GSB# 2016-0135; 2016-0265; 2016-0690; 2016-1216; 2016-1356; 2016-1357; 2016-1358; 2016-1359; 2016-1364; 2016-1365; 2016-1366; 2016-1367; 2016-1368; 2016-1440; 2016-1509; 2016-1510; 2016-1531; 2016-1532; 2016-1720 2016-1911

UNION# 2016-0229-0002; 2016-0229-0004; 2016-0229-0008; 2016-0229-0012; 2016-0229-0022; 2016-0229-0023; 2016-0229-0024; 2016-0229-0025; 2016-0229-0017; 2016-0229-0018; 2016-0229-0019; 2016-0229-0020; 2016-0229-0021; 2016-0229-0027; 2016-0229-0029; 2016-0229-0030; 2016-0229-0031; 2016-0229-0032; 2016-0229-0037; 2016-0229-0039

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

Under

THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT

Before

THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD

BETWEEN

Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Cody et al)

Union

• and -

The Crown in Right of Ontario (The Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services)

Employer

BEFORE

Jasbir Parmar

Arbitrator

FOR THE UNION

Jennifer Micallef (Counsel) Ryder Wright Blair & Holmes LLP

Mike Biliski (Counsel) Koskie Minsky LLP

FOR THE EMPLOYER

George Parris (Counsel) Treasury Board Secretariat Legal Services Branch

HEARING

June 26, 2018

Decision

I. INTRODUCTION

1This decision deals with a preliminary motion.

2By letter dated January 30, 2017, I was appointed to hear a number of grievances filed by three grievors, Messrs. Cody, Durocher, and Wong (hereafter collectively the “Cody grievances”). On the first date set for this matter, the parties attended and engaged in some informal discussions. The Cody grievances are currently scheduled to proceed in February 2019.

3By letter dated December 19, 2017, Arbitrator Petryshen was appointed to hear a number of grievances filed by Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Johnston (hereafter collectively the “MacDonald grievances”). On the first date set for this matter, the parties attended and had some mediation discussions. The Employer gave notice that they intended to make a motion for consolidation before me and the matter was adjourned. The MacDonald grievances are currently scheduled to proceed in January 2019.

4The Employer seeks an order from me consolidating the hearing of the Cody grievances and the MacDonald grievances. The Union is represented by different counsel for each set of grievances, and I will refer to each as counsel for Cody and counsel for MacDonald. Both union counsel object to the consolidation.

II. NATURE OF THE GRIEVANCES

5The relevant factual circumstances leading up to the Cody grievances began in 2011. It is alleged that Messrs. Cody, Durocher, and Wong were harassed, bullied and assaulted by Mr. MacDonald. The particulars indicate that this alleged harassment continued until it was reported in July 2016.

6The relevant factual circumstances leading up to the MacDonald grievances was that the Employer initiated an investigation of Mr. MacDonald’s conduct, including his conduct in respect of Messrs. Cody, Durocher, and Wong, and then subsequently terminated his employment, by letter dated October 5, 2017.

7The following is a brief summary of the nature of the each of the grievances, based on a review of the particulars provided in respect of the Cody grievances and a review of the MacDonald grievances:

Grievances of Cody

a. 2016-0229-0027 (September 6, 2016): that Mr. Cody was subjected to harassment and assault by Mr. Macdonald

b. 2016-0229-0002 (March 20, 2016): that Mr. Cody filed an occurrence report in September 2015 respect of the conduct of V. Montgomery (the wife of a manager), and that after that MacDonald harassed him; that an inmate under V. Montgomery’s supervision made allegations against Mr. Cody which the Employer improperly tried to address through mediation because Montgomery was intertwined with management

c. 2016-0229-0004 (March 29, 2016): that Mr. Cody was subjected to reprisal by the Employer for filing grievance B

d. 2016-0229-0008 (May 20, 2016): that the Employer failed to respond appropriate to Mr. Cody’s allegations in respect of Ms. Montgomery as raised in grievance B, resulting in an unsafe workplace

e. 2016-0229-0012 (August 7, 2016): that MacDonald and other employees (including managers) made social media postings in support of Mr. MacDonald and the allegations of assault that had been made against him by Cody, Durocher, and Wong

f. 2016-0229-0017 (August 28, 2016): that the Employer’s failed to act appropriately in response to the above-noted social media postings, creating a poisoned workplace for Mr. Cody on his return to work

g. 2016-0229-0039 (November 8, 2016): that the Employer failed to properly accommodate Mr. Cody with respect to his return to the workplace.

Grievances of Durocher

h. 2016-0229-0024 and -0022 (August 24, 2016): that Mr. Durocher was subjected to harassment and assault by Mr. MacDonald

i. 2016-0229-0029 and 0030 (September 20, 2016): that the Employer failed to respond appropriately once the alleged MacDonald harassment/assault was reported to it by Mr. Durocher, failing to provide Mr. Durocher with a safe workplace. Also the Employer failed to act on its past knowledge of Mr. MacDonald’s violent behavior, thus failing to provide a safe workplace

j. 2016-0229-0022 (August 24, 2016): relying on the particulars provided for grievance #O

k. 2016-0229-0006 (February 22, 2017): that Mr. Durocher was subjected to reprisal and bullying as a result of his complaint against Mr. MacDonald in terms of how the Employer investigated the allegations; that the Employer failed to act to provide him a safe workplace after he reported his allegations against Mr. MacDonald in terms of his safety from MacDonald and other employees blaming him about MacDonald’s removal from the workplace.

Grievances of Wong

l. 2016-0229-0032 (undated): that Mr. Wong was subjected to harassment and assault by Mr. MacDonald, which Mr. Wong reported July 4, 2016

m. 2016-0229-0023 (August 24, 2016): that the Employer knew Mr. MacDonald was violent and carried a weapon in the workplace and failed to take appropriate action to provide a safe workplace, leading to the assault by Mr. MacDonald

n. 2016-0229-0025 (August 24, 2016): that the Employer knew Mr. MacDonald threatened an inmate with a knife in 2007 but failed to take action to provide a safe work place leading to the assaults against him

o. 2016-0229-0021 (August 11, 2016): that a number of employees and former employees (including managers) made social media posts in support of Mr. MacDonald and that caused Mr. Wong further anxiety reinforcing his fears of reporting the MacDonald assaults, and created a toxic work environment for Mr. Wong, reinforcing the culture of the “Blue Wall of Silence”. Also, the Employer failed to properly respond to this conduct

p. 2016-0229-0031 (September 29, 2016): that the Employer failed to appropriately investigate Mr. Wong’s allegations (the nature of the allegations not identified), reinforcing the culture of the code of silence

q. 2016-0229-0037 (October 6, 2016): that the Employer failed to accommodate Mr. Wong with respect to his return to the workplace, including failing to provide a safe workplace; that the Employer failed to properly investigate wrongdoings (unidentified); there was conflict of interest on the part of managers who were involved in the investigation of the Mr. Wong’s allegations against MacDonald.

Grievances of MacDonald

r. 2017-0229-0025 (September 14, 2017): that the Employer breached the collective agreement in respect of union representation during a conference call on September 26, 2017, resulting inter alia in Mr. Cody using information obtained during the conference call to formulate unfounded accusations against Mr. Macdonald

s. 2017-0229-0026 (September 14, 2017): that the Employer breached Mr. MacDonald’s Charter rights, by making “prejudicial and libelous statements” against him, demonstrating the Employer’s bias against him without benefit of a hearing

t. 2017-0229-0027 (September 14, 2017): that the Employer, through the actions of the Superintendant and Deputy Superintendant, failed to properly accommodate Mr. MacDonald, constituting harassment and discrimination

u. 2017-0229-0033 (September 16, 2017): the Employer “besmirched” Mr. MacDonald’s character and reputation in respect of statements made about him by the Employer in respect of Messrs. Cody, Wong, and Durocher

v. 2017-0229-0034 (October 24, 2017): that the Employer unjustly terminated Mr. MacDonald’s employment, discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, harassed him, violated his rights to union representation, violated his rights by letting his peers know of his dismissal before he did, and by refusing to recognize his Charter right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Grievances of Johnston

w. 2017-0229-0031 (October 17, 2017): that the Employer prevented Mr. Johnston from representing a bargaining unit member (unidentified)

x. 2017-0229-0032 (October 18, 2017): that the Employer failed to produce a video of an investigation interview of Mr. MacDonald to the Union/Mr. Macdonald, in violation of the collective agreement.

III. BOARD RULES OF PROCEDURE

8Rule 3 of the Board Rules of Procedure states:

3. Consolidation of Cases

Where two or more proceedings are pending before the GSB and it appears to the GSB that,

a. They have a question of law or fact in common;

b. The relief claimed in them arises out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences; or

c. For any other reason an order ought to be made under this rule,

The GSB, on such terms as it considers advisable, may abridge the time for placing a grievance on the hearing list, and may order that:

d. The proceeding be consolidated, or heard at the same time or one immediately after the other; and/or

e. Any of the proceedings be stayed until after the determination of any other of them.

IV. PARTIES’ POSITIONS

9The Employer submits that it is appropriate to consolidate the Cody grievances with the MacDonald grievances because there is a significant overlap with respect to questions of fact. It is submitted that the alleged conduct of Mr. Macdonald, and the Employer’s knowledge, management, and response to that conduct are key underlying issues in both sets of grievances. The Employer also submits that the requested relief in the two sets of grievances arises out of the same series of events, namely Mr. Macdonald’s conduct and the Employer’s management and response to that conduct.

10The Employer submits that, given the common underlying issues, there is a risk of inconsistent findings if the matters are dealt with by way of multiple proceedings. The Employer submits that this situation is a hallmark example of when grievances should be consolidated. The Employer submits the Board should act in a manner that protects against such a result, as that is specifically what was intended by Rule 3. The Employer submits that consolidation would also support the goal of efficiency and non-duplication in the litigation of all these matters, given there will be overlapping witnesses.

11The Employer relies on the following authorities: Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Upson) – and – Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2013 CanLII 56967 (Harris) and Ontario Public Service Employees Union (McClelland/Ward) – and – Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2013 CanLII 73996 (Briggs).

12Counsel for Cody submits first that the determination of this motion should be deferred until the criminal trial of Mr. MacDonald in respect of this same conduct, scheduled for late November 2018, is completed. It is noted that there would be no delay in the arbitration as the dates for this matter are scheduled for February 2019. It is submitted that this issue may be moot after the criminal trial.

13Second, Counsel for Cody submits that consolidation is not appropriate. Counsel acknowledges that the four Cody grievances specifically grieving the assaults are related to Mr. MacDonald’s unjust dismissal grievance. The remaining fifteen, it is submitted, do not overlap with the MacDonald grievances. Counsel for Cody notes that these remaining grievances address different issues, such as accommodation, the Employer’s failure to act on many different occasions, the actions of supervisors with respect to social media, reprisal, and harassment by other individuals. Counsel for Cody submits that these other grievances have nothing to do with the Macdonald grievances, and should not be consolidated. With respect to the fact that there may be overlapping witnesses Counsel for Cody submits that is not the test for deciding to consolidate.

14Counsel for Cody submits that there are other relevant factors that should be considered in the instant case. One is that there is presently an order prohibiting contact by Mr. Macdonald with the grievors in the Cody grievances. Second, there is a recommendation by Mr. Cody’s psychologist that he not be in the same room as Mr. Macdonald without police protection due to his psychological health condition. Given these facts, Counsel for Cody submits the grievors in the Cody grievances should not have to be in the same room as Mr. Macdonald any more than necessary, which is what would happen if the grievances are consolidated.

15Counsel for Cody cited the following authorities: Toronto Police Services Board and Toronto Police Association, 2009 CanLII 14568 (Knopf); Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Gillis) – and – Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2005 CanLII 55253 (Abramsky); and Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Barbro) – and – Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2012 CanLII 76563 (Mikus)

16Counsel for MacDonald also opposes consolidation. Counsel submits I have no jurisdiction to consolidate these matters because Arbitrator Petryshen is already seized with the Macdonald grievances. It is submitted there are only two sources of authority for jurisdiction to issue the order requested by the Employer. One is section 48(12)(i) of the Labour Relations Act, which is imported into the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act which governs the instant case. The other is Rule 3 of the Board Rules of Procedure. Counsel submits that neither gives me the authority to take jurisdiction over grievances that are before another arbitrator. In particular, Counsel relies on Assn. of Management, Administrative and Professional Crown Employees of Ontario v. Ontario (MAG) (Chiba Grievance), [2017] O.G.S.B.A. No. 3, where Vice-Chair Misra determined she did not have jurisdiction to consolidate grievances which were before another vice-chair.

17Counsel for MacDonald submits that the appropriate time to consider consolidation is during the Joint File Review (JFR) stage, and relies on Article 22.17.2 of the collective agreements between OPSEU and The Crown in Right of Ontario to support that argument.

18Alternatively, Counsel submits that should I determine I have jurisdiction, it is only appropriate to have the grievances that are specifically about the assault be heard together, not consolidated.

19Counsel for MacDonald referenced the following additional authorities: CUPE, L416 and Toronto (City), [2002] O.L.A.A. No. 755 (Jolliffe); Halifax County-Bedford District School Board and Union of School Board Employees, [1995] N.S.L.A.A. No 17 (Slone); and Toronto (City) and CUPE, L416 (Tedesco), [2005] O.L.A.A. No. 400 (Carrier).

20In reply, Counsel for Cody adopted the jurisdictional arguments. She also concurred that rather than consolidation, the assault grievances, which she concedes are related to Mr. MacDonald’s unjust dismissal grievance, should simply be heard together.

21In reply, the Employer submitted that there is no reason to await the outcome of the criminal trial. He noted that there are several different charges, and there could be any range of rulings from the court. He also noted that arbitration involves certain different issues and also a different standard of proof. As such, it was not likely that the results of the criminal trial would resolve all the issues in the grievances. The Employer noted that there is no reason to wait to address the issue of consolidation, given the present case is scheduled for February 2019.

22The Employer agreed in principle that having the grievances heard together is more appropriate than consolidation. The Employer submits that the fact some issues raised in some of the grievances are not directly related should not prevent all the grievances from being heard together because ultimately the grievances are all interrelated at some level. Rather, it is submitted, any such concerns about certain slightly different issues could be dealt with procedurally by addressing certain issues first. The Employer submits that such an approach would result in the same goal, an efficient process with no duplication or inconsistent findings.

23With respect to Article 22.17.1, the Employer submitted that provision does not actually deal with JFR, and therefore does not apply. Rather it deals with pre-hearing disclosure which is not at issue here.

24Finally, with respect to jurisdiction, the Employer submits that the jurisprudence which indicates arbitrators do not have jurisdiction to order consolidation of grievances which are before another arbitrator does not apply in the instant case, because this is a matter before the Grievance Settlement Board. As such, I am not a sole arbitrator, rather I am the ‘Board’, and there is only ‘one Board’. A decision issued by the Board is not a decision of sole Arbitrator X, but rather a decision of the Board. The Employer also notes that, unlike sole arbitrators, the Board has Rules, which expressly allow for consolidation. The Employer notes there is nothing in the Rules which prohibits consolidation of a matter that has already been assigned to an arbitrator.

25With respect to the Chiba decision, the Employer submits it is wrongly decided.

V. ANALYSIS

a. Adjournment

26I see no reason to accede to the request that the determination of the motion to consolidate be adjourned until the completion of Mr. MacDonald’s criminal trial. This decision is only addressing a procedural matter. This issue is in no way impacted by the fact that there are criminal charges pending. That is distinctly different from commencing the arbitration on its merits, where the result of criminal charges may have an impact on the issues that need to be determined at arbitration justifying waiting for the resolution of the criminal charges. I observe that the cases referenced by Counsel for Cody all addressed that situation. In the present case, the results of the criminal charges are irrelevant to how the arbitration of all these grievances should proceed.

27Furthermore, absent a determination on this consolidation motion, the arbitration of the MacDonald grievances is scheduled to commence in January 2019. This is a complex case, and the parties are entitled to know the format of the proceedings in a timely fashion in order to begin their preparation. Waiting until December, just the month before, to consider this matter does not make labour relations sense.

b. Jurisdiction

28The next issue is whether I have jurisdiction to order consolidation of grievances where a different arbitrator is already seized with some of the grievances.

29There are decisions of this Board where Vice-Chairs have determined, over a particular party’s objection, to consolidate grievances with other grievances in respect of which another Vice-Chair had already been appointed (see for example McLelland/Ward, supra)

30However, the only cited decision which directly addresses the issue of the Board’s jurisdiction to make such an order is Chiba. In that case, Vice-Chair Misra was asked to consolidate the two grievances that were before her with a third grievance which had been assigned to Vice-Chair Herlich. Vice-Chair Herlich had already commenced the hearing of the third grievance and had issued a preliminary decision with respect to production. Subsequent to the issuance of that decision, the parties had engaged in mediation with the assistance of Vice-Chair Herlich. The dispute was ultimately not resolved and further hearing dates were set.

31The employer in that case wanted to consolidate all three grievances before Vice-Chair Misra. The union objected, arguing there was no jurisdiction to do so once Vice-Chair Herlich had become seized of the third grievance. Relying on Toronto (City), supra, Vice-Chair Misra concluded she did not have jurisdiction to make the requested order, with the following comments:

I agree with the Joliffe decision, cited above, in that I do not believe that my power to make interim orders on procedural matters pursuant to subsection 48(12)(i) of the OLRA can extend to incorporating into my proceeding matters that are already properly before another Vice-Chair of the Board. The parties here agreed to refer these matters to different adjudicators, and since both adjudicators have already taken jurisdiction and participated in their respective processes, in the absence of agreement of the parties, it is simply too late in all the circumstances of these cases to consolidate these matters. I do not agree with counsel for the Employer’s characterization of this motion as simply seeking an evidentiary ruling: the Employer is making a far more radical request in seeking, over the objection of the Association, to have matters that are before different adjudicators heard by one of them, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the other adjudicator.

32In the decision referenced by Vice-Chair Misra, Toronto (City), supra, Arbitrator Jolliffe was asked to consolidate the grievance before him with another grievance which the parties had agreed would be determined by a three-person Board (though the arbitrator who would serve as chair of that board had not been identified). Arbitrator Jolliffe expressed concern with the proposition that s. 48(12) of the Labour Relations Act, the basis of his authority to make interim orders regarding procedural matters, was broad enough for an arbitrator to take jurisdiction over another grievance which the parties never agreed he should have jurisdiction over. The union’s motion to consolidate was dismissed on the basis of the jurisdictional limitation.

33A similar conclusion was reached in other decisions referenced by Counsel for MacDonald, with similar reasoning.

34Notably, other than Chiba, in all of these decisions the arbitrators considered this issue as individually constituted boards of arbitration appointed to determine the specific grievances before them. The approach of and principles underlying decisions of individual arbitrators do not directly translate to the current proceeding. It has long been accepted that the adjudication of grievances by the Grievance Settlement Board, while carried out by various different individuals, is not the same as adjudication by sole arbitrators. This was set out clearly in the seminal decision of E. Blake at al - and - Amalgamated Transit Union, GSB 1276/87:

But the Grievance Settlement Board is one entity – it is not a series of separately constituted boards of arbitration. Under Section 20(1) of the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act there is a “Grievance Settlement Board” – that is, one Board.

35While there have been some legislative changes since Blake, the concept of ‘one Board’ continues in CECBA. As expressly noted in Section 47.1(6), any determination of an arbitrator on the roster of the Board is “a determination…of the Board”. This is the case despite the fact that, pursuant to section 49(1), a matter that is determined by ‘the Board’ is, in logistical terms, determined by an arbitrator jointly selected from the Board’s roster.

36If a determination of an arbitrator on the roster is a determination of the Board, then the parameters of that arbitrator’s jurisdiction must be determined on the basis of the jurisdiction of the Board. Otherwise, the result is that the Board has certain jurisdiction, but a roster arbitrator, whose decision is the decision of the Board, does not have the same jurisdictional authority. That is an untenable result. As such, the jurisdictional question in the instant case is whether the Board has the jurisdiction to consolidate the grievances at issue.

37Under s. 48 (1) and (2) of CECBA, the Board has authority to determine its own practice and procedure, including the making of rules of procedure, which pursuant to section 47.1(7) must be followed by roster arbitrators. Rule 3 of the Board’s Rules of Procedure provides that where two more proceedings “are pending” before the Board and certain criteria are met, the Board may take certain procedural actions, including consolidation or hearing together of grievances. It is useful at this juncture to note the objectives behind such a procedural rule include concerns not faced by individually appointed arbitrators – the avoidance of conflicting rulings and the appropriate allocation of limited Board resources. Notably, the Board’s authority to consolidate different grievances is not challenged in the instant case.

38So when would ‘the Board’ exercise this authority which it clearly has?

39It was suggested only in accordance with Article 22.17.2. However, that provision only applies in the context of pre-hearing disclosure, which is not applicable here.

40It was also suggested that it could only be during the JFR process, based on the argument that Rule 3 is limited to when the matters are “pending” before the Board. I reject that argument. I follow and adopt the conclusions of Vice-Chair Misra in Chiba, who similarly rejected that argument, and cited Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Moore et al) and Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2014 Can KUU 48017 (Nairn), noting that JFR is an administrative process and parties may not fully turn their mind to procedural matters at that administrative stage. That, however, should not prevent a party from making a motion to the Board in the course of a hearing, and it certainly should not redefine the Board’s jurisdiction to do what it could otherwise do.

41If a matter has been processed at JFR, then at least one arbitrator must already have been appointed to hear, as ‘the Board’, at least one of the grievances at issue. Simply put, that is what happens after a matter has been processed at JFR. The other grievances may also have been processed and have an arbitrator appointed, or the other grievances may still be before JFR and not yet be scheduled to be heard. The latter situation was the case in Moore, supra. Vice-Chair Nairn had been appointed to hear a number of grievances when she was asked to consolidate two other grievances which were still unscheduled for hearing.

42If the Jolliffe analysis were to be followed in that scenario, Vice-Chair Nairn would not have had jurisdiction to consider such a motion. Under that analysis, an arbitrator appointed to hear certain grievances has no authority to take jurisdiction over other grievances which the parties have not agreed to put before her. Following that logic, unless the parties agreed to appoint Vice-Chair Nairn in respect of the other grievances, she had no jurisdiction make any rulings in respect of them.

43However, that was not the analysis of Vice-Chair Nairn. Instead she held that, pursuant to Rule 3, she had the authority to consider whether to consolidate the grievances even though she had not been appointed to hear all of them. This decision confirms the principle that the jurisdiction of an arbitrator acting as ‘the Board’, because there is only ‘one Board’, is not bound by the same limitations as sole arbitrators.

44I see no reason to treat the situation where the second set of grievances are unscheduled as jurisdictionally different from the situation of the second set of grievances having a different arbitrator appointed. At all times, the authority of the Board to consolidate where appropriate remains the same, because there is ‘one Board’. To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the realities of labour relations in the context of adjudication at the Board.

45That does not mean the fact that the parties have appointed a different roster arbitrator to determine certain of the grievances is completely irrelevant. It certainly is a relevant factor in deciding to whether to exercise that jurisdiction. The issue of having jurisdiction is quite different matter.

46I appreciate this conclusion is different from that in Chiba. However, the principle of “one Board” was not addressed in the reasoning of Vice-Chair Misra, and that is the basis of my conclusion that I have jurisdiction. In such circumstances, I do not believe I am compelled to reach the same conclusion.

c. Whether the grievances should be heard together

47In the instant case, there has only been a single day of mediation with Arbitrator Petryshen. He has not actually commenced the arbitration. He has not issued any interim decisions. There is no suggestion that the motion for consolidation is in any way motivated by an attempt to avoid adjudication by Arbitrator Petryshen. In light of these circumstances, I do not think the very fact that a different arbitrator has been appointed to hear certain of the grievances at issue is sufficient to automatically conclude it is not appropriate to exercise my authority under Rule 3, rendering the valid objectives behind the rule unattainable.

48I have also considered the relevant factors outlined in Rule 3:

a. Whether there is a question of law or fact in common;

b. Whether the relief claimed in the proceedings arises out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions/occurrences;

c. Or any other reason such an order should be made.

49No particulars have been provided in respect of the MacDonald grievances. At noted in Upson, that is not the preferred manner of addressing a consolidation motion. I have done what I can with the information provided.

50There is no dispute between the parties that at least four of the grievances before me (those which specifically allege the assaults/harassment) involve common factual issues with Mr. MacDonald’s unjust dismissal grievance.

51In my view, all of Mr. MacDonald’s grievances are complaints about the Employer’s actions in the course of investigating the reports of the alleged assaults/harassment. As such, they are “inextricably interwoven” with the unjust dismissal grievance as they involve the same series of transactions. As such, they are no less related to the Cody grievances alleging assault.

52As for Mr. Johnston’s grievances, grievance 2017-0229-0032 is about the manner in which the Employer conducted itself in carrying out the investigation into the alleged assaults by Mr. MacDonald, even though it is a grievance filed by Mr. Johnston. Grievance 2017-0229-0031 alleges an obstruction in the Union’s right to represent a bargaining unit member but does not identify who that is. I presume the bargaining unit member referenced is Mr. MacDonald, and judging by the date of it, that it is about representation in the course of the Employer’s investigation into the alleged assaults. As such, both of these grievances (if my presumption about 0031 is correct) also have factual issues in common to the unjust dismissal grievance, which everyone agrees is linked to the Cody assault/harassment grievances.

53The parties already agreed to consolidate all of the Cody grievances together, when appointing me to hear them. Thus, I need not determine whether there is a link between each of them with any of the MacDonald grievances. As I have determined it is appropriate that the MacDonald grievances be heard together with the Cody assault/harassment grievances, the rest is an issue of how to manage the procedure of addressing all the grievances before me. That determination will be made as we proceed.

54In deciding to exercise my discretion under Rule 3, I have considered the fact of the court order limiting contact between Mr. MacDonald and the other grievors, as well as the medical recommendation of Mr. Cody’s psychologist. Those facts would have to be dealt with regardless of how all these grievances were heard, since each of the grievors would likely be a witness in the other proceedings. As such, they are not a basis to conclude the grievances should not be heard together where it is otherwise appropriate to do so. They will be addressed through case management, as we proceed.

VI. DISPOSITION

55The Employer’s motion to have the MacDonald grievances heard together with the grievances before me is granted.