GSB# 2022-9776

UNION# 2022-0135-0034

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

Under

THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT

Before

THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD

BETWEEN

Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Beckford)

Union

• and -

The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of the Solicitor General)

Employer

BEFORE

Tatiana Wacyk

Arbitrator

FOR THE UNION

Robert Healey Ryder Wright Holmes Bryden Nam LLP Counsel

FOR THE EMPLOYER

Regina Wong Treasury Board Secretariat Legal Services Branch Counsel

HEARING

October 19, 2023; March 7; April 4, 11, October 17, November 12, 19, 2024; January 30; May 20; October 2, 9, 23 and 30, 2025

Decision

1The Grievor, K’jell Beckford, was a Correctional Officer (“CO”) at the South West Detention Centre (“SWDC”).

2On November 2, 2022, the Grievor’s employment was terminated for the following reason:

1. On September 14, 2022, while participating in lockup procedures in Unit A5, you used excessive and unnecessary force on an inmate which was inconsistent to the threat posed. Specifically, it is alleged that:

a) You delivered no less than 10 closed fist strikes to the head and facial area of the inmate.

3This decision deals with the Grievance challenging that termination.

4Witnesses were excluded on consent.

BACKGROUND:

The Grievor

5At the time of the termination of his employment, the Grievor had been a CO for more than 6 years. During that time, he received positive performance reviews and a commendation, dated September 15, 2021, for his “excellent work” in stopping the flow of contraband into the Institution. His January 22, 2022 performance review indicated he met and in some instances “Exceeded Expectations”.

6The Grievor was described by Employer witnesses as a “good employee” who was “professional, resourceful and respectful”, and one who was identified for succession planning for a management position. He was also considered for the tactical team, which is limited to “good performers”. He had no prior disciplines.

7The Grievor was also viewed as having the qualities to work in the Direct Supervision Unit. These were listed as follows in the Direct Supervision Self-Directed Learning Guide as follows:

3. Competent Staff

• The officer must have the knowledge and skills to provide leadership,

• Supervise in a clear well-organized manner

• Resolve problems and conflicts

• enforce rules

• Respond to requests, build positive rapport and personal credibility, control privileges and monitor behaviour.

8Indeed, the Grievor was assigned to the Direct Supervision Unit at the time of the incident, and it was on that unit the incident leading to the termination of his employment occurred.

9The concept of the Direct Supervision Unit, simply described, is to facilitate the rehabilitation of inmates by interacting with them in a more direct and personal rather than custodial manner. The goal is to help them accept and deal with authority, so as to enable them to do so outside the institution, particular in employment situations.

10Brian Janisse, Special Projects Advisor for the Ministry, indicated this involves developing a closer relationship to the inmates by developing a better sense of who they are, what they are feeling and what might happen, with a view to being better equipped to proactively prevent escalation of disputes or stop a fight.

11This includes using what is described on page 28 in the Self-Directed Learning Guide as “Dynamic Security”:

Dynamic Security - Refers to control and influencing of inmates through increasing personal knowledge of the inmates by such means as interaction, observation, sharing of information, analysis and judicious use of incentives and disincentives.

12Perhaps most significant in this instance, this includes engaging in “Effective Supervision” described at page 44 as follows:

2. Effective Supervision

Direct supervision facilities require the officer’s station to be located inside the dayroom. The officer uses dynamic process to:

• Continuously interact with the offenders to convey and reinforce expectations for positive behaviour

• Hold offenders accountable for negative behaviour

• When the officer is the leader of the unit rather than allowing offenders to control one another, both will be far safer.

Inmate S

13The OTIS Inmate profile, under "Management Risk", effective August 18, 2018, identified the inmate as being a "High Risk Offender” for the following reason:

INMATE SERIOUSLY ASSAULTED INMATE [“XXX”] IN AREA 3 OF SARNIA JAIL - VICTIM TAKEN TO HOSPITAL - A PERIOD OF VICTIM BEING UNCONSCIOUS - HIDDEN IN CELL AFTER THE ASSAULT

14The Inmate’s Observation Sheet also shows a highlighted caution as follows: “KNOWN TO ASSAULT STAFF”.

15The Inmate Observation Sheet also contains two references of note in December 2019. In the first instance, the notation indicates he became assaultive to staff, requiring OC spray and a Use of Force, resulting in the Inmate being placed on the Special Handling Unit. The second notation indicated the Inmate remained on the Special Handling Unit and grew agitated when his cell was searched. He stated “when shit like this happens I go off” and he made several threats about “going off” again.

16In July 2022, the notes indicate the Inmate was verbally aggressive toward staff when told to return to his cell.

17In early August 2022, the notes indicate the Inmate was involved in a cell fight with an inmate. On August 16 & 17, 2022 the notes indicate the Inmate was aggressive and confrontational with COs.

18On August 23 & 24, 2022, the Inmate was denied gym access because of the number of sanctions and disciplines he had attracted.

19The next entry regarding the Inmate’s aggression toward COs is the incident resulting in the termination of the Grievor’s employment.

20Prior to the interaction which led to his termination, the Grievor had had one other physical encounter with this Inmate. The incident occurred in December of 2019, when the Grievor responded to a code blue alarm in the behaviour management unit.

21The Grievor testified that when he arrived on the scene, he saw the Inmate at the back of the room, with his back against the wall. There were three COs on one side and three or four COs on the other side. However, despite their numbers, the COs could not get the Inmate into a prone position. The Grievor could also smell OC spray, indicating it had been deployed.

22The Grievor then entered and performed a single leg takedown to get the Inmate into a prone position. The COs then turned the Inmate on to his stomach, but he continued to resist, and attempted to get back up. OC spray was deployed once more, but the only response was that the Inmate closed his eyes. He continued to resist and remained non-compliant. The Grievor then administered knee strikes to the Inmate’s upper leg, and he finally stopped resisting and was cuffed.

23The Use of Force Local Investigative Report (“LIR”) from that occurrence described the incident as follows:

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT:

On Monday, December 02, 2019 approximately 1425 hours following the completion of a Unit Search, Staff were explaining to Inmate why a contraband item (Dream catcher) was removed from his cell. Inmate became irate and suddenly rushed the door and attempted to exit his cell as Officers were about to secure the cell door. A struggle ensued and Inmate was able to push out from the cell resulting in a struggle with Officers and a Use of Force. During this incident, Inmate continued to refused staff Order's to get on the ground and resisted Officer's efforts to place him in a prone position. He continued to resist, kicking at them with his left leg and swinging at staff with his left arm. After deployment of OC Foam and with the assistance of additional Officers, Inmate was placed in a prone position where he continued to resist Officers. Mechanical Restraints and Leg Irons were applied and Inmate was escorted off the Unit to Unit A3 shower to decontaminate.

24The Use of Force ORs of the COs who participated in some manner in that incident were not filed as exhibits, so the degree and nature of their participation was not apparent. However, I note that there were nine COs, including the Grievor, listed as participants. This corresponds with the Grievor’s account that numerous COs were required to gain control over the Inmate.

25That Incident is also referenced in the Discipline Summary created in the context of the Grievor’s discipline in this instance. It describes the incident as follows:

The LIR does note that the inmate offered heavy resistance, multiple staff were required to subdue him and during the incident he did assault Officers.

EVIDENCE:

26The Employer called the following witnesses: Brian Janisse, Special Projects Advisor for the Ministry; Robert R. Houston, Accountabilities Manager; and Dean Dunne, Deputy Director of Regional Operations in the Western Region.

27The Union called the Grievor to testify.

28Both parties relied on closed circuit television video (CCTV) recordings of the incidents at issue and they were reviewed numerous times.

Employer

Robert R. Houston

29As indicated above, Mr. Houston is the Accountabilities Manager for the Ministry, and oversees legal proceedings and any use of force inquires that require expert opinion or overview. He was accepted, on consent, as an expert in the use of force and defensive tactics in connection with the Ministry's policies.

30Mr. Houston reviewed the videos and use of force reports regarding the incident which resulted in the termination of the Grievor’s employment. He provided a Will Say statement based on his review, and testified in the hearing. A somewhat abbreviated version of his evidence is set out below.

Use of Force Training in General

31Mr. Houston indicated that correctional employees who may be required to use force in the course of their duties receive training regarding allowable Use of Force (UOF) and excessive UOF. The training is provided in courses including "Basic Training" and "Defensive Tactics".

32Training for correctional employees follows the requirements and obligations set out in s. 7 of Reg. 778 of the Ministry of Correctional Services Act (the "Act"). Further to s. 7(1), correctional employees are only allowed to use force in order to:

(a) enforce discipline and maintain order within the institution;

(b) defend the employee or another employee or inmate from assault;

(c) control a rebellious or disturbed inmate; or

(d) conduct a search.

33If force must be used, s. 7(2) prescribes how much force is permissible:

When an employee uses force against an inmate, the amount of force used shall be reasonable and not excessive having regard to the nature of the threat posed by the inmate and all other circumstances of the case.

34In addition to the Act, Ministry policies set out when and how force may be used. Further to such policies, any UOF must be reasonable, authorized and justified based on all the circumstances and taking into consideration the totality of the situation and the threat posed.

35In assessing the circumstances, correctional employees are trained to look to factors that include but are not limited to the following:

a. The number of correctional employees in the immediate area versus the number of inmates;

b. The security of the area, e.g. is the correctional employee in an enclosed space or an open area with multiple escape routes;

c. Available options, in the event that the inmate becomes assaultive;

d. Immediate threat(s) to the correctional employee’s safety or the safety of colleagues or the inmate;

e. UOF options available in the circumstances;

f. The employee and inmate’s profile (e.g. size, age, gender, previous history, etc.)

36Based on an assessment of the circumstances, the CO chooses an appropriate response. In his testimony, Mr. Houston indicated that response is based on what, from the CO’s “good faith” perspective is necessary.

37Mr. Houston noted that in the overwhelming majority of situations, UOF training calls for correctional employees to start by issuing a verbal command in order to give the inmate an opportunity to comply.

38If the inmate does not comply, then the appropriate response can be identified using the UOF Management Model. In all situations, the officer must choose the least intrusive option, and, if possible, attempts are to be made to de-escalate the situation prior to any use of force. The UOF management model begins with verbal intervention, de-escalation techniques, and tactical communication. If those are not effective, and the inmate is physically uncooperative, correctional employees may move to "hands-on" techniques, i.e. physical handling, which is typically a "joint-locking" technique. If those are not effective, then the correctional employee may progress to physical take-downs and/or application of mechanical restraints.

39Throughout the process, the correctional employee should be giving verbal direction to the inmate in order to inform the inmate of what is required. This is in order to gain or maintain compliance. In all UOF situations, the correctional employee's role is defensive, and the objective is to gain or maintain control. “Control” is established when the inmate complies with direction.

40Any force used must be consistent with the profile behavior of the inmate as outlined in the UOF Management Model. Any force must be reasonable, authorized, justified and not excessive. Force options available are fluid: as the inmate's profile behaviour diminishes, so do the correctional employee's force options. This means the Officer must quickly adapt to the behavioural patterns of the inmate.

41Correctional employees are taught a number of skills and techniques to handle situations that escalate. One type of technique that is taught by the Ministry are distraction techniques which can be used in a defensive nature in order to take physical control of an inmate or escape from an immediate threat.

42Distraction techniques are intended to separate the mind from the body, take the focus of the inmate away from his/her intended goal, create lag time, and diminish the strength being used against the officer. Distractions can be physical or verbal in nature (shouting) with the intention of the Officer to escape to safety, call for backup, prevent assault, or gain control of an inmate. Physical distractions are not limited to the techniques taught in training as there are a wide variety of techniques that can be justified based on the threat posed and totality of the situation.

43UOF is always taught to be a last resort, after all other options have been considered.

September 14, 2022 - Occurrence Leading to the Termination of the Grievor's Employment

44With respect to the September 14, 2022 occurrence involving the Grievor, Mr. Houston indicated he reviewed the LIR and supporting documents, as well as the available CCTV recordings of the occurrence. The incident took place on the Mezzanine level of the Direct Supervision Unit.

45As will be seen below, Mr. Houston has incorporated elements of the Grievor’s information into his Will Say.

46Mr. Houston notes the Grievor’s Use of Force Occurrence Report (OR) indicates that he was initiating lock-up, and directing inmates to return to their respective cells for the evening.

47Inmate S had cleaning supplies in his possession and appeared intent on taking them into his cell. The Grievor informed Inmate S that all cleaning supplies are to be accounted for at shift change-over, for the oncoming officer to inspect.

48As seen on the CCTV recording, Inmate S then dropped the cleaning supplies on the floor when he was denied access to his cell with the cleaning equipment. Mr. Houston testified that Inmate S appeared agitated from this first interaction, as the video shows that other inmates and the COs on the main floor turned their attention to the exchange.

49The Grievor then attempted to negotiate with Inmate S by offering a solution, i.e. suggesting the Inmate inform the incoming officer of his interest to use the supplies.

50Mr. Houston notes that at that point Inmate S seemed to be physically agitated, as the CCTV recording shows an increase in his walking pace and posturing in his stance. The Grievor indicated that Inmate S was verbally assaultive towards him.

51The CCTV recording shows there were other unsecured inmates in the immediate area and in other areas of the unit. Mr. Houston points out this is a consideration for an increased threat assessment and identified as an Officer/Subject impact factor for officer perception.

52The CCTV recording then shows the Grievor in an “interview” stance approximately two feet away. Mr. Houston notes COs are taught to use the interview stance when interacting with inmates whenever possible, based on relative positioning and space. This stance is considered non-threatening in nature while allowing the CO to protect himself should the situation escalate.

53The CCTV recording and submitted reports show that Inmate S continued to display aggressive indicators such as glaring, direct eye contact, shoulders back, rapid hand movements and bladed off-foot stance.

54Mr. Houston points out that COs are encouraged to observe and engage inmates in conversation and commence de-escalation tactics when required. He also notes, however, that the conversations may not always result in a positive interaction, but that it is imperative that the communication continues to ensure safety and security of the dayroom, other inmates, and staff. Verbal and paraverbal indicators of hostile behaviour can be observed and recorded to assist with reporting all circumstances of the event.

The Grievor's Direct Orders

55The Grievor continued to engage Inmate S in conversation in front of the cell door. The Grievor appears to be pointing inside of the cell and his OR indicates he was providing clear direction for the Inmate to enter his cell. However, Inmate S was physically uncooperative, not complying with this direction. Instead he called the Grievor a "Fucking Goof".

56Mr. Houston points out that in inmate subculture, the term "Goof" is regarded as the highest level of insult. He notes COs should be aware of the implications of the use of this term, as it can be a valuable indicator of the threat of assault, and assist with a proper threat assessment. The Grievor ‘s Use of Force OR indicates that, in fact, the Inmate called him a Goof, twice.

57The first instance was in response to the Grievor directing the Inmate to pick the cleaning equipment up and give it to him, to which the Inmate responded: “You do it goof”.

58The Grievor responded that the Inmate would be placed “on a sanction”, and directed him to enter his cell in order to be secured. He indicates Inmate S began to raise his voice further, and became more physically agitated by balling up his fist and “shrugging” his shoulders. He then stated: OK then make me you fucking goof.”

59Mr. Houston notes the CCTV recording shows that the Grievor and Inmate S continued to engage in conversation. Based on the body language and abrupt gestures by both parties, Mr. Houston observed that the de-escalation tactics appeared not to be effective in defusing the situation.

60Mr. Houston indicates that at one point Inmate S did fully enter the cell, and as the door was going to close behind him, the Grievor stopped the door from closing. This is contested by the Grievor, who maintains that the Inmate was still holding the door open with his heel, and that unless the door is pressed from the outside, it comes to rest on the pin. Mr. Houston also agreed, while testifying, that it was entirely possible that even if the Grievor had attempted to push the door closed, the Inmate would have pushed it open. (I note that is what happened in the December 2019 episode described above in paragraph 24)

61While Mr. Houston indicated it is unclear whether the door would need to be pressed to engage the locking mechanism, the Grievor testified that inmates don’t let the door slam shut. Rather, it is a subculture rule that they hold the door with their butt or heel, then slowly walk in so that the door comes to rest on the pin. Then COs secure the door.

62In any event, Mr. Houston opines that the time at which the door is partially closed is a “key moment” in this interaction, and that had the door been secured, the threat of assault by Inmate S would have been greatly diminished. That would have enabled the Grievor to continue with his secondary options such as misconduct placement, manager notification and allow the situation to gradually degrade based on a secure barrier.

63However, Inmate S then reopened the door aggressively by pushing it hard with his right foot. The Grievor reported that at that point, the Inmate also directed his cell partner to pack his belongings.

64Mr. Houston points out this can be an additional indicator that the Inmate's profile behaviour was about to escalate, as the Inmate is suggesting he will likely not be returning to his cell.

65The Grievor testified that he also understood this to mean that the Inmate anticipated being moved for disciplinary reasons, as an Inmate’s belongings accompany them when that occurs.

66When Inmate S reopened the door, CO Adam Bergeron, the Grievor’s shift partner, entered the video frame. CO Bergeron appeared calm and positioned himself close to the railing, approximately three feet away from Inmate S, and observed the escalating interaction.

67The CCTV recording shows Inmate S slid his right foot back, balled his right fist and clenched his jaw. Mr. Houston points out these are high indicators of an impending physical assault, and the Inmate's profile, according to the Use of Force Management Model, was in the “assaultive behaviour” category.

68CO Bergeron disengaged from his position and continued past the Inmate. He confirmed the cells behind Inmate S were secured, and then returned to a tactical position behind Inmate S.

69Mr. Houston points out that relative positioning is part of the safety techniques taught in training to enhance officer and inmate safety. He observes that based on the CCTV recording, the Grievor appeared to be very close to Inmate S and would have benefited from more distance to allow for more reaction time.

OC deployment

70The CCTV shows the Grievor drawing his Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) canister from his holster and shaking it in front of Inmate S. Mr. Houston notes that shaking of the OC canister in front of an inmate can be considered an intimidation tactic and is not consistent with training. However, Mr. Houston also notes that Inmate S's profile behavior was verbally resistant, physically uncooperative, and he was in a “fighting stance” at the time the Grievor drew his canister.

71In that regard, Mr. Houston testified that the Inmate’s body language was on the “more aggressive side” i.e. his right hand was balling up and his shoulders became more rounded, and he appeared to be glaring at the Grievor more. Mr. Houston testified that these are all indications that something is going to happen, and that it all changed “within a few seconds”.

72Mr. Houston also noted the Inmate’s apparent lack of concern regarding CO Bergeron being present. He comments that in some cases the presence of a second CO results in a diminished threat level, but that was not the case in this instance.

73As will be seen below, most importantly, in my view, Mr. Houston notes that the Grievor’s OR indicates that he had knowledge of Inmate S's previous profile behavior and high potential to become physically assaultive. Mr. Houston points out this information is helpful prior to the use of force as it lends to the Officer/Subject impact factors that help assess, plan, and act on an impending situation.

74Mr. Houston also points out that COs should inform a manager of a potential threat prior to engaging in a use of force if the situation does not require immediate intervention, but conceded, in cross-examination, that he was not suggesting that ought to have somehow have occurred in this instance.

75He does point out there were no apparent barriers preventing the Grievor from tactically stepping back, while keeping full visual contact of Inmate S, and that such strategies are taught in Defensive Tactics practical training movement drill.

76Mr. Houston notes that after the Grievor took out and shook his OC canister, Inmate S then took a step towards the Grievor, and the Grievor responded by deployed his OC foam to his head and facial area.

77Mr. Houston opines the Grievor could have used better de-escalation skills and relative positioning to help alleviate the confrontation.

78Mr. Houston also suggests the Grievor could have disengaged with the intention of re-engaging at several key moments leading up to the use of force.

79That having been said, Mr. Houston indicated that it was his opinion, based on the totality of the situation, once the situation escalated, the Grievor’s deployment of OC can be justified and is reasonable. He notes Inmate S's stance, body language, and verbal cues were key factors in this decision, as well as CO Bergeron's positioning in relation to the Inmate, a safe exit, and an approximate 9-foot drop to the ground over the railing.

80Mr. Houston points out the threat of imminent danger from Inmate S at the time the OC was deployed was very high.

81Mr. Houston further noted that OC is to be deployed at a minimum of three feet to prevent hydraulic needle effect, but in this instance, Inmate S decreased the spacing by lunging towards the Grievor, and it appears the deployment took place within three feet. Mr. Houston indicated the Grievor should have anticipated that Inmate S could become assaultive, including in response to the OC deployment, and increased his spacing from Inmate S.

82The Grievor then holstered his OC canister and engaged in physical contact. The CCTV recording shows that Inmate S tucked his head and began to throw overhead punches with both arms towards the Grievor. Reports do not indicate if continued tactical communication was used as per training standards after deployment. However, the Grievor punched back.

Punches

83After holstering his OC canister, the CCTV recording shows the Grievor initially places his hands on the midsection area of Inmate S, which Mr. Houston suggested may have been an attempt to gain control of Inmate S's arms. However, despite OC foam around his eyes and forehead, and his eyes being closed, Inmate S is seen throwing uncontrolled punches at the Grievor. Mr. Houston testified the size of the Inmate suggests these were “heavy punches”.

84Mr. Houston points out that COs are taught a number of techniques, including defensive stance positioning, re-directs, blocks, step-and-glides and escapes to minimize or avoid strikes from inmates. However, the Grievor did not use any of these techniques. Rather, while attempting to gain physical control of Inmate S's arms, the Grievor received one clear punch to the facial area that knocked his glasses off. CO Bergeron was seen reaching forward with both hands from behind Inmate S and taking hold of his right arm.

85The Grievor responded by throwing punches at Inmate S as their body momentum moved down the corridor towards the corner of the mezzanine. CO Bergeron continued to hold on to the Inmate’s right arm and was spun around to the opposite side of the Inmate, away from the Grievor. CO Bergeron was then moved out of range of the CCTV recording. Both Inmate S and the Grievor are seen exchanging punches for a short period of time. it is not clear how many connected with the other.

86Mr. Houston notes the Grievor did report that he employed multiple "closed fists strikes" to the face and ribs of Inmate S. "Strikes" taught in training are to be delivered as a distraction technique in an open hand fashion to the facial area, or by the knee to the nerve bundle in the leg.

87Mr. Houston indicated COs are expected to use taught techniques or modified taught techniques. All taught training tactics are designed to be utilized in close spaces. Some techniques for this situation are disengage, checks or re-direct, roundhouse punch escape, straight punch escape, 1 ½ or 2½ take-down technique. Throughout the process, clear and direct orders should be given to the inmate.

88However, Mr. Houston conceded that by the time the altercation rounded the corner, it would have been difficult for the Grievor to transition to another technique, given the limited space and the “rapid use of punches utilized by the Inmate.”

89Mr. Houston points out that the punches thrown by the Grievor are not a taught technique. However, COs can use techniques not taught if they can justify the force used as reasonable and not excessive, having regard to the nature of the threat posed by the inmate and all other circumstances of the case.

90Mr. Houston indicates that while the Grievor may be able to justify the punches while Inmate S is engaging in punching, he states that once Inmate S stopped throwing punches, the Grievor’s punches were no longer reasonable or justified.

91Mr. Houston identified that transition as being when the CCTV recording shows Inmate S covering his head with both hands in a crouched stance, while the Grievor continued to deliver multiple closed-fists punches “toward” Inmate S's head and upper body area while he was in this position.

92Mr. Houston indicated that at that point, the Grievor failed to adjust his response to the threat posed when the inmate crouched over and covered his head. However, Mr. Houston also notes that while Inmate S could have been compliant, he may have also been blocking the punches with the intention to retaliate with more of his own punches. Mr. Houston conceded, in cross-examination, that covering one’s head with one's hands is a classic boxing technique. He also conceded that despite the Inmate’s posture, the Grievor did not have control of the situation.

93Finally, Mr. Houston also agreed that it is important that the control techniques utilized are consistent with the profile behaviour of the inmate.

94However, Mr. Houston was critical that the Grievor did not continuously assess, plan and act while he continued to punch the Inmate. While he acknowledges the Grievor reported that space was a factor in his force option choice, he suggests the Grievor had a variety of other options such as attempting a takedown designed to be utilized in closed spaces and minimize injury to the inmate and CO.

95In any event, as seen on the CCTV recording, CO Ryan Blevins arrives on the scene while the Grievor is continuing to throw punches toward the Inmate. At this time, CO Bergeron appears to be pinned against the corner wall while attempting to secure one of the Inmate's limbs.

96The Grievor, and COs Bergeron, and Blevins were then able to ground Inmate S face down on the floor. Mr. Houston notes, however, that reports indicate that he continued to be verbally abusive and physically uncooperative. However, the Grievor was subsequently able to handcuff the Inmate’s arms behind his back.

97In his conclusion, Mr. Houston’s considered the Grievor’s rational for why he used closed fist strikes to defend himself. This included the deep laceration to his lip resulting from the punch he received from the Inmate. Other factors include the heavy weight of Inmate S; the presence of multiple inmates in the immediate area; the lack of space to initiate a takedown technique; and, the overall risk to himself and his partner.

98Based on the totality of the situation, with considerations to the impact factors and special circumstances reviewed on the CCTV recordings and reported by the primary officers, Mr. Houston concluded that the initial punches thrown by the Grievor may be justified and deemed reasonable based on the totality of the situation.

99However, he also concluded the Grievor failed to use a reasonable amount of force once the Inmate covered his head and stopped throwing punches, and that the punches thrown after that point were excessive and not justifiable. However, he conceded in cross-examination that he did not know if any of the punches actually landed, and had seen no evidence of an injury to the Inmate.

100Significantly, when advised that in the previous (December 2019) incident with this Inmate, several COs were required to bring him under control, and that even when he was on the ground he continued to punch and resist, Mr. Houston indicated he was not aware that was the case. He agreed that in that case, that knowledge and understanding would be relevant to the Grievor’s assessment and planning, as well as decisions regarding disengagement.

101Mr. Houston agreed that even though the three COs grounded the Inmate, he was not under immediate control when grounded, and that his behaviour at that point, i.e. verbally abusive and physically uncooperative, was consistent with the Grievor’s knowledge of the Inmate’s past conduct.

Brian Janisse

102It was Mr. Janisse, Deputy Superintendent of Operations at the time, who terminated the Grievor’s employment.

103When it was suggested to him, that in view of the Inmate’s history of assaulting COs, this Inmate should not have been in the direct supervision unit at the time, Mr. Janisse was somewhat equivocal. He indicated that while he wouldn’t argue there weren’t better candidates, the Institution was experiencing “capacity issues”. He also pointed out that inmates’ behaviour changes over time, and they are constantly evaluated regarding the appropriateness of putting them in the Direct Supervision Unit. He noted that there were lengthy periods in Inmate S’s Observation Sheet which indicated he was compliant and receptive to direction.

104However, Mr. Janisse agreed that the direct supervision model requires a high level of interaction with inmates, and interacting with inmates rather that using force is expected in instances where there is disagreement and conflict. He conceded the video showed that the Grievor was following this model of supervision, it was his view that as the dialogue became more heated, the Grievor ought to have locked the Inmate in his cell before telling him he was going to be sanctioned for his conduct, as that information is not usually well received.

105Mr. Janisse was also of the view that the Grievor missed an opportunity to avoid the escalation of the dynamic by failing to close the door, securing the Inmate inside.

106However, Mr. Janisse also agreed with Mr. Houston that the Grievor's deployment of OC spray was justified, and that one of the risks at that time was the 9’ drop over the railing, given that the incident occurred on the 2nd floor.

107Mr. Janisse also agreed that the Grievor stopped punching the inmate before he was under control.

108While Mr. Janisse testified that at the very least, he believes the punches at issue, i.e. when the Inmate was crouched and covering his head, connected with the Inmate’s hands, but he did not know if any actually connected with his head.

109Mr. Janisse also agreed that having been struck in the face; having lost his glasses; the danger of the 9’ drop over the railing; and, the prior incident when several COs were required to restrain the Inmate, were all legitimate considerations at the time the Grievor was attempting to restrain the Inmate.

110Mr. Janisse further agreed the Grievor had good cause to consider himself in danger of harm.

111However, Mr. Janisse maintained that once the Inmate was no longer throwing punches, the Grievor ought to have stopped to assess whether the Inmate’s intentions were to comply or to keep fighting. He conceded, however, that as Mr. Houston noted, when the Inmate was crouched with his hands covering his head he could have been compliant, or it could have been a ruse, with the intent to retaliate with more of his own punches at the first opportunity, and added: “I guess we will never know”.

112Finally, Mr. Janisse also conceded that even after the Grievor stopped throwing punches, the Inmate remained physically uncooperative and non-compliant. He agreed the threat from this Inmate did not disappear.

Dean Dunne

113Mr. Dunne’s evidence was essentially consistent with that of Mr. Houston and Mr. Janisse, in that he was of the view the Grievor missed an opportunity to avoid the escalation to a physical altercation when he pulled the Inmate’s cell door open as it was closing. He maintained the Grievor should have let the door close and disengaged.

114In cross-examination, on viewing the video, Mr. Dunn conceded that at the time at issue, the Inmate did not fully enter the cell, as his left shoulder was still holding the door open. He also agreed that in order to close the door, the Grievor would have had to push against the Inmate. However, he indicated that while he was previously unaware that was the case, he remained of the view the door should have been closed.

115In that regard, Mr. Dunne opined that the Grievor knew the Inmate was difficult and could fight through OC spray. In those circumstances, the course of action should have been disengagement, securing the cell and then returning with reinforcement.

116Mr. Dunne also took issue with the Grievor shaking the OC spray before deploying it. He indicated this was not part of training and could be seen as intimidation. However, he also conceded, in cross-examination, there was no policy prohibiting shaking the OC canister.

117In addition, while it was initially Mr. Dunn’s view that the OC spray was deployed much too close to the Inmate’s face, he conceded in cross-examination that the video shows that the Inmate “leans in a bit and unfortunately creates an unsafe distance.”

118Mr. Dunne also testified he did not see any risk of the Grievor being thrown over the railing, but conceded that it was fair to say that any time a CO is involved in a physical struggle on the mezzanine, it is reasonable to consider the risking of going over the railing.

119Mr. Dunne further agreed that after the Grievor was struck in the face and had his glasses knocked off, he needed to defend himself, as the Inmate continued to approach.

120Mr. Dunne further maintained the Inmate was compliant when he started to cower and protect his head from the Grievor’s punches, and that it would have been appropriate for the Grievor to “stop fighting” and disengage at that point. However, he agreed, again in cross-examination, that at that point the Inmate was not restrained or grounded.

121When advised the Grievor’s evidence would be that CO Bergeron was yelling at the Inmate to “stop and get on the floor” but he failed to do so, Mr. Dunne agreed that, if that was the case, the Inmate was also not at all compliant at that point. He subsequently agreed that it was a distinct possibility that rather than complying, the Inmate was positioning himself to continue the assault.

122When advised the Grievor’s evidence would, in fact, be that the Inmate continued to struggle even when grounded, and until restraints were put on him, Mr. Dunne indicated he did not disagree.

123Mr. Dunne conceded that the Ministry view was that the Grievor was a “good guy", but indicated that was not sufficient to counter the excessive number of strikes deployed. While he believed the punches numbered about 10 or 11, he was not sure.

124Mr. Dunne also indicated that during the “quantum call” resulting in the decision to terminate the Grievor’s employment, the actual number of punches deployed was not discussed.

125Finally, Mr. Dunne conceded that it was hard to tell from the video recording if any of the punches actually landed on the Inmate.

Union

Kajal Beckford

126The Grievor testified that he viewed his employment as a Correctional Officer as a career, and had invested in it as such. He had undertaken voluntary training, and sought counsel from those with more knowledge. He indicated he took the job seriously and thought he had found his “home”.

127The Grievor testified regarding his prior interaction with Inmate S, as set out in paragraphs 20 – 25, above. He described the Inmate as extremely belligerent and disdainful of authority and the COs efforts to speak with him and calm things down. The Grievor further indicated that he had anger management issues and was “difficult to control.”

128He further indicated that Inmate S did not subscribe to the direct supervision model, or any of the tenets that make it successful. He was not only not willing to interact with staff, but actively prevented other inmates from doing so.

129The Grievor indicated that he, as well as other COs, had had multiple conversations, including with the Block Sergeant, regarding having Inmate S moved out of the Direct Supervision Unit, but as the institution was experiencing severe overcrowding, they were told to resort to “unit sanctions” to manage him.

130The Grievor filled in what had, until his testimony, been the missing element of dialogue which accompanied the altercation. In light of this already somewhat lengthy decision, I will attempt to convey a somewhat abbreviated version.

131As indicated by Mr. Houston, the Inmate wanted to take cleaning equipment into his cell. While not normally an issue, it was immediately prior to the shift change, as at the end of each shift, all such materials must be accounted for. Accordingly, the Grievor directed Inmate S to return the cleaning supplies, but pointed out he could request them back from the incoming CO. However, the Inmate responded “You do it Goof”. At the same time, Inmate S was “swearing under his breath”, saying he was being “set off”, “targeted” and “disrespected”.

132The Grievor indicated he had never had a conversation with Inmate S so he thought he might feel less disrespected if the Grievor attempted to build a rapport with him. In that regard, the Grievor advised Inmate S it was not in his character to disrespect anyone, and suggested they take the “temperature down”. The Grievor asked the Inmate how he disrespected him. However, the Inmate indicated the Grievor was always “setting him off”. The Grievor then asked if it was by asking him to do something that was required by protocol, as in this instance? At that point, another inmate, who had been holding the cell door open and listening to the exchange, picked up the cleaning equipment, and apparently returned it.

133The Grievor continued to attempt to develop a rapport, and indicated he was confused, again asking how he was disrespecting Inmate S, and pointing out he was not asking him to do anything other than what was required by protocol.

134It was about that time that Inmate S was entering the cell and the door was closing. The Grievor testified that at no point was the Inmate fully within the cell, but rather stopped it with his heel. The Grievor indicated that this occurred at the same time he placed his hand on the door.

135In any event, the Grievor testified that he could not have closed the door at that point, as he and the Inmate were still having a conversation. Things had not yet started to escalate, and he was still trying to establish some rapport. He indicated that while there had been some name calling, the Inmate had made no threats, so the Grievor felt there was no need to close the door, as he was trying to determine why the Inmate felt the Grievor was disrespecting him. He believed the situation would be resolved verbally.

136Continuing in the same vein, the Grievor pointed out to Inmate S that it was he who was disparaging the Grievor, calling him names and putting the equipment on the floor. He also advised the Inmate that if he continued to do so, he would not get the cleaning equipment back.

137The Grievor described his strategy as using “tactical communication” i.e. verbal intervention, negotiation and diffusion skills. Specifically, he explained why he was asking Inmate S to return the cleaning materials, pointing out it was consistent with standard protocol, and trying to get Inmate S to engage in a dialogue and explain how he felt he was being disrespected. The Grievor emphasized he was trying to diffuse the situation by speaking to the Inmate. He also indicated that he was trying to impress upon Inmate S that it was not worth losing direct supervision privileges over cleaning equipment, so he emphasized the consequences of his conduct.

138However, Inmate S just responded with more name calling. In response, the Grievor advised Inmate S that due to his conduct, he would be placed on unit sanction i.e. locked in his cell for most of day.

139At that point the Inmate exited the cell, and refused, when directed to return to his cell, by challenging the Grievor to make him go back in.

140The Grievor testified that until the Inmate exited the cell and challenged him to make him go back in, he was trying to build a rapport so he could ascertain why the Inmate was upset.

141While the Grievor issued multiple orders for the Inmate to go back in his cell, the Inmate refused to do so. Instead, he referred to charges resulting from his having attacked other COs and also told his cell mate to “pack his shit”. The Grievor understood this to mean the Inmate was planning to act in a way that would result in his removal from the unit.

142The Grievor indicated that at that point he believed a physical assault by the Inmate was imminent. He unholstered his OC spray, with the view that it could de-escalate the dynamic, as it would communicate to Inmate S that if he went any further it would be deployed.

143However, as the Grievor stepped back, Inmate S advanced, and the Grievor deployed the OC spray. The Grievor testified that while he had planned a take-down, the Inmate pulled away. The Grievor then attempted to perform a check with his right hand but the Inmate was too strong.

144Instead, the Inmate hit the Grievor in the face, knocked his glasses off. The Grievor indicated that as a result, he was extremely disoriented, with blurred vision and little equilibrium. He responded by deploying defensive strikes, with the Inmate responding in kind. The Grievor testified he felt that in the confined area, that was the best option available to him. He could not see successfully attempting to take down the Inmate, as he was young, strong and about 100 pounds heavier than the Grievor.

145The Grievor testified that he knew he was in an extremely compromised state, as he could barely see, had difficulty retaining his footing, and he knew how strong the Inmate was, and how unresponsive to direction. As a result, he was very anxious, and felt that if anyone was capable of putting him over the railing it was Inmate S. The Grievor testified that at the time, he thought he had made contact with the railing, but having seen the video he realized he had been confused, and that his back had hit the wall, but not the railing.

146As the Grievor and the Inmate rounded the corner in their exchange of blows, CO Bergeron, who by then was out of site of the camera, was also attempting to hold the Inmate.

147The Grievor testified that at that point, he could hardly see anything, and was unsure of the exact posture of the Inmate, as he is shorter than the Grievor. Rather, the Grievor indicated he could only see the bright orange of the Inmate’s uniform, and the Inmate’s blurred facial features.

148He conceded, however, that he could see that the inmate had his head lowered and his arms over his head. However, the Grievor indicated that could have meant Inmate S was simply waiting for another opportunity to continue his assault. The Grievor described the Inmate's position as a typical wrestling position prior to executing a takedown. As he could not be certain of Inmate S's intent, he continued to deploy what he described as defensive strikes. After reviewing the CCTV recording at a reduced speed, the Grievor conceded that he attempted to throw 11 punches, but could not say how many connected or where. He indicated he was just trying to get the Inmate to stop punching and to get him “off” him.

149The Grievor testified that during this time, CO Bergeron was behind the Inmate, pinned in the corner but trying to bring the Inmate down while giving him constant orders to stop and get on the ground.

150The Grievor indicated a Code Blue had been initiated, and other COs were responding. He could also hear Officer Blevins approaching and giving the Inmate orders.

151The Grievor conceded that once Officer Blevins, who is 6’ 7” and weighs 300 pounds arrived, he threw one more strike, and the three COs grounded the Inmate and put cuffs on him.

152The Grievor indicated he had no idea of how many defensive strikes he attempted, or how many connected with the inmate or where.

153Once the Inmate was restrained, he and CO Bergeron escorted him off the Unit. However, he continued to be physically resistant, and ignored their orders. Once he was contained in the cell and they were removing the restraints, inmate S attempted to kick the Grievor in the groin.

154The inmate was medically assessed and no injuries were visible. While the inmate did not cooperate during the medical assessment, he later complained of pain on the left side of his head and an ice pack was provided.

155The Grievor’s immediate injuries, on the other hand, were a split lower left lip, and an injury to his right wrist and the last two digits on his right hand. He was subsequently diagnosed as experiencing concussion symptoms i.e. sensitivity to light, headache and disorientation, from the blow to his face. There was also a suggestion that CO Bergeron suffered an injury to his right forearm.

156The Grievor was off work and in receipt of WSIB benefits until September 25, 2022.

157Asked if he would do anything differently in his allegation meeting, the Grievor indicated he felt like he went through extensive steps to de-escalate the dynamic. However, he conceded he should have secured the door before telling the Inmate he was going to lock him in on a unit sanction.

ANALYSIS:

158It is trite law that any force used in correctional institutions must be reasonable in the circumstances, and in accord with the training provided by the Ministry, and consistent with legislative parameters. Further, if the force used is not reasonable and is excessive, this is just cause for discipline.

159The Ministry, in its submission, spent considerable time on what the Grievor might have done to avoid the situation escalating to a Use of Force. This included not telling the Inmate he was going to be placed on Unit sanction before he was secured in the cell, which was conceded by the Grievor.

160However, the Ministry also referred to supposed opportunities where the Grievor could disengage from the interaction, which was not conceded by the Grievor.

161For example, while Mr. Houston opined that the Grievor could have used better de-escalation skills and relative positioning to help alleviate the confrontation, it is not apparent what that would have involved given that the Inmate appeared to have decided that he was going to assault the Grievor.

162Similarly, Mr. Houston suggested the Grievor could have disengaged with the intention of re-engaging at several key moments leading up to the Use of Force. However, given the speed with which the altercation erupted, it is difficult to envision how this would have been accomplished. As both Mr. Houston and Mr. Janisse conceded, it happened in just a matter of "seconds".

163In any event, while that may be the case on another unit, in this instance I am persuaded that the Grievor’s, albeit failed, attempt to prioritize developing a rapport with the Inmate, was consistent with his responsibilities on the Direct Supervision unit.

164However, it is clear that these responsibilities were particularly challenging with Inmate S. Indeed, based on his profile, and capacity issues aside, it is unclear how this particular inmate was identified as a candidate to be housed in the Direct Supervision Unit. Be that as it may, that is where he was.

165If there is a criticism to be leveled in this regard, it is that the Grievor perhaps tried too hard to meet those responsibilities. I am reluctant to find fault, now in retrospect, for the Grievor doing essentially what he was trained to do as part of the Direct Supervision Model. While the Grievor does not dispute that telling the Inmate he was going to be placed on unit sanction before he was contained in his cell was a misstep, his rational of connecting the Inmate’s conduct to consequences is not, on its own wrong.

166Further, the Grievor’s discipline does not relate to anything before the point when the Inmate had his head down and hands over his head, and the Grievor continued to throw punches “toward” him.

167It is at this point that the Ministry states the Grievor ought to have “reassessed” the appropriate force required by the changing circumstances.

168It bears repeating that in assessing what is reasonable in the circumstances, COs are trained to look to factors that include but are not limited to the following:

a. The number of correctional employees in the immediate area versus the number of inmates;

b. The security of the area, e.g. is the correctional employee in an enclosed or open area with multiple escape routes?;

c. Available options in the event the inmate becomes assaultive;

d. Immediate threat(s) to the correctional employee’s safety or the safety of colleagues or the inmate;

e. Use of force options available in the circumstances;

f. The employee and inmate’s profile (e.g. size, age, gender, previous history, etc.)

169What the Grievor would have known at the time was that he and CO Bergeron were still the only two COs dealing with the Inmate. They had so far been unsuccessful in gaining control, let alone compliance from the Inmate. This would have been consistent with the Grievor’s prior experience with this Inmate, where at least 6 COs had difficulty gaining control of the Inmate. I note that Mr. Houston also commented that it was somewhat unusual that the presence of a second CO did not de-escalate the situation. However, it appears Inmate S was confident that two COs could not physically contain him.

170In terms of security of the area, the Grievor was acutely aware of the risk accompanying being on the mezzanine, and the ability of this particular Inmate to send him over the railing.

171Further, the options in the event the Inmate became assaultive again, were limited. This applies as well with regard to item e) Use of force options available in the circumstances.

172While Mr. Houston opined that the Grievor had “a variety of other options” other than continuing his strikes, he only suggested that the Grievor could have attempted a takedown. But the Grievor had already attempted a takedown but the Inmate proved too strong. His partner was also trying to bring him down with no success. Again, this would be consistent with what the Grievor knew regarding the strength of this particular individual, who had managed to withstand the efforts of at least six COs in the past to bring him to ground.

173Accordingly, the next factor to be considered by the Grievor was the risk to both his partner and himself. The Grievor had already been injured in trying to contain the Inmate, resulting not only in the split lip and injury to his hand, but as it turns out, possibly a concussion. He had no reason to believe this Inmate would be reluctant to cause either him or his partner significant injury given the opportunity. Again, his concern regarding the possibility of being thrown over the railing if the Inmate got the upper hand was a valid consideration in the circumstances.

174This brings me to item f) and the most critical consideration i. e. the employee and Inmate’s profile (e.g. size, age, gender, previous history, etc.). In this instance, the Grievor was aware that the Inmate, while shorter, was approximately 100 lbs heavier. He was also younger, as the Grievor mentioned in his testimony.

175The most significant critical element, however, was this Inmate’s previous history, which I set out in detail above, in paragraph’s 13 – 25. For the sake of brevity, and to avoid unnecessary repetition, I will only repeat the concise description of the Grievor’s prior use of force experience with this Inmate as set out in the Discipline Summary created in the context of the Grievor's discipline. It describes the incident as follows:

The LIR does note that the inmate offered heavy resistance, multiple staff were required to subdue him and during the incident he did assault Officers.

176I note as well that Mr. Houston testified that he was unaware that in the previous incident with this Inmate several COs were required to bring him under control, and that even when he was on the ground he continued to punch and resist. Mr. Houston agreed that in that case, that knowledge and understanding would be relevant to the Grievor’s assessment and planning, as well as decisions regarding disengagement.

177Had Mr. Houston had this information when reviewing the CCTV recordings and other materials, this would have given him a more complete picture of the situation the Grievor found himself in. Unfortunately, that critical piece of information appears to have been omitted.

178Accordingly, one element of the reassessment the Grievor would be required to make was a judgement call regarding whether the Inmate’s posture of head down, arms over his head, signified “compliance”, or whether it signified “strategy”. Mr. Houston and Mr. Janisse conceded it could have been either.

179The Grievor, on the other hand, testified it was a typical position in wrestling before doing a takedown. It is apparent from the Grievor’s testimony and continued strikes that his assessment was that it was strategy, and that given an opening, the Inmate would resume his assault.

180As Mr. Houston testified, a CO’s choice of an appropriate response is based on a good faith assessment regarding what is necessary in the circumstances. In this instance, I find there is no basis on which I can conclude that the Grievor’s assessment was incorrect or made in anything other than good faith.

181Rather, I note that despite the Grievor’s “strikes” (more will be said below), by the time CO Blevins had arrived, and the Grievor made his last “strike”, the posture of the Inmate had not changed. It still took the three COs to bring him down. So it appears clear the Inmate was not inclined to comply, even when faced with a third CO larger than himself.

182Even once he was brought to ground, forcibly, the Inmate continued to resist, which again suggests a distinct and continued disinterest in complying.

183Even when brought under control, and in the course of having his handcuffs removed, Inmate S attempted to kick the Grievor in the groin.

184Finally, I note that in Part A of the LIR, Sergeant Shilson, the Initial Incident Manager reported that:

I/M [S] was escorted to A3 were (sic) the verbal abuse and physical resistance continued by I/M. Tactical communication, and takedown techniques were also deployed in A3.

185Consequently, based on his history, and what occurred after the Grievor’s “strikes”, I find it was more likely than not, that this Inmate was not going to comply unless physically forced to. And it was going to take more that the Grievor and CO Bergeron to do it.

186To be clear, given everything that the Grievor knew, based on the list of considerations set out above, I find it was not unreasonable for him to assume, given the slightest opportunity to gain an advantage, the Inmate would take it, and would potentially be unstoppable until more help arrived. The risk to both the Grievor and his partner would be grievous and imminent. Accordingly, he continued what he characterized as, and I find, were defensive strikes.

187While the Ministry relied on a number of cases where COs or employees were disciplined or dismissed for an unreasonable use of force, the facts in all instances were significantly distinct from those in this instance.

188The closest factual parallel was in the case of OPSEU and Ontario (Ministry of the Solicitor General) (Haist), Re, 2023 CarswellOnt 16652. In that instance, the grievor and an inmate engaged in a physical altercation, during which the grievor threw three closed fist punches.

189Vice-Chair McLean noted, at paragraph 81, that closed fist punches don’t always constitute the use of excess force. However, he also points out, in paragraph 82, that at the time of the altercation there were two other COs in close proximity, and many more on the way, as the grievor undoubtably knew. Vice-Chair McLean found that in those circumstances the Grievor was “in little danger” and found that regardless of whether they landed, throwing punches in that instance was itself an act of misconduct.

190I have, of course, made a different finding in this circumstance, in that it is my view that the Grievor and CO Bergeron were at significant risk from Inmate S if they were unable to defend themselves.

191This brings me to the strikes for which the Grievor was disciplined.

192Specifically, the Grievor’s employment was terminated because he “delivered no less than 10 closed fist strikes to the head and facial area of the inmate”.

193However, I find there is actually no evidence of 10 closed fist strikes to the head and facial area of the inmate.

194While Mr. Houston, in paragraph 93, indicates the CCTV recording shows the Grievor throwing multiple closed fist punches "toward" Inmate S, it is not clear to anyone how many or where any of the punches connected.

195Indeed, the only specific information in that regard, which I note was not referenced in the hearing but was filed as an exhibit, is contained in the Use of Force OR of CO Bergeron. In his OR, CO Bergeron, the only eye witness, indicates that during the altercation, he was pushed back into the corner. He indicates the Inmate was resisting the whole time, refusing to go down to the ground and being verbally aggressive and threatening. He further writes that:

Due to the Inmate actively resisting with myself, I observed CO Beckford apply pain compliance techniques, mainly three closed fist strikes to IM rib cage area. IM was then brought to ground seconds later after CO Ryan Blevins arrived upstairs, he took control of IM legs.

196As I indicated, the above was not addressed in the hearing, and I make no finding in that regarding.

197However, for all the reasons set out above, I am not persuaded the Grievor “delivered no less than 10 closed fist strikes to the head and facial area of the inmate”.

198Nor am I persuaded that, in these very specific circumstances, given the profile characteristics of this particular Inmate, the Grievor’s attempts to defend himself and his partner constituted an excessive or unreasonable use of force.

DISPOSITION:

199This Grievance is allowed. The Grievor is to be reinstated and made whole.

200I remain seized to address any issues arising from this award.