time by seven months for the filing of a grievance in relation to discharge. I do not find the case to be of assistance. In that case, on the advice of her personal lawyer, a grievor opted to proceed by way of a claim for wrongful dismissal rather than filing a grievance in relation to the termination of her employment. As Arbitrator Springate noted, this advice was wrong. Seven months later, after receiving advice from counsel for the union, the grievor filed the grievance. In all of the circumstances, Arbitrator Springate accepted that the grievor had a reasonable explanation for her delay. There is no parallel to this case in which no explanation is offered for the delay.

38In this case, the delay was at best five months in relation to the incidents of December 2, 2021 and October 14, 2022 and as much as nine years in relation to the other incidents to which the Employer objects. In these circumstances, I am not prepared to exercise my discretion to extend the time for filing a grievance in relation to the incidents to which the Employer objects.

Relevance of Particulars to the Timely Grounds for the Grievance.

39While the incidents objected to by the Employer are untimely and may not themselves be the subject of a grievance, they may nonetheless be relevant to the proof of the incidents which are timely. As stated in Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Vrantsidis) v Ontario (Education), 2025 CanLII 102378 (ON GSB) (Anderson):

[18] Discrimination and harassment can be subtle. Evidence with respect to events prior to the period covered by the grievance may be relevant to proving that what occurred was a manifestation of discrimination or harassment. At the same time, the right of the employer to a fair hearing may be compromised if required to defend itself in relation to events in the past which were not grieved.

[19] To address these challenges, the Grievance Settlement Board has adopted the “three-year rule” in cases of harassment or systemic discrimination. The “rule” allows a union to introduce evidence of events prior to the date of the grievance in order to prove that what a grievor experienced during the period covered by the grievance constituted discrimination or harassment. The “rule” also limits how far back in time that evidence can reach in order to avoid undue prejudice to the employer in having to investigate and respond to events not previously grieved. The time period chosen by the Board has generally been three years. The “three-year rule” is in fact not so much a rule as a guideline.

40Arbitrator Watters provided the following oft cited statement in OPSEU (Akintunde) and Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2019 CanLII 42398 (ON GSB), 2018 CanLII 55850 (ON GSB) with respect to the three year rule:

6. A concise statement of the three (3) year rule is found in the following passage from the Lunan Decision:

7. The Board has held that a grievor alleging harassment and discrimination can be permitted to adduce evidence over a period of three years before the date of the grievance. See Patterson (Leighton) and Patterson (Abramsky)… Evidence of events up to three years before the grievance should allow the union sufficient opportunity to prove a pattern of harassment and not be so long ago as to be difficult to defend. However, the Board has also held that it is not a rigid rule. It is a guideline: the Board must consider each case on its facts. See O’Brien (Leighton) …Thus it could be fair to the parties to extend the three years or shorten the period.

8. It is clear from a reading of the authorities that the three (3) year rule is intended to strike a fair balance between the interests of both parties. More specifically, the ability of the Union to establish an alleged pattern of improper conduct must be weighed against the Employer’s right to effectively defend itself against dated accusations. In deciding whether, and how, to apply the rule, the Board has considered the following matters:

(i) whether the grievor was aware of the right to challenge or grieve the earlier events which the Union seeks to rely on;

(ii) whether the hearing would be unduly protracted by the application of the rule, as a result of the need to present and consider voluminous evidence relating to the past events; and

(iii) whether extending the period of arbitral review would raise concerns from both an equitable and procedural standpoint.

41Notably, application of these factors may lengthen the three year period or shorten it. In this respect, I note factor (ii) seems to be addressed to whether the three year period should be shortened.

42The effect of the three year rule is that the admissibility of evidence which pre-dates the grievance by more than three years (to use the typical period for ease of reference) may be determined on a preliminary basis.

43The Union argues that establishing such a temporal limitation on evidence on a preliminary basis is contrary to principles of natural justice, as an arbitrator does not have discretion to reject relevant evidence, citing George Brown College of Applied Arts and Technology v Ontario Public Service Employees Union, 2016 CanLII 9122 (ON LA) (Bendel) at paras. 58 and 59. Once again, I note that this is not a decision of this Board. In any event, for the following reasons stated in Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Vrantsidis) v Ontario (Education), 2025 CanLII 102378 (ON GSB) (Anderson), I respectfully disagree with Arbitrator Bendel:

[47] The Union argues that Syndicat des Employés Professionels de l’Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières v. Université du Québec (1993), 1993 CanLII 162 (SCC), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 494 (SCC) stands for the proposition that it is a breach of natural justice for a tribunal to exclude evidence that is clearly relevant.

[48] I do not accept that Syndicat des Employés Professionels de l’Université du Québec à Trois-Rivière stands for this proposition. Rather, Syndicat des Employés Professionels de l’Université du Québec à Trois-Rivière states that a labour arbitrator is entitled to reject relevant evidence unless doing so would clearly amount to a breach of natural justice. In that decision, Lamer C.J. writing for the majority, stated (at p. 491):

For my part, I am not prepared to say that the rejection of relevant evidence is automatically a breach of natural justice. A grievance arbitrator is in a privileged position to assess the relevance of evidence presented to him and I do not think it is desirable for the courts, in the guise of protecting the right of parties to be heard, to substitute their own assessment of the evidence for that of the grievance arbitrator. It may happen, however, that the rejection of relevant evidence has such an impact on the fairness of the proceeding, leading unavoidably to the conclusion that there has been a breach of natural justice.

[49] The three-year rule and its exceptions can be seen as ensuring any exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence does not result in a breach of natural justice. A similar conclusion was reached by Arbitrator Herlich in Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Dubuc) v Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2016 CanLII 90058 (ON GSB). In the result, I see no reason not to apply the “three-year rule” to the particulars filed by the Union.

See also Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Akintunde) v Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2019 CanLII 42398 (ON GSB), 2018 CanLII 55850 (ON GSB), (Watters) at para. 11 to the same effect.

44A recurrent argument of the Union arises from the observation that there is only one employer. Based on this observation, the Union appears to argue that conduct by one manager is always relevant to determining whether conduct engaged in by another manager constitutes harassment or discrimination, citing Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Barker) v Ontario (Solicitor General), 2020 CanLII 20374 (ON GSB) (Gee).

45While the Employer is responsible for the actions of all of its managers, the threshold question in each case is whether the actions of a given individual constitute harassment or discrimination. Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Barker) v Ontario (Solicitor General), 2020 CanLII 20374 (ON GSB) (Gee) does not support the broad proposition advanced by the Union. On the contrary, it is authority for the proposition that conduct of one manager is not always relevant to the assessment of the conduct of another manager. In that case, at paras. 61 to 65, Arbitrator Gee considered whether the actions of one manager (Ms. Ives), which were not the subject of the grievance but fell within the three year period prior to it, might be relevant to assessing whether the actions of a subsequent manager (Ms. Coleman) constituted harassment and discrimination. Arbitrator Gee stated:

[62] Having identified the incident that forms the basis of the grievance, I turn to consider whether the earlier incidents described in the particulars involving Ms. Ives are relevant. At the risk of being repetitive, in order to be relevant, they would have to be of assistance to proving (or disproving) that the incident that forms the basis of the grievance (the incident involving Ms. Coleman) was part of a course of conduct that amounts to harassment. In order to answer this question, I consider the timing of the alleged incidents and the nature of the allegations to be relevant.

Ms. Ives was alleged to have made insensitive and inappropriate comments about the grievor. Ms. Coleman was not. Rather, it was alleged that she was acting within the scope of her managerial responsibility but “left the grievor with the wrong impression that the grievor believes resulted in harm to her relationship with other employees.” Arbitrator Gee commented that the only shared characteristic between these incidents was that the grievor felt harassed, and held that was not sufficient.

46The Union argues that the relevance of all evidence, whether it predates the grievance by less than three years or more, should be determined in the course of the hearing on the merits, and not on a preliminary basis. The Union cites: Toronto (City) v Toronto Professional Fire Fighters Association, 2017 CanLII 47855 (ON LA) (Parmar); Grange v. Toronto (City), 2014 HRTO 633 (Reaume) at paras. 25 and 26; and Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Jackson) v Ontario (Children, Community and Social Services), 2021 CanLII 37030 (ON GSB) (Banks) (“Jackson #2”). I am not persuaded that any of these decisions provides a basis for departing from the Board’s practice of determining the admissibility of evidence which predates a grievance by more than three years on a preliminary basis.

47Grange v. Toronto (City), 2014 HRTO 633 (Reaume) is a decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, not this Board. Further, the decision was with respect to the specific wording of a provision of the Human Rights Code. It addressed an argument that an application to the Tribunal alleging systemic discrimination on the basis of a series of incidents had not been filed within the time limits specified by section 34(1) of the Code. The Adjudicator emphasized that s. 34(1) requires only that an applicant “believe” that their rights have been infringed. She held this is equally true in cases of single incident discrimination and cases of systemic discrimination in which a series of incidents is alleged to have occurred. It was within the context of interpreting this statutory provision that she made her comment that determinations of credibility should not be made at a preliminary stage of the proceedings.

48Toronto (City) v Toronto Professional Fire Fighters Association, 2017 CanLII 47855 (ON LA) (Parmar) is also not a decision of this Board. There are, however, observations within that decision which I find instructive. In that case, the grievance alleged the grievor was subjected to a poisoned work environment and gender-based discrimination, and referred to a number of incidents following her assignment to a particular fire station, Station #332, involving a number of different employees in the three years preceding the grievance in support. The decision addresses two preliminary motions. The first was the scope of any remedy which might be granted. That is not an issue which I need address at this time. The second was the scope of the evidence which might be led by the union on behalf of the grievor. The union sought to lead evidence not just with respect to the preceding three years but also with respect to a variety of events which dated back a further four years: para. 45. Noting that evidence could unduly lengthen the proceeding, Arbitrator Parmar stated she did not accept the evidence should be heard simply to establish context: para. 46. I find that observation instructive. However, Arbitrator Parmar then expressed the view that the test for admissibility is always relevance and that it would not be appropriate to make that determination on a blanket basis prior to the hearing commencing: para 47. For reasons stated, this Board does not accept this premise. Rather, this Board has applied the three year rule to exclude evidence prior to the hearing commencing. Further, I note that at paragraphs 35 and 36 of her decision Arbitrator Parmar referenced two awards not of this Board in which an arbitrator similarly restricted the temporal scope of the evidence, prior to the hearing. Leaving aside when the determination should be made, Arbitrator Parmar made another observation with respect to the admissibility of evidence which predates a grievance by more than three years which I find instructive. She stated:

48. However, I would like to give the parties some general guidance. Evidence which pre-dates the Grievor’s assignment to Station #332 must relate directly to, and therefore be probative, in determining the allegations at issue. It is not enough that it is simply evidence of other incidents of alleged harassment.

I shall return to this statement below.

49Jackson #2 is a decision of this Board. However, all of the particulars at issue before Arbitrator Banks related to incidents within three years of the date of the grievance: see para. 45. Presumably for this reason Arbitrator Banks made no express reference to the three year rule. In any event, the decision is not authority for the proposition that a preliminary determination should not be made with respect to evidence which predates a grievance by more than three years. I shall return to Arbitrator Banks’comments with respect to preliminary determinations on evidence within the three year period below.

50The three year rule distinguishes between evidence which predates a grievance by three years and evidence which predates a grievance by more than three years. Different considerations apply to preliminary determinations with respect to the admissibility of each. It is useful to commence with the determinations applicable to evidence which predates a grievance by more than three years because such evidence is less likely to be determined to be inadmissible on a preliminary basis and it then may provide part of the context within which evidence which predates a grievance by more than three years is to be considered.

Evidence Which Predates a Grievance by Three Years or Less

51In Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Cooper) v Ontario (Clean Water Agency), 2019 CanLII 42398 (ON GSB) (Anderson), I stated:

[12] The three year rule, however, does not provide a basis to expand the grievance before an arbitrator. It also does not render what would otherwise be irrelevant evidence relevant. Evidence is not admissible simply because it falls within the three years (or such other period as is appropriate in the circumstances), it must be relevant to proving the incident or incidents which form the basis of the grievance constitute harassment. Further, to the extent that evidence with respect to earlier events is relevant, the three year rule does not provide a basis for granting a remedy with respect to those events per se.

A question which arises from the Union’s submissions is whether the determination of relevance should be made on a preliminary basis.

52In Jackson #2, Arbitrator Banks made a distinction between preliminary determinations based on relevance and arguable relevance. With respect to a challenge to particulars on the basis of relevance Arbitrator Banks stated:

[39] As the Union points out, this Board has with good reason taken a cautious approach to making determinations of relevance prior to a hearing. This reluctance appears to me to be based on an understanding that the relevance of particular alleged facts is generally best determined when they can be placed in the context of a developing factual record. The potential relevance or irrelevance of particular allegations of fact to demonstrating a collective agreement breach may only become apparent upon consideration of what they could demonstrate in combination or in context of other alleged facts, directly or by inference. Conversely, particular allegations of fact may demonstrate little on their own, but may provide context that sheds light on what other alleged fact may prove. As a result, considering motions to strike specific allegations of fact on the basis of relevance could involve more varied, contextual and detailed considerations than simply determining whether a set of particulars cannot possibly serve to demonstrate a collective agreement violation.

53This did not mean, however, that Arbitrator Banks was of the view that particulars within the three year period should never be struck on a pre-hearing basis. Rather, in his view particulars were appropriately struck if they were not arguably relevant. Arbitrator Banks stated (at para. 38):

it [is] appropriate to strike sets of particulars that taken together, could not possibly serve to demonstrate a violation of the collective agreement.

I would observe that a set of particulars which is untimely cannot possibly serve to demonstrate a violation of the collective agreement.

54In Barker (at para. 62 set out above), Arbitrator Gee noted that in order to be relevant, particulars must be of assistance to proving (or disproving) an incident or incidents which form the basis for the grievances was part of a course of conduct which amounts to harassment or discrimination. To this end, she stated, consideration of the timing and nature of the particulars of past conduct is appropriate. In the case before her, she noted that a gap of eight months between the last incident involving the first manager and the incident involving the second manager which formed the basis for the grievance strongly suggested that the events were not part of a course of conduct: paras. 63 - 64. At para. 65, she also noted that the allegations against the first manager were of a much different character than the allegations against the second manager. She stated:

In order for incidents to be a course of conduct, one would expect to see some shared characteristics between the incidents. In this case, the only shared characteristic is that the grievor felt she was being harassed. That is not sufficient.

55In summary, with respect to particulars falling within the three year period (or such other period as is appropriate) prior to the grievance, a cautious approach should be taken to making determinations of relevance prior to a hearing. This does not mean that particulars falling with the three year period prior to the grievance should never be struck. Sets of particulars which taken together, could not possibly serve to demonstrate a violation of the collective agreement should be struck. In this respect, a set of particulars which is untimely, and completely unrelated to a timely set of particulars, cannot possibly serve to demonstrate a violation of the collective agreement and should be struck. In determining whether there is a relationship, consideration may be given both to the time and the nature of the particulars. Relevant factors include: whether the allegations are with respect to the same individual; whether there is a significant gap so that the particulars may not be said to be a course of conduct; and whether the incidents have shared characteristics. The mere fact that a grievor believes there is a connection is not sufficient. Further, in determining whether three years or some shorter period should be adopted, consideration should be given to whether the hearing would be unduly protracted as a result of the need to present and consider voluminous evidence relating to the past events.

Evidence Which Predates a Grievance by More Than Three Years

56As noted, the three year period (or such other period as is appropriate) is considered sufficient to permit the union to establish a pattern of behaviour. It follows that evidence which predates the grievance by more than three years will not typically be admitted simply to establish a pattern of behaviour. Put differently, it will not typically be admitted simply to provide context or to establish further incidents of the type of behaviour which founds the grievance. In these respects, I find Arbitrator Parmar’s comments in Toronto Professional Firefighters Association, set out above, applicable.

57In Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Fletcher) v Ontario (Natural Resources and Forestry), 2018 CanLII 102772 (ON GSB), Arbitrator Petryshen did not strike certain particulars which were more than three years old on a preliminary basis because they “relate to subsequent particulars within the three year period”: see para. 7. In my view, the particulars must also relate directly to and therefore be probative in determining the allegations at issue: see Toronto Professional Fire Fighters Association at para. 48.

58The Union makes reference to several cases in which this Board did not strike on a preliminary basis particulars which predated a grievance by more than three years.

59In Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Lunan) v Ontario (Labour), 2015 CanLII 36166 (ON GSB), there were seven grievances before Arbitrator Leighton, each of which alleged discrimination and harassment. The first grievance was dated December 7, 2012 and “arose because of alleged comments made by a co-worker about the grievor’s behaviour when she first joined the ministry in 2004.” Arbitrator Leighton stated (at para. 9):

While I am not prepared to allow the union a carte blanche to tender evidence between 2004 and 2013, it may be appropriate to hear evidence on the incident, which allegedly occurred during the grievor’s training in 2014 [sic: 2004]. Whether this evidence is relevant or necessary is a decision better made during the hearing.

60The Union relies on this statement to argue that determinations of whether evidence in relation to particulars which predate the grievance by more than three years is relevant or necessary should be made during the hearing. I am not persuaded. I note that apart from the one incident in 2004, Arbitrator Leighton determined on a preliminary basis that she would not hear evidence with respect to all incidents which predated the first grievance by “approximately three years”: para. 10. The determination to exempt the evidence with respect to the 2004 incident was fact specific and not of assistance to me in this case.

61In Ontario Public Service Employees Union (O’Brien) v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2011 CanLII 10242 (ON GSB), there were three grievances before Arbitrator Leighton, one filed in 2003 and the other two in 2009. All of the grievances made allegations with respect to failure of the employer to accommodate a disability. The Grievor had been out of the workplace due to disability since 2001, and Arbitrator Leighton observed that “The union’s particulars between 2003 and 2008 indicate only that Ms. O’Brien “remained under a doctor’s care and unable to work….” Given the “commonality of the grievances” and the fact that there would not be “voluminous evidence”, Arbitrator Leighton did not strike out the evidence which predated the 2009 grievances by more than three years but post-dated the 2003 grievance. Rather, she held that “it would be fair to allow the evidence back to December 11, 2000, subject to a finding of actual prejudice if the employer can prove it during the hearing”: para. 17.

62The Union places emphasis on Arbitrator Leighton’s consideration of whether there would be “voluminous evidence” to argue evidence should be heard with respect to “discrete events” in 2018 and 2019. I am not persuaded. In O’Brien, there were no allegations of impropriety with respect to the period which would be covered by the evidence in question. In the case before me, by contrast, the Union seeks to rely on the “discrete events” as further incidents of alleged impropriety. As noted, in general the rule serves to exclude evidence tendered simply to establish further incidents more than three years prior to the grievance. Whether the evidence in relation to them would be “voluminous” is beside the point.

Application to Case at Hand

63I turn now to apply the above principles to the particulars to which the Employer objects. Before doing so, I wish to emphasize that I am only determining at this point whether particulars should be struck on a preliminary basis. This determination is without prejudice to the right of the Employer in the course of the hearing to object to evidence in relation to the surviving particulars on the basis of actual relevance or actual prejudice.

Particulars Within Three Years of the Time for Filing the Grievance

Paragraphs 24 and 25: Discriminatory and Harassing Behaviour by AA

64Paragraph 24 relates to comments made on December 2, 2021 by AA, a co-worker of the Grievor, during a Teams meeting convened by the Grievor’s manager, BB. In her complaint, the Grievor identifies as Black and describes Mr. AA as not a visible minority. She describes AA’s comments as indicative of racist stereotypes of Black People as aggressive and dangerous. Paragraph 25 alleges that following this meeting the Grievor told “management” that she would not be speaking to or working directly with AA one on one as she did not feel comfortable to do so. Paragraph 25 further alleges that management took no action and continued to require her to interact with AA. This is an ongoing concern of the Grievor, as reflected in allegations to which the Employer does not object, at paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 78 and 81. Accordingly, paragraphs 24 and 25 will not be struck as they are relevant but only as context to those allegations. Standing on their own as allegations, they are not timely and are not before me.

Paragraphs 32 to 34: Vacation Denial

65These paragraphs relate to occasions in 2021 and 2022 on which the Grievor’s requests for vacation were denied by her then manager, BB. Among other things, the Grievor alleges that BB exercised his discretion in a manner that was contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code (the “Code”) and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (the “OHSA”). BB left the OPS in or around May, 2023. In the result, there are no timely allegations in relation to BB. There are timely allegations with respect to the Grievor’s current manager, DD. While the Employer is responsible for the actions of both BB and DD, the threshold question in each case is whether the individual’s actions constituted harassment or discrimination. There is nothing in the materials before me which suggests the actions of BB would be probative with respect to whether the actions of DD constituted harassment or discrimination. Accordingly, paragraphs 32, 33 and 34 are struck.

Paragraph 49: Singling Out of Black Employees and Labelling them as “Frustrated”

66This stand alone paragraph relates to a meeting on July 8, 2021 during which it is alleged that a manager, EE, “singled-out the (Complainant & PP) the only two Black individuals in the meeting and made racist remarks about how it was clear that they both were very frustrated.” There is no other allegation, timely or otherwise, in relation to EE. There is nothing to link EE’s actions to allegations with respect to any other manager other than the Grievor’s belief that he was being racist. This is not sufficient. Accordingly, paragraph 49 is struck.

Paragraphs 50 to 52: Sit-Stand Desk – Complainant Singled Out for Defective and Dangerous Equipment

67These paragraphs relate to an allegation that “since 2022” the Grievor has been requesting an update to her work station because her sit-stand desk was not working. They reference two solutions offered to her by “HR”. It is the obligation of a party providing particulars to state “who, what, where and when”. It is not clear when the solutions in question were offered to the Grievor. In the absence of clarity on this, given the generally chronological ordering of the particulars I proceed on the assumption that they predate the time for filing of the grievance. With respect to the first solution, it is alleged that “GG (HR)” made complaints that “insinuated that the Grievor was ungrateful”. This appears to be the only reference to “GG” in the particulars. There are other references to “HR” in the particulars, but not in connection to any timely allegations. With respect to the second solution, it is alleged that “HR” had proposed to reassign the Grievor to a workstation within the immediate vicinity of FF, a colleague who had falsely accused the Grievor of physical assault. The false allegation of assault is the subject of paragraph 12 of the particulars. It was made in 2019. There is a timely particular in paragraph 82 with respect to FF following the Grievor to her workstation, asking work-related questions, and “engaging in forced pleasantries multiple times which made the Complainant very uncomfortable”. It is not entirely clear how that paragraph relates to the Grievor’s overall allegation of discrimination and harassment, but the Employer does not seek to have it struck and I would not do so at this stage in the proceedings.

68As discussed below, it will be difficult if not impossible, to understand the basis for the Grievor’s reaction to FF described in paragraph 82 without hearing some evidence with respect to the fact of the allegation of assault which is the subject of paragraph 12. There is, however, nothing to link the actions of “GG (HR)” or “HR” described in paragraphs 50 to 52 to any timely allegation other than the Grievor’s belief that they all constitute discrimination or harassment. That is not sufficient. The paragraphs are struck.

Paragraphs 55 to 58: CWW Denial

69These paragraphs allege that on January 24, 2024 the Grievor received an email from her manager, HH, on behalf of “the director” regarding “greyed-out periods”, during which she would not be permitted to make use of her approved two-week compressed work week (“CWW”) schedule. The Grievor alleges that she and another Black employee were the only employees with a two-week CWW who were subject to this restriction. She alleges this was harassing and potentially discriminatory. There are no references to CWW in the timely allegations. There is no reference to HH elsewhere in the particulars. It is not clear who “the director” on whose behalf the email was alleged to have been sent is, but in any event there are no timely allegations in relation to anyone identified as a director. In short, there is nothing to link these allegations to any timely allegation other than the Grievor’s belief that she has been subjected to discrimination. That is not sufficient. The paragraphs are struck.

Paragraphs 59 to 61, 64, 65 to 69, 70 to 72: WDHP Complaint and EDI Session

70Paragraphs 59 to 61 note that on February 15, 2023 the Grievor filed a WDHP complaint against: AA; her Acting Director, CC; and her acting manager, BB. The WDHP complaint included allegations of AA “drawing on a “master and slave” mentality, expecting the Complainant to perform [his] own work, without credit or compensation, and on his command”. The particulars allege that despite raising these issues with management, “they continued to assign the Complainant to work with AA and took no corrective action to address his problematic and racist behaviour towards the Complainant.”

71Paragraphs 65 to 69 allege that on August 25, 2023, the Employer advised the Grievor that the result of its preliminary assessment of her WDHP complaint was that the allegations it raised were not a breach of the Respectful Workplace Policy but rather simply “interpersonal and workplace conflict”. The Grievor disagrees with this conclusion, in particular having regard to comments she alleges were made by AA at an EDI meeting held in June, 2023 (described in paragraph 64). She also alleges that no explanation was provided as to how the Employer reached this conclusion. She alleges that the Employer’s conclusion is another example of minimization of her experience and failure to act, contrary to the Employer’s obligations under the Code, the OHSA and the collective agreement.

72Paragraphs 70 to 72 relate to mediation sessions which were held involving the Grievor, AA and CC in December, 2023 following the denial of the WDHP complaint.

73There are timely allegations with respect to AA at paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 78 and 81. Paragraphs 59 to 61, 64, 65 to 69 and 70 to 72 are relevant, but only as context to those allegations. Standing as allegations on their own, they are not timely and are not before me. In that respect, it is not apparent to me at this time that the correctness or reasonableness of the Employer’s preliminary assessment that the Grievor’s WHDP complaint was out of scope or its alleged failure to provide an explanation for this conclusion are relevant to the allegations with respect to AA at paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 78 and 81.

Paragraphs 62 and 63: Attempt to Deny Sick Credits

74These paragraphs allege that on January 5, 2023 the complainant’s then manager, BB, and “one staff from HR” tried to deny the Grievor her entitlement to STSP in 2023 by providing false information. There are no other references to sick credits or to anyone providing false information in the particulars. There are no references to BB or “HR” in the timely allegations. In short, there is nothing to link these paragraphs to any timely allegation other than the Grievor’s belief that she has been subjected to discrimination. That is not sufficient. I also note that BB left the OPS in or around May, 2023. These paragraphs are struck.

Particulars Beyond Three Years of the Time for Filing the Grievance

75I commence with a general consideration of the factors set out in Akintunde.

(i) whether the grievor was aware of the right to challenge or grieve the earlier events which the Union seeks to rely on;

There is no suggestion that the Grievor was unaware of her right to challenge or grieve the earlier events.

(ii) whether the hearing would be unduly protracted by the application of the rule, as a result of the need to present and consider voluminous evidence relating to the past events;

As noted, this factor appears to be related to shortening the three year period, not lengthening it. In any event, evidence beyond the three year period, whether voluminous or not, must be probative of the timely allegations and not simply provided for context or as examples of further incidents in order to be considered. My specific consideration of the particulars, set out below, was conducted on that basis.

(iii) whether extending the period of arbitral review would raise concerns from both an equitable and procedural standpoint.

The Union argues the Grievor in good faith tried to work with the Employer to resolve her concerns and should not be faulted for doing so. I note the most recent effort by the Grievor to work with the Employer described in the particulars is her WDHP complaint and the subsequent mediation exercise. That came to an end in December, 2023. The Union’s argument would have some application had a grievance been promptly filed thereafter. It was not. Rather, the grievance was not filed until June, 2024. On the other hand, as the Employer argues, extending the period for arbitral review would give rise to equitable concerns for it as some of the events in question are in the distant past, which gives rise to concerns to reliability of memory, and some of the individuals named in the particulars related to the earlier period are no longer employed by the Employer.

76I turn now to specific consideration of the particulars in question.

Paragraphs 1 to 11: Discriminatory and Harassing Behaviour of JJ

77These paragraphs allege discriminatory and harassing behaviour by JJ during the time period February 7, 2017 to March 19, 2019. It appears that JJ was a co-worker of the Grievor at the time. The only other reference to JJ is at paragraph 33 which was struck for reasons stated above. In any event, paragraph 33 does not appear to allege any improper conduct on the part of JJ. The Grievor states she reported JJ’s comments to KK, LL and MM. There is no further reference to KK in the particulars, although as discussed below there is a reference to KK in para. 30 in relation to the denial of the Grievor’s vacation request on or about January 26, 2017. As also discussed below, the only other possible reference to MM is a reference to “MM” in para. 31 in relation to a meeting with respect to the same vacation request on February 1, 2017. There is a reference to LL, who appears to have been with HR, at paragraph 53 in relation to the Grievor’s sit-stand desk in June, 2019, but it is not an allegation of improper conduct by LL towards the Grievor. In short, there is no connection between any of these paragraphs and any of the timely allegations. These paragraphs are struck.

Paragraph 12: False Allegations of Physical Assault by FF

78This paragraph contains an allegation that on April 1, 2019 the Grievor became aware of “false allegations of physical assault by FF”. It appears that FF alleged the Grievor had assaulted her. The Grievor’s complaint appears to be that neither management nor HR made her aware of FF’s allegation because, they said, they did not believe FF.

79There is a timely particular in paragraph 82 with respect to FF following the Grievor to her workstation, asking work-related questions, and “engaging in forced pleasantries multiple times which made the Complainant very uncomfortable”. It is not entirely clear how that paragraph relates to the Grievor’s overall allegation of discrimination and harassment, but the Employer does not seek to have it struck and I would not do so at this stage in the proceedings.

80It will be difficult if not impossible, to understand the basis for the Grievor’s reaction to FF described in paragraph 82 without hearing evidence with respect to the fact that FF made the allegation of assault which is the subject of paragraph 12. The reaction of management and HR to that allegation of assault, however, is irrelevant. Accordingly, paragraph 12 is struck except for its first sentence.

Paragraphs 13 - 23: Discriminatory and Harassing Behaviour of AA

81These particulars relate to comments allegedly made by AA and to the allocation of work as between AA and the Grievor during the period 2018 to 2019. There are further incidents of allegations which are timely, as discussed above in relation to paragraphs 24 and 25. This is insufficient basis to permit evidence to be called with respect to these incidents given that they fall well outside the three year period before the filing of this grievance. Accordingly, these paragraphs are struck.

Paragraphs 29 to 31: Vacation Denial

82These paragraphs relate to vacation requests made by the Grievor in 2017. There are references to actions or comments by “KK (acting manager)”, who may be KK referenced in paragraph 4, and “MM (acting director)”, who may be MM also referenced in paragraph 4. As noted, there are timely allegations with respect to the Grievor’s current manager, DD. While the Employer is responsible for the actions of all of its managers, the threshold question in each case is whether the actions of an individual constitute harassment or discrimination. There is nothing in the materials before me which suggests the actions of KK or “MM” would be probative with respect to whether the actions of DD constituted harassment or discrimination. Accordingly, paragraphs 29, 30 and 31 are struck.

Paragraphs 35 to 43: 2018 Mediation - Employer Facilitates Bullying and Harassment of Complainant

83These paragraphs relate to a session with an external mediator which was held in the fall of 2018 “to address ongoing issues of workplace toxicity” and to statements and assurances made by “CC (manager)” and “NN (director)” to the Grievor following that mediation session. There is no reference to either the mediation session or to the statements or assurances given in any of the other particulars. It is not apparent how these paragraphs would be probative of any timely allegations. Accordingly, paragraphs 35 to 43 are struck.

Paragraphs 44 to 48: Resignation from XX Activities and Voluntary Groups – Employer Minimizes Complainant’s Concerns

84These paragraphs relate to the Grievor advising “CC” on June 11, 2019 of “her plans to resign from XX due to discrimination and harassment she had been exposed to.” The paragraphs allege that over the course of the next month CC and “NN” minimized her concerns. The particulars allege:

The Employer’s minimizing of the Complainant’s experience of harassment and discrimination, and failure to act, contributed to a toxic work environment and a failure to protect the Complainant from harassment and discrimination in violation of their duties under the Code and Occupational Health and Safety Act.

85There is no reference in the timely allegations to any “NN”. There is a reference in the timely allegations to CC. Assuming this is the same person as “CC (manager)” referenced in paragraphs 44 to 48, the allegations contained in those paragraphs constitute other incidents of alleged discrimination or harassment by CC. Since they predate the timely incidents by more than three years, that is not sufficient. Accordingly, these paragraphs are struck.

Paragraphs 53 and 54: Sit-Stand Desk – Complainant Singled Out for Defective and Dangerous Equipment

86These paragraphs flow from paragraphs 50 to 52 described above. They describe a further incident on June 5, 2019 in relation to the Grievor’s sit-stand desk and the response of “HR LL”. For the reasons set out above, paragraphs 50 to 52 were struck. For the same reasons, and because at best the incident described in paragraphs 53 to 54 is another incident of the same behaviour but one which predates the time for filing the grievance by more than three years, these paragraphs are also struck.

Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 4th day of May 2026.

Appendix “A”

(The Union’s Particulars)

Since May 2015, the Complainant has been subjected to repeated acts of harassment, belittlement, and discrimination in the workplace. The Employer has been made aware of these issues time and time again, but has failed to take appropriate corrective action, as set out below.

Discriminatory and Harassing Behaviour of JJ

1. JJ made repeated sexist, racist and harassing remarks to the Complainant. The Employer was made aware of these behaviours and took no corrective action.

2. On February 7, 2017, the Complainant was subjected to bullying and harassment by JJ who made the following comments:

a. "Keep quiet and keep your mouth shut"

b. "It was better when 'the guys' were here and the older women. When they were here, if I asked from something, it got done...no questions asked. When [past female ZZ employee] was here, if I asked her to do something, she did it, period."

c. "Stop sending emails with updates/stop sending emails all together"

d. RR, and no director or anyone of higher authority should be asking you for any information or questions because "who are you?" and "that's not the way things are done around here. That's not the way it's supposed to be."

e. "I've been here 15 years and you know nothing"

f. "I've been here 15 years and I don't need you to tell me how things are around here. We taught you...and you have no right to lecture me."

g. "You have no right to be responding to me/my emails."

h. "You have no right to be talking with the exec team."

i. "You went to school, and they taught you how to speak, how to write, and how to act, but that's not how things are supposed to be around here"

j. "I will not respond to anything you say to me, because I'm not a child"

3. These comments are harassing, and draw on sexist, ageist and racist stereotypes.

4. The Complainant reported JJ’s insults in an email to KK, LL and MM. MM thanked the Complainant for reporting the issue and assured her that steps were being taken to address and correct the situation.

5. The Complainant is not aware of any steps being taken and the situation did not improve as sexist remarks and targeting behaviour continued by JJ.

6. On March 23, 2017, after a meeting between CC, JJ and the Complainant, JJ came to the Complainant alone and said “next time…let’s leave hormones and emotions out of the meetings. Life is too short to worry about work stuff.”

7. The Complainant went to CC shortly after to ask if her conduct in the meeting was unprofessional in any way. CC say “no; that the Complainant was respectful and professional” and she then reported what JJ said to her.

8. Again, nothing improved and it is not clear that any actions were taken by management to address JJ’s problematic and discriminatory behaviour.

9. On March 18, 2019, the Complainant attended a meeting with CC and JJ wherein she felt threatened by JJ.

10. JJ said to the complainant in the meeting that "he has “been working there since 1985”, and in that time he has “learned it is not good to make enemies at work”. JJ stated that he “thought we were over this stuff” and then stuck his pinky out in front of the Complainant and asked her to pinky swear that they would move forward. The Complainant said that she didn't have a problem moving forward but she doesn't touch pinkies. JJ kept pushing his fingers out to the Complainant until CC had to intervene.

11. As set out above, management witnessed and/or was informed of these harassing and discriminatory actions but failed to do anything to address the Complainant’s concerns. The Employer’s failure to act to protect the Complainant constitute a breach of the Complainant’s rights under Article 2 and the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

False Allegations of Physical Assault by FF

12. The Complainant became aware of the allegations on April 1, 2019. The Employer replied to the Complainant’s email on April 1, 2019. When the manager was asked if they had seen the photos that allegedly show proof of the assault, she said “no.” When the Complainant highlighted that neither HR nor management had made her aware of the allegations made against her, the manager advised that she didn’t believe them, which is why it was not brought to the Complainant’s attention. Additionally, when the manager was asked if they thought this was linked to JJ’s comment on March 18, 2019, that “it is not good to make enemies at work,” given JJ and FF are extremely close acquaintances at the office, the response was “maybe.”

Discriminatory and Harassing Behaviour of AA

13. AA has harassed, bullied and discriminated against the Complainant continuously, and with the knowledge and condonation of the Employer since 2018. The Employer tolerated AA yelling at the Complainant, including for not taking on his work, and forced the Complainant to continue to be exposed to AA’s aggressive and inappropriate behaviours.

14. Furthermore, AA’s behaviours and comments became increasingly racist over time. The Employer took no action to protect the Complainant.

15. In the summer of 2018, AA took over the WW project claiming he could improve upon it.

16. The Complainant was very vocal and provided reasons why the solution AA was proposing would not work, nevertheless, CC gave AA the approval to proceed. Things began to fall apart in a very short time after the project began. Whenever the Complainant tried to assist, AA would state “you do things your way, and I will do things mine.” The mountain of issues generated caused multiple individuals and departments, including stakeholder, to get frustrated and at a loss regarding what was happening/what to do. By the end of June, AA got extremely upset and the Complainant was abandoned with his project, and the mountain of issues AA left behind. AA was able to go on vacation and return to the office, while the Complainant was left to complete and fix everything, all by herself.

17. In June 2018, the Complainant requested postponement of her 3-week vacation in July, due to fire/flooding at her place of residence. Despite this emergency CC continued to require the Complainant to work. When the Complainant asked to bump to the month of August, she was denied verbally from taken her full 3 weeks off because it was reporting season, however, due to health reasons the Complainant went on medical leave for the month of June but prior to commencing her leave, CC mentioned that if they had any questions about work, she would reach out. Upon the Complainant's return, she discovered that AA took time off on the very days/length of the SDC project launch that he was supposed to be the lead on. Ultimately highlighting that everyone else is allowed to take vacation when they want, despite their deliverable deadlines, but not the Complainant.

18. On or about October 25, 2018, AA had a conversation with the Complainant and told her to “take a different approach” to situations at work. He stated she should come to work “wearing a rubber suit” and just let things done to her bounce off and not get bothered.

19. On or about May 9, 2019, AA yelled at the Complainant and told her that she should be doing his work because he was “tired.” Prior to this chat with AA, the Complainant had sent AA a detailed list of things to assist with his project and directions to guide him through the work, however, AA wanted/needed the Complainant to sit with him and go through things line by line and do the work with him. The Complainant refused and told AA that if he had questions or needed any further assistance, he should set up a meeting with her (the Complainant) and CC to go over it. His response was “Fine, I won’t ask you questions anymore.” AA, later came back to apologize but still argued that the Complainant “should be doing the work.”

20. Not only was management aware of this incident, but at one point during that day, CC, the manager at the time, advised the Complainant that she should have done AA’s work.

21. On or about November 13, 2018, AA tried to pass off the Complainant’s work as his own and was later exposed.

22. On or about March 3, 2019, AA was upset about having to do his own work and the Complainant not answering/doing it for him and yelled at the Complainant.

23. AA repeatedly told the Complainant to do his work because she is “quicker” and “faster” than him and would get angry and even yell at her if she resisted. This presumptuous and inappropriate behaviour is consistent with treatment of the Complainant as subservient, which is degrading and consistent with a Master-Slave mentality. This behaviour was on full display and was tolerated and condoned by management.

24. On or about December 2, 2021, there was an online Teams meeting scheduled by the manager (BB) for the department's Assessment Officers (OO, AA, PP and the Complainant) regarding work responsibilities, backups and resource planning for 2022. Multiple times during the discussion, AA, who is not a visible minority, made anti-Black statements by declaring that he was “scared and afraid” to talk to the Complainant “due to mistreatment in the past.” When questioned and asked to elaborate, he provided details that did not substantiate his claims. Again, these comments are indicative of racist stereotypes of Black people as aggressive and dangerous.

25. Following the knowledge of and hearing AA make these anti-Black statements, the Complainant informed management that she would not be speaking to or working directly with AA one-on-one as she did not feel safe or comfortable doing so. However, management took no action and continued to require her to interact with AA.

26. As recently as this current … year, the Complainant has been tasked with AA’s work, including fulfilling his back-up duties. The Complainant has been expected to continually guide AA and assist him with his projects.

27. On November 7, 2024, when the Complainant attempted to address their concerns with management, regarding the imbalanced work and disregard of the joint agreement between the Complainant and AA, she was met with behaviour and language that was hostile, unprofessional, dismissive and questionable. The Complainant was also subjected to retaliatory behaviour (i.e., mocking the Complainant and intentional taunting statements) amid the current dispute resolution procedure.

28. Again, the Employer has failed to act to protect the Complainant from harassment and discrimination by AA. The Employer’s failure to act to protect the Complainant constitute a breach of the Complainant’s rights under Article 2 and the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

Vacation Denial

29. The Complainant made a vacation request on or about January 26, 2017, for three weeks.

30. The request was denied by KK (acting manager). The Complainant asked to compromise with two weeks instead, it was still denied.

31. The Complainant received a meeting invite from the MM (acting director) on February 1, 2017—without any details. At the meeting, the Complainant was informed that she cannot go on vacation because she is too important to the team and that the only reason for her vacation to be approved would be “if she was getting married or “God forbid, stepped off the curb and got hit by a bus.”

32. On July 5, 2021, the Complainant had received approval for vacation from August 30, 2021 to September 9, 2021. On August 6, the Complainant requested an extension of nine days to vacation (start August 16th instead) to which the manager, BB, offered a compromise, then retracted it, and then denied it – all with multiple changing reasons:

a) Reason 1: psychometrician is on vacation and returns August 23, 2021. Offered for vacation to start on August 23, not August 16.

b) Reason 2: one day later, request denied because team requires 2 weeks notice

c) Reason 3: Need to brief an employee, which was impossible, given that they were on vacation; and

d) Reason 4: Manager refuses to propose optimal time to take vacation until end of the year.

33. In or about February 2022, the Complainant requested three days of vacation, which was denied, based on another employee’s (JJ’s) work (or lack thereof) from another department, and the subsequent work of a secondary department and what was described as “operational needs” from the Complainant, which did not exist.

34. In denying vacation requests, the Employer not only violated Article 30 of the Collective Agreement, but is singled the Complainant out for adverse and harassing treatment, in violation of the Code and the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

2018 Mediation- Employer Facilitates Bullying and Harassment of Complainant

35. In the fall of 2018, YY contracted mediators from Elana Fleischmann & Associates, to address ongoing issues of workplace toxicity.

36. Not only was the mediation unsuccessful, but the session became itself a forum for bullying and harassment of the Complainant.

37. During part 2 (Oct 22) of the Team Strengthening Session, three colleagues near the end of the meeting, ganged up against the Complainant. Following the directed attacks and negative statements made against the Complainant by team members, the mediators recognized there clearly was a problem of toxicity.

38. After observing these dynamics, the mediators offered private meetings with the mediators and CC.

39. On October 25, 2018, the Complainant met with NN (director) and CC (manager) regarding an incident that happened on October 22 and the climate within the department.

40. NN’s opinion was that the Complainant was experiencing sexism, ageism and “perceived racism.” The Complainant clarified that these were not perceived but her regular workplace experience.

41. NN indicated that the mediation “blew up in their face” and there is a “deep culture in not treating each other right – and those are difficult to change”.

42. CC agreed to various strategies/commitments in December 2018 including:

(a) Regular and ongoing meetings will take place between [CC or QQ] and the Grievor to discuss workplace issues.

(b) An internal process for raising issues related to human rights, including harassment and discrimination, will be created.

(c) Management will ensure that any “difficult conversations” (i.e. sexism; racism; gender inequality; ageism) with team members will take place in a private and safe environment and will not be raised in any public meeting or other format.

43. Despite the Employer clearly recognizing ongoing issues negatively affecting the Complainant and strategies needed to improve the situation, the above measures were not implemented and the Complainant continued to experience harassment and discrimination in the workplace.

Resignation from XX Activities and Voluntary Groups – Employer Minimizes Complainant’s Concerns

44. On or about June 11, 2019, the Complainant informed CC of her plans to resign from XX due to the discrimination and harassment she has been exposed to. The Complainant later that day resigned from being a member of multiple internal/voluntary groups.

45. CC advised the Complainant that she (CC) and NN were not happy about the Complainant’s resignation from the groups.

46. The Complainant responded that she’s stressed, overworked and overburdened with work and feels that management is not hearing her. CC got offended and sought to clarify who the Complainant was referring to as part of management. The Complainant said she was referring to both CC and NN, citing as an example — how in December they met with mediators, made commitments to meet—decided on once a week but and the meetings never held. [CC or QQ] said, “Fair enough – I can own that.”

47. On or about July 4, 2019, the Complainant met with NN for over one hour. NN told the Complainant that she thinks her decision to resign from the groups was made because she was mad. She said the Complainant’s decision was self-sabotaging/career-sabotaging. She said the Complainant put her in a particular position without having a conversation with her manager and NN and that the Complainant should have allowed for discussion and more negotiation. That the Complainant should have kept her mouth shut. Throughout the meeting she kept asking “Do you think this doesn’t happen to other people? Do you think you are the only one that experiences _(XYZ)__” and giving examples of her experiences—essentially completely negating the racist behaviours and microaggressions the Complainant goes through daily. With every example the Complainant gave, NN countered it with “do you think you are the only one?”

48. The Employer’s minimizing of the Complainant’s experience of harassment and discrimination, and failure to act, contributed to a toxic work environment and a failure to protect the Complainant from harassment and discrimination in violation of their duties under the Code and Occupational Health and Safety Act.

Singling out of Black Employees and Labelling them as “Frustrated”

49. During the July 8, 2021 Data Working Session meeting, despite not having a microphone or camera on/working during a meeting, the IT manager EE, singled-out the (Complainant & PP) the only two Black individuals in the meeting and made racist remarks about how it was clear that they both were very frustrated.

Sit-Stand Desk – Complainant Singled out For Defective and Dangerous Equipment

50. Since 2022, the Complainant had verbally been requesting for an update of her workstation, since her sit-stand desk was not working.

51. The first solution offered was to remove her 27” monitors and put on 23” monitors—lying that it was what was documented in the Complainant’s accommodation. Importantly, the IT department stated that 23” monitors were decommissioned and were being thrown out—27” is the standard/minimum. This means that YY took the 23” monitors from the trash pile. They then offered the Complainant a broken/malfunctioning sit-stand desk that they found in the basement, as a permanent solution. GG (HR) made comments which insinuated that the Complainant was ungrateful for not taking the noticeably broken and uneven desk.

52. Another solution from HR was to reassign the Complainant’s workstation within the immediate vicinity of FF’s workstation—the colleague that falsely accused the Complainant of physical assault.

53. This is not the first time, that the Employer failed to provide and uphold accommodations documented on file for the Complainant. On June 5, 2019, while working at XX, another employee took the Complainant’s accommodated desk, because their recently requested/delivered desk was broken. HR (LL) advised the Complainant that a service call was put in for the broken desk and the wait would be 48-72 hours.

54. This is a further example of singling the Complainant out for degrading, lesser treatment than her colleagues and is a continuance of harassing and discriminatory behaviour by the Employer.

CWW Denial

55. The Complainant filed a grievance resulting to the reinstatement of her 2-week CWW schedule in late June 2023. The Complainant was given 5 extra vacation days, and an implemented grey-out periods (for all of May and June and first two weeks of September)

56. On January 25, 2024, the Complainant received an email from her manager, HH, on behalf of the director regarding greyed-out periods – time periods when the Complainant was not permitted to benefit from the CWW arrangement.

57. The Complainant learned that she and another Black employee were the only employees with a 2-week CWW who were not permitted to take their CWW during a “greyed out period.” Others had no such restrictions on their CWWs

58. Again, this is just another example of the Complainant, a Black Employee, being singled out for adverse treatment, which is harassing and potentially discriminatory.

WDHP Complaint – February 15, 2022

59. On February 15, 2022, the Complainant filed a WDHP complaint against AA, her Acting Director, CC, and her acting manager, BB. The WDHP complaint chronicled the ongoing issues of race-based discrimination the Complainant had endured in the workplace and tolerated by management, including anti-Black statements by AA that he was “scared and afraid” of the Complainant, drawing on racist stereotypes of Black people as aggressive and dangerous, and AA advising the Complainant that she needs to “wear a rubber suit to work,” suggesting she should tolerate his and others’ racist and inappropriate behaviour and comments.

60. The Complaint also provides examples of AA drawing on a “master and slave” mentality, expecting the Complainant to perform AA’s own work, without credit or compensation, and on his command.

61. Despite the Complainant raising these issues with management, they continued to assign the Complainant to work with AA and took no corrective action to address his problematic and racist behaviour towards the Complainant.

Attempt to Deny Sick Credits

62. On January 5, 2023, the Complainant’s manager and one staff from HR tried to deny the Complainant her sick credits and entitlement to STSP in 2023, by providing false information. Her manager, BB, wrote to her to inform her that as she was away on December 30, 2022, her sick credits for 2023 would not be credited to her.

63. The Complainant referenced the relevant provision of the AMAPCEO Collective Agreement and contacted OSS for clarification following which it was confirmed by OSS that the information provided by the Complainant’s manager and HR was blatantly false.

June 2023 – Discriminatory Comments at EDI Session

64. In or around June 2023 the EDI team held a session about anti-racism and microaggressions. AA was present at this session and made comments about how he disagreed with everything that was shared in the session, and how people should not take things so personally. The EDI team members questioned AA and, and he was rolling his eyes. They asked him if people should just put up with this type of behaviour, and he said yes, because some people are just that way.

WDHP Complaint Found “Out of Scope”

65. On August 25, 2023, the Employer relayed the results of the preliminary assessment of the Complainant’s WDHP complaint, finding that the allegations she had raised were “not a potential breach” of the Respectful Workplace Policy.

66. Despite identifying clear examples of AA’s persistent behaviour, consistent with racist stereotypes and mistreatment, the Employer found that the allegations were “not a potential breach,” and that the matters were simply “interpersonal and workplace conflict” and that the issues were beyond the timelines in the RWP, and did not meet the threshold for harassment. The Employer also found that since the conduct in question “did not meet the threshold of harassment and/or discrimination” there was no breach by BB or CC.

67. The Employer gave no explanation of how it reached these conclusions that the issues the Complainant identified were simply “workplace conflict.”

68. The issue of what took place at the June EDI session was specifically raised by the Complainant with the WDHP office, and yet the Employer gave no consideration whatsoever of how this event shed light on the actions and perspective of AA. Had the Employer appropriately considered all information available, it would have realized that AA’s actions in the EDI session revealed that he did indeed hold problematic and discriminatory views, incompatible with a respectful workplace.

69. The Employer’s determination that the Complainant’s workplace experience was not indicative of racism or harassment is simply another example of ongoing course of minimization of her experience and failure to act, contrary to the Employer’s obligations under the Code, the Occupational Health and Safety Act, and Articles 2 and 3.1.

December 2023 “Mediation”

70. After determining that the Complainant had not experienced racism or harassment, the Employer proceeded to offer a “conflict resolution” mediated session between the Complainant, AA and CC. These resulted in non-enforceable “agreements” between the Complainant and each of these individuals, where they parties essentially agreed to work on their relationships and communication.

71. As the “mediation” was predicated on an assumption that the issues between the Complainant and these other individuals were purely inter-personal, they did nothing to address the underlying issues of discrimination that remain unaddressed.

72. The mediation failed for the following reasons:

73. The Complainant understood YYs suggested mediation to be focused on her WDHP complaint, however, that was not the case as the mediators had no context or details about the WDHP complaint. The mediators confirmed that their role was strictly workplace restoration—not a focus on the specific complaint.

74. The Complainant was offered mediation due to her complaints against her former manager, but he left YY...so it was unclear why YY hired mediators for "workplace restoration" if he is not employed at YY. More so, the mediators were unaware of the details of the complaint and uninterested in knowing the root cause of the issues.

75. During the mediation, it was made clear that the purpose of the session was to create an action plan that both parties would agree to even though the plan is unenforceable.

76. The purpose and effectiveness of the process was brought to question because it was mentioned that racism which is the crux of the issues can’t be discussed.

77. The mediation process was not neutral. At one point during the mediation session, the Complainant took time to step away and confer with [Grievor or QQ] (Complainant’s support person/union rep) and one of the mediators, leaving AA alone with the other mediator to have a discussion. When the Complainant returned to the larger group, she met AA and the other mediator laughing, joking and talking about personal matters. The Complainant found this shocking and unprofessional given the purpose and nature of this process and believes this caused a shift in behaviour of that mediator and bias throughout this process.

78. The mediators kept trying to "encourage" the Complainant to own up & provide her role in the situation and that it wasn’t about identifying a victim. AA voiced how he felt the joint agreement list provided was one-sided and the mediators suggested what the Complainant "should start doing" to help the situation, which made it clear to the Complainant that the mediators were not listening to her, because earlier in the meetings, she gave multiple examples of how she did the exact things they were suggesting and how negative AA’s behaviour/response was. The Complainant took time to carefully review the list in the joint agreement and quickly realized their stance was not neutral because at the next joint meeting, the Complainant asked the entire group to explain how the initial agreement list was one-sided, as when broken down, four items were AA focused, three items were focused on the Complainant, and the remaining four were joint. Not one person could provide an answer—instead the topic was changed. Eventually, the initial agreement remained substantially unchanged.

May 2, 2024 – Excessive Scrutiny Regarding Leave

73. On or about April 12, 2024, DD approved the Complainant’s request for a special or compassionate leave to attend to a personal legal matter. However, after approving this leave, DD began cross-examining the Complainant for more details about the legal matter, pressing her for details about her circumstances and why she could not take the day on the weekend instead. The intensive questioning, combined with the undertone of disbelief, made it clear that DD had unjustified skepticism about the veracity of the Complainant’s request and suggested he thought she was trying to scam the Employer, again consistent with anti-Black stereotypes that the Employer consistently applied to the Complainant.

May 10, 2024 Incident – Minimization of Complainant’s Concerns

74. The Complainant’s manager came up with an idea where the team members would take turns to chair meetings. The manager would draw up a roster. The Complainant told her manager that she did not feel comfortable chairing the meeting due to her past experiences of harassment and discrimination. Having continuously experienced racist and harassing remarks from certain colleagues, and in circumstances where the Employer had not acted to create a safe environment, the Complainant felt she would be making herself vulnerable as a target for further harassment and racism. Her manager agreed to leave the Complainant out from chairing meetings. However, on or about May 10, 2024, without speaking to her, he included the Complainant’s name on the roster of chairs. When the Complainant asked why her name was included, the manager said he thought the Complainant would change her mind with time. The minimization of the Complainant’s fears and the suggestion that the Complainant would just change her mind is itself a minimization of her ongoing experience of racism and harassment.

75. This created a situation that was extremely uncomfortable for the Complainant, where she would now draw attention to herself by having her name subsequently removed from the roster.

76. This May 10, 2024 incident, which was the culmination of years the Employer’s close to decade long neglect of the Complainant’s concerns about harassment and discrimination, ultimately led to AMAPCEO filing a Dispute on the Complainant’s behalf on June 4, 2024.

Employer Continues to Instruct Complainant to Complete AA’s Work

77. On or about July 2, 2024, AA sent an email to the group, including the Complainant and DD, making a statement about adult/mature students. The Complainant replied, correcting a statement that AA had made. Rather than instructing AA to correct his own work, DD directed the Grievor to correct AA’s work so that the project could be finalized.

Employer Implies Abuse of Sick Leave and Accuses Complainant of Being “Adversarial”

78. The Complainant voluntarily provided a medical note to the Employer covering three days of leave (July 4, 5 and 8) due to an injury sustained on July 3, 2024. The Employer requested an additional note for the fourth/final day (July 9) and advised the Complainant in writing that “I think you are making this much larger than what it is” when the Complainant questioned the rationale for the request and who would pay for the medical note. When DD met with the Complainant one-on-one on July 15, 2024, he advised the Complainant that there was “no need to be adversarial.” Again, the request for a second medical note was unnecessary and indicative of bias and undue scrutiny of the Complainant. The labeling of the Complainant as “adversarial,” when she reasonably questioned the rationale for the additional note is also indicative of anti-Black stereotypes of Black women as aggressive.

Humiliating and Singling Out Complainant in Group Setting

79. On or about July 18, 2024, during a meeting held at 10:15AM with internal staff and external stakeholder groups, DD called out staff to speak on a matter and when the Complainant’s name was called, he added that she should only share if comfortable doing so—ultimately broadcasting that there was an issue. When the Complainant asked DD that afternoon why he had singled her out with this type of comment, his explanation was that he “wanted to be respectful because he knows there is contention” between herself and AA. While true, the Employer was once again singling out the Complainant in an embarrassing manner and acknowledging lingering issues with AA while failing to address the poisoned work environment in a productive manner.

Followed by FF in the Office

80. On or about July 19, 2024, FF followed the Complainant to her workstation multiple times, questioning the Complainant regarding the use of her personal CD drive and engaging in forced pleasantries multiple times, which made the Complainant very uncomfortable. The Complainant believes that these forced interactions were as a result of a discussion DD had with FF earlier that day.

Complainant Singled Out in Team Meeting

81. During a team meeting on or about August 14, 2024, the topic of making vacation requests came up and a team member asked DD to share/direct the team to resources and policies around this matter. DD then called the Complainant out by name and in a snarky tone stated that the Complainant could share the information since she is so well versed on the Collective Agreement. This comment was intended to humiliate and retaliate against the Complainant for her previous efforts to enforce her Collective Agreement rights and was consistent with the Employer’s view of the Complainant as a “troublemaker,” and someone whose concerns were not worthy of genuine concern and attention.

82. AMAPCEO reserves the right to amend these particulars as this case moves forward.

Appendix “B”

WITHOUT PREJUDICE – SUBJECT TO AMENDMENTS

Agreed Statement of Facts – Preliminary Motion

On a without prejudice basis, the Parties agree to the following facts for the sole purpose of the preliminary objections that the Employer has identified will be raised on the upcoming Dec 1, 2025 hearing date in respect of GSB No. 2024-01512.

1. The Complainant filed a WDHP complaint form dated February 15, 2022 (note, year was a typo, meant to be 2023) on February 17, 2023 [Tab 2]

2. On August 25, 2023, the Complainant met with the WDHP advisor assigned and was informed verbally that her WDHP complaint had been found to not be a potential breach of the WDHP policy.

3. On September 11, 2023, the Complaint met with the SS, CEO, the responsible manager for her WDHP complaint, regarding the outcome her WDHP complaint. During the meeting, the Complainant was advised of the option of participating in a mediation arranged by the Employer’s Conflict Resolution Team.

4. On September 13, 2023, SS followed-up with the Complainant to inquire whether she has made a decision on whether to participate in mediation. On September 15, 2023, the Complainant advised that she has decided to move forward with mediation [Tab 4]

5. On September 15, 2023, AMAPCEO wrote to the Employer noting that the Complainant had been informed that her WDHP complaint had been rejected, that the filing deadline for a Dispute was October 6, 2023, and requesting a 4-week extension, which request was granted by the Employer [Tab 3, p 9-10].

6. On September 18, 2025, the Complainant wrote to the WDHP advisor to request a written decision regarding her complaint. On September 25, 2023, the WDHP advisor provided confirmation of its assessment in writing on September 25, 2023 [Tab 5].

7. While the Complainant’s WDHP complaint was found to not be a potential breach of the WDHP policy, the Employer arranged for mediation to take place between the Complainant, AA (the Complainant’s co-worker) and CC (interim Director at the time and current Director), who had both been named as Respondents in the WDHP complaint. The Employer offered for BB to be included in the mediation as well, but he declined. The mediation was to take place over four days in December 2023 (though a fifth day was ultimately added to address issues with AA).

8. On November 9, 2023, AMAPCEO wrote to the Employer to propose that in light of the mediation sessions, the Employer place the Dispute in abeyance “until we get the report from the mediator.” The Employer responded that the YY office had no concerns regarding AMAPCEO’s request to place the matter in abeyance [Tab 3, p 6-7].

9. The mediations took place in December 2023. At the end of the mediation sessions, the Complainant entered into written agreements with each of AA and CC about how they were to interact going forward. The mediation between the Complainant and AA concluded on December 20, 2023 and the two employees confirmed their endorsement of the mediation agreement by December 22, 2023 [Tab 6]. The mediation between the Complainant and CC concluded on December 20, 2023, and an agreement was reached [Tab 7].

10. There was no other written outcome or “report” produced by the mediator.

11. The Complainant’s manager BB left his position and the OPS in or around May of 2023. Another individual acted in the position for a short period until the new manager, DD took over in or about mid March 2024.

12. On May 29, 2024, AMAPCEO wrote to the Employer indicating that the Union was ready to proceed with the grievance. The Employer responded thanking AMAPCEO for the information and update [Tab 3, p 5-6].

13. The Dispute was filed June 4, 2024 [Tab 8].

14. That same day, DD replied, requesting additional information and asking whether the Dispute was “related to an ongoing issues that I have been briefed about, or is this a new issue.” The DRO replied that the Dispute “relates to both previous and on-going issues” and that “We would provide detailed information at the FRS meeting.” [Tab 9]

15. Between May 29, 2024 and July 15, 2024, the parties exchanged emails regarding arranging the formal resolution stage meeting [Tab 3, p 1-4].

16. A confirmation of the Formal Resolution Stage Meeting was sent by the Employer July 15, 2024. The confirmation letter included a request by YY for “disclosure of all the issue and facts in support of the dispute pursuant to Article 15.5.7 of the AMAPCEO Collective Agreement” by July 19, 2024 [Tab 10].

17. On July 17, 2024, the Union followed up with the Employer with respect to its request for disclosure [Tab 11].

18. On July 19, 2024, the Employer shared a folder of preliminary disclosure relating to the Union’s Dispute [Tab 12]. AMAPCEO did not provide the Employer with further information by this date as requested.

19. During the FRSM meeting that took place by Teams on July 23, 2024, the AMAPCEO Dispute Resolution Officer read his speaker’s notes describing the Dispute [DRO speaker notes at Tab 13]. The meeting notes made by the Employer’s Human Resources Consultant are appended as Tab 14.

20. Prior to the DRO’s presentation describing the dispute, the Human Resources Consultant stated that “The Employer does not have any preliminary objections at this time, however, reserves the right to raise/rely on any preliminary objections should this grievance proceed to a hearing at the Grievance Settlement Board.”

21. No timeliness objection was raised by the Employer during the meeting.

22. On July 25, 2024, the Employer wrote to AMAPCEO seeking approval for a time limit extension until August 30, 2024 to provide sufficient time for the Designee to reach a decision given the length of the FRSM on July 23, 2024. AMAPCEO agreed to an extension until August 23, 2024 [Tab 15].

23. The Employer sent the Designee’s response to the Dispute on August 19, 2024. The letter states:

In the event of any preliminary objections to the Grievance Settlement Board’s jurisdiction, “YY will be taking the position that the Grievance Settlement Board lacks the jurisdiction to review the merits of this grievance. YY reserves the right to raise and rely on any other preliminary objections.” [Tab 16].

24. On August 27, 2024, AMAPCEO sent Joint Review process submissions to the Employer and asked for confirmation of the ERA on the file [Tab 17].

25. AMAPCEO referred the Dispute to the GSB on September 11, 2024 [Tab 18].

26. The DRO and the ERA exchanged correspondence between September 19, 2024 and November 29, 2024 [Tab 19].

27. The case was placed on a list to be scheduled as part of the joint scheduling process between AMAPCEO and the Employer. Through that joint process, a first day (April 10, 2025) was scheduled with Arbitrator Reva Devins.

28. On October 9, 2024, a Notice of Proceeding was issued for the case [Tab 20].

29. On February 12, 2025, AMAPCEO sent a letter requesting disclosure in relation to the matter [Tab 21].

30. On March 20, 2025, Employer counsel responded with preliminary disclosure, notice of anticipated preliminary objections, including an objection based on timeliness, as well as a request for further particulars. [Tab 22].

31. This was the first time the Employer explicitly mentioned a potential “timeliness” objection.

32. On April 7, 2025, the Union provided particulars [Tab 23].

33. On April 10, 2025, the parties attended the GSB. The Parties engaged in mediation discussions but were unable to reach a resolution for this matter. During discussions, the Employer counsel raised that it anticipates on raising preliminary objections, including timeliness, the three-year rule, and no prima facie case. The Parties agreed to set dates, and further discussed that it was anticipated that the first of those dates may be used to address the Employer’s preliminary objections. The Parties also set timelines for the Union to provide any further updated particulars and for the Employer to provide formal notice of the preliminary objections it intends to raise.

34. On May 13, 2026, the Union provided updated particulars in this matter [Tab 24].

35. On June 12, 2025, the Employer provided formal notice of its preliminary

[Tabs Omitted.]

Footnotes

1. 1The conclusion of the agreement was delayed by unavoidable unavailability of counsel for one of the parties, the details of which are not relevant.