IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

Under

THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT

Before

THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD

BETWEEN

Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Martin)

Union

and -

The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Transportation)

Employer

BEFORE

Nimal Dissanayake

Arbitrator

FOR THE UNION

Lesley Gilchrist Anjana Kashyap Ontario Public Service Employees Union Grievance Officers

FOR THE EMPLOYER

Jordanna Lewis Treasury Board Secretariat Labour Practice Group Counsel

HEARING

March 7, 2022 (last date written submissions)

Decision

1Ten individual grievances filed by Ms. Stella Martin (“grievor”) were before me when the Board convened on August 4, 2021. I pointed out to counsel that the grievances clearly raise human rights issues, but are scheduled for mediation-arbitration under article 22.16. The Board was advised that the parties had agreed that the grievances should proceed under article 22.16 as scheduled.

2Mediation commenced on August 4th and continued on November 2, 2021, but no settlement was reached. Employer counsel gave notice that she would be bringing a motion for summary dismissal of all ten grievances on the grounds that the particulars do not disclose a prima facie case for the violations alleged in the grievances, and/or because the Board lacked jurisdiction to deal with the allegations. The parties agreed that the motion will be argued by way of written submissions, and that the requirement in article 22.16 to issue the decision in 5 days is waived.

3When written submissions were received, they were extensive. Each party also filed voluminous books of documents and authorities. I have reviewed and considered all submissions, the documentary evidence, and legal authorities. However, I have attempted to keep the reasons succinct in accordance with article 22.16.

4The grievor is employed as an Information Retrieval Analyst at the Information Data Retrieval Union (“the Unit”). At the relevant time Ms. Natascia Proietti was the grievor’s direct supervisor. She reported to the Manager of the unit, Ms. Patty Watters. In response to the Covid 19 pandemic, in March 2020 the employer converted to a process of its employees working from home. Then in July 2020, the employer required employees in the unit to work in the office one day a week between Monday and Thursday. The grievor was assigned to work in the office on Wednesdays. All of the grievances relate to this mandatory requirement to work certain assigned days in the office.

5Applying arbitral principles, I have made the following conclusions:

There has been no improper expansion of the scope of the grievance.
It is appropriate to consider particulars of the union relating to post-grievance facts, to the extent they are a continuation of, or flow from, the assertions made in the grievances.
Since these are individual grievances, the Board is required to determine whether the union has made out a prima facie case for the violations alleged in each grievance, and uphold or deny the motion on each grievance. However, I have considered all particulars the union has provided to the extent they are relevant.

In its submissions the employer had set out evidence it proposed to lead to refute the assertions of fact in the union’s particulars. I agree with union counsel that since a no prima facie case motion has to be decided assuming that the asserted facts are true, that evidence is not relevant at this stage. I have not considered that evidence.

6It is well established that for a no prima facie case motion to succeed, the moving party must establish that the facts asserted, if accepted as true, are capable of establishing the elements necessary to substantiate the violations alleged. Re Couture, GSB 2008-0868 (Dissanayake). Bald allegations or conclusions are not accepted as true, unless supported by assertions of fact. Re Bharti, GSB 2013-2789 (Anderson). Also, the Board will not weigh the quality of the union’s proposed evidence Re Evangelista, GSB 2009-1091 (Harris). Credibility will not be assessed. However, alleged facts that are patently ridiculous, and not capable of belief or proof, will not be accepted as true. Re Solomon Smith, GSB 2017-0054 (Anderson).

7With the foregoing principles in mind, I turn to the grievances.

Grievances 2020-2136 and 2020-2137

Grievance 2020-2136 cites violations relating to “health and safety, accommodation, Covid and OHRC”. Grievance 2020-2137 cites “health and safety, harassment, management rights and discipline”.

Union particulars

8When the employer made it mandatory for employees in the grievor’s unit to work in the office one day a week between Monday to Thursday in July 2020, no employees were scheduled to work in the office on Fridays. The grievor was assigned to work in the office on Wednesday. On July 28, 2020, the grievor, in her capacity as a union steward, asked why her unit was “deemed essential”, and requested that the “office day” be flexible, or that some employees be allowed to continue working from home. On July 30, 2020, the employer responded in writing, explaining why in its view, the scheduling it had implemented was required due to operational reasons. The grievor still had the question why her unit was deemed essential, when other departments were not. “The grievor believes that her unit was targeted because of her union activity, and that the employer’s decision was unreasonable.”

9The grievor implied from the employer’s response that the employer would be flexible if the grievor was unable to come to the office on the scheduled day, but no flexibility was in fact offered. In August, the grievor wrote to Ms. Proietti that her commute to work on Wednesday “would be challenging,” that she “wished to avoid the TTC, and had to commute to the office with household members (her daughter) who also had essential in person duties (as a pharmacist) at a hospital. The grievor asked to be allowed to attend the office on Friday August 14 instead.” The employer refused, simply informing that “Everyone works from home on Fridays.” No rationale was given, and there was no discussion as why that had to be so. Then the grievor asked to be allowed to come to the office on the Monday, but was refused. On August 12, she asked that she be switched with an employee who had Mondays as the assigned office day, or that she be permitted to pick up/drop off work during non-work times “to avoid running into other staff. These suggestions were not responded to in a meaningful way by her supervisor.”

10The next day, August 13th, the grievor wrote “ explaining that her circumstances had changed, and she had limited ways of getting to office, and requested that her supervisor allow her flexibility to avoid the TTC. The employer responded that the grievor could come in on Thursday instead of Wednesday. There is no indication that the employer explored allowing the grievor to come in on Monday as requested. Thursday was not a day that the grievor indicated she would be able to travel to the office.” On August 14, 2020, the grievor wrote to Ms. Watters requesting her assistance. She replied to the grievor that “getting to her place of employment was her responsibility, and indicating that Thursday was her scheduled rotation, although prior to this it had been Wednesday.”

11Finally on August 18, 2020, the grievor wrote to Ms. Watters “indicating that her husband had a medical condition, and that he needed to be guarded carefully from potential exposure. In the union’s view, this was a request for accommodation under the Human Rights Code. The employer did not respond to this in any meaningful way, nor did they explain why it was vital that the grievor’s section work in the office, when other sections were not required to.” The employer informed the grievor that it was her responsibility to make alternate arrangements if she was uncomfortable using public transportation.

Union argument

12The employer’s rigid stance and inflexibility in scheduling for the grievor’s unit and the grievor constituted harassment of the grievor. The scheduling was “unreasonably and unnecessarily rigid.” Other departments allowed some flexibility in scheduling staff back to work. The grievor’s unit was treated differently and arbitrarily. Since the employer did not provide a reasonable basis for the differential treatment, on a prima facie basis, it is reasonable to infer that the grievor’s union membership “could be a factor” in the adverse treatment.

13With regard to the request for accommodation, the basis was “marital status.” The grievor has asserted that she “was frightened that she will pass covid” to her spouse by travelling on TTC to work. While the employer responded to each of the grievor’s communications, those responses were “not meaningful.”

14The union argued that throughout the exchanges the employer was not compliant with articles 3.3 (harassment and bullying) and 9 (health and safety) because it was behaving “vexatiously”.

Disposition

15On health and safety “The onus is on the union to establish the degree of risk and to prove the causal link between the actions of the employer and the harm done to the grievor as a result of those actions.” Re Press, 2013-1461 (Mikus). It is not enough to show that the grievor’s request would give her greater or better health and safety precautions, without establish that existing precautions were not reasonable. Whether reasonable precautions were provided is an objective assessment. Accepting the facts – not subjective assertions by the grievor being frustrated or frightened – set out in the particulars as true, they are not capable of establishing a prima facie violation. That aspect of this grievance fails.

16On harassment and bullying, “The question is not whether a complainant believed she was subject of bullying and harassment. The question is whether a reasonable person, informed of all relevant facts, would conclude the impugned behaviour would constitute harassment or bullying, if the perpetrator knew or ought reasonably to have known that it was unwelcome”. Re Solomon Smith, 2017-0054 (Anderson) and authorities cited at para.14. The particulars have no possibility of meeting this test. That aspect of the grievance also fails.

17There is simply no factual basis offered in the particulars to support the allegations of discrimination (differential treatment) or reprisal (targeting) because of the grievor’s union activity/membership. The mere fact of such activity and membership is not a reasonable basis to make the inferences the union asks the Board to make. The fact that she believed that to be the case is not enough. That aspect of the grievance fails.

Discrimination/failure to accommodate – Marital status

18The protection in the Human Rights Code accorded to “marital status” is broad enough to capture a spouse, depending on the particular facts. A. vs. B 2002 SCC 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 403 (Supreme Court of Canada): SMS Equipment Inc. v. CEP, Local 707, (2015) ABQB 162 (Alta Queen’s Bench).

19Similarly depending on the facts, an employee within a protected group, for example an employee with a disability, may be entitled to accommodation in relation to his or her commute to work. OSSTF AND TDSB (2020) Carswell Ont. 247 (Nyman).

20The particulars set out a number of requests by the grievor for a change in the schedule the employer implemented for recalling employees in the unit to work in the office, under which she was required to work in the office on Wednesdays. At first, her concern was a general one, why her unit was subject to a rigid schedule when other departments were more flexible. Then she sought flexibility for her own schedule asserting there were challenges to her commute to work. She explained that she “wished to avoid the TTC, and had to arrange her commute to the office” with her daughter. She wanted to alter her office day to the Friday. Then she asked that for the week of August 10, her day in the office be altered from Wednesday to Friday, why the employer decided that no employees in her unit would work in the office on Fridays, and why no discussion of this took place and no “meaningful” rationale for the decision was provided. All her requests to attend the office on days other than the assigned day Wednesday were refused.

21The particulars up to that point do not indicate any request for accommodation on the basis of marital status or any other protected ground. The accommodation request was made on August 18, 2020. The only assertion about that request is to the effect that she informed the employer “that her husband had a medical condition, and that he needed to be guarded carefully from potential exposure”. Therefore, the question is whether employer contravened the duty to accommodate by refusing the request.

22To be successful on a claim of discrimination based on marital status, the grievor must establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on the three-fold test set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore v. British Columbia (Meiorin), 2012 SCC 61, 2012 S.C.C. 61, which is as follows: (1) The grievor has a characteristic that is protected from discrimination. (2) The grievor has experienced an adverse impact. (3) The grievor must show that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact.

23In applying this test in determining a no prima facie motion the Board must accept the facts asserted as true. The union submitted that the Board should take judicial notice that Covid 19 was highly contagious and dangerous. The grievor has clearly asserted that her motivation in avoiding the TTC was her fear of transmitting Covid-19 to her spouse. Protecting a vulnerable spouse from a dangerous and deadly infection is obviously an obligation that flows from being married.

24Relying on Re SM and St. John (City), 2020 Carswell 380, the union submitted that the protected characteristic of the grievor is the fact that she is married. It was submitted that the facts in this case are very similar to the facts in that case. Therefore, the particulars are capable of meeting the first requirement in the Meiorin test. The requirement of adverse impact is met since the grievor had to use vacation and other credits to protect her spouse, which she would otherwise have used for other purposes. The third requirement in the test is met, as the protected characteristic of her being married was a factor in the adverse impact. Thus the particulars are capable of meeting all three requirements of the Meiorin test.

25The Board agrees that judicial notice should be taken of the contagious and dangerous nature of Covid-19. However, the Board must also take judicial notice that in recognition of that danger, various safety precautions were implemented to protect the public, including compulsory vaccination, distancing, limiting the number of people in public settings, frequent cleaning and wearing face coverings. People were advised not to frequent public places unless it was essential to do so. Precautions implemented included public transit, like the TTC. Of course there was no guarantee that these would prevent infection.

26With respect, I do not agree that Re SM and St. John (City) (supra) stands for the proposition that one is protected from discrimination under Human Rights legislation and comparable collective agreement provisions merely by being married. In that case, the Commission found that the grievor’s spouse was ill at home, had mental health issues and needed to be cared for in the evenings. There was medical evidence that the care should be provided by the grievor, and not by anyone else. There was evidence that the spouse experienced stress even when there was talk about finding other home care. In these circumstances, it was held that as a spouse, the grievor had a “right and an obligation” to care for her spouse. It was this obligation to provide personal care, which flowed from the marriage, not the marriage itself, that led to the finding that the grievor’s request to work day-shifts only had to be accommodate.

27In contrast, the only facts asserted in this case is that the grievor wrote to the employer “indicating that her husband had a medical condition, and that he needed to be guarded carefully from potential exposure.” Assuming, as I must at this point, that the grievor genuinely believed what she indicated to the employer, it is a conclusion she formed herself. There is no assertion that the spouse was isolating and confined to the house. There is no assertion that there was any medical advice that due to the spouse’s medical condition the grievor should avoid public places generally or public transit specifically. There is no assertion that the TTC did not exercise adequate safety practices in relation to covid. It is understandable that anyone would want to take optimum precautions, including even not going to work, in order to reduce the risk of infecting members of the household including a spouse. That subjective desire, however genuine, would not provide the required protected characteristic, just as the mere fact of having children at home would not. In the case of children, it is the need and the obligation to care for young children that provides that characteristic. For example, merely because someone has a teenage child who is healthy and capable of taking care of himself/herself at home may not, by itself, provide the parent the required protected characteristic. It is the obligation to care that flows from the family status that provides that protection. In this case, it was a desire or preference on the part of the grievor to provide the best possible protection to her spouse. While that is very understandable, it cannot bring her request within the scope of protection afforded by the marital status recognized by the law and the collective agreement. Therefore, this aspect of the grievance also fails.

Grievance 2020-2237

28This grievance alleges violations relating to health and safety, accommodation, covid, harassment, discrimination, and management rights.

Particulars

When employees in the grievor’s unit were assigned three days in the office in October 2020, the grievor “continued to have issues with her commute and tried to avoid taking the TTC where possible to protect her partner from potential infection. As a result the grievor remained at the office far later than her assigned hours. She asked the employer to allow her to accrue time off. The employer suggested this was a CWW, and suggested that it would have to be approved by the management team in the grievor’s section, by which the grievor understood it had to be approved by Natascia. This was never enacted, and nobody followed up with the grievor”.

Union submissions

29The union submitted that in the face of the grievor’s expression of concern with her commute and request for accommodation, the employer was not inclined to even discuss the possibility of allowing her to do compress flex hours.

Disposition

30The Board has decided above that the grievor had not established a prima facie case of discrimination. Therefore, the employer did not have a duty to accommodate. The particulars cannot support any of the violations alleged in support of the grievance. The employer’s motion therefore is upheld, and the grievance is dismissed.

Grievance 2020-2138

31This grievance cites health and safety, bullying, harassment, and management rights as violations.

Particulars

“On Friday October 14, 2020, the grievor made Ms. Watters aware that a member of her household had been exposed to Covid and requested direction on whether she should report to work as scheduled on Monday. The grievor did not receive a reply, including an out of office, prior to finishing with her computer for the day. The grievor frequently has work that does not involve her computer. The grievor received a reply on Monday morning at 9:43 AM offering guidance. However, the grievor had already commenced work from home that day. The employer eventually disciplined the grievor for this. The manager emailed the grievor on November 5, 2020, indicating that she was tracking the time the grievor spent away from her desk, and suggesting that she was not working that day and directing her to respond to a meeting request. This, in the grievor’s view, is unreasonable micromanagement.”

Union Submissions

32Counsel submitted that the way the grievor was treated for being absent (being disciplined) on the Monday due to a potential covid exposure by a member of the household, and the suggestion that Ms. Watters was paying particular attention to how the grievor was working, created a toxic work environment.

Disposition

33The particulars fall far short of what the law requires for appropriate particulars. For example, it is not known when (during the day on Friday or at the end of the day) or how (personally, telephone, text, or email) Ms. Watters was “made aware.” The Board has determined below that the particulars do not disclose “discipline.” It was a non- disciplinary letter of counsel. The particulars are so deficient that I cannot relate them to any of the alleged violations of health and safety or harassment (bullying) violations. The motion succeeds and the grievance is dismissed.

Grievances 2020-2139 and 2021-2936

34Grievance 2020-2139 alleges violations relating to health and safety, bullying, harassment, management rights and Human Rights Code, and 2020-2136 alleges discipline, bullying, discrimination, harassment, health and safety and management rights.

Particulars (for both grievances)

“The allegation letter provided to the grievor was unduly insensitive and hurtful. The employer provided the allegation letter on the grievor’s vacation day. In the allegation meeting the grievor complained that the stress of the meeting was causing a migraine, and the employer did not desist or offer any assistance. The grievor contests the allegations levied by the employer, and the finding of discipline. The disciplinary letter was issued without just cause, and was imprecise in terms of which allegations were supported, and which were not. The grievor received a letter of counsel on March 8, 2021, which was unduly punitive. The grievor believes the letter of counsel constitutes disguised discipline. In the alternative, the grievor believes that the letter of counsel nonetheless constitutes differential treatment that is part of a course of harassment, and contributes to a toxic work environment.”

Union submissions

35On grievance 2020-2139 the union submitted that the grievor was targeted for an allegation meeting on a day she was not at work. When the grievor alerted the employer during the meeting that she was experiencing a migraine the employer responded “callously”. Rather than ending and rescheduling the meeting, the employer simply authorized her to take a sick day after the meeting. The grievor was not provided any assistance. This exacerbated her migraine. It was submitted that this employer conduct could support findings of harassment and discrimination.

Disposition of grievance 2020-2139

36The particulars, accepted as true, may at most justify a conclusion that the employer could have been more sympathetic and helpful during the allegation meeting. However, failure to follow best management practices, even when seen in light of all of the particulars relating to other allegations of harassment and discrimination, would not support the violations alleged. The employer’s motion is upheld. Grievance 2020-2139 is dismissed.

Union submission on grievance 2020-2936

37Counsel pointed out that the letter of counsel alleged that the grievor committed “infractions” on several days despite reminders. That constitutes allegation of “insubordination by violating covid health and safety protocols. The intent of the letter, although titled a letter of counsel, is “intended to scold and castigate” the grievor, not to communicate and assist her. Therefore, it was discipline.

Disposition of grievance 2020-2936

38The Board has repeatedly held that employers are entitled to correct culpable behaviour by counselling without resorting to discipline, and that this approach is to be encouraged. Re Barillari, 2001-1829 (Dissanayake); Re Szkok, 2017-2152 (McLean). The particulars do not assert that anything in the letter suggests that it may be used in the future for progressive discipline purposes. For example, that it does not set out that it is not disciplinary, would not be placed in the personnel file or will not be relied on for progressive discipline purposes. The mere fact that it alleged culpable conduct cannot turn a letter which meets those characteristics of a letter of counsel recognized by the Board into a letter of discipline. The particulars are not capable of showing a prima facie case for the alleged violations. The motion is upheld, and the grievance is dismissed.

Grievance 2020-2244

39The alleged violations are discipline, Covid19, harassment, discrimination and management rights.

Particulars

The union relied on the same particulars set out with respect to grievances 2020-2138 and 2021-2936. No additional particulars specific to this grievance were provided.

Union submissions

40The union relied on the underlined words in the following excerpt from Re Cross, 2013-1029 (Misra) at para. 46:

“The exercise of normal management rights does not excuse harassment, and giving directions, evaluating performance, and disciplining employees should not be considered harassment in the normal course of events provided that such activities are not carried out in a manner that is abusive, demeaning or hostile, and has a legitimate workplace purpose.

41The failure to practise best management practices, errors of judgement or even action that violate the collective agreement or legislation would not constitute harassment, bullying or discrimination in the absence of the type of abusive conduct described in the underlined words the union relied on. The particulars do not assert such conduct. The grievor’s belief, however sincere it may be, is not enough to infer harassment, bullying or discrimination. Re Damani, 1581-1995 (Gray). Similarly, the fact that the grievor felt stressed, angry, frustrated, and disappointed, by itself is not enough. As arbitrator Luborsky, after a review of the jurisprudence, including that from the Supreme Court of Canada, wrote at para 20 in Re Cara Operations, 2005 CanLII 94066 (ON LA), [2005] 141 L.A.C. (4th) 266, “… I must objectively assess the evidence to determine whether workplace harassment has occurred. Consequently, even if the grievor believed she was a victim of such harassment, suffered real medical consequences as a result, her perceptions and their result are not enough, in themselves, to support a finding of harassment.” The motion is upheld, and the grievance is dismissed.

Grievance 2020-2175

42This grievance cites allegations relating to management rights, harassment, discrimination, health and safety, and job posting.

Particulars

The grievor participated in a job competition in November 2020. She was not screened in for an interview. She “believes” that her skills, abilities, and qualifications, in addition to her seniority, should have garnered her an interview, and that the employer did not “appropriately measure” her skills, abilities and qualifications. It is further asserted that while the employer scheduled a “debrief” meeting at the grievor’s request, it was cancelled at the last minute and no attempt was made to reschedule it.

Disposition of grievance 2020-2175

43As noted in numerous decisions, the fact that the grievor “believes” something, however genuine that belief may have been, is not sufficient for the Board to accept that belief as true for a prima facie case motion. Likewise, “not appropriate” is a conclusion by the grievor. Neither assertion is supported by any facts such as what the grievor’s skills, qualifications and abilities were in relation to skills, qualifications or abilities of the job posted. The employer’s failure to reschedule the debrief meeting requested by the grievor, by itself, is not sufficient to infer any of the violations alleged. The employer’s motion succeeds. The grievance is dismissed.

Grievance 2020-2666

44This grievance alleges violations relating to health and safety, accommodation, bullying, covid, harassment, discrimination, and management rights.

Particulars

On or around January 25, 2021, the grievor informed the employer that she was having “car maintenance” and would be unable to report to the office on Monday February 1 as scheduled. She requested permission to work from home that day. The employer insisted that the grievor “offset” that day with another day to maintain the requirement of 3 days a week in the office. The grievor had requested exactly such an offset in August 2020, and the employer refused. The grievor then opted to use a credit and requested an emergency day. The employer asked if the grievor wanted to use a vacation day or discretionary day, and she requested the latter. The employer denied the discretionary day, and asserted the grievor could have worked from home instead. This was misleading and opportunistic on the part of the employer, after specifically asking the grievor if she wanted to use a discretionary day.

Disposition of grievance 2066-2666

45No specific submissions were made as to how these particulars, by themselves or read together with the totality of particulars, could possibly establish a prima facie violation of health and safety, accommodation, bullying, covid, harassment, discrimination or management rights provisions of the collective agreement or legislation. They cannot. The motion is upheld, and the grievance is dismissed.

Grievance 2020-2667

46This grievance alleges violations relating to harassment, discrimination, bullying, health and safety and management rights.

Particulars

The particulars set out several incidents:

(1) On January 13, 2021 the grievor indicated that she wished to attend a “town hall” meeting. The employer insisted on knowing the length of the meeting before permitting the grievor to attend.

(2) On February 2, 2021 the grievor received an email informing that she was an hour late and demanding to know how she would make up the time. In the grievor’s view, this was unnecessary as she had routinely been working extended hours due to her commuting situation.

(3) On March 24, 2021 the grievor requested a vacation day in advance of a MERC meeting to prepare. Attending these meetings does not normally require use of credits. The employer “bickered” with the grievor and did not desist until an email was received from Will LaRose explaining the situation.

(4) Around April 2021 the “office day” protocol was changed and the grievor was assigned to work in the office two half- days a week on Mondays and Wednesdays. The grievor expressed that she had difficulty commuting on this schedule, and asked if she could work a single full day a week instead. “The employer declined, but instead, bewilderingly, offered to allow the grievor to work two full days in the office as an accommodation.” The grievor informed that “she and her spouse suffered from health conditions that would put them at higher risk if they contacted covid. The employer ignored this information.”

Union submissions

47Other than generally asserting that the employer’s conduct in the foregoing situations created a “toxic work environment” for the grievor, no submissions were made as to how these particulars could possibly establish that, by themselves or read together with all of the particulars.

Disposition of grievance 2020-2667

48The particulars do not support any of the alleged violations or a finding of a toxic work environment. The employers motion succeeds. The grievance is dismissed.

Conclusion

49Counsel for the union submitted that in defending against this motion the union is not required to set out its evidence. She urged the Board to hear all of the evidence before deciding the grievances. However, that would be to exempt these grievances from no prima facie case motions. There is no basis for doing that. The particulars are replete with conclusions and subjective opinions such as unreasonably, unnecessary, vexatious, arbitrary, not meaningful, unduly, insensitive, hurtful. There are numerous assertions of what the grievor believes. The Board has not given any weight to these. The difference in is that facts the grievor relies on are not required to be substantiated by evidence. They are accepted as true. In accordance with well established arbitral principles, the Board has accepted the facts asserted in the particulars as true, and determined that they are not capable of establishing a prima facie case for any of the grievances. Therefore, all of the grievances are dismissed.

Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 1st day of April, 2022.

Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Martin) v. The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Transportation), 2022 CanLII 35398

Case Summary

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

BETWEEN

Union