GSB# 2023-01591; 2023-01592; 2023-02127; 2023-02225

UNION# 2023-0553-0001; 2023-0553-0002; 2023-0553-0003; 2023-0553-0005

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

Under

THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT

Before

THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD

BETWEEN

Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Hubber et al)

Union

• and -

The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Parks)

Employer

BEFORE

Tatiana Wacyk

Arbitrator

FOR THE UNION

Ali Saghari Collins & Metcalfe LLP Counsel

FOR THE EMPLOYER

Katie Ayers Treasury Board Secretariat Legal Services Branch Counsel

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

September 12, November 7 and December 1, 2025

Decision

1This Grievance is a consolidation of four separate Grievances brought by employees of the Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Parks (“MECP”).

2This decision deals with two preliminary objections regarding the particulars provided by the Union in this matter.

3In the first instance, the Employer submits that the particulars are entirely insufficient. In addition, the Employer submits the particulars do not identify a prima facie breach of the Collective Agreement.

4As such, the Employer submits this Grievance must be dismissed at a preliminary stage.

THE GRIEVANCES:

5Paul Hubber and 77 of his colleagues filed a grievance which was dated July 27, 2023, but was received and dated by the GSB on September 12, 2023 ("the Hubber Group Grievance").

6That Grievance states:

GSB#2023-01591

We grieve the violation of the Collective Agreement including but not limited to Article 2, Appendix 42, the OPS Flexible Work Strategy and the OPS Return to Workplace Plan and/or other related article or appendix within the collective agreement, the Employment Standards Act, Ontario Human Rights Code, Occupational Health and Safety Act, and any related employment statute or principle in law that may apply, as well as any related Employer Policy. The employer cancelled the modern and flexible work arrangement (OPS Return to Workplace Plan) that has been in place since November 1, 2021, with insufficient notice. Part 4 of the Appendix 42 of the Collective Agreement states, “When the employer cancels or amends a modern and flexible work arrangement, they shall provide notice to the affected employee(s) in writing at least one (1) month prior to the cancellation or amendment. An employee can cancel the agreement with at least (1) month notice.” Staff were given two (2) weeks written notice to work on site 5 days per week on June 30, 2023. This has created hardship among staff, particularly those with children and elders in care, but also those that require additional commuting arrangements. Childcare for summer months needs to be arranged at least 6 months in advance.

7The second group Grievance, brought by over 70 grievors and identified as the "Irwin Group", was dated July 27, 2023 but received by the GSB on September 12, 2023. (Grievance #2). The Grievance states:

We grieve the violation of the Collective Agreement including but not limited to Article 2, Article 3, Appendix 42, the Respectful Workplace Policy, the OPS Flexible Work Strategy and/or other related article or appendix within the collective agreement, the Employment Standards Act, Ontario Human Rights Code, Occupational Health and Safety Act, and any related employment statute or principle in law that may apply, as well as any related Employer Policy. The employer abused their management rights and created inequity within the workplace by suddenly cancelling arrangements under the OPS Flexible Workplace Strategy for all staff in the branch with the exception of management and administrative staff. This was done citing "to support operational needs, including team connection, collaboration and culture" which should apply to staff and managers without exception. This inequitable decision was made without considering work performed by individual staff, most of whom conduct a significant amount of desk/computer work that is critical for operations. This blanket decision has created a toxic workplace where management is gaslighting employees about performance metrics that have not been provided and are not supported by available data or any feedback on individual performance reviews. Management's authoritarian approach has created inequity within the branch as well as across the OPS, where scientists and technologists continue to operate under the OPS Flexible Work Strategy. This has adversely affected the mental health of affected staff. While management has provided information on mental health help resource, they have refused to acknowledge the impact of their actions on mental health of staff.

8Karen Irwin then filed a Grievance dated September 6, 2023. (Grievance #3). That Grievance states:

I grieve the violation of the Collective Agreement including but not limited to Article 2,3, Appendix 42, the Respectful Workplace Policy, the Code of Conduct, the OPS Flexible Work Strategy and/or any other related article or appendix within the collective agreement, the Employment Standards Act, Ontario Human Rights Code, Occupational Health & Safety Act, and any related employment statute or principle in law that may apply, as well as related Employer policy. The employer rejected my accommodation request dated June 30, 2023, to work from home for up to two days per week to work on deskwork, provided I am not needed to be present in the laboratory for physical benchwork. At the same time other staff in LaSB and similar staff throughout the OPS are permitted to work from home two days per week unquestioned when they perform similar deskwork. This is an abuse of power to allow some staff, including themselves, and not others a flexible work arrangement where possible.

9The fourth grievance to be consolidated with the others was filed by Ann-Marie Irwin Abbey on September 15, 2023. (Grievance #4). That Grievance states:

I grieve the violation of the Collective Agreement including but not limited to Article 2,3, Appendix 42, the Respectful Workplace Policy, the Code of Conduct, the OPS Flexible Work Strategy and/or any other related article or appendix within the collective agreement, the Employment Standards Act, Ontario Human Rights Code, Occupational Health & Safety Act, and any related employment statute or principle in law that may apply, as well as any related Employer policy. The employer abused their management rights by arbitrarily denying my request for alternative work arrangements while approving the request of another person in my unit with a similar job description. The reasons given are morale and engagement, which was killed when the employer took away our flexible work arrangements given to the rest of the OPS. This also goes against multiple OPS policies as listed above.

SUFFICIENCY OF PARTICULARS:

Employer

10Employer Counsel points out the Union’s particulars were submitted on April 29, 2025 and discussed later that day during an attempt to mediate a settlement. At that time, Employer counsel advised that the Employer anticipated bringing a preliminary objection that the Union’s particulars were not sufficient and did not present a prima facie breach of the Collective Agreement.

11Employer Counsel notes that despite being put on notice on April 29, 2025, of the Employer’s intent to bring these preliminary objections, the Union chose not to submit any revised version of the particulars.

12The Employer points out the particulars are three pages, and ten paragraphs, in length. The first two paragraphs set out that there are four grievances in this matter, two group grievances and two individual grievances, and that they were attached.

13The Employer notes that the grievances were not attached to that email, but were provided on April 25, 2025.

14The remaining eight paragraphs are divided into four sections of two paragraphs. Each pair of paragraphs follow the same pattern. The first paragraph lists the Articles of the Collective Agreement; statutes; policies and principles that the Employer is alleged to have breached with the conduct that is being grieved and the second paragraph lists the desired remedies.

15In its submissions, the Employer sets out, as examples, the particulars provided with regard to two of the Grievances.

16Specifically, the particulars regarding the Hubber Group Grievance allege that Employer conduct in cancelling the modern and flexible work arrangement by not providing sufficient notice to the affected employees has breached the following agreements, statutes and principles:

a. Article 2 and Appendix 42 of Collective Agreement;

b. The OPS Flexible Work Strategy and/or any other related article or appendix within the Collective Agreement;

c. The OPS Return to Workplace Plan;

d. The Employment Standards Act;

e. Ontario Human Rights Code;

f. Occupational Health and Safety Act;

g. Obligations of good faith and fair dealing.

17The remedies sought from this grievance are:

a. Reinstatement of the hybrid work model for all staff;

b. For the employer to engage in meaningful discussions and in good faith at the LERC level to find solutions that meet both workload and work-life balance demands and to provide sufficient written notice to any staff required to work on-site more than the OPS minimum of 3 days per week;

c. Return vacation/sick or unpaid days to staff who had to use them due to being unable to find child/elder care;

d. Pay damages for expenses and losses as a result of the sudden change to work schedules;

e. Any other remedy deemed appropriate by the arbitrator.

18The Union particulars regarding the second group Grievance, titled “Irwin, Karen et al. 2023-0553-0002” allege the Employer abused its management rights and created inequality in the workplace by suddenly canceling work arrangements made under the OPS Flexible Work Strategy. This conduct is also alleged to have breached the following agreements, statutes and principles:

a. Article 2, Article 4 and Appendix 42 of Collective Agreement;

b. The Respectful Workplace Policy;

c. The OPS Flexible Work Strategy and/or any other related article or appendix within the Collective Agreement;

d. The Employment Standards Act;

e. Ontario Human Rights Code;

f. Occupational Health and Safety Act;

g. Obligations of good faith and fair dealing.

19The remedies sought from this grievance are:

a. Reinstatement of the hybrid work model for all staff;

b. For the employer to engage in meaningful discussions and in good faith with individual staff members to explore work arrangement models that optimize operational requirements in a respectful and productive manner;

c. For the employer to update the Respectful Workplace Policy to include other forms of harassment such as gaslighting and bullying;

d. For the employer to engage in meaningful discussions and in good faith at the LERC level to find solutions that meet both workload and work-life balance demands and to provide sufficient written notice to any staff required to work on-site more than the OPS minimum of 3 days per week;

e. Return vacation/sick or unpaid days to staff who had to use them due to being unable to find child/elder care;

f. Pay damages for expenses and losses as a result of the sudden change to work schedules;

g. Any other remedy deemed appropriate by the arbitrator.

20The Employer points out the remaining four paragraphs containing the particulars regarding the individual grievances, follow the same format as above.

21The Employer further submits that following the first two "administrative" paragraphs, there is absolutely nothing in the particulars that is not entirely duplicative of what was written on the grievance forms and, often, even though this is nearly impossible, provides even less detail than is actually contained on the grievance form itself.

22The Employer submits the Union’s particulars do not add a single fact or statement that was not contained on the grievance forms for any of the four Grievances.

23The Employer submits that if the Union had simply submitted the four grievance forms and stated they were the Union’s particulars, that would have actually provided more detail.

24Accordingly, the Employer’s position is that the four grievance forms do not contain sufficient particulars, nor do they present a prima facie case.

25However, given that the grievance forms actually contain more detail than the particulars, the Employer indicates its submission will, at times, reference what is written on the grievance forms themselves.

26In that regard, the Employer submits that in making its request for particulars, waiting for particulars, and finally being provided particulars, and then expressing its concern about the inadequacy of the particulars, it has not been able to progress the consolidated Grievance in any meaningful way.

27In anticipation of the Union requesting that the Board find the particulars sufficient and/or asking for more time to provide further particulars, it points out that the Grievances are two years old, and the Union has not told the Employer one single fact in relation to any of the four Grievances that was not written on the grievance forms.

28The Employer submits that to provide the Union with a second opportunity would be to reward the Union for its blatant disregard for the Board’s time and resources.

29The Employer submits the particulars are entirely insufficient in every way.

30It points out the Collective Agreement speaks about the mutually negotiated desire to provide for an efficient and expeditious arbitration process. Article 22.14.4 reads:

The Parties agree that principles of full disclosure of the issues in dispute as alleged by a grievance advanced by the Union on behalf of a member, or members, or the Union itself, and the full disclosure of facts relied upon by management in a decision are key elements in amicable and expeditious dispute resolution processes.

31The Employer points out the jurisprudence at the GSB is clear that the allegations of fact in a party’s particulars should be sufficiently comprehensive in that it would be unnecessary for that party to call any evidence if the opposite party were to admit the truth of all the allegations of fact therein. (see OPSEU (Gates et. al.) and Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (January 22, 2007), GSB No 2005-3003 et al, (Dissanayake) (“Gates”) at page 7, and the cases cited therein.)

32The Employer further notes the jurisprudence is also clear that each side is entitled to know the case it is required to meet. It submits that when a party is faced with allegations, it should expect to receive an answer to the questions when, where, how, and who from the party making the initial allegations. (see Gates, supra at page 5; OPSEU (Singh) and Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (June 27, 2005), GSB No 2001-1070 (Abramsky) (“Singh”) at page 5).

33This was stated concisely in OPSEU (Morsi) and Ministry of Finance (August 27, 2008), GSB No 2006-2863 et al, (Devins)), where the Board said at page 4:

The collective agreement, in Article 22.14.4 confirms the need for “disclosure of the issues in dispute as alleged by a grievance advanced by the Union …” This Board has consistently found that the employer is “entitled to know the case that it is required to meet” and that the obligation to provide particulars includes receiving “an answer to the questions “when”, “where”, “how” and “who” from the party making the initial allegations.”

34Accordingly, it is not for the Employer to guess the specifics of the alleged differential treatment, or to try to figure it out. Nor is it required to wait until the Grievor’s evidence on examination in-chief to learn the basis of the Grievor’s claim of differential treatment. (Gates, supra at page 5; Singh, supra at page 6.)

35Nor should the Employer have to do extensive research in order to respond to the vagueness of the particulars – it is not up to the Employer to guess, or comb its records to determine facts in order to respond to vague and unspecified allegations. (Singh, supra at page 6).

36The Employer points out that all grievors, regardless of whether they retain legal counsel, are expected to take responsibility for the carriage of their grievance by providing the basic particulars underlying the grievance. (Singh, supra at page 6).

37Further the GSB jurisprudence is clear that the failure to provide particulars, particularly after an order of the Board requiring them, may lead to dismissal of the grievance. (Gates, supra at page 5. Tab 7 – Singh, supra at page 6).

38While the Employer concedes that an arbitrator should not lightly dismiss a grievance; however, it points out that in the appropriate circumstances, dismissal of a grievance may be an appropriate remedy. (Gates, supra at page 5; Singh, supra at page 6)

39As the Board said in Gates, supra at page 5:

I agree that the outright dismissal of a grievance for lack of particulars is to be treated as an extraordinary remedy and may appear to be harsh on the particular grievor. However, that must be balanced with the broader interests of the parties, who by agreeing to Articles 22.14.4 and 22.14.5, have clearly recognized that the full and timely exchange of information relied upon by the respective parties in relation to a grievance is critical to the efficacy of the grievance and arbitration procedure. Moreover, where the failure to provide particulars occurs in the face of a Board order, the integrity of the Board’s authority also becomes a significant consideration.

40The Employer submits the principles with respect to sufficiency of particulars were summarized well by Arbitrator Banks in Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Jackson) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Children, Community and Social Services), GSB Nos. 2019-1995; 2019-2941; 2020-1545 (Banks), a relatively recent decision:

24The parties have agreed in Article 22.14.5 of the Collective Agreement to provide full disclosure to each other at the earliest stage of the grievance procedure. In interpreting and applying this longstanding provision, the Board has repeatedly stressed the need for pre-hearing disclosure of sufficient particulars to enable parties to know the case that they have to meet. The following often-cited passage from Arbitrator Herlich’s decision in Re Ross, 2096/96, quoted in Gates at page 3, summarizes this requirement:

Written particulars are to include not merely legal conclusions, but in addition the facts which the union and the grievor assert support any such conclusion and demonstrate the discrimination or breach of the collective agreement alleged. With respect to each act or omission alleged, the particulars shall indicate what was done or not done, when, where, by what means and by whom and, to the extent that motivation may be a relevant fact, with what motivation.

See also Sparkes, para 21; Assenov, para 4.

25The purpose of requirements to disclose particulars is to ensure that proceedings are both efficient and fair. Parties have responsibilities to be forthcoming about the bases for their claims. As the Board explained in Singh, supra at page 17:

Arbitration is a legal process which provides rights to all of the parties, including the employer. The employer has the right to know, in advance, the case it has to meet. As Chair Carter stated “all grievors, regardless of whether they retain legal counsel, are expected to take responsibility for the carriage of their grievance by providing the basic particulars underlying their grievance.”

26Failure to meet these responsibilities can result in particulars being struck, with the result that a party may not call evidence with respect to the allegations in question, or in the dismissal of a grievance: Singh; Assenov; Sparkes. In Singh, Arbitrator Abramsky dismissed a discrimination grievance with respect to which the Union and the grievor provided only the names of individuals who he alleged had been treated differently than him with respect to work assignments, but not the specific assignments or areas and dates of the assignments. Arbitrator Abramsky reasoned that because the Collective Agreement requires full disclosure at the earliest stage of the grievance procedure, the Employer need not wait until a hearing to obtain it or extensively search its records over an unspecified period of time. She concluded on page 8 of the decision that the Union was required “to name the individuals who benefitted and those who did not from the application of the Employer’s policy, the dates of each occurrence upon which they alleged that the policy was broken, and the particulars regarding which rules and how the rules were broken in each case”. She noted that to allow otherwise would undermine the goal of an efficient hearing where everyone would know before the hearing exactly what the case was about. See Singh, at pages 7 to 9. I agree with the Employer that Singh is instructive as to the extent of information required in disclosure of particulars. (Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Jackson) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Children, Community and Social Services), GSB Nos. 2019-1995; 2019-2941; 2020-1545 (Banks), at paragraphs 24-26).

41While there are sometimes disagreements between the Employer and the Union with respect to the exact level of detail required in particulars, the Union generally does not contest the notion that it is required to provide particulars to the Employer in grievances where it bears the onus.

42However, the Employer submitted there can be no disagreement that in this instance, the Union has completely failed to meet the standard of particulars, as expressed in the above-noted cases and a number of other decisions by the GSB, which requires the Union to indicate what was done or not done, when, where, by what means and by whom and, to the extent that motivation may be a relevant fact, with what motivation.

43The Employer points out there are a multitude of GSB cases that apply this standard to grievances before the Board.

Demonstration of the Insufficiency of the Particulars for these Four Grievances

44In this instance, the Employer submits it has no idea what the alleged violation of the listed agreements, statues and policies are. Rather, it submits the Union has simply alleged that various uncontextualized actions have taken place, and left it for the Employer to figure out what happened, where, when and how this was a violation of statutes and the Collective Agreement.

45An illustration of just some of the missing information is that while the Hubber Group Grievance says that a flexible work arrangement was cancelled with two weeks’ notice, the following particulars are missing:

• What the OPS Return to Workplace Plan said;
• The date and form of the requirement to work on site five days a week;
• (It is possible the particulars are trying to state that the cancellation occurred on June 30, 2023, but there is no indication when the employees were required to return working on site five days a week)
• Who cancelled this plan;
• Whether the Hubber Group raised this with management at the time;
• In what way the OPS Return to the Workplace Plan is considered a flexible hours of work arrangement in accordance with Article 42;
• How the requirement to work on site five days a week constitutes a flexible hours of work arrangement, as defined in Article 42.

46The Employer also asks why, if the Union concedes that the Collective Agreement only requires one month notice (if Article 42 even applies, which the Employer does not concede), is the Union asking for six months’ notice to allow for childcare arrangements.

47The Employer submits the above is not intended to be a comprehensive illustration of all of the missing information in the particulars with respect to the Hubber Group Grievance, but rather serves as an illustration of all of the work the Union has, unfairly, laid at the feet of the Employer i.e. to figure out the alleged breaches of the Collective Agreement, and each individual statute, as well as the facts supporting those alleged breaches.

48Similarly, Grievance #3 says Ms. Irwin, the Grievor, had her accommodation request rejected. However, it does not indicate:

• the nature of her accommodation request and under what enumerated ground was it sought;
• What information was contained in the accommodation request;
• Why her accommodation request appears to have her daily schedule contingent on where she is “needed to be in the laboratory for physical benchwork” instead of providing restrictions and limitations that the Employer is allegedly required to accommodate;
• Why the actions or arrangements of other staff are relevant to her individualized accommodation request;
• Why the Union is asserting the arrangements of other staff in LaSB and across the OPS are relevant in any way to her individualized accommodation request; and
• In what way is it an alleged abuse of power to grant arrangements to some staff and not others?

49The Employer indicates the above is not intended to be a comprehensive illustration of all of the missing information in the particulars with respect to Grievance #3, but rather it serves as an illustration of all the work the Union has, unfairly, laid at the feet of the Employer to determine.

50Specifically, the Employer, blindly, must determine the alleged violations of Article 3, the Code, the OHSA and the ESA. The Employer is also required to guess how Ms. Irwin’s management is abusing its power when other unnamed staff, in a different area of the OPS, with a different manager are allowed a flexible work arrangement.

51The Employer further submits that even if the Employer were aware of the rationale for granting something to one employee and not another, failure to provide the name of this other person or these other people, precludes the Employer from examining its own decision-making.

52The Employer asserts that by not providing this, or any, level of detail, the Union is engaging in a “fishing expedition” by forcing the Employer to look into all staff with any other arrangement, to the extent there are any such staff, because the Employer has no idea which staff members the Union says received more advantageous treatment than the Grievor. The Employer asserts the Board ought not to permit the Union to engage in what it describes as a “disguised fishing expedition".

53The Employer indicated it would not go through the same exercise for the other Grievances, on the basis that the above examples serve to illustrate the gravity of the Union’s failure in this regard and provide a sample of the most obvious missing details.

54However, the Employer submits that even if these questions were answered in their entirety, without seeing the level of detail provided, the Employer would not necessarily concede that the particulars were sufficient.

55Accordingly, the Employer submits that the Board must concluded that these particulars are entirely insufficient.

Union

56The Union submits it has sufficiently particularized the facts of the consolidated Grievance and that the Employer has enough information to proceed without any prejudice against it. It points out these Grievances stem from policies implemented by the Employer and accommodations which were denied by the Employer.

57The Union maintains the Employer has been in conversation with the Grievors since it decided to implement its return-to-work policies, and has all the information regarding the accommodation requests the Union is asserting were improperly denied.

58Accordingly, it maintains the Employer was, at all times, aware of the substance of these Grievances and if further particulars were required, the Employer had the opportunity to request responses to questions or request an order for additional particulars.

59In that regard, the Union submitted it is trite law, expanded on below, that if there are insufficient particulars, the Employer has the opportunity to seek an order for expanded particulars.

60The Union maintains that to dismiss this case without this step would be irregular, and argues such a request would have been the most time and cost-efficient way to proceed if the Employer had concerns about the particulars.

61The Union submits that should the Board deem that its initial particulars are insufficient, it is willing to expand on them. It maintains the Union should have the opportunity to respond to specific inquiries from the Employer.

62The Union further submits that such remedies for allegedly incomplete particulars are common practice in grievance arbitration before the Board. It maintains the Employer’s position that this Grievance should be dismissed when it has not specified its concerns in the form of follow-up questions is patently unreasonable. It argues that dismissal of this grievance, where the issues have been outlined and the Employer has been involved closely in the matter would be inappropriate.

63In that regard, the Union submits the particulars thus far provided clearly set out the specific allegation that the Employer failed to meet the notice period required by the Collective Agreement.

64Further, the Employer is aware that it denied accommodation requests following its decision to change work from home schedules.

65The Union pointed out the Board has been clear that the Union is not required to describe all the evidence it intends to rely on. (see Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Jackson) v Ontario (Children, Community and Social Services), 2021 CanLII 82489 (ON GSB) at para 27).

66The Union further submits that much of the information the Employer seeks from the Union is within its own knowledge. It points out that while the Employer states that the Union’s particulars do not include “What the OPS Return to Workplace Plan said” or “who cancelled this plan”, it maintains the Employer should not be relying on the Union to provide this information.

67In Gates, supra, the Board is clear that “outright dismissal of a grievance for lack of particulars is to be treated as an extraordinary remedy”. In that instance, the Board only dismissed two out of the 5 grievances filed by the union due to lack of particulars. Further, in Gates, particulars were ordered by the arbitrator before the issue of dismissal on the grounds of insufficient particulars was raised. The Union reiterates that this avenue has been available to the Employer and should not be cause for dismissal of this grievance.

68The Union maintains it sets out clearly in its Grievances and particulars that a fundamental portion of these Grievances is the Employer’s failure to accommodate. It points out the Board has deemed that in group or consolidated grievances, individual details of the allegations as they relate to each individual is not necessary. In Gates, supra, the Board stated at the bottom of page 16:

Considering that we have here a union grievance alleging that the employer had wrongly interpreted and applied the collective agreement in relation to meal breaks, I agree with union counsel that the particulars it has provided with respect to 3 employees, as illustrating the alleged violation, sufficiently apprises the employer of the case it has to meet. The lack of detailed particulars with regard to all employees will not prejudice the employer's preparation of its defence. A union grievance can cover a large number of employees in the bargaining unit or indeed every employee in the bargaining unit. It will be wasteful to require that the union provide detailed particulars with respect to each and every employee who may be covered by the union grievance. As suggested by the union, in the circumstances it is appropriate that the interpretational issue be determined on the basis of the employer's treatment of the named grievors. If the union is successful, the parties can determine whether the decision confers any entitlement to any other employees in the bargaining unit and failing agreement return to the Board. [emphasis added]

69The Union reiterates that dismissal due to insufficient particulars should be reserved for extraordinary circumstance. In that regard, it relies on Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Niyonkuru) v Ontario (Ministry of Transportation), 2013 CanLII 88092 (ON GSB) where the Board stated at paragraphs 33 and 34:

33. As a general observation, I would reiterate the remarks that I made in a previous decision when I agreed with Vice Chair Abramsky in Ontario (Singh) that the relief currently being sought by the Employer is an extra-ordinary remedy that should only be available in the most exceptional circumstances:

As a matter of general principle, the arbitration process is designed to ensure adjudication of the dispute between the parties on the merits, based on all of the relevant evidence. A decision to summarily dismiss or allow grievance, or to prevent a party from calling for relevant evidence, should not be ordered lightly.

34. My hesitation to dismiss the grievance at this preliminary stage is heightened by the Union's submission that it can provide further details of the allegations that would remedy any deficiencies in their current particulars. In my view they should be provided the opportunity to do so.

70The Union pointed out that even where it is determined that the Grievor has not provided sufficient particulars, the Board is reluctant to dismiss a grievance. In Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Ontario (Finance), 2008 CanLII 70523 (ON GSB), the Board concluded that the grievor had intentionally declined to provide sufficient particulars. However, even in the face of outright refusal to provide particulars the Board at the bottom of page 4, concluded that it would not order a dismissal:

Having considered the submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that the particulars provided to date are insufficient. I am not prepared, however, to dismiss the grievances. In my view, the appropriate remedy is an order for further particulars.

71Accordingly, the Union submits that if its initial particulars are determined to be insufficient, the Union should be given the opportunity to resubmit them.

Additional Information on Initial Particulars

72The Union also provided the following information under the above heading.

73On or around March 2020, the OPS was sent home to work due to the Covid-19 pandemic. While most OPS employees work full time from home, many LaSB employees returned to the workplace on a hybrid basis to conduct essential laboratory analysis. Staff were assigned days to go in so that people would be able to maintain social distancing as recommended by public health officials at the time. When the rest of OPS was called back to the office, LaSB staff were already attending the workplace for an average of 3 days per week.

74On or around July 29, 2021, the Secretary of Cabinet ("SOC") sent an announcement that the OPS would begin returning to the workplace 2-3 days per week on October 18, 2021 (almost 3 months’ notice). Due to the resurgence of Covid-19 (Omicron variant), this return to work was pushed back until February of 2022 (announced Dec 13, 2021, or 2 months’ notice). It was quickly pushed back again until March 31, 2022 (announced Dec 17, 2021, or 3 ½ months’ notice).

75On or around, March 16, 2022, the SOC updated the return-to-work plan again so that staff would only have to attend 1 to 2 days per week starting on April 4, and 3 days per week beginning on May 16, 2022 (2 months’ notice).

76In summary, the SOC sent 4 separate written announcements regarding the return to work with a minimum of 2 months’ notice for any change.

77The Union points out this exceeds the requirements of Appendix 42 of the OPSEU Collective Agreement which requires 1 month’s notice in writing for a change in an alternative work arrangement.

78On or around June 9 and June 12, 2023, staff in the three scientific sections of LaSB were given verbal instructions to return to the workplace full time on June 26, 2023. This gave employees in the scientific sections only two weeks’ notice as to the change to their schedule. This change would not apply to managers who would continue working 3 days per week onsite.

79Staff in the three affected sections wrote letters to their respective managers detailing the benefits of working some days remotely each week and requested management to reconsider.

80On or around June 29, 2023, during a Local Employees Relations Committee meeting, the Director was informed of Part 3, Appendix 42 of the Collective Agreement, which speaks to the requirement for a 1 month notice for any changes to the work arrangements.

81On or around June 30, 2023, BAS and OCS managers informed their sections that they must return to full time in office on July 17, 2023, and July 24, 2023, respectively. The Union asserts that both these notices do not comply with the Collective Agreement (1) month notice requirement. ICS was already on site 5 days per week but received the same email.

82The Union also acknowledged that in the FRM, the Employer argued that the hybrid work arrangement that LaSB has been using for over 3 years (March 2020 until June 2023) was not an Alternative Work Arrangement and, therefore, not covered under Appendix 42. However, the Union points out the SOC met or exceeded these requirements on four occasions prior to this, suggesting a policy or a precedent.

83The Union indicates its position is that the Employer discriminated against staff on the basis of family status contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code. In that regard, it submits the Employer did not take into account that requiring a full return to office at the beginning of the summer without giving parents enough time to make childcare arrangements or arrangements for elderly dependents would create issues for the staff. The Employer’s insistence that it couldn’t wait or be delayed unfairly affected staff in the branch. Several tried (unsuccessfully) to get accommodation, so they could adapt to the new work conditions and were denied.

84The Union indicates that staff felt discriminated against because their needs and circumstances were not taken into consideration and they were penalized for not being able to comply with the return to workplace order. It points out they were required to use their own vacation or unpaid days.

85On or around July 6, 2023, all three sections received an identical email from their managers stating that the reasons for the return to the workplace 5 day per week was because staff had failed to meet the standard of service delivery in terms of backlogs, delays and other key metrics. At that time there was absolutely no backlog or delay in any sample analysis. The Employer was unwilling or unable to tell staff what key metrics they had not met.

86Staff compiled data on productivity in each section starting from 2019 until 2023. For all three sections, productivity increased while the number of staff decreased (mass retirement in 2019 due to TEI that were not replaced). During this time there were no backlogs, and the lab met turnaround times 100% of the time except when there was an instrument failure or some other manager-approved extenuating circumstance. This occurred simultaneously with additional responsibilities taken on by staff members including the building of Horizon LIMS, participation in the Wastewater Surveillance Initiative and taking over drinking water samples from the Hamilton Public Health Unit so they could pivot to Covid testing – activities that garnered recognition in both the MECP Awards and an Amethyst Award.

87The Union points out that during the hybrid work period from 2020 to 2023, all sections achieved their highest recorded performance, demonstrating increased productivity per FTE, with no backlog and no turnaround time exceedances. The Union alleges the Employer’s claim that staff failed to meet service delivery and key performance metrics was inaccurate and was a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts.

88Two charts indicating the productivity data were attached.

89The Union continues that this completely demoralized highly educated, professional staff who took great pride in their work and their careers. Since that time, at least 15 staff who signed the original grievances have left their positions, representing a nearly 20% turnover in 2 years.

90The Union points out this has increased the workload on remaining staff resulting in increased toxicity in the branch even for those in unaffected sections. Furthermore, staff were expected to perform management duties when their manager was working from home (e.g. taking attendance during evacuations and fire drills).

91The Employer said that staff could ask for formal AWA’s, accommodation or ad-hoc days, but the Union maintains these were routinely denied. Ad-hoc days were then used by management to “bribe” staff into doing extra work (e.g. they could work from home for one day if they did some specific extra task). The result is a work environment where there is absolutely no trust between management and staff. Staff are overworked and feel disrespected by managers who are able to work from home.

92On or around August 14, 2025, the latest return to office announcement from the SOC was sent out for a return to 4 days in office starting on October 20, 2025 (9 weeks' notice) and to 5 days in January (almost 5 months).

Employer Reply

93In its substantive Reply, the Employer reiterated much of its original position.

94Accordingly, to avoid unnecessary repetition in an already length decision, I will set out only the Employer's submissions with regard to the Union's suggestion that it be given another opportunity to provide any further particulars if those provided are determined to be inadequate, and the Employer's response regarding the Union's "Additional Information on Initial Particulars" set out above.

95In the first instance, the Employer submitted the Union has already had multiple opportunities to produce particulars. It points out repeated requests for particulars were made in March, April, and May 2024, and despite a mediation scheduled for June 27, 2024, no particulars were provided. Rather, the particulars were finally provided the morning of April 29, 2025, the next scheduled hearing date, leaving no time for substantive discussion.

96The Employer also pointed out that despite being advised of its intention to bring these motions on April 29, 2025, the Union elected not to amend or supplement those particulars during the four-and-a-half months before the Employer filed its motion materials.

97The Employer concedes that in some instances, where the Union has submitted insufficient particulars, the Board will provide the Union with a new deadline by which to submit sufficient particulars or else the grievance may be dismissed. In those cases, the Board deems it unfair to dismiss the grievance without this second opportunity and explicit warning being provided to the Union.

98The Employer submits this course of action might be reasonable in another context wherein the particulars were largely sufficient but certain details in a small number of paragraphs were not sufficiently detailed. If that had occurred, and the Union had demonstrated an intent to provide particulars, the Employer could be expected to identify specific deficiencies, and the Union may be provided an opportunity to correct those deficiencies.

99However, in this case, the Employer submits there are no facts or details that provide any level of detail on the Grievance forms. While the Employer conceded that Board should be reluctant to dismiss grievances at this stage, giving the Union yet another opportunity to provide particulars would completely ignore the complete lack of any detail on the particulars provided thus far.

100The Employer further submits the Union has not taken these Grievances seriously. It has not demonstrated any intent to engage in a meaningful process of expeditious and efficient dispute resolution. The Employer submits the Union has made a mockery of Article 22.14.4.

101Consequently, the Employer argues the Union should not receive a second opportunity to submit particulars. It points out the Grievances were filed approximately two years ago, and the Union's particulars simply copied the grievance forms. The Union has known the Employer has taken the position the particulars were insufficient for approximately six months yet nothing has been done.

102The Employer submits it should not be forced to wait further for the Union to decide to provide the Employer sufficient information.

103Further, the Employer submitted that if the Board provides the Union a further opportunity, it is providing the Union license not to provide any meaningful particulars for an extended period of time without consequence and instead would reward delay and undermine process efficiency. It will create a standard by which it is impossible to have a grievance dismissed without providing the Union with multiple opportunities, as it is hard to imagine a situation where the Union has submitted less information to the Employer.

104With respect to the "Additional information for the Union’s particulars" submitted in the Union's Response, the Employer points out that rather than provide this additional information with respect to the Grievances or supplementary particulars during the four and a half months between the April 29, 2025, GSB date and the Employer filings its submissions, the Union elected to wait until after the Employer made its submissions to provide this material.

105The Employer points out that had it been submitted in advance of the Employer making its submissions, the parties could have made arguments with respect to the additional information and/or addressing the sufficiency of the additional information as considered as part of the particulars.

106However, given the late submission of this information, the Employer submits it must not be considered for the purposes of this motion.

PRIME FACIE CHALLENGE:

Employer

107The Employer submits there is no dispute the onus is on the Union and the Grievors to establish a prima facie case of a violation of applicable statutes or the Collective Agreement. The case law at the GSB is well-established with respect to the benchmark for the Union to meet the test for a prima facie case. It is whether the facts asserted, if accepted as true, can support a violation. It is about the facts, not the arguments or the conclusions drawn by the Union. (Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Martin et al) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), GSB No. 2013-3579, August 12, 2015, (Anderson) at paragraph 3).

108Accordingly, when the Board finds that particulars have not established a prima facie violation of the Collective Agreement, the grievance must be dismissed at this preliminary stage.

109In Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Couture et al) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Government Services), GSB No. 2008-3329, April 7, 2011, the Board noted at page 10, that the Union had full opportunity to put its best case as to facts through its particulars, without having to prove those facts.

110Vice-Chair Dissanayake ultimately agreed with the Employer that the matter should be dismissed on a preliminary basis, having found that the Union had not shown that the Grievors met one of the requirements of the relevant Collective Agreement provision - which was necessary in order to entitle the Grievors to the stand-by pay it claimed. He found, at paragraph 24:

It follows from the foregoing that the particulars relied upon by the union fail to make out a prima facie case for meeting a mandatory condition for its claim for stand-by pay on behalf of the grievors. In other words, even if all facts asserted by the union are accepted as true, the grievance would not succeed. In the circumstances, the employer’s motion is upheld, and the grievances are hereby dismissed.

111With regards to a prima facie motion, Vice-Chair Dissanayake articulated the relevant test about halfway through paragraph 12, and stated that “[i]n each case where a prima facie motion is made, the Board is required to determine whether the facts asserted, if accepted as true, are capable of substantiating the violation alleged.”

112The Employer points out the parties have often accepted these cases as accurately summarizing the principles of a prima facie motion.(See for example, Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Pletikos) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), GSB No. 2011-0750, September 3, 2013 (Dissanayake). In Pletikos, supra, in describing the Union’s particulars, the Board wrote:

12… The fundamental flaw with all of the arguments advanced is that for any of them to succeed, the grievor must be able to establish that a right that he had under the collective agreement was interfered with as a result of the employer’s actions. As applied to an individual grievance, when section 7(3) of the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act refers to “all differences” arising from the collective agreement, it envisages a difference between the employer and the grieving employee. The difference, to be arbitrable, must be about a right the grieving individual has under the collective agreement.

113The Board in that instance, granted the Employer’s prima facie motion and dismissed the grievance. While it noted the decision did not endorse the Employer’s alleged conduct, it stated at paragraph 19, that “… for reasons set out in the Board’s jurisprudence, not all work-related concerns, legitimate they may be, are remediable under the grievance and arbitration procedure before the Board.

Application of the No Prima Facie Case Law to the Particulars

114The Employer submits that not only are the particulars insufficiently particularized, in this instance, in the sense that required details were not included, but also that those included fall short of establishing a prima facie case.

115Specifically, in the Hubber Group Grievance, the only facts alleged are that the OPS Return to the Workplace Plan was cancelled with two weeks’ notice – although the Employer points out this detail is not even provided in the particulars, but was gleaned from the Grievance Form.

116Even if true, the Employer points out the Union has not even met the basic test of establishing that the Grievors in the Hubber Group meet the necessary conditions to fit under Appendix 42.

117Also, and extremely importantly, Appendix 42 states that the Employer’s exercise of discretion under this article is not grievable. Accordingly, the Employer points out the Union has not even demonstrated this is a situation that fits under Appendix 42 and, if it does, the Union has not pled any facts that support a theory that this is something that could be grieved.

118In Grievance #2, it is alleged arrangements under the OPS Flexible Work Strategy were cancelled for staff, but not for management and administrative staff, which created inequity within the branch and the OPS.

119Again, this level of detail is not provided in the particulars, but rather is gleaned from the Grievance Form.

120In that instance as well, the Union is grieving a breach of Appendix 42, but again has not pled any facts that support a theory that this is something that could be grieved.

121The Employer points out that in both Group Grievances, other statutes are cited, but there are absolutely no details as to how the Employer’s conduct breached any of these statutes. The Union does not specify how requiring staff to come into the workplace five days a week breached the Code, OHSA or ESA.

122The grievance form also states that the decision was made without considering work performed by individual staff and is not supported by performance metrics that staff have seen or feedback on individual performance reviews. The Employer points out the Union’s particulars do not specify which Article in the Collective Agreement requires the Employer to consider those factors in its decision-making.

123In Grievance #3, the particulars allege an accommodation request for two days per week working from home was rejected and that other employees in the LaSB and OPS work from home two days a week. Even if true, there are no details regarding the accommodation request, or the Grievor’s restrictions and limitations. As such, if the accommodation request was simply a request to work from home, it does not explain how that attracts the protections of Article 3 or the Human Rights Code.

124If the accommodation request was made pursuant to the Code, the nature of that request is not explained in any detail. Rather, the Employer submits it appears the Grievor is using the word “accommodation” devoid of any context.

125The Employer points out that a simple reference to “accommodation” on a grievance form is not sufficient to demonstrate a prima facie breach of the Collective Agreement and Code. To find otherwise would essentially give the Union a “blank cheque” to include such a reference on every grievance form in order to avoid providing any level of detail, and force the Employer to defend each case in a hearing on the merits. This is inconsistent with GSB jurisprudence and is entirely inconsistent with what the Parties have agreed in Articles 22.14.4 and 22.14.5.

126Nor do the particulars explain why management‘s application of its discretion with a different result with regard to other individuals in a different area of the OPS breaches the rights of the Grievor. It points out the GSB has repeatedly ruled that “Me Too” grievances are not permitted.

127The Employer submits the Union’s position with regard to Grievance #3 is open to the interpretation that any arrangement granted to any employee in the OPS, must be granted to all employees in the OPS or else management is abusing their power.

128The Employer submits that position is obviously completely ridiculous and would, literally, cause the entire OPS to become non-functional. It would shut down the delivery of all important public programs and benefits across the province, as one employee’s flexible work arrangement would have to be granted to literally every employee who asked.

129The Employer concedes that it cannot be that the Union is actually advancing that argument in this instance, but due to the lack of sufficiency in the particulars, the Employer indicates it is left guessing as to the Union’s actual position.

130In Grievance #4 the particulars allege that an alternative work arrangement request was denied for the Grievor, but another individual’s request was approved, and this was arbitrary.

131The Employer submits that even if that is true, the Grievor does not provide details regarding her request. As a result, it is not clear if it meets the conditions of Appendix 42.

132Even if it does, the Employer submits there is no Collective Agreement article that provides OPSEU employees with a right to an alternative work arrangement. Further, the Employer again points out that Appendix 42 also states that the Employer’s exercise of discretion under this Appendix is not grievable in any event.

133The Employer indicates it accepts that grievance forms are written by employees who are not lawyers, and cannot be expected to advance their legal positions flawlessly on their grievance form. However, the Employer’s objection is not with the insufficiency of the grievance forms, but rather with the Union’s failure to provide sufficient particulars, which articulate the allegations and the facts relied upon in support of the allegation that the Employer has breached the Collective Agreement.

134The Employer submits that as illustrated above, there is no way the Board could uphold the grievances on the basis of the particulars provided. It submits that to do so would completely undercut the existing jurisprudence with respect to what constitutes a prima facie case.

Union

135The Union denies it has failed to make out a prima facie case in its allegations. It argues that significant weight should be given to hearing a case on its merits, particularly one in which infringement of rights under the Code is alleged.

136The Union submits that the Letter of Understanding at Part 3, Appendix 42 of the Collective Agreement requires the Employer to provide one months' notice if staff’s work arrangement is to be amended or canceled. It points out that the Grievances filed and the particulars provided clearly set out that this notice was not provided.

137Further, the Union reiterates that as determined in Gateway Casinos & Entertainment Limited v Move Up – Cope, Local 378, 2019 CanLII 18376 (BC LA) the Union is not required to disclose its legal arguments in its particulars prior to a hearing. It submits that arguments such as "estoppel" on the basis of previous practice are open to the Union to make.

138The Union submits that merely because the Employer does not agree with the Collective Agreement and other legal principles that apply to the circumstances does not mean the Union has not established a prima facie case.

139Most critically, the Union indicates that a significant portion of these grievances are regarding the Employer’s failure to accommodate its employees after providing inadequate notice of return to in-person work. It asserts that primarily, the Employer is in violation of protections against discrimination on the basis of family status, and specifically, obligations relating to children and dependent elders.

140The Union points out the requirements for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of family status were cited in Toronto (City) v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79, 2022 CanLII 51865 as follows at the bottom of page 18:

In terms of the state of the law with respect to establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in the context of the protected ground of family status, the appropriate starting point is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore, supra. Even though that case dealt with a claim of a failure to accommodate a student in the context of a disability, the Court articulated the general test for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under human rights legislation in Canada. In particular, the Court ruled that an individual claiming discriminatory treatment must prove the following to establish a prima facie case of discrimination:

(i) that they have a characteristic protected from discrimination under the Code.

(ii) that they experienced an adverse impact.

(iii) the characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact on the individual.

141The Union points out that in order to make a prima facie determination the allegations in the particulars must be accepted as “true and provable” (Hum v. CUPE, Local 1974, 2007 CanLII 55949 (ON LRB)). It states that as such, the test for a prima facie discrimination has been met.

142Indeed, the Union further submits that "this conclusion can even be inferred from the fact that only 2 weeks of notice was given to individuals with familial responsibilities protected by the Code" and, [u]nless the employer is inferring (sic) that the Union is required to prove that the Grievors had children or elderly dependents at this stage, the grievances clearly pass the test for a prima facie case.

143The Union points out the Board has consistently held that it will only dismiss a complaint if it is very clear that a prima facie case has not been set out, and the bar for this determination is extremely high. In support of that principle the Union points to a decision of the Labour Relations Board in Hum v. CUPE, Local 1974, supra, where at paragraph 4, Vice-Chair Rowan states:

4. In assessing whether an application makes out a prima facie case for the relief requested, the Board must treat all of the allegations of fact pleaded by the applicant as being true and provable. In International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers, [1999] O.L.R.D. No. 1492, the Board reviewed its approach to determining whether to dismiss an application because it does not disclose a prima facie case as follows at paragraph 4 and 5:

4.The test that a responding party must take place in order to persuade the Board that an application should be dismissed on the basis that there is no prima facie case established in the application is, in my view, a strict one. An applicant should not be deprived of the opportunity to have a hearing on the merits of his or her application simply because the argument is novel or the circumstances giving rise to the application are unusual. In Caravelle Foods, [1983] OLRB Rep. June 875 the Board characterized the test a responding party must meet in seeking to have an application dismissed on a prima facie motion in the following terms at page 881.

The words prima facie case in section 71 is meant to allow the dismissal of a case without hearing where the allegations are insufficient to render reasonable or arguable a conclusion that the Act has been breached.

In Paiva Foods Ltd., [1985] OLRB Rep. May 690 the Board set out the test at page 691 as follows:

The Board’s discretion to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it does not disclose a prima facie case should only be exercised in the clearest of cases, that is, when the Board is satisfied that there is no reasonable likelihood that a violation of the Act can be established on the facts as alleged."

5. Where, however, the Board is satisfied that the responding party bringing the prima facie motion has met the burden imposed, it is incumbent on the Board to dismiss the application, thereby conserving the limited resources of the Board for matters that do require a hearing. As Mr. Justice Grange said in Shaw v. McLeod, 1982 CanLII 2140 (ON SC), 35 O.R. (2d) 641:

I concede that on this motion if, after a careful review of the law, the Court determines that he [the Plaintiff] cannot possibly succeed, then his action should be mercifully dispatched.

In determining whether to dismiss an application for failing to make out a prima facie case, the Board must have regard only to the applicant’s allegations and must accept those allegations of fact.

144The Union reiterates that the allegations in this case are clearly laid out and submits they are entitled to be heard.

145Specifically, it maintains the Employer has been put on notice regarding the two central allegations in this case.

146One, that the Employer has failed to abide by the Collective Agreement and principles that govern the same when it comes to providing sufficient notice of changing practices.

147However, the Union submits that even if this failure cannot be tied to the Collective Agreement, the Union must have the opportunity to establish estoppel on this matter based on past practices.

148Second, the Employer has been put on notice that the Union is alleging infringements of the Grievors’ rights as protected under the Code due to the Employer’s failure to accommodate. This failure to accommodate has significantly impacted members of the bargaining unit who have the right to have their matter heard.

Employer Reply

149Again, in its Reply, the Employer reiterated much of its original position. Accordingly, to avoid unnecessary repetition in an already length decision, I will provide only a brief summary of the Employer's Reply submissions below.

150The Employer argues that the Union’s particulars do not disclose factual allegations capable of supporting any of the asserted violations:

151The Employer submits the Union’s assertion that the Employer failed to provide notice required by Appendix 42 is unsupported by any facts—only a conclusion that notice was insufficient.

152Further, the Union relies on broad categories (e.g., childcare impacts, eldercare, work-from-home denials) without any factual grounding. The Employer also points out that references to discrimination on the basis of family status appear for the first time in the Union’s submissions in response to the Employer's motion, not in its particulars. It submits that such after-the-fact framing cannot cure the deficiencies.

153In that regard, the Employer points out that GSB case law is clear that Code-based allegations are not exempt from the requirement to plead a prima facie breach of the Collective Agreement.

154The Employer further submits that the Union cannot rely on estoppel because it has provided no particulars supporting such a claim. In that regard, the Employer submits the jurisprudence requires a clear link between the alleged representation and a right in the Collective Agreement, and in this instance, (see Eagles, supra) the Union has identified none.

ANALYSIS:

155It is appropriate to begin my analysis by setting out again, for convenience, the provisions of Article 22.14.4:

The Parties agree that principles of full disclosure of the issues in dispute as alleged by a grievance advanced by the Union on behalf of a member, or members, or the Union itself, and the full disclosure of facts relied upon by management in a decision are key elements in amicable and expeditious dispute resolution processes.

156In addition, Article 22.14.5 provides:

22.14.5 The parties agree that at the earliest stage of the grievance procedure, either party upon request is entitled to receive from the other, full disclosure.

157I will first address the "Additional information for the Union’s Particulars" submitted in the Union's Response.

158As the Employer pointed out, as of April 29, 2025, the Union was aware the Employer was going to bring this motion. However, in the four and one half months between that date and the Employer's submissions, the Union provided no additional particulars or information regarding these Grievances.

159It is perplexing as to why the Union would wait until the Employer had filed its extensive submissions before providing this additional information. If I were to give the additional information any weight, fairness would dictate that the Employer then be given an opportunity to address those additional facts, essentially starting another series of submissions and responses in what has already been a protracted process.

160However, that is not only unreasonable, as I also find it to be unnecessary, as the "information" is primarily just that. It too is devoid of sufficient particulars which would satisfy the entitlement of the Employer to know what case it has to meet. Accordingly, I do not need to hear from the Employer with regard to what, if any, weight it should attract.

Sufficiency of Particulars

161As comprehensively set out by Counsel for the Employer, at its most fundamental, the duty to provide particulars has consistently been articulated in the jurisprudence as requiring the Union to indicate what was done or not done, when, where, by what means and by whom. Fairness dictates that parties are entitled to know the case they need to meet.

162Further, arguments or conclusory statements based on unparticularized allegations of fact are not sufficient and do not constitute particulars. (see Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Dartch) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of the Solicitor General), GSB No. 2019-3018, March 11, 2021 at paragraph 14).

163Applying that very fundamental test to the particulars, I must agree that the Union has almost completely failed to meet the standard for providing particulars, as expressed above, and in the cases cited by the Employer.

Hubbard Group Grievance

164Specifically with regard to the Hubbard group of grievances, the Employer is correct that the particulars provide even less information than the Grievance. Cobbling the two together, it appears the Grievance alleges that the Employer cancelled the "modern and flexible work arrangement” (OPS Return to Workplace Plan) with insufficient notice i.e. 2 weeks’ notice rather than the one month required under Appendix 42, resulting in the violation of provisions of the collective agreement and various pieces of legislation, policy and principles of industrial relations.

165As pointed out by the Employer, however, the particulars do not indicate in what way the OPS Return to the Workplace Plan constitutes a modern and flexible work arrangement in accordance with Appendix 42.

166Accordingly, the particulars of the work arrangements and the reasons the Union maintains they constitute a modern and flexible work arrangement pursuant to Appendix 42 ought to have been included in the Union's particulars. However, no facts were pled that would bring the OPS Return to Workplace Plan within the parameters of Appendix 42.

167However, in the additional "Information" regarding the particulars, the Union included in its Response, the Union acknowledged the Employer's position that the hybrid work arrangement for the LaSB employees was not an "Alternative Work Arrangement "and therefore is not covered by Appendix 42. Despite that acknowledgement, the Union has still not provided particulars which indicate, how and why it maintains Appendix 42 is applicable in the circumstances, or even if that remains its position.

168The Union does assert, however, that even if the Employer is correct, and the Employer's "failure" to provide the notice required by Appendix 42 cannot be tied to the Collective Agreement, the Union must have the opportunity to establish estoppel on this matter based on "past practices." (More will be said below regarding that assertion.)

169The second component of the Grievance also contains more information than set out in the particulars. It states that the two week's written notice to return to work on site 5 days per week "...has created hardship among staff, particularly those with children and elders in care, but also those that require additional commuting arrangements. Childcare for summer months needs to be arranged at least 6 months in advance."

170This is and remains a "bald" allegation, which contains none of the elements of who, when, where, and what required for particulars. It tells us nothing regarding who was affected, how, what accommodation requests, if any, were made and denied, by whom, and why those denials were violations of any of the agreements, policies, statutes and principles listed.

171Instead, in its Response, the Union maintains that it sets out clearly in its grievances and particulars that a fundamental portion of these Grievances is the Employer's "failure to accommodate", and that the Employer "is aware that it denied accommodation requests following its decision to change work schedules." It adds that "much" of the information the Employer seeks from the Union is "within its own knowledge."

172In effect, the Union is saying "we allege the Employer has violated the rights of all the Grievors represented in this Grievance. However, it is up to the Employer to figure out the details”.

173This assertion is a complete repudiation of the parties' agreements set out in Articles 22.14.4 and 22.14.5. It also flies in the face of the undisputed historic understanding, reflected in decades of jurisprudence, that for reasons of fairness and efficiency, everyone's interests are best served with a comprehensive sharing of positions between litigants. This includes comprehensive particulars which enable a party to know what case they have to meet.

174Finally, the Board's decision in Gates, supra is of little assistance to the Union. The Union is correct that in that particular instance, the Board determined that individual details of the allegations, as they relate to each individual are not necessary. However, the issue in that case was a collective agreement interpretation dealing with meal breaks. The Union in that instance had already provided particulars with respect to three employees as illustrating the alleged violation, and the Board found that sufficiently apprised the employer of the case it had to meet.

175That is vastly different from allegations that individual employees are entitled to accommodation for their individual and unique circumstances. The duty to accommodate flows from an in-depth analysis of the circumstances, including the often very personal obligations, supports, job duties etc. of the individual requesting accommodation. Even if the Union had provided particulars regarding one individual alleging a failure to accommodate, (which it has not) those particulars cannot then be apply to the group, which is what the Union appears to be suggesting.

176For the reasons set out above, I find the Union has failed to provide the necessary particulars with regard to the Hubber et al Grievance to enable the Employer to know the case it has to make.

177Further, the case law at the Board is well-established with respect to the benchmark required to meet the test for a prima facie case. The test is whether the facts asserted, if accepted as true, can support a violation. Most importantly, it is about the facts, not the arguments or the conclusions drawn by the Union. (See Martin et al, supra and Dartch, supra) cited at paragraphs 107 and 165 respectively.

178The Employer has made comprehensive and compelling submissions in this regard, and there is no need to repeat them.

179Rather, the same failure to provide particulars also results in my finding the Union has failed to make out a prima facie case. As indicated earlier, in order to make out a prima facie case, sufficient facts must be pled, which, if found to be true could reasonably establish the alleged violation.

180It may be the Union's failure to provide particulars was informed by the Union's view that it had made out a prima facie case of discrimination as it stated that "this conclusion can even be inferred from the fact that only 2 weeks of notice was given to individuals with familial responsibilities protected by the Code" and, [u]nless the employer is inferring (sic) that the Union is required to prove that the Grievors had children or elderly dependents at this stage, the grievances clearly pass the test for a prima facie case".

181If the Union is suggesting that the mere fact the same notice was given to all employees, including those with dependents, creates a prima facie case of discrimination under the Code, this is simply incorrect. That assertion alone, even if true, could not reasonably support a finding of discrimination on the basis of family status.

182This leaves the Union's suggestion that even if the Employer is correct, and the OPS Return to Workplace Plan does not come within the parameters of Appendix 42, and therefore the failure to give one month's notice cannot be tied to the Collective Agreement, the Union must have the opportunity to establish estoppel in this matter based on past practices.

183However, as pointed out by the Employer, the jurisprudence is clear that in order to establish estoppel, there must be a clear link between the alleged representation and a right in the Collective Agreement. This is comprehensively set out In the Board's decision in Eagles, supra, at paragraph 14, where Vice-Chair Petryshen relied on Board jurisprudence to expressly find that a representation relied upon to base an estoppel must have an explicit or inferential link to the Collective Agreement.

184That applies equally with regard to the Hubbard Group Grievance. In the first instance, it is not at all clear that the fact that at other times, in different circumstances, the Employer gave different amounts of notice directing the Grievors to return to the office constitutes a "representation" on which the Grievors were induced to do anything, or can be said to have relied on to their detriment.

185In any event, without an explicit or inferential link to the Collective Agreement, and the Union has identified none, the Employer having given notices of varying lengths cannot support an estoppel argument, or be found to either create or alter a collective agreement right.

186Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, I find the Hubber Grievance has also failed to plead a prima facie case, as the Union has pled no facts, which if accepted as true, could support a finding of a violation of any of the listed agreements, statutes, policies and principles.

Irwin Group Grievance

187The Irwin Group Grievance alleges the Employer abused its management rights and created a toxic workplace by suddenly cancelling the OPS Flexible Workplace Strategy for all staff, with the exception of management and administrative staff. It maintains this decision has adversely affected the mental health of affected staff, which the Employer refuses to acknowledge.

188It further alleges the Employer's approach has not only created inequity within the branch but also across the OPS, where scientists and technologists continue to operate under the OPS Flexible Work Strategy. The Grievance submits this "inequitable" decision was made without considering desk/computer work performed by individual staff.

189The Union particulars simply state that the Employer abused its management rights and created inequality in the workplace by suddenly canceling work arrangements made under the OPS Flexible Work Strategy, breaching the listed agreements, statutes, policies and principles.

190Once again, the particulars provide less factual information than the Grievance. While the Grievance takes issue with Management and Administrative staff being treated differently from the Grievors, the basis for their entitlement to have identical or even similar work arrangements is not set out. Nor do they articulate the requirement to consider their desk/computer work or how that would have affected the entitlements of the Grievors to be treated the same or similarly to Management and Administrative staff.

191Further, there are no facts provided regarding how the decision to cancel the OPS Flexible Work Strategy for all staff other than management and administrative staff create a "toxic" workplace.

192Finally, while the Grievance alleges the Employer's decision has adversely affected the mental health of affected staff, no details regarding these mental health effects, and who was affected have been provided, and what, if any, accommodations in that regard have been requested.

193Essentially, the Employer is left with the understanding that the Grievors are unhappy regarding its decision to cancel the OPS Flexible Work Strategy as it applies to them, but have failed to plead or link any rights or entitlements under the listed agreements, statutes, policies and principles which would entitle them to challenge that decision.

194Accordingly, I find the Union has failed to adequately particularize this Grievance as well.

195Further, in the absence of the Union's failure to plead any facts which, if found to be true could reasonably prove the Union's case, I find the Union has also failed to plead a prima facie case with regard to this Grievance.

Ann-Marie Irwin Abbey Grievance

196This Grievance alleges the Employer abused its management rights by arbitrarily denying the Grievor's request for alternative work arrangements while approving the request of another person in her unit with a similar job description. The Grievance alleges this took away the flexible work arrangements that are available to the rest of the OPS, and violates the listed agreements, statutes, policies and principles.

197The Union particulars simply state that the Employer inappropriately rejected the Grievor's “work from home” accommodation request.

198Once again, there are no particulars regarding the ground on which entitlement to accommodation is claimed; what supporting documentation was provided; who denied the accommodation request; and what other rights and entitlements are alleged pursuant to the other listed agreements, statutes, policies and principles which would entitle the Grievor to challenge that decision.

199Accordingly, I find the Union has failed to adequately particularize this Grievance as well.

200Further, in the absence of having pled any facts, which if found to be true could prove the Union's case, I find the Union has also failed to make out a prima facie case in this instance.

Grievance of Karen Irwin

201In her Grievance, Ms. Irwin alleges the Employer rejected her accommodation request, dated June 30, 2023, to work from home for up to two days per week to work on deskwork, provided she was not needed to be present in the laboratory for physical benchwork. She points out that other staff in LaSB and similar staff throughout the OPS are permitted to work from home two days per week unquestioned when they perform similar deskwork. Ms. Irwin states it is an abuse of power to allow some staff, including themselves, to have a flexible work arrangement, but denied that to other staff.

202In the Union's particulars with regard to this Grievance, the Union simply states that the Employer inappropriately rejected the Grievor's "work from home" accommodation request. The particulars again list the agreements, statutes, policies and principles alleged to have been violated.

203Once again, I find the particulars in this instance fail to set out the nature of Ms. Irwin's accommodation request. As pointed out by the Employer, the missing particulars include: the enumerated ground pursuant to which the accommodation was sought; the supporting information contained in the accommodation request; why the Grievor's accommodation request was contingent on when she is “needed to be in the laboratory for physical benchwork”, instead of providing information regarding the restrictions and limitations the Employer is allegedly required to accommodate; why the actions or arrangements of other staff are relevant to her individualized accommodation request; and, why the Union is asserting the arrangements of other staff in LaSB and across the OPS are relevant in any way to her individualized accommodation request; and finally, how it is an alleged abuse of power to grant arrangements to some staff and not others.

204In addition to the critical missing information set out by the Employer, referenced above, I might add there is no information regarding who denied the accommodation request, or the other staff who she believes have unfairly been given a more favourable work schedule are.

205Nor is there any no indication what other rights and entitlements are alleged pursuant to the listed agreements, statutes, and policies which would entitle the Grievor to challenge the Employer's decision.

206While I find that Ms. Irwin has provided sufficient particulars regarding the specific accommodation she requested, this is insufficient to satisfy the requirement to give full particulars.

207Rather, I find that neither the Grievance nor the particulars provide sufficient information required by the Employer to know the case it must meet.

208As a result, I find this Grievance has not been adequately particularized.

209Further, in the absence of having pled any facts, which if found to be true could prove the Union's case, I find the Union has also failed to make out a prima facie case in this instance.

CONCLUSION:

210Accordingly, I find that none of the Grievances have been adequately particularized, or have pled a prima facie case.

211They stand to be dismissed on that basis.

NEXT STEP:

212The Union submits that if its initial particulars are determined to be insufficient, the Union should be given the opportunity to resubmit them.

213While the Employer agreed that in similar motions, specific deficiencies in the particulars can be identified and addressed, it maintained that in this instance, the particulars are entirely insufficient in every respect, and it is not simply a matter of pointing to specific parts of the particulars which are wanting. It maintained that every single paragraph is insufficient and completely devoid of the required level of detail.

214The Employer submits this is a complete abdication of the Union's obligation to provide the Employer with timely information in order to facilitate the efficient and expeditious resolution of disputes, whether through litigation or a mediated settlement.

215The Employer points out the Board's jurisprudence is clear that it has the power to dismiss a grievance if the Union does not provide sufficient particulars or identify a prima facie breach of the Collective Agreement in its particulars.

216The Employer submits there is no reason to give the Union any further opportunities to submit revised particulars based on what has occurred to date, and requests the Board dismiss these Grievances in their entirety, as there is absolutely no reason to allow the Union a second opportunity to correct its entirely insufficient particulars.

DISPOSITION:

217Articles 22.14.4 and 22.14.5 set out the requirement to provide "full disclosure" with regard to the issues and facts to be relied on by the parties and to do so "at the earliest stage of the grievance procedure" demonstrate a desire and agreement to avoid exactly what has occurred in this instance.

218The Grievances were filed between July and September 2023. The Employer requested particulars from the Union on March 28, April 26 and May 24, 2024.

219No particulars were provided by the first dates scheduled for this matter on June 27, 2024, and the matter was set down again for hearing for April 29, 2025. On the morning of April 29, 2025, the Union finally provided the particulars addressed in this decision. The Employer, on review of these particulars, immediately advised of its intention to bring these motions. The Employer then brought its motions, via written submissions, on September 12, 2025.

220Yet, after a significant expenditure of time and resources, the parties are essentially where they were when these Grievances were brought - without adequate particulars or a prima facie case for the Employer to know the case it has to meet.

221While the Union pointed out that any failure the Board may find to produce full particulars, was not in the face of a Board order, it cannot be that parties can simply wait for a Board order to comply with Articles 22.14.4 and 22.14.5, and only then provide what they are required under the Collective Agreement and rules of fairness to provide. The delay and waste of resources would be unsustainable.

222Further, while the Union has suggested that the Employer could simply send its questions, to which it would respond, the reality is that given the dearth of particulars, the primary questions would be "what are these grievances about?” As pointed out by the Employer, unlike other instances where parties are giving an opportunity to essentially fill in gaps in their particulars, in this instance, the absence of almost any particulars results in a large void, rather than a few gaps in details.

223What the Union is essentially suggesting is that now we actually begin the exchange of information.

224However, I find the Union's failure to provide even the most basic particulars to date should not be rewarded by yet more delay, to enable the Union to now do what it ought to have done in the Spring of 2024, when asked several times for its particulars.

225Accordingly, while I accept that, as the Board said in Gates, supra, that the outright dismissal of a grievance for lack of particulars is to be treated as an extraordinary remedy, I find these facts call for such an extraordinary remedy.

226The broader interests of the parties, articulated in Articles 22.14.4 and 22.14.5, which speak to the critical need for the full and timely exchange of information in order to efficiently and fairly resolve the disputes which arise between the parties must be respected, as does the integrity of the Board's processes.

227For all the reasons set out above this consolidated Grievance is dismissed.